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This dissertation analyzes the rhetorical situation of the peasant-driven land reform 
struggle in the country of Paraguay.  While the term “Campesinos Sin Tierra” unites the 
many different groups participating in the struggle, this work specifically identifies the 
character of many peasant organizations at local and national levels of participation as 
well as exploring the attitudes and contributions of individual peasants. The struggle is 
situated within both historical and rhetorical contexts.  The historical importance of land 
tenure practices is recognized and traced from pre-Columbian civilization to the present.  
The concept of land as a socio-political instrument as well as an economic resource is 
explored and related to the present politics of land reform.  In addition, the nature of 
peasant organization, protest strategies, argumentation and success are thoroughly 
investigated and elucidated in this work.  Through on-site research, interviews and 
translation of newspaper accounts and academic students of Paraguayan peasants, the 
dissertation develops a thick description of peasant perspectives in the struggle.  
Particular attention is devoted to unearthing argument strategies and the specific language 
employed by individual peasant protestors, peasant organizations and other groups.  An 
analysis of these argument strategies constitutes the basis for evaluating the struggle as a 
new social movement in the context of social movement theory.  Finally, the dissertation 
proposes that “rhetoripolitical” practices structure and constrain the argumentative and 
 iii
protest strategies employed in the struggle and serve to explain its failure as a new social 
movement. Rhetoripolitics functions as a hegemonic process of argumentative cooptation 
that both limits protest innovation and safeguards the social order from social protest 
activity.  Rhetoripolitics is discussed as a historical and cultural phenomenon situated 
within the cultural milieu of Paraguay and the Paraguayan land reform struggle.  The 
dissertation concludes by suggesting that rhetoripolitics could structure the nature of 
social struggles in other developing nations and place constraints upon the nature of 
social protest as it has in the Paraguayan case.  Rhetoripolitics may function as an 
important limit to the ability of nations in the developing world to participate in the new 
social movement phenomenon. 
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Paraguay and the Land Reform Struggle 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
Paraguay is only one of many small, underdeveloped Latin American 
nations that have rigorously pursued a policy of intensive natural resource 
exploitation as a means of economic expansion.1  This policy, pursued intensely 
by Paraguay in the last 40 years, enabled unparalleled economic gains in the 
1960s, 70s and mid-80s.  Growth during this period was high and stable reaching 
an average growth rate of 8.5% in the 1970s before dipping in the 80s (Borda, 
Economi a 72).  As the Paraguayan government encouraged landless peasants to 
populate new colonies in the nation’s vast tracts of tropical forest, forestry, 
agricultural and even cottage industry products bolstered the local economy 
creating a new sense of economic prosperity throughout the country.2   
                                                 
1 As a nation still dominated by an agrarian economy, Paraguayan society has developed a deep 
social/structural dependence upon land.  Paraguay has followed expansionist land-use policies for 
nearly 200 years creating a culture that depends upon agriculture and resource extraction.  This 
expansionist policy was intensified and institutionalized in the early 1960s by the Stroessner 
administration with the formation of the Instutito del Bienestar Rural (IBR) whose purpose was to 
select and distribute land to peasants and to aid newly formed colonies with credit and supplies.  
In addition to the economic benefit resulting from expansion of the agricultural sector, 
colonization had the benefit of easing social tension in the Paraguayan society as a whole as the 
Paraguayan population tripled during the period between 1950 and 1992.  The need for space, 
housing and employment was practically and methodically met by distributing land in the open 
and unpopulated countryside to anyone willing to work it productively.   
2 Agricultural expansion and colonization policies between 1963-1989 resulted in a growth rate 
that reached 9% annually during the 1970s, dwarfing that of the United States over the same 
period.  This economic expansion was sustained through the 1980s, a period of crisis for many 
other Latin American societies.  However, the end of agricultural expansion with the exhaustion of 
state land reserves triggered a severe economic reversal that has mired Paraguay in a worsening 
fiscal crisis that has seen a decline in real GNP of 4.5% over the last three years, spurring social 
insecurity and protest. 
 This economic policy benefited Paraguay socially as well as economically.  
The physical redistribution of citizens permitted Paraguay to avoid both the urban 
and rural overcrowding issues experienced throughout Latin America.  Paraguay 
maintained a population growth rate of 2.8% throughout this period and reached a 
rate of 3.2% in the last decade (GTZ 45).  Moving people from urban and rural 
centers to new colonies in unpopulated regions of the country provided 
employment, improved the economy, and relieved population pressures. 
Nevertheless, the supply of land was not inexhaustible.  During the mid- 
1980s land became scarcer and economic expansion stagnated.3  With the fall of 
long-time dictator Alfredo Stroessner in 1989, the Paraguayan government chose 
to abandon an expansionist/internal economic policy for a neo-liberal position 
focusing on export and competitive trade.4  In the period following the Revolution 
                                                 
3 The success of this expansion is further complicated by the problems inherent in the agro-
exportation model.  By 1992, cotton was the primary crop on approximately 533,000 hectares of 
land, affecting 250,000 farming families who depended on the crop as their sole means of support 
(U.S. Department of State, 1998 Country Report).  At this time, there were twenty-one cotton 
processing centers throughout the country.  A combination of a glut in cotton prices, the advance 
of the cotton boll weevil and poor weather devastated the industry.  At present, an estimated 
100,000 families will be utilizing 200,000 hectares of land supporting only twelve cotton 
processing centers as peasants have attempted to diversify their production without much success 
(“Algodón” 28).  This golden period of new land and new economic opportunities brought new 
dependencies as well: cotton and soybeans account today for 65% of all exports (U.S. Department 
of State, 2001 Country Report). 
4 Alfredo Stroessner Matiauda rose through the ranks of the Paraguayan Armed Forces to become 
president of the Colorado party (the ruling party in the country since 1947), the Chief of the armed 
forces and the President of the republic.  Stroessner has the distinction of having ruled Paraguay 
longer than any other person in the country’s history, ruling from 1954 to 1989. Maintaining his 
power by means of coercion, repression and even torture, he was encouraged and supported with 
US military and financial backing from 1954 to 1977.  Stroessner’s long rule has left an imprint 
upon the country that some would call indelible.  In the twelve years since the fall of the 
dictatorship, the democratic reform of the society has been obstructed by the resistance of the 
social, political, and economic legacy of the Stroneato.  As the late Vice-president of the Republic 
stated during one of the many chaotic political episodes in Paraguay’s painful transition from 
dictatorship to democracy, “Todos somos hijos de Stroessner” [We are all sons of Stroessner].    
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 of 1989, the economy has only managed to achieve marginal gains.5  Peasants 
who had come to expect the government to provide land and technical support to 
their children had to divide their own parcels amongst their sons.  The standard of 
living quickly fell as rural farmers divided their ten hectare plots among four to 
five sons creating farms that were too small to support a single family.  The 
problem of minifundia, long known throughout Latin America, had finally come 
home to roost in Paraguay.   
Statistics on rural poverty following the expansionary period are horrific.  
A 1992 census revealed an endemic level of poverty in the country with a 
concentration in the rural peasant population.  The study showed that 64% of all 
Paraguayans live in poverty for a total of 2,885,379 people.6  72% of all rural 
families live in poverty; more than 1,500,000 Paraguayan peasants do not have 
access to the basic necessities such as food, clean water, medicine and (most 
importantly) work each day.  In the most remote areas the problem is at its worst.  
Poverty in the department of Alto Parana  reaches a level of 90% of all families 
(Fogel, Pobreza 22-23). 
                                                 
5 After the Revolution of 1989, the Paraguayan economy improved dramatically owing to 
corrections in governmental monetary policy.  Paraguay saw its Gross National Product rise from 
4,028 billion dollars in 1989 to 6,250 billion dollars in 1991 as a result of these policy changes.  
However, the economy stagnated between 199-93 before growing again to 9,612 billion dollars in 
1996.  Nevertheless, as the agrarian crisis mounted the country has suffered a terrible reversal of 
economic fortune that has seen its GNP shrink back to 1994 levels at 7.854 billion dollars in 2000 
with an additional shrinkage of 3% in the year 2001 (U.S. Department of State, 2002 Country 
Report).  Calculating for inflation, the Paraguayan economy has grown only negligibly between 
1989 and 2001.   
6 A more neutral study conducted in 1992 by the International Development Bank concluded that 
66.3% of all Paraguayans live in poverty.  Poverty is established at a rate of 129,129 Gs./month or 
$71.74 each month.  This amounts to a mere $860.86/year.  Indigence was defined by the study at 
76.200 Gs/month or $42.33/month or $508/year (Borda, Economia y Pobreza en Paraguay 682).  
My personal observations of rural life would place the average rural income at $500/year.  This 
compliments my belief, based on direct observation (while living in the rural countryside from 
1993 to 1995) that approximately 95% of all rural families live in indigence, lacking adequate 
food, shelter, clothing, and medicine.    
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 As rural communities felt the material impact of this change in economic 
policy and began to recognize it as the source of their economic difficulties, it 
quickly became apparent that the scarcity of land was a lie; there were, in fact, 
millions of hectares of unproductive land throughout the country.   
An agricultural census in 1991 revealed that 9.7 million hectares of land or 
more than 41% of all arable land in the country was in the hands of 351 
individuals alone.  Small farms consisting of no more than five hectares comprise 
40% of all farms in the country, 78.7% of all farms are less than 20 hectares in 
size and farms of more than 1000 hectares represent more than 80% of the arable 
land in the country and the situation is actually getting worse (Fogel, Pobreza 
39).7   
Dionisio Borda, a Paraguayan sociologist, points out that poverty is 
widespread in Paraguay and has intensified in recent years (Borda, “Pobreza” 
681).  While the poverty itself is visible, its growth is not.  Borda’s analysis of the 
Paraguayan economy bears this out.  The percentage of the population living in 
poverty has grown with the emerging national crisis following the fall of cotton 
prices and the bank failures of 1995.  While earlier studies were inconclusive (the 
1992 Facultad de Economi a UNA-BID and the 1994 Banco Mundial studies were 
widely at variance), only recently have realistic estimations of Paraguayan 
poverty emerged.  The private consulting firm, Consultores Asociados, combined 
studies performed by the Banco Central del Paraguay, the Ministerio de 
Hacienda, the Secretaría Técnica de Planificación, the United Nations, Salud 
                                                 
7 Since 1981 Paraguay’s GINI index (which is the measure of resource distribution within a 
population with 0 as equitable and 1 as completely inequitable) for land had increased from 0.921 
in 1981 to 0.934 in 1991 (Fogel, Pobreza 39). 
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 Pública, The World Health Organization and data compiled from newspaper 
accounts in 2002 to produce the first, truly substantive estimation of Paraguayan 
poverty (“Grave Deterioro” 14).  According to the study, the Paraguayan poverty 
rate for economically active persons over the age of 18 has increased from a 
whopping 441,000 or 45% in 1998 to an estimated 1,008,000, or 60% of this 
population (“Grave Deterioro” 14).  One can imagine that these figures must be 
even worse for the non-working population. 
Statistics further demonstrate that Paraguayans living in poverty endure 
increasingly more difficult conditions.  Borda’s study revealed that during the 
same period (1981-1991) indigence increased from 37.5% to 47.1%, 
unemployment increased from 6.7% to 12% and sub-employment reached a total 
of 48% of workers during the same period (Borda, “Pobreza” 682).  Borda 
identifies the major factors contributing to poverty in Paraguay as unequal 
distribution of land,8 the lack of access to capital by the poor,9 and grossly 
unequal income distribution (684).10  
The concentration of economic resources in the hands of a few elite 
members of society is the direct result of Paraguay’s colonial past.  At first, huge 
tracts of land were granted by Spain to Spanish nobles, then the entire territory 
was given to the Jesuits, then back to nobles, then (after the Revolution of 
                                                 
8 While UNA/BID figures show that only 2.9% of peasants have no access to land, that figure is 
distorted by the exclusion of Paraguayan youth under the age of 20 who work their family’s 
diminishing plots without land of their own. 
9 60% (167,378 of 307,221) of all agricultural enterprises in the country possess spraying 
equipment essential for agricultural production.  Only 7.4% of all small agricultural enterprises 
(less than 20 hectares) receive finance assistance from the Credito Agricola de Habilitacion 
(Agricultural Credit Assistance) through MAG, El Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganaderia, or the 
Ministry of Agriculture. 
10 In 1992 the wealthiest 10% of the population controlled 42% of all wealth in the country while 
the poorest 10% controlled less than 1% (Borda, “Pobreza” 684). 
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 Independence) to the Paraguayan government which sold off large tracts of that 
land to what were in effect, Paraguayan nobles.  There is a pervasive, implicit 
attitude about land in Paraguay that is best expressed by the British philosopher 
Henry George: “In all times, among all people, the possession of land is the base 
of aristocracy, the foundation of great fortunes, the source of power” (George 
5).11
Outraged peasants farmers, known as campesinos,12 protested the 
economic change and began demanding land from the government and the 
appropriation of these large land-holdings, known as latifundia.13  Marches of 
protest, confrontations with government authorities, squatting and land occupation 
developed as tactics for achieving the articulated needs of what became known as 
the Movimiento de los Campesinos Sin Tierra.  Comprised of various unaffiliated 
groups throughout the country, the first large scale protests began in 1994 with the 
first bloqueo de la ruta, a tactic imported from the Brazilian land reform struggle 
                                                 
11 An International Development Bank study in 1992 revealed the imbalance in economic benefits 
accruing from this land ownership: the 10% of wealthiest families control 42% of all earnings 
while the 10% of poorest families account for less than 1% of all earnings in the country (Sauma 
11). 
12 The term campesino has a complex meaning in Paraguayan society. It is normally translated 
from the Spanish to mean “rural peasant” with negative connotations including “ignorant” and 
“backward.”  While the term does bear these connotations in Paraguayan society, it carries 
additional, positive articulations to terms such as “honest to a fault,” “simple and pure,” and 
“innately Paraguayan.”  These positive terms rest on the recognition that the Paraguayan 
campesino and his labor has exclusively contributed to the Republic’s economic and military 
welfare throughout its entire history.  The concept of the honest, hardworking campesino was 
celebrated during the Stroessner regime, and the campesino’s sacrifices during the War of the 
Triple Alliance (1863-1870) and the Chaco War (1932-1935) were used to model ideal citizenship.  
13 Latifundia find their origin the original colonial land grants known as hacendados.  The term 
Hacendados refers to the extensive cattle ranches or Haciendas.  These ranches were the most 
prized property in early Paraguayan history.  The extensive forest cover made it difficult and 
expensive to clear land for cattle ranching.  The original haciendas were located in the few natural 
pampas or grassy plains in Paraguay.  Peasant land grants were excluded from these productive 
natural areas (Fogel, Luchas 20). 
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 whereby campesinos block the highway and resist police and military efforts to 
remove them. 
These tactics have resulted in little success, if success was measured in 
terms of the goals articulated by the campesinos themselves: technical support, 
guaranteed agricultural commodity prices, and land.  Yet, the struggle has resulted 
in a great deal of publicity and discussion of the issues surrounding the question 
of land in the Paraguayan society.  There are early signs that the campesinos have 
become aware of the “real” effect of their protest strategies.  The exigence arising 
from the failure of more confrontational strategies has resulted in a series of non-
confrontational, media events that seek to create public argument over the issue of 
land as opposed to securing that goal by means of the protest itself.  This activity 
may constitute an awareness of the role of campesinos as players with an 
emerging socio-political identity in the country.   
The Campesinos Sin Tierra struggle is poised in a moment of transition: 
after nearly forty years of life under a dictatorship and brutal repression under 
Alfredo Stroessner de Matiauda from 1954 to 1989, the adoption of a democratic 
system of governance and freedom of the press has created a unique opportunity 
for social struggle and a new sense of possibility in Paraguay.  A rhetorical 
analysis of the conditions for this transition, the constitution of socio-political 
identity and the definition of stakes in the public/national argument are 
worthwhile.  Such an analysis would clarify the stakes of the struggle, shed light 
on the roles of discourse and argument in social struggles, and, eventually, reveal 
productive tensions between the rhetoric of social movement theory generated 
 7
 from the experience of industrialized nations and the practices utilized in 
Paraguayan social struggles.  This chapter lays out the rationale for this project, 
previews its challenges, sets forth an organizational overview, and discusses the 
nature of peasant struggles in Paraguay, social movement theory, the terrain of 
struggle, the impact of peasant culture and its resistance to traditional land tenure 
practices.  Finally, I will lay out specific questions guiding this inquiry as well as 
a methodology and the organization of the work as a whole. 
 
1.2. Project Overview 
 
Small rural farmers known as campesinos began a march upon Nuestra 
Senora de la Asuncion, the Paraguayan capital on February 14, 2001, demanding 
land reform, technical support for their agricultural initiatives and a fixed price for 
the year’s cotton crop.  This march culminated in a protest rally in front of the 
Congressional building on March 26 (“Gobierno” 1).  The campesinos hoped to 
gather small farmers and other groups (such as labor unions) as they marched 
across the countryside.  The media reported that 50,000 participants joined in that 
protest.  The real number was probably closer to 80,000 as the news media 
habitually under-report protest numbers in the country.  The number of 
participants in this protest exceeded 1% of the entire Paraguayan population or 
4.3% of the total working population of the country.  This is the equivalent of 
more than 12 million Americans marching in protest in a single event.   
While there are many social struggles in Paraguay, the land reform 
struggle has the broadest appeal, the largest potential membership, and the longest 
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 tenure of any such struggle in the country.14  In a country that after a thirty-year 
period of economic expansion has averaged a negative growth rate over the last 
ten years, there is a general discontent among the population.  The land reform 
struggle is the most centrist of the disaffected groups because “land” is the 
symbolic and economic foundation of the nation.  Amongst many differing needs 
within diverse constituencies in Paraguay, each Paraguayan citizen shares an 
economic and social relationship to the land and its function in the society as a 
result of a protean colonial system with a long history of structuring Paraguayan 
history, culture and society. 
Since the foundation of the Paraguayan Republic in 1814, the colonization 
of unexploited territory has been the engine driving this nation’s economy and 
society.  This expansion functioned to spur the society in the same fashion that 
westward expansion across the North American continent both drove and shaped 
the American economy and social character.  The difference, however, lies in 
Paraguay’s continued expansion up to the last decade of the 20th Century.  Nearly 
200 years of expansion predicated upon the dispensation of land to peasants ended 
in the 1990s.  Furthermore, the government’s decision to choose a new economic 
path after the overthrow of long-time dictator Alfredo Stroessner exacerbated the 
                                                 
14 In addition to the numerous campesino groups, there are other groups such as CNT 
(Coordinacion Nacional de Trabajadores), the nation’s largest trade union, educators, government 
employees in specific agencies, indigenous groups, the homeless, and other groups. During a 
month-long visit in August of 2000, I personally attended 4 peasant protests, 3 protest marches by 
workers in two different government ministries, 2 teachers protests (including a highway 
blockade), 1 protest by homeless persons, 1 protest march by the opposition party calling for the 
renunciation of the president and, finally, the semi-permanent protest of 6 different peasant groups 
occupying the La Plaza de la Independencia in front of the congressional building.  All of these 
protests occurred in the capital; many more occurred in smaller cities throughout the country.   
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 social strife created by the government’s refusal or inability to supply land for 
colonization. 
This has resulted in an intensification of land reform protest activity and 
the self-recognition of peasants as social/political agents within the Paraguayan 
society as the social and economic pressures driving land reform have continued 
to intensify.  These trends are evident from the increase in number and the 
progressively nuanced nature of protest strategies that peasants have employed to 
popularize their cause.  Highway closures and land seizures have become popular 
new methods of resistance in addition to more traditional forms of resistance such 
as mass marches and protest rallies.  Since 1989, the overall incidence of protest 
strategies has accelerated to the point that the concept of private property has 
broken down and large landowners have resorted to hiring private defense forces 
to expel squatters.  Political pressure from wealthy agro-industrialists has pushed 
an “agrarian code” bill to the Paraguayan Senate to force the government to 
directly confront this lawless practice.   
The Paraguayan land reform struggle lacks formal organization, funding, 
networking, collaboration amongst its members, or even a fixed set of demands.  
This protest activity differs substantially from the leader-driven, organized groups 
that have operated as liaisons between government organizations and the public 
interest.  An analysis of this social struggle promises to shed new light on social 
movement theory as the gaps between different types of protest struggles 
elucidate insights previously obscured.  
 10
 The Paraguayan land reform struggle merits scholarly attention in the field 
of rhetoric because it presents a unique case that calls into question accepted 
notions of social movement structure as well as social movement success.  In 
addition, an examination of social movements in the developing world can 
contribute to a broader understanding of social movements as global phenomena.  
The bulk of the rhetoric of social movement studies has been limited to the 
industrialized world.15  Operative definitions, data, and theoretical perspectives 
have all been predicated upon examples drawn from social phenomena in the 
industrialized world and industrialized contexts. This focus upon the social 
struggles in industrialized nations has neglected broader and more provocative 
social struggles in the developing world.  This is an oversight that social 
movement scholars can begin to correct by accounting for social struggles in the 
developing world and in such nations as Paraguay. 
In this dissertation, I will investigate and describe the Paraguayan land 
reform struggle in order to provide a detailed example of a social movement in the 
developing world.  I will discuss the structure and practices of the land reform 
struggle within the context of Paraguay’s long history.  I will elucidate the 
rhetoric of the land reform struggle as a public argument in the context of the 
cultural and economic history of the nation, tracing out the cultural significance of 
“land” as a term in public argumentation.  These public arguments will be drawn 
from several sources including individual interviews, newspaper accounts, and 
                                                 
15  However, it should be noted that a huge body of movement scholarship from other disciplines 
(such as sociology and anthropology) exists.  Some of these works will serve as resources for a 
rhetorical approach to the subject, such as Arturo Escobar and Sonia Alvarez’s Politica Cultural y 
Cultural Political: Una Nueva Mirada sobre los Movimientos Sociales Latinoamericanos.   
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 scholarly studies.16  Finally, I will discuss the nature of success in terms of this 
struggle and discuss prospects for the future.   
 
1.3. The Nature of Social Struggles in Paraguay 
 
February of 2001 saw a number of popular social struggles in Paraguay.  
On February 7, medium and large-scale farmers initiated a tractorazo or “strike 
with a tractor.”  Asking for reductions in energy costs (including gasoline) and 
mandated rises in market crop prices, these farmers closed Ruta Cuatro with their 
farm equipment to draw attention to their cause.  Their successful blockage of 
commercial traffic on that route gained immediate government interest and 
resulted in government mediated negotiations of the farmers’ demands. 
On February 24, labor unions protested against taxes, governmental 
corruption, and in favor of raising the minimum wage.  Protesters gathered in the 
park in front of the congressional building and shouted slogans until the municipal 
police attacked them, wounding dozens and dispersing the crowd.  The minimum 
wage in the country is 350,000 Guarani es or one hundred dollars each month. 
Although these protests shared similar qualities, the peasant land reform 
struggle differs substantially from similar labor union and medium scale farmer 
                                                 
16 I will be using interview material drawn from three separate periods.  First, I will draw upon my 
experience of daily work and life in the seven peasant communities where I served as an 
agricultural extension agent and volunteer with the Peace Corps (Sept 1993 – Dec 1995).  
Secondly, I will draw upon the formal interviews I conducted in Asuncion, Villaricca, and the 
Colonia Independencia from June 9, 2000 to August 15, 2000.  Thirdly, I will draw upon 
interviews I conducted from August 2, 2002 to August 28, 2002 in Asuncion, the Asentamiento 
Capi’ibary (San Pedro de Ycuamandiju), the squatting communities of Yvyturuzu (in Guaira) as 
well as peasants from all over the country who were interviewed at the headquarters of MCNOC 
in Asuncion.  Finally, I will draw upon such interviews as have been recorded in the news media 
and in scholarly work.  
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 protests in Paraguay.  This difference is constituted by the unique history of the 
land reform struggle and the way that history has shaped the terrain of struggle 
and constrained the public argument. 
Many social and political actors in Paraguay have organized themselves in 
the form of public protests.17  These protests typically demand economic or 
political concessions.  In the case of the February 2001 tractorazo, the protestors’ 
efforts produced a tangible economic and political result: government mediated 
talks created a mandated minimum price for cotton.  Mid-sized farmers who 
depend upon cotton and soybeans as cash crops will greatly benefit from the 
increased profits.  However, the mid-sized farmer has still not proven that he has a 
political voice in the country, and it will once again be necessary to block the 
highways when conditions worsen in order to gain political attention.  Demands 
made by the gremiales or labor unions have had the same short-term effects in the 
past, such as increases in the minimum wage and promises of a reform of or a 
stricter enforcement of the labor code.  
These short-term, immediate gains are the tangible goals of every 
Paraguayan social struggle save one: the land reform struggle.  While it is true 
that the Paraguayan land reform struggle does have short-term goals including the 
expropriation of large, unproductive land holdings, and governmental support of 
small-scale agriculture in the form of technical training, the real terrain of struggle 
lies in the achievement of cultural recognition for rural Paraguayans that results in 
social, political and economic re-structuring of the society.  This far reaching, 
albeit implicit, goal of the land reform struggle may utilize the very same 
                                                 
17 Appendix A offers a complete list of social organizations referred to in this work. 
 13
 techniques of public demonstration, and occupation of public or private properties 
used by other protest groups.  The difference, however, lies in the rhetorical 
orientation of the protest activity.  Peasant protests possess the unique quality of 
appealing to the public rather than the state itself for reform.  Peasant protests also 
utilize a different set of socio-linguistic argument platforms in the construction of 
land reform appeals than other groups do with their simple displays of force and 
threats of strike.   
Another unique aspect of the land reform struggle is that it engages a truly 
national social issue.  It has mobilized large numbers of Paraguayans in all sectors 
of society to speak out.  Land occupations, highway road blocks, and mass 
protests are watched, discussed and even supported by many Paraguayans who are 
not self-identified as campesinos.  In the eyes of the public, the struggle is not so 
much for land as it is for recognition.  Urban Paraguayans, aware of if not directly 
involved in the political and economic disenfranchisement of the campesinos, 
regard the peasant struggle for the “right” to land as a struggle over identity.  A 
massively corrupt, self-serving and unrepresentative Paraguayan government that 
has alienated nearly all sectors of Paraguayan society has historically ignored the 
identification of social interest groups save only to appeal to them or play them 
against one another at election time.  The land reform struggle represents the first 
self-identification of a social group in the country that has demanded recognition 
by the government and has called for the fulfillment of the social contract as laid 
out in the Paraguayan constitution.  In this sense then, the land reform struggle 
represents not only a collection of special interest groups who stand to benefit 
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 from land redistribution but the struggle shares a wider public desire for the 
reformation of the state, the resolution of the deeply rooted social inequality that 
pervades the country, and calls for a redefinition of citizenship and identity in 
Paraguayan society.   
 At present, land reform demands have been successful only insofar as 
they have spurred public debate and have required the Paraguayan government to 
enter into that public debate.  In reality, very little land has actually been occupied 
or offered to campesino groups in order to address their demands. Alain 
Touraine’s interest in public opinion as the target of New Social Movements 
indicates that there may be wide similarities between such movements and the 
land reform struggles in Paraguay. 
 
1.4. Social Movement Theory 
 
In some respects, a rhetorical approach to understanding the Paraguayan 
struggle for land reform elucidates important aspects of the protest activity that 
can be difficult to see from other theoretical vantage points.  However, the 
Paraguayan land reform struggle also strains traditional categories of rhetorical 
analysis.  This struggle may or may not actually constitute a New Social 
Movement, or it may contain elements of both struggles and movements.  
Furthermore, the status of these struggles as an incipient movement implicates 
work in many areas of social movement scholarship.  While this case has broad 
implications, I will focus upon the field of rhetoric and, more specifically, 
rhetorical social movement theory. 
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 Much of social movement theory, including the rhetorical approach to 
social movement theory, has focused upon the success or failure of protest 
activity.  The effectiveness of public protest has been questioned as early as 1915 
by Robert Michels who argued that even apparently successful social movements 
ultimately fail because they are unable to change the underlying social structure 
they challenge.  He calls this phenomenon The Iron Law of Oligarchy. (Michels 
389-90)18  
Leland M. Griffin’s landmark 1952 study, “The Rhetoric of Historical 
Movements,” reflects the central concern with the issue of success and lays out 
the basic criteria for the study of social movements: 
1. Men have become dissatisfied with some aspect of their 
environment; 2. they desire change—social, economic, political, 
religious, intellectual, or otherwise—and desiring change, they 
make efforts to alter their environment; 3. eventually, their efforts 
result in some degree of success or failure; the desired change is, 
or is not, effected and we may say that the historical movement has 
come to its termination. (Griffin 184) 
 
It is evident that Griffin’s definition applies to the Paraguayan case.  To use 
Griffin’s categories we would describe the movement in the following manner.   
1. This rural peasant struggle is a result of a profound dissatisfaction with the 
harsh economic conditions of rural life in Paraguay.   
                                                 
18 The Iron Law of Oligarchy has also been termed the Michelsian Dilemma.  The nature of this dilemma is 
as follows: it is an historical fact that oligarchies, or small groups of economically privileged members who 
dominate a society, tend to dominate even modern political systems.  In order to change the political and 
social system, one must change oligarchies, which amounts to nothing more than substituting one small, 
ruling elite for another.  Michels argues that no system of governance can be truly representative and that 
the Iron Law of Oligarchy demands the substitution of oligarchies rather than a true change in the system of 
governance.  The Michelsian dilemma logically follows from the Law: any minority group that seeks to 
“overthrow” an oligarchy can only become an oligarchy in itself (Michels 389-90).  (See also Cohen and 
Arato, Civil Society 492-563). 
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 2. Peasants wish to implement political and economic change through their protest 
efforts.  Politically, they demand the Paraguayan government directly address the 
issue of land by appropriating, dividing and re-distributing the unproductive 
latifundias throughout the country.  This would result in immediate economic 
change, as peasants would be able to earn a living by farming their own plots of 
land.   
This application of Griffin’s template to the Paraguayan land reform 
struggle presents a problem as reflected in the third element of this reconstruction.   
3. No change has yet occurred.  A very small number of concessions have been 
made to the peasants and some land occupations have been titled to peasant 
squatters.   
From this perspective, the struggle must be considered a failure because what 
Griffin calls “the desired change” has not occurred as no real economic benefit 
has resulted from protest activities to alleviate the severe economic problems 
plaguing the residents of rural Paraguay. 
The issue of success is of particular importance to the rhetorical approach 
because rhetoric has traditionally set forth clear criteria for evaluation of 
persuasive speech acts.  Griffin argues that social movements are evaluated in two 
ways: achievement of ends and the use of rhetoric to achieve those ends (Griffin 
187).19  Failure to properly employ rhetoric is thus implicitly argued to cause the 
failure of the movement as a whole.  Success equals the effective employment of 
                                                 
19 Herbert W. Simons, Elizabeth W. Mechling, and Howard N. Scheier offer a “Rhetorical 
Determinism Table” that proposes a scheme for relating rhetorical methods and social ends in their 
article, “The Functions of Human Communication in Mobilizing for Action from the Bottom Up: 
The Rhetoric of Social Movements.” 
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 persuasive techniques that enable the achievement of ends.  The persistence of the 
Paraguayan struggle is an apparent failure based on the achievement of goals.  No 
real change has been effected and yet the struggle continues and even grows. 
The Paraguayan land reform struggle is also challenged by Griffin’s 
description of the organizational composition of social movements.  Griffin 
affirms the central role of rhetoric as a means to achieve desired ends and 
describes the key rhetorical mechanism for the task as the “orator.”  In this view, 
social movements work through public arguments conducted between “aggressor 
orators” or “defendant rhetoricians” and an assumed public audience (Griffin 185-
6). 
The Paraguayan case defies this rhetorical model, as campesino groups are 
composed of largely illiterate, ignorant peasants who do not even speak the same 
language as the public (defined as private citizens and politicians).20   
Furthermore, the struggle lacks the cohesion necessary for a representative 
leadership that functions to voice the social struggle’s positions.  Consisting 
sometimes of no more than squatting or public disturbances motivated as much by 
alcohol, indolence or boredom as by principle, it is difficult to describe this 
                                                 
20 Paraguay has been defined as a bilingual nation.  The native Guarani language and the 
colonizer’s Spanish have co-existed since the conquest.  However, to say that Paraguayans are 
bilingual is not completely true.  According to the 1982 National Census 40.13% of all 
Paraguayans spoke only Guarani, 48.63% spoke Guarani and Spanish and 6.49% spoke only 
Spanish.  Among rural residents of the country 60.25% spoke only Guarani, 31.21% both 
languages and 1.64% only spoke Spanish.  Among urban residents 15.5% spoke only Guarani, 
70.82% both languages and 12.67% spoke only Spanish (Melia, El Guarani 496). Belying these 
numbers is the prejudice toward the use of Guarani as a public instrument of communication.  The 
average urban Paraguayan views the use of Guarani as an instrument of public communication as 
a sign of ignorance, thus diminishing the average rural Paraguayan’s ability to enter into fair, 
public debate.  
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 struggle as a social cause led by orators who can be judged by the quality of the 
rhetoric they use to persuade an audience. 
 In fact, the Paraguayan land reform struggle could better be described as 
an anti-movement if Griffin’s criteria are applied.  Rather than being led by 
orators who employ rhetoric to achieve the ends of the movement, the Paraguayan 
land reform struggle is prone to subversion, often led or motivated by outsiders 
who work against the interest of the struggle. 
 In a case in the district of Yhu in the department of Caaguazu , twenty-five 
to thirty peasants invaded and occupied land belonging to Pedro Anciaux in 1996.  
This land occupation was not motivated by any struggle for leadership.  It was led 
by two Senators and the head of the armed forces in an attempt to push legislation 
through the Paraguayan Senate.  Peasant witnesses identified Antonio Alvarez 
Alvarenga and Silvio Ovelar as the senators who opened the gates to the property 
and exhorted the peasants to enter and to take land for themselves. General Lino 
Oviedo was quoted as encouraging the group, “Que atropellen la propiedad.  Le 
voy a hacer legal!” [Go ahead.  Invade the property.  Don’t worry about it.  I’ll 
make it legal!] (“Responsabilizan al Gobierno” 12). 
An earlier incident more perversely demonstrates the nature of this 
manipulation. In 1994, Colorado party officials rounded up twenty peasants and 
brought them to Asuncion, the capital.  Once there, the peasants were told that 
there were some bad men who did not want the peasants and veterans of the 
Chaco War to receive land.  This information was provided with a great deal of 
parapiti or cane liquor.  After several hours of prodding, the drunken peasants 
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 were taken to the congressional building where opposition lawmakers (Liberales) 
were staging a protest.  The Liberales constituted, at that time, the only legitimate 
opposition to the Colorado party and offered the best hope of supporting the land 
reform struggle’s agenda.  The Colorados pointed out the group as the “bad men.”  
The peasants attacked them, beating them until they dispersed.  The Colorados 
disappeared and the police soon arrived to jail the campesinos.  The campesinos 
were released the next day without being charged because they are viewed as 
simple people not responsible for their actions.  When such cases are evaluated 
with Griffin’s analytical framework, the Paraguayan land reform struggle would 
likely be judged a failure. 
 Another approach to the study of social movements is resource 
mobilization theory.  This theory suggests that actors in social movements engage 
in cost-benefit analyses to determine their actions and that social movements 
function to organize and mobilize social and political resources to achieve desired 
outcomes (Zald 58).  Resource mobilization not only presumes that actors are 
rational but that the key feature of social movements is not argumentative but 
logistical.  The essential feature of social movements from this perspective is their 
organizational dynamic and the efficiency of its structure or pattern of behavior 
(Buechler 218).  Social movements that are efficiently structured are able to 
mobilize political and social forces to achieve goals are deemed successful. 
The Paraguayan land reform struggle would be deemed a failed or a 
failing movement by resource mobilization theory.  There is no pattern to the 
behavior of land reform agitators.  Some invade and take land (whether they are a 
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 peasant in need of land or not).21  Others march in protests wholly ignorant of the 
goals of the protest, knowing only that the government is bad that that their 
friends are also marching to oppose the sinvergüenzas who are the cause of all 
that is wrong in the country.   Not all of these social actors would define 
themselves as members of the struggle or, if they did, they might claim to belong 
to completely different organizations or offer completely different reasons for 
their protest activity.22   
There is no single organization that comprises the land reform struggle in 
Paraguay; this makes a study of the organizational dynamic of the struggle very 
difficult.  Most protests are spontaneous land seizures or organized political 
chicanery that often work against the goals of the land reform struggle.  The 
manipulation of gullible, illiterate peasants in order to benefit the political 
machinations of elite interests in the country is the standard rather than the 
exception. 
An editorial column in the September 22, 1996 issue of the newspaper 
ABC color describes a situation in which peasant farmers who seek to mobilize 
political resources often inadvertently become a political resource themselves and 
actually contribute to the problems they seek to solve: 
                                                 
21 Personal interview with campesinos, Mario Espinola of Santo Domingo and Christino Barua of 
Nino Ykua.  
22 Christino Barua, a peasant farmer squatting land in the department of Guaira, reported that an 
un-named friend had invited him to join a peasant land invasion in that department.  Explaining 
that he already had land, his friend was reported to have said, “Tranquilo pa!  Ndaipori problema, 
oi yvy ve la mita oihaixa!” [No problem! There is enough land for everybody!] (Barua, Personal 
Interview).  Mario Espinola, another peasant in the area, pointed out that many “sinvergüenza” 
[lazy peasants] or “mondaha” [thieves] join peasant land grabs in order to obtain land even though 
they 1) already own land and 2) have the sole intention of selling the land rather than cultivating it  
(Espinola, Personal Interview). 
 21
 In this country, equal to the endemic “land problem” in Brazil, it 
has not only caused violence, terror and loss of human life in the 
delirious spree of property invasions, the logging of forests, 
destruction of public property, the theft of cattle and removal of 
people by the forces of public order, the burning of farm building 
and imprisonments but has also politicized in the extreme, to the 
point that not a few politicians and labor leaders have sought 
political advantage by inciting groups of peasants to the violent 
seizure of land. 
 
This very same irrational and perverse populism that has brought 
insecurity to rural property and production, resulting in a loss of 
investment, unemployment, an increase in rural poverty as 
recorded in the Agrarian Code that is being studied by Congress.  
This problem will continue to damage the political work of 
agrarian distribution and of legislation designed to intervene as 
well as the state planning that has reached an unparalleled level of 
development and that, satisfied with itself, will transform the rural 
countryside into an immense political tool. (Reforma Agraria 8) 
 
 Finally, resource mobilization of the poor, who by definition have few 
resources to call upon, is most difficult.  Francis Fox Piven and Richard A. 
Cloward have theorized that social movements representing the poor often have 
no recourse but to simply withdraw from cooperation with the social order (Piven 
and Cloward 24).  Such withdrawal amounts to a refusal to participate in the 
normal function of a system that depends upon their participation to function 
adequately.  However, the ability of the poor to elicit a response from institutional 
authorities is limited by the ability of those authorities to mobilize political and 
economic resources against the movement.  Incarceration, murder, intimidation, 
and unequal access to representation in a court of law are only a few of the 
insurmountable resource deficiencies suffered by the Paraguayan peasant.    
 Traditional social movement theories would judge the Paraguayan land 
reform struggle as a dismal failure and would even question its definition as a 
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 social movement.  I argue that The Paraguayan land reform struggle is a complex 
social phenomenon situated in a previously unexplored geographical, cultural and 
linguistic context.  The application of social movement theory to the Paraguayan 
case as a social movement challenges that theory and calls for significant 
theoretical innovation.  The remainder of this section will examine social 
movement theory’s ability to support study of the Paraguayan land reform 
struggle as a new social movement and as a rhetorical phenomenon. 
 Bronislaw and Barbara Misztal point to both the failure of traditional 
social movement theory to address the rhetorical construction of identity and the 
“new” types of social movements that appeared in the mid to late 1970s as the 
impetus for new social movement theory.  Characterized by Misztal and Misztal 
as strongly neo-Marxist, new social movement theory cast off presuppositions 
about the class and political nature of actors.  Furthermore, these new social 
movements appeared not to be leader driven or to be centered around well-defined 
social conflicts such as class or race.   
 Alberto Melucci suggests that this “new” type of social movement can be 
broadly defined as “a form of collective action based on solidarity, carrying on a 
conflict [which] breaks the limits of the system in which the actions occurs” 
(Melucci, “Symbolic” 795).23  He further refines this definition by including the 
movement’s ability to “activate” the conflictual nature of inherent social dualisms 
in society as a criterion (Melucci, “Symbolic” 796-97).  This activation differs 
                                                 
23 While this definition may appear excessively broad, Melucci intends it purely as a counterpoint 
to the excessive empiricism represented in resource mobilization theory.  Recognizing the 
potential problem here, he also qualifies his definition by noting that it is merely an “analytical 
tool” and not “a metaphysical truth.”  He goes on to refine this definition later in the same article 
(Melucci, “Symbolic” 795). 
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 from traditional movements by 1) moving the field of struggle from institutional 
politics to culture and 2) by achieving a structural complexity which must be 
understood as both multivalent (demonstrating both synchronic and diachronic 
socio-political orientations) and profound, constituting a fundamental challenge to 
the dominance of the socio-political norms and a means of expressing and 
experiencing “a different way of naming the world” (Melucci, “Symbolic” 801).   
 Claus Offe offers an even broader definition of new social movements.  
He suggests that such movements be defined as “the ‘modern’ critique of further 
modernization [within a society, a] … critique based on major segments of the 
educated new middle class and carried out by the characteristic model of 
unconventional, informal, and class-unspecific mode of action of this class” (Offe 
856).  The Paraguayan land reform struggle may provide a challenge to Offe’s 
location of the impetus of such struggles in the empowerment of the middle-class. 
 While new social movements have received a great deal of treatment and 
analysis as phenomena situated within socio-political structures, other work 
focuses more upon the means of struggle including the language and 
argumentative tactics employed by these movements.  These approaches comprise 
the rhetoric of movement studies scholarship that seeks to investigate the 
rhetorical complexity that the new social movements exhibit.  Richard B. Gregg 
challenged the simple orator/audience paradigm in his 1971 article “The Ego-
Function of the Rhetoric of Protest” in which he argued that orators in a social 
movement may choose to address themselves as well as the “establishment” 
(Gregg 74).  Gregg pointed out that Griffin’s simple persuasory model did not 
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 account for the often-ineffective nature of the rhetorical arguments used to 
supposedly persuade an audience.  Since unreasonable demands and offensive 
language all operate contrary to the function of such rhetoric to persuade, Gregg 
pointed out that something more than simple oratory was occurring in protest 
rhetoric.  Noting that protesters failed to “make the kinds of appeals which might 
gain them a receptive audience,” Gregg reasoned that protesters sometimes 
communicate with/amongst themselves and not with the government institutions 
identified as the audience (Gregg74).   
 Gregg suggests that movement theory developed during the 50s and 60s 
modeled social movement rhetoric as a “rational discourse” in which actors 
operate within “moral ideals” and under principles of “rational discussion” (Gregg 
89).  He contrasts this rational discourse with what he calls the “ego function” of 
rhetorical discourse, a practice of self-affirmation gained through the rhetorical 
act (Gregg 74).  Gregg concludes that rhetorical theories of movement studies that 
fail to account for both the irrationality of actors and the ego-function of the 
rhetorical act are omitting an important aspect of social movement phenomena. 
More recently, Arturo Escobar has argued from a sociological perspective 
that movement theory must account for the “self-understanding” of social actors 
whose actions are defined by their self-knowledge (Escobar, “Culture” 63).  
Furthermore, this self-understanding does not exist as broad, categorical identities 
such as class or race that Misztal and Misztal warn are misleading.  Escobar 
points out that the context for this self knowledge exists within a “submerged 
social and cultural background” that even the actors themselves might not be 
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 aware of (73).  Finally, he points out that the particular form of any given social 
movement, its impetus and cultural locus are all highly contingent upon local and 
micro-social factors defining the struggle as a mixture of political, social, 
economic and cultural issues whose boundaries and arguments are often unclear 
(Escobar, “Culture” 82). 
Touraine has identified movements whose self-reflective character has 
produced new protest strategies and has argued that such movements form a 
unique form of social protest as new social movements.  New social movements 
are social movements whose object of struggle is this protean mass of political, 
social, economic and cultural issues identified by Escobar.  Touraine calls this 
“historical action” or “historicity,” the means of control of the production of 
society rather than the resolution of specific grievances or social injustices 
(Touraine, Voice 145).   
 The work of scholars like Touraine and Escobar is representative of new 
social movement analysis that originated in the work of European scholars in the 
1980s and quickly spread.  The European approach to studying social movements 
as complicated phenomena has challenged traditional approaches to scholarship 
and both broadened and invigorated social movement research.  No longer tied to 
an antiquated rhetorical model nor limited by crude definition of social movement 
(only well-defined, social movements addressing broad social issues) new social 
movement theory offers expanded opportunities to analyze protest activity. 
A key aspect of Touraine and Escobar’s theorization of the new social 
movement phenomenon is that while the social movement engages society-wide 
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 issues of political, social, economic and cultural import, movement struggle is 
experienced by individuals whose challenge to society is not wholly 
circumscribed by the movement organization; rather, this resistance begins at the 
level of everyday life with individuals.  That experience exists as residual or 
emerging practice that can form a point for collective action through the assertion 
of identity.  This results in what Escobar calls the “subjective mapping of 
experience” in the “broader socioeconomic and cultural context” (Escobar, 
“Culture” 77).   
Touraine explains this articulation between the micro-social knowledge of 
the individual and the macro-social function of the movement as moving from the 
self-conception of the social actor as an individual within a mass of de-socialized 
plebs who is incapable of social action to a member of a collective body as a 
social movement (Touraine, Voice 146).  The awareness of a collective body‘s 
capacity for asserting a cultural “counter model” of society constitutes the 
“historicity” of a movement and can only be achieved when individual actors 
within the movement make the connection between their local struggles and the 
contest for control of historicity.  Touraine refers to a movement’s awareness of 
the struggle for historicity as the “highest level of meaning” within a movement 
(Touraine, Return 104).   
As Touraine sees it, the function of new social movements is to 
collectively organize social actors in order to seize the ability to produce and 
juridicate the political, social, economic and cultural issues that manifest 
 27
 themselves at the local level.  This definition of new social movement paves the 
way for a more lucid analysis of the Paraguayan land reform struggle.  
Arturo Escobar identifies status quo historicity in Latin America as “the 
Hegemonic discourse [that has] transformed the system thorough which identities 
were defined” (Escobar, “Culture” 65).  Marginal social groups in Latin America 
have never had the ability to define themselves.  What we now have is a vast 
landscape of identities—“the ‘illiterate,’ the ‘landless peasants,’ ‘women 
bypassed by development,’ the ‘hungry and malnourished, ‘those belonging to the 
informal sector,’ ‘urban marginals,’ and so forth” out of which the category of 
landless peasant is only one of a host of “identity groups” (Escobar, “Culture” 
65).  Touraine’s highest level of meaning for the Paraguayan land reform struggle 
would constitute a challenge to that status quo historicity and the assertion of rural 
peasants as an identity group in their own terms.   
At present, the exigence of the land reform struggle in Paraguay is the 
economic turmoil generated by the transition from one economic mode of 
production (the internal, agrarian market) to another (the competitive agro-
exportation market).  Escobar argues that this change is not merely a change in 
economic policy but a cultural change as well.  Economies possess a “cultural 
content” and “every new technology inaugurates a ritual—a way of doing things, 
of seeing the world, and of organizing the social field” (Escobar, “Culture” 69). 
The land reform struggle does not merely seek to gain land for landless 
peasants but seeks to counter the mechanism of social control that dictate the 
historicity of the society.  An application of the new social movement paradigm to 
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 the Paraguayan land reform struggle reveals a complex struggle that is sometimes 
successful and sometimes misguided.  The social struggle’s challenge to the 
emerging hegemony of the free market represented by Paraguay’s entry into 
MERCOSUR and global capitalism is an implicit challenge to the government’s 
authority to make such decisions at all.24  Touraine’s observation regarding the 
differences between new and older forms of social protest has particular relevance 
here:  
In the olden days, social actors protested against the traditions, 
conventions, forms of repression and privileges that stood in the 
way of their recognition.  Today they protest with the same vigor, 
but their protest is directed against the apparatuses, discourses, and 
invocations of external dangers that stand in the way of the 
affirmations of their projects, the definition of their own 
objectives, and their direct engagement in the conflicts, debates, 
and negotiations they wish for. (Touraine, Return 18) 
  
The Paraguayan land reform struggle’s inability to gain land concessions 
from the Paraguayan government does not constitute a failure of the struggle by 
any means.  In fact, the persistence of the struggle in light of its inability to gain 
these concessions indicates that the struggle is not predicated upon this goal.  
While the ultimate goal of the Paraguayan land reform struggle may lie in 
achieving the “highest level of meaning” of this particular struggle in Touraine’s 
view, the practical goals of the peasant members of the struggle may be to find 
any means of expression at all.  The very ability of peasants to construct acts of 
                                                 
24 MERCOSUR is an acronym for Mercado Comun de Sur or Southern Common Market.  
MERCOSUR is a free trade pact amongst Brazil, Paraguay, Argentina and Uruguay with limited 
tariff agreements.  MERCOSUR is an attempt by the two largest economies in South America 
(Brazil and Argentina) to gain a competitive advantage within their own geographic region.  This 
union was spurred and inspired by other agreements such as ALALC, la Asociacion 
Latinoamerican de Libre Comercio of 1961 and more recent developments such as the Andean 
Pact of 1969, the European Union 1993 and The North American Free Trade Agreement.  
Paraguay and Uruguay were invited to join the pact between Argentina and Brazil as natural 
geographic partners whose small economies fail to threaten their larger neighbors. 
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 protest and to draw attention to their plight represent significant accomplishments 
in their own right.   
There exists no public sphere that solicits and protects public expression in 
Paraguay.  This strongly contrasts with the experience of Western societies in 
which social organizations, including protest organizations, function as a public 
sphere that “sluice” everyday concerns into agenda items ripe for institutional 
revolution (Habermas 367).  According to Habermas, modern democratic 
societies develop a public sphere as the normal result of social evolution.  
However, Habermas’ ideal conception of social development often sharply 
contrasts with reality.  In their analysis of the social movements of the dis-
empowered, Piven and Cloward describe the inability of the poor to thoroughly 
conceptualize protest activity let alone to articulate it: 
Thus the class struggles that might otherwise be inevitable in 
sharply unequal societies ordinarily do not seem either possible or 
right from the perspective of those who live within the structure of 
belief and ritual fashioned by those societies.  People whose only 
possible recourse in struggle is to defy the beliefs and rituals laid 
down by their rulers ordinarily do not. (Piven and Cloward, Poor 
People’s 2) 
 
In the absence of a Habermasean public sphere, the poor and 
disenfranchised have resorted to alternative models for public expression and 
argument.  Saul Alinsky in his book, Reveille for Radicals, suggests that the 
apparent weakness of disenfranchised social groups can be effectively employed 
as a strategy in its own right.  He suggests that reaction by the opposition may be 
more important than action taken by protestors in support of their arguments 
(Alinsky 150).  If Piven and Cloward are right in arguing that the poor have no 
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 real resources with which to negotiate with authorities, via some variation on 
Habermas’ public sphere, then Alinsky’s idea may shed some light on the few 
successful Paraguayan peasant protests that have operated from a position of 
weakness. 
Robert Cathcart describes such a strategy as a dialectical engagement 
(Cathcart 87).  Disagreeing with what he perceived as overly simplistic definitions 
of social movements, Cathcart suggests that the subject of social movement 
studies is not merely the social movement itself but a phenomenon resulting from 
the “dialectial tension growing out of a moral conflict” within society (Cathcart 
87).  To talk about a social movement without discussing its context and its 
interlocutors is to misunderstand the phenomenon entirely.  Operating under 
Cathcart’s definition of a social movement, the Paraguayan land reform struggle 
ought to be defined, discussed and judged effective or ineffective in terms of its 
ability to use arguments in order to resolve the very social tensions that created it.  
Thus, the success of the Paraguayan land reform struggle may, ultimately, lie in 
its very non-existence; its widespread presence today may be the greatest 
indication of its failure.  
My analysis of this Paraguayan land reform struggle will apply new social 
movement theory in order to examine the complex and multiple forces shaping 
social actors, the competing arguments, the socio-economic and political contexts 
shaping the arguments and the terrain for social confrontation.  I will challenge 
the notion that the movement has failed while examining the real results of the 
struggle and its future outlook.  
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1.5. The Terrain of Struggle 
 
As I noted earlier, the Paraguayan society had operated under an 
expansionist policy that, when halted in the 1990s, created economic and social 
chaos.  The Paraguayan economy began to shrink during the decade and the 
disparities between the culture of the capital city (where just under half of the 
population lives) and the rural countryside (where the other half of the population 
lives) became evident.  These cultural differences are marked by many apparent 
differences, for example: language, cultural practices, and physical appearance.25   
The primary material cause of such differences is a scarcity of land for young 
peasants whose families have only enough land to support themselves. 
Peasant appeals for land, investment in rural development, rural credit, 
and subsidized crop prices are issues that reveal the existence of two distinct 
cultures in Paraguay.  The nation is united by a system of land tenure and marked 
by the domination of the rural culture by the European/modern culture, with the 
resultant economic dependence of the European/modern culture upon the 
productive capacity of the rural culture.26  This cultural bifurcation has its origins 
                                                 
25 The Paraguayan peasant is culturally and socio-economically differentiated from the 
Paraguayan city-dweller by a number of traits.  He or she prefers to speak Guarani because his or 
her Spanish is poor.  He or she seeks out conversation heedless of social status, speaking with 
beggars as well as with ministers.  He or she drinks terrere with relish and with great frequency 
throughout the day.  He or she prefers to wear zapatu or sandals as he or she lives for the most part 
py nandi or barefoot in the countryside at home.  The popular expression, “Xe py nandi,” “I am 
barefoot” identifies one as an average peasant.  Finally, the Paraguayan peasant has much higher 
cheekbones, is shorter and has darker skin than the average city-dweller.  This is a result of the 
much greater percentage of native genetic traits in the countryside. 
26 It is important to note that this rural culture is by no means a pre-Columbian paradise of 
traditional social and linguistic practices that have endured for thousands years and remain 
presently inscribed in a romantic struggle with the forces of colonialism and modernism.  Very 
little of the pre-Columbian culture remains.  What exists today is a nearly entirely colonized rural 
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 in the system of land tenure, European colonization and the subsequent influence 
of each in the subsequent development of modern Paraguayan society.  Thus, 
while responding to the economic pressure of a failed/failing social system 
resulting in the material pressures of a failing economy and a scarcity of available 
sources of income, the real engine for the Paraguayan land reform struggle is the 
contest for cultural and economic hegemony via the regulating mechanism of land 
tenure. 
Bartomeu Melia points out the entrenched nature of the colonial past and 
its bearing upon present-day Paraguayan culture: 
Por el modo como se proceso la nacion paraguaya su cultura es 
necesariamente colonial…Lo que puede llegar a ser tragico y 
constituirse en amenaza permanente contra el ser nacional es la 
ideologizacion unilateral del proceso, silenciando el desequilibrio 
economico dentro de la nacion y el antagonismo de las clases 
social que precisamente el systema colonial vino a instaurar y que 
mantiene hasta hoy.  Si el Paraguay no entiende su proceso 
colonial, esta  en peligro de volver a ser colonizado siempre de 
nuevo. (Melia 71-2) 
 
[As for the mode of Paraguayan national development, the culture 
is necessarily colonial…What could become tragic and develop 
into a permanent menace to the national well-being is the unilateral 
ideology of the process that disguises economic inequality in the 
nation and the antagonism of the social classes that precisely this 
colonial system created and maintains today.  If Paraguay doesn’t 
come to grips with its colonial roots, it is in danger of falling into a 
state of constant re-colonization]. 
 
Melia traces the seat of colonialism to the cultural ideology of “civilization” 
which resides in the city and identifies the rural countryside as its opposite and 
preferred site of “re-colonization.”  This thematic is popularly understood in 
                                                                                                                                                 
culture that has been inscribed into the ideology of the urban/modern world as its opposite.  I will 
discuss in detail the inability of the Paraguayan peasant to access any non-colonized social space 
from which to construct a position of resistance and how that struggle, in the form of public 
argumentation, identifies, employs and is subverted by cultural values in that struggle.     
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 Paraguay as expressed early in Paraguayan history by Domingo Faustino 
Sarmiento in his early post-colonial novel, Facundo. 
Se ven a un mismo tiempo dos civilizaciones distintas en un mismo 
suelo: un naciente, que sin conocimiento de lo que tiene sobre su 
cabeza remedando los esfuerzos ingenuos y populares de la Edad 
Media; otra, que sin cuidarse de lo que tiene a sus pies intenta 
realizar los ultimos resultados de la civilizacion Europea.  El siglo 
XIX y el siglo XII viven juntos; el uno dentro de las ciudades, el 
otro en las campanas…(se trata) de la lucha entre la civilizacion 
Europea y la barbarie indigena, entre la inteligencia y la material, 
lucha imponente en America. (Sarmiento 51)27
 
[One sees two distinct civilizations in the same land: one born with 
no idea of what it has above its head copying the popular, native 
force of the Middle Ages; the other that without care for its origins 
attempts to copy the latest cultural innovations of the European 
civilization.  The 19th Century and the 12th Century exist side-by-
side; the first in the cities and the other in the countryside… (this 
describes) the struggle between the European civilization and 
native barbarism, between mind and matter, the enduring 
American struggle]. 
 
In stark contrast to the thinking of Melia is the critique of the urban/rural 
dichotomy offered by scholars such as Nestor Canclini and Arturo Escobar who 
have pointed out the tendency to refer to traditional or modern cultures as “pure 
objects” of study (Canclini 4). Canclini points out that Latin American cultures 
exist as “multitemporal heterogeneities” rather than as the crude opposition of 
“traditional” and “modern” cultures (Escobar, “Culture” 47).  The representation 
of the past is, for Canclini, a “cultural ritualization,” a politicized patrimony, or a 
                                                 
27 Melia identifies Sarmiento as a major impetus for modernization in Paraguay, asserting that “La 
influencia del las ideas sarmientianianas, y de Sarmiento mismo, en la educacion Paraguaya de la 
postguerra, es un hecho indiscutible” (Melia, “Nacion” 481).  Sarmiento developed his modernist 
ideology as the president of Argentina during the War of the Triple Alliance.  These modernizing 
ideas represented in Facundo were further propagated by such figures as Jose Segundo Decoud 
who founded the Universidad Nacional de Asuncion (UNA) upon the principles espoused by 
Sarmiento.  Melia argues that Sarmiento and Decoud mark a split in Paraguayan culture caused by 
and reproduced today as a neo-colonialist practice 4 (Melia, Una Nacion, 73-4). 
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 form of political theater that functions to ground and justify an existing socio-
political system as a culmination of historical forces (Canclini 109). 
Thus, while Melia’s work can be interpreted as a reduction of history to an 
ontological certainty, it is more productive to regard Melia and Sarmiento as 
media for “cultural ritualization.”  That is to say that, the division of Paraguayan 
culture into urban and rural cultures is not necessarily a historical fact but the 
product of national folklore become fact.  In the Paraguayan case, the social elites 
have purposely propagated the myth of the independent, enduring mestizo peasant 
who sacrifices all for the State in the course of constructing a rhetoric to justify 
the many military regimes that have ruled the country since the beginning of the 
Chaco War.28   
Furthermore, I don’t want to suggest that the study of the Paraguayan land 
reform struggle will constitute a simple demarcation between a “traditional” 
peasant culture and a colonizing modern culture.  I am careful to avoid the 
academic tendency that Arturo Escobar warns of, the tendency to reduce the 
“Third World” to a geographic/cultural region resisting modernity with a 
“reservoir of ‘traditions’” (Escobar, Encountering 215).  Nevertheless, Paraguay 
is a unique case in Latin America.  Escobar and many others have noted the 
erosion of urban/rural or traditional/modern paradigms, which have been 
problematized by urban migration from the rural countryside.  Movement from 
the rural countryside has shifted 60%-70% of the total population of most Latin 
American nations to urban areas, relegating rural social practices to mere folklore 
for the vast majority of those populations.  Those who live in most of Latin 
                                                 
28 The rhetorical construction of the peasant identity is further treated in Chapter 2. 
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 America today are urban immigrants who, long ago, lost their “natural” relations 
with their own rural culture.  Paraguay has resisted this geographic and cultural 
shift as more than half of Paraguay’s population remains rural to the present day 
(Escobar, Encountering 229). 
While I will argue that a deep socio-economic and cultural divide 
separates rural and urban Paraguayan societies, it is important to note that this 
division is not an a-historical a priori but social product.  The site of the 
Paraguayan land reform struggle is not a bleak terrain marked by modern and pre-
modern boundaries but a series of shifting hybridized ideologies constantly re-
inscribed in the feudal model adopted from the colonial practices that originally 
inscribed the division between urban and rural Paraguayan societies.  The struggle 
for land in Paraguay is in reality an ideological struggle for national identity, for 
social and political power and the power to write or re-write the long colonial 
history and present ideology that pits one cultures, essentially two different 
peoples with a shared history, against each other. 
 
1.6. Land, Peasant Culture, and Resistance 
 
Since the end of the War of the Triple Alliance in 1870, Peasants have 
fought for and received concessions of land from the Paraguayan government.  
This process has intensified in recent history, particularly during the Stroneato. 
Years of IBR short-tenure land distribution, technical support and agricultural 
credit created a culture of dependence.  According to Carlos Pastore, 50% of all 
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 peasant families live as squatters upon land which they have no legal right to 
work upon (Pastore 75).29   
The pressure to take land and its obvious abundance have created in 
combination with more than one hundred years of government land grants have 
created a discourse defining the culture of the Paraguayan peasant and his or her 
relationship to the land.  The average number of children in a rural family is 6.5.  
Young boys are expected to marry and begin their own families on their own land 
upon reaching the age of 18.  A man without land cannot marry.  The State 
granted land to their grandfathers; their fathers were granted land by their own 
fathers who took land and petitioned the government for recognition of those 
holdings.  Today’s young men expect to receive their heritage as well, land.  
Independence, wealth, and social standing as well as the basic means of 
production are all identified with land ownership.  In fact, veterans of the Chaco 
War were granted plots of land above all other material rewards in recognition of 
their service to “La Patria.” 
Carlos Fernandez Gadea affirms the importance of land to the rural 
peasant: 
Quiero senalar que el tema de TIERRA, es fundamental en la 
politica agraria de mi pai s [Paraguay].  No podemos olvidar que 
existe una VERDADERA LEGION DE SIN TIERRAS, que 
deambulan por el campo en espera de que el ESTADO pueda 
hacer efectiva su promesa constitucional, de atender las 
necesidades primarias de estos sujetos agrarios, de esta poblacion 
campesina,que es elemento dinamico de la produccion agraria.  
Mientras no hay soluciones a estos problemas, no existira 
tranquilidad, no habra nuevas inversiones, y los niveles 
productivos como en muchos rubros seguiran bajando por todos 
estos problemas. (Gadea 1) 
                                                 
29 Pastore’s work is based upon data from the early 1970s. 
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[I want to note that the theme of LAND is fundamental to agrarian 
politics in my country (Paraguay).  We cannot forget that there 
exists a literal legion of landless poor who wander the countryside 
in the hope that the STATE will make good on its constitutional 
promise to attend the primary needs of these agro-citizens who are 
such a dynamic element in agricultural production.  Without 
solutions to these problems there is no peace and will be no new 
investments or production level as many crops will continue to 
deteriorate losing their values as a result of these problems]. 
 
This articulation has been made possible through the complex relationship 
between culture and economy and institutionalized in the form of the IBR.  
Economies possess a “cultural content” as Escobar expresses it.   “Every new 
technology inaugurates a ritual—a way of doing things, of seeing the world, and 
of organizing the social field” (Escobar, “Culture” 69).  The period of agro-
economic expansion produced a unique rural cultural in Paraguay, a culture 
dependent on and organized around “land.”   
Peasant demands for land reform have been spurred by the end of the 
colono system and they are constrained by a nostalgia for the socio-linguistic, 
political, and cultural models of the Stroneato, the golden age of Paraguayan 
expansion.  Calls for land reform, even though they would appear to challenge a 
system of social injustice, are always already inscribed in a complex ideology of 
domination.  Peasant demands have been structured by governmental agencies 
and through the peasant discourse itself that reproduces the social and economic 
model provided by the IBR.  These structures form the Paraguayan peasant 
identity within the national ideological narrative.   
Peasants have been defined in the national narrative as barbarous and 
childlike according to the state and the public.  Protest strategy and peasant 
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 demands can be interpreted as a desire to improve the peasant’s self-image, and 
the peasant’s desire to meet the ideal presented by la mita Paragua’y pe or the 
citizens of Asuncion, the capital.  Within the national narrative, the native 
Paraguayan (defined as the non-Europeanized, mestizo) is ignorant and childlike, 
in need of his patron or local boss.30  The native Paraguayan is seen as virtuous, 
honest to a fault, and simple.  This attitude is captured in the expression, “Que 
Paraguayo!”  This is blurted out to indicate that someone has made a mistake out 
of pure ignorance.  Peasants not only agree with this evaluation of themselves, 
but, after years of conditioning, are accustomed to following the orders of their 
patrones or any leader who presents himself.  The following is the list of demands 
made by landless peasants in the last 20 years of the struggle.  These demands 
were made during the March 26th protest (“Campesinos” 1).  They are no more 
than a call for the reinstitution of the colonization program: 
1) Land concessions (implicitly, the resumption of colonization)  
2) Price subsidies (specifically cotton) 
3) Technical support (which includes technical training in the use of pesticides, 
crop management practices, and other areas of agronomics). 
                                                 
30 Whereas 19th Century caudillismo was eliminated in most modern Latin American states, the 
tradition of the strongman or charismatic dictator survived in Paraguay as a cultural practice until 
the last caudillo, Alfredo Stroessner de Matiauda fell from power in 1989.  The long history of 
single party and single-man rule in the country reinforced and institutionalized the practice 
clientelismo, the system of reciprocal exchange of goods and services between individuals of 
unequal status reliant upon face-to-face negotiations (Powell 412). The foundational study of 
clientelismo was conducted by Mintz and Wolf in 1950.  An overview of early scholarship in 
clientelismo has been compiled by Arnold Strickon and Sidney M. Greenfield, Eds. Structure and 
Process In Latin America: Patronage, Clientage and Powers Systems.  John D. Martz, points out 
the importance of clientelismo in Latin American studies “…clientelism is viewed as an enduring 
mechanism of internal control in society.  If it is true that each and every political regime is 
pressed to offer identifiable goods and services in meeting citizen needs, then it must also find 
mechanisms to assure the maintenance of social and political control.  This suggests that the 
unfailing presence of clientelism, identifiable in all times and settings, underlines the fundamental 
character of the concept for an understand of Latin American social and political life” (Martz 10) 
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 4) Infrastructural development 
Since March of 2001, peasant demands have expanded to include the 
following: 
1) The removal of Paraguay from MERCOSUR 
2) The resignation of President Gonzalez-Macchi  
3) The resignation of presidential cabinet members  
4) An end to the state privatization program (ANTELCO) 
5) A call for the passage of anti-corruption legislation 
The shared goal of each of these demands is the insistence upon the 
fulfillment of the social contract and the guarantee of each Paraguayan citizen’s 
right to earn a living in a society of laws.  To the campesinos, this is a call for the 
Paraguayan government to allocate state resources in a fair and just manner.  The 
cry for land is not made out of mere avarice or even brute necessity from their 
point of view.  Rather, the campesino is calling for what he calls his patrimonio or 
his right to a livelihood that the campesino has inherited through the sacrifices of 
his forefathers in the foundation of the Paraguayan nation, the defense of the 
Republic in war, and the daily contribution of the peasant upon whose labor and 
industry the entirety of the agricultural economy has been dependent to the 
present day. 
 
1.7. Thesis Questions/Method of Study 
 
Provided the challenge to the rhetoric of social movement theory that this 
dissertation project poses, I have developed questions designed to direct this 
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 research.  These questions deal with issues specific to the Paraguayan land reform 
struggle as well as with the rhetorical theory of social movements.  After 
establishing these guiding questions, I will discuss the methods to be employed 
for exploring these questions. 
 
1.7.1. Questions about the Paraguayan land reform struggle 
 
1) What is the historical terrain of struggle in Paraguay and how has that terrain 
been determined by factors such as class, race, language and culture?  What are 
the ideological structures employed by the struggle?  What does “land” mean as 
an ideological concept in the struggle?  What alternative historical structures 
exist?   
 
2) Given that social struggles operate on synchronic as well as diachronic axes, 
what is the synchronic terrain of the struggle?  Is it limited to the borders of 
Paraguay or are larger, transnational factors involved as well?  If so, how do they 
enable or constrain this struggle? 
 
3) How does the nature of protest change as material, political and cultural 
constraints on campesino resistance mount? 
 
4) What are the prospects for the struggle to transcend such constraints by 
transforming the terrain of struggle? 
 
5) From several theoretical perspectives, the Paraguayan land reform struggle 
appears to have been an abject failure.  Why is this so?  Is such a conclusion 
warranted? 
 
A host of theoretical issues is opened up by pursuing the questions above.  
Some of these issues deal with the limits of rhetorical social movement theory 
derived largely from case studies in industrialized nations to effectively explain 
the nature of protest in poorer southern countries.  A related issue involves the 
relationship between post-colonial ideologies and social movements.  The legacy 
of colonialism in the United States and Europe strongly differs from resulting sets 
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 of practices found today in modern Latin American social, economic, political 
and cultural life.  The profound differences between the industrialized nations of 
the north and the poorer nations of the south are both historical and complex.  I 
propose to investigate the impact of these differences on the nature and function 
of social movements.  By investigating the Paraguayan example as a new social 
movement, I hope to discover explanatory gaps that can be used to generate a 
productive critique of new social movement theory as a Western theory that has 
failed to account for the fundamental differences to be found between the 
industrialized and the non-industrialized nations of the world.    
 
1.7.2. Critical Method 
 
 The move from traditional models of rhetorical social movement analysis 
to the study of new social movements has widened the field of social movement 
inquiry. However, that field must be further broadened to include the linguistic, 
cultural and geographic factors that a case like the Paraguayan land reform 
struggle presents.  I propose to apply the work of Touraine, Escobar and other 
new social movement theorists to the case of the land reform struggle in 
Paraguay.  After setting out the terms of the analysis, I will evaluate how well the 
Paraguayan case fits the criteria set forth in the theory.  In the case that the 
Paraguayan case does not satisfy the criteria, I will determine why and seek to 
investigate how the Paraguayan case, despite not fulfilling such criteria, might 
still constitute a new social movement.  At the same time, I will outline the 
structure, tactics, rhetoric and social practice of the Paraguayan social struggle 
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 using that information to consider new social movement theory.  In the case that 
important elements of the Paraguayan land reform struggle are not accounted for 
by new social movement theory, I will determine why such an omission exists and 
what impact it might have upon that body of theory.  
 I read several different classes of text in this dissertation.  Information is 
difficult to come by in Paraguay.  Despite the existence of six different 
universities in the capital, only recently has anything other than historical work 
been published.  Conditions before the revolution were so bad that the most 
authoritative newspaper in the country, Diario ABC Color, was ordered closed by 
the dictator and only opened again after the revolution.  The very idea of the 
freedom of information is a new concept in the country.  After the revolution, 
statistical analyses of poverty, income and other demographic data have been 
compiled, creating a basic resource for some scholarly work (the most notable of 
which is Ramon Fogel’s analysis of poverty in Paraguay). 
 As a result of the dearth of information on the subject, I apply a three-
pronged approach to information gathering for this dissertation.  I rely most 
heavily upon newspaper accounts of public arguments, protests, and land 
occupations.  Of the many newspapers available in Paraguay I refer almost 
exclusively to Diario ABC Color.  While there do exist other newspapers in the 
country, Diario ABC Color has taken a critical position towards the Paraguayan 
government.31  Unlike other papers such as Noticias or Ultima Hora that are 
either closely linked to prominent political figures or which owe their existence to 
                                                 
31 Paraguay has many newspapers at present including: La Nacion, Noticias, Ultima Hora. Itapua 
Hoy, Neike, Paraguay Digital, Viva Paraguay, and ABC Color. 
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 having accommodated the dictatorship, Diario ABC Color has always challenged 
governmental attempts to limit free speech.32  Consequently, Diario ABC Color is 
the only newspaper in Paraguay that consistently reports information that is free 
of direct or indirect government censorship.   
          However, newspapers cannot adequately represent the peasant worldview 
nor can I infer from them the available information.  For this reason, I have 
conducted interviews with the peasants themselves.  Visiting asentamientos and 
attending peasant protests has allowed me to sample peasant perspectives on the 
Paraguayan land reform struggle.  This sampling of the peasant’s own views on 
the struggle has been important because the inability of the peasants to represent 
their perspective has in part fed the struggle.  In order to understand that struggle, 
it is imperative that I understand what motivates the primary actors.   
Finally, I rely upon my lived experience with the peasants.  I lived for two 
years as a Peace Corps volunteer working through the Ministry of Agriculture as 
an agricultural extension agent living in a small pueblo in the rural countryside.  
My experience of the daily life of the peasant farmer gives me a unique 
perspective on the social practices and material conditions contributing to that 
identity and driving peasant demands.  In addition to that experience, I have 
traveled to Paraguay on two separate occasions living for periods of 1½ months 
and 1 month while performing interviews in the countryside.  I interviewed 
                                                 
32 From the paper’s inception in 1967, the staff have suffered government persecution for its 
critical treatment of the government.  This persecution includes, imprisonment, disappearances, 
threats, assassination attempts, deportations, and attacks on the newspaper’s facilities.  Finally, 
after years of strong-arm tactics, the paper was shut down by order of the Ministry of the Interior 
on March 22, 1984.  The paper remained closed for five years, only re-opening after the fall of the 
dictator in March of 1989. 
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 peasants in established as well as squatter’s communities.  I shared not only time 
and space with these people but their own homes, their diseases, their parasites, 
their work, their stories and their lives. 
 
1.7.3. Chapter Organization 
 
This section contains a preview of the five chapters of the dissertation.  
Chapter two explores the material and cultural factors driving the struggle through 
an examination of the historical origins of protest activity and the history of land 
tenure in Paraguay.  I will identify the key historical precedents in the land reform 
argument and explore the meaning of these terms in the context of Paraguayan 
history.  I will examine the material impetus of the struggle, and I will 
demonstrate the relationship of colonial social models upon present-day social 
perceptions, noting how these atavisms impact today’s land reform struggles by 
structuring the way Paraguayan’s think about such pertinent issues as land and 
citizenship. 
 I will address the first set of my guiding questions in chapter two: What is 
the historical terrain of struggle in Paraguay and how has that terrain been 
determined by factors such as class, race, language and culture?  What are the 
ideologies are employed by the struggle?  Is the concept of “land” structuring in 
terms of any social ideology?  Taking care not to restrict myself to interpreting 
data outside of their context, I will attempt to verify my observations, taking into 
account how those cultural factors are self-identified by the struggle’s members.  
This historical grounding is essential to the construction of the peasant cultural 
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 perspective on the struggle.  I will define key terms in the peasant argument such 
as pobreza or “poverty,” sintierra or “landlessness,” latifundia, minifundia, and 
campesino. Only after we establish the peasant’s perspective on land tenure can 
we understand the cultural reality shaping the campesinos sin tierra struggle. 
Chapter three explores the public arguments employed by the land reform 
struggle and their relationship to the declared causes of the struggle.  This chapter 
will be devoted to discovering and analyzing the sources and characteristics of the 
arguments employed in the Paraguayan land reform struggle.  I will address my 
second and third sets of guiding questions in this chapter:  
2) Given that social struggles operate on synchronic as well as diachronic axes, 
what is the synchronic terrain of the struggle?  Is it limited to the borders of 
Paraguay or are larger, transnational factors involved as well?  If so, how do they 
enable or constrain this struggle? 
 
3) How does the nature of protest change as material, political and cultural 
constraints on campesino resistance mount? 
 
I hope to examine the production of argument in the Paraguayan land reform 
struggle by identifying and classifying these diverse arguments in terms of their 
socio-linguistic, geographic, historical and economic and ideological origins.  The 
existence of many different social actors, social groups and arguments requires 
that a distinction be made between the arguments offered by peasants themselves 
and the arguments offered on behalf of the peasants.  
 In Chapter four, I will evaluate the success of the Paraguayan land reform 
struggle by engaging the last set of my guiding questions: From several 
theoretical perspectives, the Paraguayan land reform struggle appears to have 
been an abject failure.  Why is this so?  Is such a conclusion warranted?  I hope to 
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 answer such questions as: Why ask for land in the first place?  What does land 
mean?  Will the acquisition of land actually address the forces motivating the 
struggle or are there larger issues than property at stake in this struggle?  
Preliminary work suggests that the answer to these questions is unfavorable to the 
peasant cause.  Based upon the data I have uncovered, the real motivation for the 
land reform struggle is severely constrained by the colonial ideology that permits 
the exploitation of rural labor and which is reinforced by the national narrative.  I 
will briefly explore the results of apparently successful protests by analyzing 
available data and peasant experiences of land settlement.  I hope to challenge 
traditional notions of success and failure by demonstrating that the Paraguayan 
land reform struggle thwarts simple attempts to impose traditional criteria for 
social movement success.   
 The fifth chapter of this dissertation will discuss implications that the 
study of the Paraguayan land reform struggle may have for the study of other 
struggles in the developing world.  In addition to an evaluation of the struggle 
itself, I will evaluate the potential effect of this study upon rhetorical social 
movement theory.  How does the example of the Paraguayan land reform 
struggle/movement challenge rhetorical social movement theory?  I hope to 
indicate the direction that future rhetorical studies of Latin American social 
movement theory can take to address the following questions: Can a theory of 
post-colonial public argument be constructed?  Can new social movement theory 
accommodate this?  Do the differences between industrialized and non-
industrialized societies affect the fundamental definition of new social 
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 movements?  Do high levels of illiteracy present insurmountable obstacles to 
Touraine’s notion of the “highest level of meaning?”  Is it even possible that 
illiterate peasant farmers could conceptualize such a goal, and if not, what is the 
implication for Touraine’s theory in developing nations? 
 A final point of challenge would be to question the ability of rhetorical 
social movement theories to account for globalism and societies in transition from 
non-democratic and state-planned economies to democratic and free market 
political models.  Do anti-globalism struggles truly represent the “highest level of 
meaning” in these social conflicts, and if so, what mechanisms exist to address so 
abstract and diffused a challenge?   
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 II. The History of the Land Struggle in Paraguay 
 
2.1  Today’s Collective Struggles 
 
On March 14, 2001, fifty thousand rural peasants marched on the national 
congressional building in the Paraguayan capital, Asuncion.  This was the eighth 
of a long line of protest marches (dating back to 1994) engineered by rural 
peasants in order to bring their plight to the attention of legislators as well as the 
urban residents of the capital city.  This march resulted in a promise by 
congressional leaders to act quickly on rural and agricultural legislation to relieve 
the economic hardship suffered throughout the “democratic transition period” that 
has redefined Paraguayan society since the fall of Alfredo Stroessner in 1989.   
These peasants marched upon the capital in order to deliver their demands 
to their legislators.  Presuming that government inaction is the result of ignorance 
or a failure to recognize the severity of the crisis, peasants sought to deliver their 
message to legislators in-person.  Peasant leaders met privately with senators in 
order to discuss land reform, agro-technical training, free cotton-seed, government 
crop subsidies, and the freedom of imprisoned peasant leaders while tens of 
thousands of their comrades milled around in the plaza and the grounds 
surrounding the congressional building.  Uniformed police moved through the 
crowd and lines of officers in riot gear formed a human barrier in front of the 
congressional building itself as well as the nearby Supreme Court building.33  
                                                 
33 Police and other city authorities are provided sufficient time to prepare for protests as a result of 
the 1997 law regulating demonstrations in Asuncion.  This edict delimits the time and location of 
protest in the capital. It also requires protesters to notify the police 24 hours before any 
demonstration in the downtown area. The police may prohibit any such protest but must provide 
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 Despite the heavy police presence, comprised of approximately 300 officers in 
uniform and nearly as many out of sight in adjacent blocks, armed with sawed off 
shotguns and teargas, there was little tension to be observed.   
Both the police and the protesters knew how this drama would be played 
out according to the implicit rules.  Protests are relatively common in Paraguay.  
From January to July of 2002 alone, approximately 100 protests of one kind or 
another took place on public and governmental property in the capital, while 
another hundred occupations were distributed throughout the rest of the country.34  
Each side understands its role.  Peasants march; the police make their presence 
known; protest leaders meet with legislators and emerge with a compromise.  
During the March 14th protest, the senate approved an emergency measure 
to supply 12.386 million Guaranies, to placate the three peasant organizations 
involved in the protest (MCNOC, ONAC, and CPA-SPN).35  However, only 
13.5% of that actual figure was actually transferred to the organizations with the 
promise that the rest was to come at a later date.  This amounts to a total of 
1,672,110 Guaranies for the participants involved in the march.  Satisfied with the 
                                                                                                                                                 
written notification of such a ban within 12 hours of receipt of the organizers' request. The law 
permits a police ban only if another party already has given notice of plans for a similar rally at the 
same place and time. In addition, the law prohibits public meetings or demonstrations in front of 
the presidential palace and outside military or police barracks. This law does not apply to religious 
processions. (U.S. Department of State, Human Rights Report: Paraguay 1999). 
34 The rural uprising against land tenure policy is so widespread that several dozens of land 
occupations of invasiones are occurring at any moment.  While they may occur anywhere in the 
country, invasiones have tipically been concentrated in departments with the largest latifundial 
holdings and the best land.  For example, in early December of 2003, the department of Alto 
Parana was experiencing nearly 30 different simultaneous invasions in the districts of  
Hernandarias, Itakyry, and Minga Porá. With fourteen individual peasant groups invading and 
squatting on land in Itakyry alone (Dos campesinos 1). 
35 La Mesa Coordinadora Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas (MCNOC), the La 
Organizacion Nacional Campesina ONAC), and Coordinadora de Productores Agrícolas de San 
Pedro Norte (CPA-SPN) constitute the three largest peasant organizations in the country and, 
taken together, constitute the Campesinos Sin Tierra as a movement rather than as a single 
organization. 
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 results of the protest, leaders urged their followers to return to their small, rural 
farms and to await the promised legislation that would enable them to acquire 
land and to receive adequate governmental support for their agricultural 
endeavors. 
This may seem like an example of successful protest action, yet if one 
accounts for the expenditures of each protest participant, the net gain does not 
outweigh the net loss.  Each peasant had to give up at least an entire day of work.  
Those who traveled from distant departments had to spend up to 18 hours in 
transit to reach the city.  This travel itself is a cost.  In addition, peasants had to 
provide for their own meals.  Taking the average value of a day’s labor, 12,000 
Guaranies, and adding 10,000 Guaranies for meals and another 20,000 Guaranies 
in travel, a conservative estimate of individual protest expenditures is 42,000 
Guaranies.  This is the equivalent of $9.54.  The governmental grant in the 
apparently enormous amount of 1,672,110,000 Guaranies translates to $380,000 
dollars or $7.6 dollars for each of the 50,000 participants.  Finishing the 
calculation, each member of the protest lost $1.94 for a total of $97,000 or 
426,800,000 Guaranies. 
It is not uncommon for peasants to engage in yearly, nation-wide protests.  
These protests mobilize significant numbers of peasants and electrify both the 
rural countryside from which tens of thousands of angry peasants have come to 
carry a message as well as the urban centers they invade in order to deliver their 
message to local and national politicians.  However, mobilization in itself does 
not mean success.  In most cases, peasant protests amount to little but sound and 
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 fury signifying nothing in spite of their effectiveness at organizing peasants and 
coordinating individual protestors into in single group capable of putting real 
pressure on the authorities to take the plight of the landless peasant seriously.  
The ultimate ineffectiveness of apparently successful protest strategies is 
exemplified by peasant protest in the department of San Pedro in early July of 
2001.  On July 9, 2001, peasants erected a blockade of the highway at the Santa 
Rosa crossing in the department of San Pedro. Approximately, 1500 peasants 
completely closed a highway backing traffic up three kilometers.  200 riot police 
armed with shotguns, tear gas and fire hoses appeared with a judicial order for the 
removal of the protesters. Only the intervention of the El Obispo de San Pedro, 
Monseñor Lugo, avoided a confrontation with police who were about to carry out 
an order of removal by force.  This protest resulted in the formation of a state 
governmental office called La Unidad Técnica de Ejecución de Proyectos or 
Technical Entity for the Execution of Projects (UTEP), comprised of 
governmental ministers, Monseñor Fernando Lugo and one of the peasant leaders. 
Funding for the office would be managed locally by the local government in 
consultation with Monseñor Lugo and peasant leaders.  Finally, the national 
government agreed to forgive the debt of agricultural organizations in the region.  
The office has no funding and has done little more than promise to aid the 
peasants in the region.  It did not take long for the protestors’ demands to be 
subverted by administrators and politicians.  Yet, the piecemeal concession 
defused the threat posed by the peasants and belied the otherwise successful 
organizational effort to bring real pressure on politicians to institute social change. 
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 Applying the same “successful” protest strategy, on July 25, Jorge 
Talavera, a leader of the MCNOC organized and led 400 peasants to block 
Highway 1 in the department of Misiones in the southern part of the country. 
Talavera met with congressional leaders as the protest blocked traffic along that 
important route.  He demanded that the Paraguayan government free up $1.5 
Million for the purpose of buying land for landless peasants in “zonas del 
conflicto” or zones of conflict.  He also asserted that three peasant settlements in 
Misiones required technical assistance as well as credit and support for educators 
in the community.  This protest ended with the promise of Congressional leaders 
to push legislation already pending in the Senate that would address some if not 
all of these concerns.  However, when it became clear that those Congressional 
leaders would not support the legislation to release the funds the MCNOC 
renewed its protest effort by repeating the strategy that had successfully pressured 
politicians at Santa Rosa in San Pedro and on Highway 1 in Misiones. 
These protests took place on and after August 2, 2001 as peasants blocked 
highways in ten different states.  Straining police and military resources 
throughout the country, the well-coordinated action involved an estimated 30,000 
peasants from all parts of the country.  The technical feat of organization was 
orchestrated by MCNOC.  One of the organization’s leaders, Belarmino 
Balbuena, issued a list of demands that typify peasant concerns.  The principal 
demands of this protest were the following: 
1) Cumplimiento de acuerdos y compromisos del Gobierno nacional con el 
campo. 
[Respecting agreements and promises made by the national government with rural 
peoples]. 
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2) Apoyo a los proyectos de producción agrícola.    
[Support for on-going agricultural production projects].  
 
3) Justicia por crímenes cometidos contra campesinos. 
[The prosecution of crimes committed against peasants]. 
                                                         
4) Cese de persecuciones a dirigentes campesinos.                                                                   
[Ending the persecution of peasant leaders]. 
 
5) Por mayor presupuesto para la salud, educación, agricultura y obras públicas. 
[Great budgetary commitments to public health, education, agriculture and 
infrastructure]. 
 
6) Definición y ejecución de una política de desarrollo nacional en base a la 
producción agropecuaria.                                                                                                                  
[Definition and execution of national politics of development based on livestock 
production]. 
 
7) Abandonar el modelo de transición neoliberal, antipopular y anticampesino.                            
[Abandon the transitional neo-liberal, anti-populist and anti-peasant political 
model]. 
 
8) Contra las privatizaciones, desempleo y corrupción. 
[Against the privatization of state monopolies, unemployment and corruption]. 
 
Although coherent, well-managed and coordinated, these protests dissolved in the 
face of a large police presence in some protest sites, a lack of institutional support 
in others, judicial removal orders and strong statements by the president 
threatening the protesters with violence.  
Thwarted by the tactics employed by the state to blunt the force of the 
peasants’ ability to organize large numbers of protestors and to bring pressure to 
bear upon politicians to act, peasants resorted to another strategy later in the same 
year.  On October 17, 2001, campesinos took permanent possession of the plaza 
in front of the congressional building.  They joined others representing several 
different campesinos sin tierra groups.  Several occupants had lived in makeshift 
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 tents made of tarps and other scavenged materials for six months in the Plaza de 
Libertad directly in front of the Congreso Nacional.  The leader of this group, 
Samuel Frutos, who represents peasant families in the department of Cordillera 
who seek the redistribution of six thousand hectares of land in that state, 
explained what drives the protesters to occupy the plaza and to live such a 
precarious existence: ‘‘Esta es la solución que se le da al pueblo; esta es la 
reforma agraria, esta es la justicia social’’ [This is the solution that presents itself 
to the people, this is land reform, this is social justice].  There is no other solution 
for landless peasants but to travel to the capital to plead with legislators for land. 
Juan Mena represented another faction occupying the plaza.  He explained 
his reasons for protest: 
Hace dos meses que estamos, vinimos en reclamo de tierra. En el 
año 1999 llegamos a un acuerdo, nos prometieron tierra y como 
no estaban cumpliendo, venimos para presionar.  
 
[We have been here for two years; we came to get land.  In 1999, 
we arrived at an agreement, they promised us land but since they 
haven’t followed through with their promise, we came to pressure 
them.]  
 
Juan Mena began living in the plaza on the 13th of August seeking restitution for 
the more than six thousand landless peasants in the communities of Altos, Atyrá, 
Caacupé y Tobatí.  Juan, along with every other individual protestor occupying 
the plaza, was evicted on Oct 19, 2001 on the grounds that they were violating 
environmental laws and were damaging the park.  These peasants relocated their 
structures and their belongings to an adjacent cathedral where they made camp 
within the heart of the capital city some 40 yards from the Congress.  No legal 
recourse was made available to the protesters nor had they received any signs that 
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 legislators had been pressured by their protest.  After the clearing of the Plaza de 
Libertad and the removal of the protestors to the adjacent cathedral, the impetus 
of that particular phase of the movement was lost.  
The net result of the 2001 campaign season of the Paraguayan land reform 
struggle, which functions as an umbrella term for peasant protests, land invasions 
and other conflicts too numerous to detail, was that no new legislation was passed 
and dozens more illegal occupations had been initiated by impatient peasants.  
The protests I have chosen to discuss demonstrate the degree of commitment, the 
resources invested and the efficacy of organizational efforts peasants have 
brought to bear in the course of pressing a case with little gained in return.   
It is evident that protest activity is structured through the complex 
relationship between historical and cultural factors.  While it is a truism that 
history and cultural structure all interaction, creating the context for defining the 
success, failure and the stakes of a social movement, the Paraguayan land reform 
struggle offers a particularly interesting case.  In this case, the forces enabling and 
constraining the conflict have defined Paraguayan life and citizenship for more 
than 500 years.  Hence, it is warranted to investigate the historical dimensions of 
this struggle.  Arturo Escobar has pointed out the deeply historical nature of 
present-day struggles. 
Los movimientos sociales no solo han logrado en algunas 
instancias trasnformas sus agendas en politicas pu blicas y 
expandir las fronteras de la politica insitutional, sino que tambien, 
muy significativamente, han luchado por ortogar nuevos 
significados a las nociones heredadas de cuidadani a, a la 
representacion y participacion politica, y como consequência, a la 
propia democracia.  Tanto los procesos mediante los cuales el 
programa de un movemiento se convierte en politica publica, como 
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 los de busqueda de una nueva definicion del significado de 
terminos como “desarrollo” o “ciudadano,” por ejemplo…. 
(Escobar, Alvarez and Dagnino 18) 
 
[Social movements have not only achieved, in some instances, the 
transformation of their agendas in public politics and expansion of 
the frontiers of institutional politics, but also, very importantly, 
they have struggled to obtain new significance for inherited 
notions of citizenship, representation in political participation and, 
as a consequence, their own sense of democracy.  Just as these 
movement strategies have been applicable to public politics they 
serve as a search for a new definition for the meaning of terms 
such as “development” or “citizen,” for example…]. 
 
Thus, according to Escobar, it is necessary to examine Latin American 
social movements like the Paraguayan land reform struggle in terms of a historical 
legacy that defines the very terms of the struggle.  Here Escobar implies that 
social practices such as “la representacion y participacion politica” 
[representation and political participation] obtain a social inertia that constrains 
the ability of dissenting publics to challenge political and economic norms.  
Social struggles, thereby, become historical struggles.   
Alain Touraine labels the historical nature of social conflicts and the 
object of struggle for social movements “historicity” (Touraine, Return 40).  
Historicity is “the set of cultural models (cognitive, economic, and ethical)” that 
members of a society, including protestors, take for granted (Touraine, Return 
42).  Touraine argues that successful social protest activity is a conscious 
challenge of the “given” nature of historically grounded social practices.  For, as 
he points out, most social conflicts are mere struggles and not true movements 
since only protestors who are consciously aware of the historical stakes of the 
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 struggle constitute an actual movement as opposed to a mere struggle or collective 
behavior (Touraine, Return 64). 
The signification of collective behavior is necessarily far removed 
from the consciousness of its actors, since it is defined in terms of 
the functioning of the social system and not in terms of the 
representations or of the projects of the actors…. (Touraine, Return 
65) 
 
Understanding the historical conditions of the Paraguayan land reform struggle is 
crucial to grasp the present-day constraints upon its success or failure as well as 
its latent social movement potential.  
 The struggle for the control of and the accessibility of land has been a 
potent social and political force throughout Paraguayan history.  The history of 
Paraguay has been quite well documented as a series of wars [the War of the 
Triple Alliance (1865-70) and the Chaco War (1932-35)] and political transitions 
(the Revolution of 1811, postwar reconstruction, the Revolution of 1904, the 
Revolution of 1947, the golpe del estado of 1954, and the Revolution of 1989).  A 
history of land tenure, on the other hand, while paralleling the political and 
military history of the nation, differs significantly in some periods.  For example, 
while the Revolution of 1811 freed Paraguay from Spanish rule, land tenure 
practices didn’t change at all.  Furthermore, the impact of the Chaco War on these 
practices is almost insignificant while the period following the War of the Triple 
Alliance defined a complete turnabout in land ownership practices. 
In order to write a history of Paraguayan land tenure, I have divided the 
historical record into 5 epochs: 1) the Native/Colonial Epoch (1535-1811), 2) the 
Statist Epoch (1811-1870), 3) the Neo-colonial Epoch (1870-1954), 4) the 
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 Postcolonial Epoch (1954-1989) and 5) the Epoch of Struggle (1989-present).36  
Each of these epochs is defined by a specific agrarian policy and land tenure 
regime.  At the base of my analysis is the fact that each of these regimes is 
defined by the coordination of three basic elements: 1) domination of the land 
market in order to 2) monopolize agricultural and natural resource markets, and 3) 
ensure the availability of cheap labor for farming and resource extraction.  Each 
regime develops a scheme that adapts the colonial system to the emerging 
conditions of the developing nation.  The initial disequilibrium of unfair land 
distribution, differing access to capital and socio-political domination of an elite 
class have been the historical conditions Paraguayan history that have preserved a 
system that, at its base, has changed little in five centuries. 
This historical inquiry is guided by Francis Fox Piven and Richard A. 
Cloward’s observation that there exists a “consistent bias toward the interests of 
elites inherent in presumably neutral governing structures, no matter what the 
mandate of the electorate” (Piven and Cloward, Poor People’s 3).  Tracing the 
nearly 500 year history of land tenure practices will allow us to map out the 
means by which the once obvious and inescapable fact of elite privilege has 
managed to preserve and even disguise itself through ideology. 
                                                 
36 I borrow heavily from Carter and Galeano’s agrarian history to impliment this model.  While 
Carter and Galeano’s analysis contributes much to an understanding of an agrarian history of 
Paraguay, I am suggesting that examining this history as an arrangement of elements of economic 
production provides an understanding of the historical roots of today’s rhetoric in Paraguay’s land 
reform debate.  Carter and Galeano divide historical epochs on the basis of political regimes that 
implement distinct agrarian systems.  I would argue that their analysis fails to recognize that these 
political regimes are created by the necessity for a new agrarian system and that it is the agrarian 
system that supports and deposes political regimes in this fundamentally agrarian ecomomy in 
which the support of the rural peasantry is crucial for political stability.   
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 The transformation of the instruments of elite class domination from 
armed repression to an interpellating ideology more aptly describes the terrain of 
struggle encountered by the Paraguayan land reform struggle.37  Piven and 
Cloward discuss poor people’s movements, such as the Paraguayan land reform 
struggle, as “mass movements” characterized by a lack of organization, cohesion, 
planning, and formal structure (Piven and Cloward, Poor People’s 5).   In the 
discussion of these “mass movements,” it is concluded that the competition 
between elite class interests and the poor are not dependent upon the quality of 
organization, the clarity of the message, or the commitment of individual 
protestors; in fact Piven and Cloward conclude that “elite responses are not 
significantly shaped by the demands of leaders and organizers.  Nor are elite 
responses significantly shaped by formally structured organization of the poor” 
(Piven and Cloward, Poor People’s 36).   
This historical inquiry will demonstrate the historical transformation of 
physical coercion into ideological interpellation.  This analysis is crucial to 
understanding mass movements representing the interests of the poor because 
history is such a powerful determinant in the social struggles of mass movements 
that, as Piven and Cloward have concluded that “protestors win, if they win at all, 
what historical circumstance has already made ready to be conceded [author’s 
emphasis]” (Piven and Cloward, Poor People’s 36). 
 
                                                 
37 The term “interpellation” is here used as Louis Althusser applied the term within his theory of 
the “hail.”  The term “interpellation” is derived from the same root as the term “appellation,” 
which means a name.  Althusser’s point in his essay “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses” 
is that the state possesses the ultimate power to define the individual perceptions and identity of its 
citizens (Althusser 127-148, 177-186). 
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 2.2  The Native/Colonial Epoch (1535-1811) 
 
Prior to the conquest, the largest tribe of Indians inhabiting the traditional 
geographic borders of Paraguay (the areas between the Pilocomayo and the 
Parana rivers) was the Guarani .   The Guarani  Indians were a people defined by 
their relationship to the land (Gonzalez 26).38 A semi-nomadic, warlike people 
their culture was suffused with practices related to the land they lived upon.  The 
conquistadores did not travel up the Pilcomayo River to discover a degenerate 
native people devoid of culture and learning.  To the contrary, the Guarani people 
had developed advanced migratory farming practices, natural medicinal 
knowledge, cultivated a wider variety of crops than their counterparts in Europe at 
the time, and practiced a system of egalitarianism within the tribal structure of 
communal land ownership or tekoha, that roughly translates as the place of the 
people.39  
The tekoha was not delimited by the land itself.  A tekoha could be any 
land.  The tekoha related to the people and designated the area where the Guarani  
Indians were located at any given time.  The tekoha would change when the tribe 
migrated elsewhere.  In fact, these migratory/landless practices were rooted in a 
migratory economy.  The Guarani  Indians employed slash and burn agriculture as 
a means of opening up forested areas that were then farmed and abandoned after 
several years of cultivation.  The poor soils of Paraguay were quickly sapped of 
                                                 
38 Natalicio Gonzalez points out that Yvaga or Heaven in Guarani was conceived as a forest 
comprised of fruit-bearing trees and easily hunted game (Gonzalez 73).   
39 All tribe members within the Guarani society were essentially equal, with no land or significant 
possessions to differentiate them.  Only the tribal leader, the mburuvicha or cacique, held a title 
and status in the tribe.  This status was granted for his ability to adjudicate disputes and to live a 
model life within the tribe (Vera 31-36). 
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 their nutrients, while the efficiency of the low intensity farming practices of the 
native peoples depended upon high quality soils that would sustain high yields 
with little labor input for two or three years after the forest had been burned off.  
When the soils degraded, the natives moved on in search of better land.  These 
practices endured for more than 400 years as peasants employed the same 
practices until the 1990s when population pressures made available land too 
scarce or costly to find; forcing peasants to begin to change their farming 
practices.     
These communal and migratory practices stood in stark contrast to the 
European attitude toward land as epitomized by the Papal Bull of 1493: 
Las damos—las tierras—concedemos a Vos y a los Reyes de 
Castilla y Leon, Vuestros herederos y sus sucesores; y hacemos, 
constituimos y deputamos a Vos a los dichos Vuestros herederos y 
sus sucesores Senores de ellas, con libre, llano y absoluto, poder, y 
jurisdiccion. (Pastore 34) 
 
[We give you—the land—we grant you and the Kings of Castille 
and Leon, to your heirs and successors; and we make, establish and 
authorize your proclamations (as well as those of) your heirs and 
male successors with free, clear and absolute power and 
jurisdiction]. 
 
 This was followed upon by the Leyes de Indias that made the case for the 
Spanish Crown’s private ownership of the Americas and that enabled the Crown 
to bestow ownership of the land upon the first Spanish citizens to inhabit it: 
Por donacion de la Santa Sede Apostolica y otros justos y 
legitimos titulos, somos Sen or de las Indias Occidentales, Islas y 
Tierra firme del mar oceano, descubiertas o por descubrir, y estan 
incorporadas a nuestra Real Corona de Castilla. (Pastore 34) 
 
[By concession of the Saintly Apostolic Seat and other just and 
legitimate titles, we are the rulers+ of the West Indies, the islands 
and the mainlands (and) the ocean, already discovered to yet to be 
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 discovered, and they are to be incorporated into our Royal Crown 
of Castille]. 
 
The invasion and occupation of the Americas redefined the very concept 
of land along cultural boundaries.  The natives’ communal attitudes toward land 
quickly conflicted with the private property concept the invaders brought with 
them to the New World.  The Leyes de los Indias guaranteed every inhabitant of 
the Americas the right to obtain land for the purposes of crop production and 
animal husbandry (Pastore 122).  This law clearly illustrates how European 
invaders first created a land market in order to monopolize agricultural and 
natural resource markets thus guaranteeing the availability of cheap labor for 
farming and resource extraction.  The Leyes de los Indias mark an important 
phase in the shift from thinking about land as either communal or ownerless to 
thinking about it as a property and a resource, access to which could and ought to 
be reserved for the privileged.  
The difference between the native concept of land use or tekoha and the 
private ownership of land has been a bone of contention ever since the Spanish 
colonization of Paraguay.40  Attempts to incorporate Native Americans into the 
system of private ownership of land foundered on the fact that Native Americans 
themselves were property of the encomiendas upon which they lived.  The 
principle of private property in no way worked to the benefit of the native 
                                                 
40 As Ramon Fogel notes the continued viability of the concept of the tekoha in his analysis of the 
asentamiento Capi’i Bary where peasants seized land.  According to Fogel, for the peasants of 
Paraguay the concept of “land” is inseparable from the concept of culture as one of the leaders of 
the squatter’s community of Capi’i Bary explains using the idea of the tekoha, “Para nosotros la 
comunidad o tekoha no es algo que se vende sino el espacio donde la vida se renueva y se afirma 
un modo de ser” [For us, the community or tekoha isn’t something that you can buy or sell but a 
space where life renews itself and affirms a mode of existence] (Fogel, Luchas 192). 
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 population of Paraguay.  Forced to work on the encomiendas as braceros,41 the 
native populations soon fled to more remote areas of the country where they were 
known as the ka’aguygua (which translates as the communities of the forest).  It 
was in the ka’aguygua where communal land tenure practices survived to the 
present day.  The ka’aguygua populations occupied either unclaimed or 
unoccupied lands in the interior and moved on as colonial authorities expanded 
their control of the vast territory of Paraguay. The inherent mobility of these 
populations served them well as they were thus able to combine economic 
sustainability with enough mobility to stay out of reach of the colonial authorities.  
At the same time, Spanish peasant populations squatted these same lands and 
intermixed with native populations.  The resulting population is 95% mestizo, or 
mixed Native American and Spanish heritage.  The resulting culture is hybrid, 
mixing Spanish and Guarani language, culture and social practices.  Commonly 
identified as the campesino or rural culture, this way of life is strongly identified 
with 19th Century agrarian practices, the dominance of the Guarani language and 
a penchant for squatting land. 
That is not to say that the campesino culture of rural Paraguay has 
preserved the pre-colonial ideology of the Native American culture.  In reality, 
neither of the two distinct cultures that existed at the time of the conquest, the 
Native American and the Spanish Conquistador, has been recognizably preserved 
in Paraguay.  Nowhere is this more evident than in the complex and conflicting 
                                                 
41 Braceros were the laborers on the large ranches of the Spaniards.  These braceros were 
primarily native peoples living on the land granted by the Crown to Spainish nobles.  As dictated 
in the Leyes de los Indias, the native populations of those lands granted by the Spanish Crown 
became the possessions of the noble who had the right to enslave and force into labor such people.  
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 conceptions of land use extant in Paraguay today.  The socialist practices of the 
Guarani  Indians who viewed the land as an instrument for social support of 
agricultural practices exists in the countryside amongst peasants whose ancestors 
practiced mobile farming for thousands of years before they modified those 
practices in the last 400 years to squat on the land of others.  As Saro Vera has 
argued, the Paraguayan peasant’s life still preserves some of the real practices of 
the Guarani Indians, but practice does not equate with ideology. 
El paraguayo, sin embargo, se ha consubstanciado con su tierra; 
ha mantenido una costumbre especifica aun dentro de la 
alimentacion y ha mantenido una lengua especifica, propia de la 
Nacion Guarani.  En el Paraguay nada cambio por siglos 
enteros…Lo que importa es que el paraguayo permanecio  en su 
tierra con un mi nimo de mezcla.  Los mestizos se cruzaron entre si , 
por lo menos, por tres siglos hasta conformar un tipo especial de 
hombre aun en lo soma tico; ante todo, una etnia cultural. (Vera 
17) 
 
[The Paraguayan, nevertheless, is a product of his land; he has 
maintained a specific practice in terms of his diet and has 
maintained a specific language, property of the Guarani  Nation. In 
Paraguay, nothing changes for centuries at a time…. What this 
means is that the Paraguayan resides within his domain with a 
minimum of influence.  Individuals of mixed race breed with each 
other for at least three centuries until producing a special type of 
man in terms of physique; and more importantly, a cultural 
ethnicity]. 
 
However, even as the peasant continues to live in largely the same way 
that he or she has lived over the last 500 years, the state has always regulated the 
use and ownership of land, dictating the nature of the agricultural society in 
Paraguay.42  This statist function has always contrasted with the egalitarian 
                                                 
42 Even today, agriculture is the dominant sector of the modern Paraguayan economy.  It directly 
accounts for 28% of GDP and occupies 34% of the workforce in the country.  Agricultural exports 
consisting of soybeans, cotton, grains, meat and meat products, lumber, vegetable oil, and yerba 
mate account for 85% of all exports  (U.S. Department of State, 2000 Country Report). 
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 attitudes of the campesino culture.  The privatization of land and its control have 
traditionally permitted elite groups to monopolize power and to support political 
and social arrangements that disenfranchise the vast majority of the Paraguayan 
population.  These divisions (as I will discuss later) have traditionally fallen along 
the spatial, cultural, linguistic, and political axes that have historically separated 
rural Paraguayans from urban Paraguayans.  
Nevertheless, there exists, to this day, a tension between a communal 
conception of land use and the concept of private land.  Land reform efforts are 
largely an attempt to normalize the casual practice of squatting on vacant or 
otherwise unproductive lands owned by absentee landlords.  The land reform 
struggle has identified latifundias improductivas or large, unproductive land 
holdings, of more than 5,000 hectares that the peasants feel should be defined as 
state property and should be redistributed en toto to the peasants for the purposes 
of production and the greater benefit of the other state as a whole.  This argument 
finds its origins in the establishment of private property and the resistance of the 
Native American cultural legacy of Paraguay. 
Perhaps as a result of the persistence ka’aguygua, Native American 
populations in Paraguay have diminished far more abruptly than in other Latin 
American countries.43  The racial and cultural integration of the Native American 
and poor European populations who mixed in the relative isolation of these 
squatter communities produced a homogenous and unique rural culture that has 
resulted in a dilemma.  When Native Americans were both racially and culturally 
                                                 
43 Fewer than 78,000 Native-Americans were identified out of a population of 5.5 million 
inhabitants in the nation’s 1991 census. 
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 distinct from European immigrants, it was easier for Europeans to impose 
“civilizing practices” upon the “uncivilized” native population.  The distinction 
between Paraguayos, as European immigrants with full citizenship, rights and 
representation before the law and indios, as a separate social, racial and, most 
importantly, political category during the colonial era has now been replaced by a 
new tension between Paraguayos, as citizens embracing a modern vision of the 
state, and campesinos, who embrace s traditional vision of the state, including an 
agricultural economy, speaking Guarani , living in close association with the land.  
This history of the fusion of these two groups and lifestyles can be traced back to 
the origins of the Paraguayan state. 
 
2.3  The Statist Epoch (1811-1869) 
 
The very foundation of the Republic of Paraguay in 1811 can be defined 
as a fundamental land reform.  In the year of the revolution, Dr. Jose Gaspar 
Rodri guez de Francia, the then caudillo or sole ruler of the country, defined all 
Spanish lands “estancias de la Patria” (Fogel, Luchas 22).44  De Francia’s 
legendary one-man rule of Paraguay from 1812 to 1840 earned him the name, El 
Supremo, the Supreme One.  De Francia’s complete control of the country 
allowed him to manipulate land tenure into order to reshape the political terrain of 
the country after many years of Spanish rule.  He expropriated the landholding of 
religious orders in 1824 and in 1825 he expropriated the landholdings of powerful 
                                                 
44 This definition reveals the foundation of power at the beginning of the Paraguayan republic; 
land is power. After the expulsion of the Jesuits in 1767 and later the Spanish, the state had 
become the owner of 60% of the country's land by the mid-1800s (US Library of Congress 18). 
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 individuals who wanted to join the Paraguayan and Argentine republics under 
Argentine rulership.45  After thwarting the threat of Argentine control, he then 
redistributed land to strengthen popular and elite class support for the revolution 
(White 58).  That land had been previously distributed by the Spanish crown in 
the form encomiendas and was redistributed by de Francia to members of the elite 
creole class as hacendados and peasant lots.46  These measures were deemed 
inadequate by the peasantry, as de Francia’s real intentions were to guarantee the 
fidelity of the organized elites.  Peasants eventually occupied unclaimed land 
(which fell into state control after the Revolution) in the interior of the country 
(Pastore 54).  This was performed on an individual or familial basis with no 
organization.  Peasants were forced into the practice of illegal occupation as state 
land ownership climbed during de Francia’s reign to reach more than 80% of the 
country’s entire territory. 
The reign of Carlos A. Lo pez was notable for the re-entrenchment of 
creole power.  Lopez came to power after the death of El Supremo in March 1841 
when the Congress elected him as First Consul. Later, in 1844 Lo pez was named 
President of the Paraguayan Republic.  He ruled as Paraguay’s second absolute 
                                                 
45 A paranoia and a xenophobia about foreign intervention (perhaps collective memories of a 
brutal colonization) are epitomized in the mistrust Paraguayans display towards Argentines.  This 
fear of foreign (particularly Argentine) intervention/annexation recurs throughout Paraguayan 
history.  Having participated in the War of the Triple Alliance, Argentina as well as Brazil 
appropriated significant portions of Paraguayan territory after the war.  The Argentine legionaires 
who remained after the war advocated the absorption of Paraguay by Argentina (a dream of 
reconstituting the previous colonial possession with its capital in Buenos Aires).  Later, the 
struggle is seen as cultural with writers warning of the imminent Portenalizacion (Papaluga 20).  
More recently, the struggle for control of the Pilcomayo river and its water resources demonstrates 
the historical character of Paraguayan xenophobia. 
46 The term “hacendado” refers to the extensive cattle ranches or haciendas.  These ranches were 
the most prized property in early Paraguayan history.  The extensive forest cover made it difficult 
and expensive to clear land for cattle ranching.  The original haciendas were located in the few 
natural pampas or grassy plains in Paraguay.  Peasant land grants were excluded from these 
productive natural areas (Fogel, Luchas 21).    
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 dictator and caudillo until his death in 1862.  Utilizing his vast powers, several 
large grants of land were given by the caudillo to close family members during 
this period and 21 native settlements were dispossessed of their land and 
belongings.  An October 7, 1848 decree expropriated all lands, private and 
communal, of these twenty-one tribes, including 200,000 cattle (Fogel, Luchas 
24).  The natives were compensated for their loss with the proclamation of official 
citizenship in the Paraguayan Republic.47  These natives were either actual or 
potential slave labor for the Spanish encomiendas.  They were liberated from that 
state by C.A. Lopez’s decree while, at the same time, relieved of all worldly 
possessions including the land the Spaniards let them manage in order to preserve 
a labor pool.  Whether intentional or not, Lo pez’s decree mobilized these 
populations as available labor on the haciendas created in de Francia’s reign.   
The theft of their land and animals necessitated that the natives leave their 
own lands to work on these extensive ranches and farms, which grew in light of 
the emphasis Lo pez placed on trade with Europe.  This provided an immediate 
solution to the labor shortage that plagued the Lopez administration in its effort to 
both close the country to immigration and yet grow the economy.  Lopez’s efforts 
economically integrated the native population of Paraguay while disenfranchising 
                                                 
47 This critical distinction between peasant (campesino) and creole (criollo) states of citizenship is 
nowhere better represented in the early history of Paraguay than in this instance.  For the Creole 
citizen, citizenship means protection of one’s economic interests under the law as the Creole’s 
economic interests coincide with the state’s economic interests.  The peasant, however, is a rich 
source of capital for the state and the peasant’s economic interests do not historically coincide 
with those of the state; consequently, peasants find no protection under the law from dispossession 
and exploitation as those are the historical interests and function of the state in relation to the 
peasant class of citizenry.  Historically, citizenship has meant little more than an obligation to the 
state in the form of military, social or economic service. 
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 them politically, thus preserving the power and authority of an elite oligarchy 
headed by Lopez.   
This system also integrated the Spanish peasant and native populations in 
a manner that is unique in all of South America.  Peasants and natives worked and 
lived side-by-side on haciendas where they intermarried and intermingled 
customs, preserving a significant number of native practices that have evolved 
into campesino culture.48  Even today, the mestizaje or the genetic and cultural 
mixing of natives and peasants of Spanish extraction in the countryside is nearly 
complete at 98% of that population (U.S. Department of State, 2000 Country 
Report).   
 C.A. Lopez, like his predecessor, de Francia, found it necessary to exclude 
foreign appropriation of land in order to maintain control of the country and its 
agrarian economy.  To this end, Lopez prohibited all foreign ownership of land in 
the country.49  This had the effect of dispossessing the few foreign land holdings 
that still existed in the country to the financial gain of Lopez as head of the state 
as well as preventing foreigners from gaining any financial purchase in the 
political struggles for control of the Paraguayan elite class which was the key to 
controlling the country. 
 The awesome power of the state to simply dispossess rural peoples of their 
property, the restriction of access to land in order to mobilize the 
peasant/mestizo/native labor market, and the patronizing practice of maintaining 
control over land and natural resources by distributing land among members of 
                                                 
48 I will discuss more about the unique character of the campesino culture and its Guarani origins 
in Chapter three. 
49 The August 1st decree of 1854. 
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 the elite are all persistent and defining characteristics of Paraguayan land tenure 
practices as well as key features of the Statist Epoch.  The power of the state as 
the ultimate arbiter of land tenure is unabated to this day and is echoed in the 
peasant demands of the state that it dispossesses latifundistas of their properties.  
It is important to note that it is well outside of the peasants’ mentality that they 
could, themselves, dispossess these landowners of their possessions.  The 
dominion of the state in these affairs remains unquestioned to this day.  
Furthermore, the Statist Epoch established the consanguinity of national interest 
and the control of natural resources.  Under de Francia and C.A. Lopez, it became 
a normal practice for the state to monopolize agricultural and natural resource 
markets to ensure the wealth of its elite class and the stability of its governance. 
We will see these themes repeated in the Neo-Colonial Epoch as the 
Paraguayan state works to preserve a fundamentally colonial economic system 
with infusions of foreign capital.50  At the beginning of this period the loss of 
control over the land market and the consequent agricultural and natural resource 
markets fell into the hands of foreign interests almost dissolved the country.  
From the Revolution of 1904 on, the availability of cheap labor for farming and 
resource extraction as well as a means for controlling the peasantry became 
essential to stable governance. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
50 I will argue later that this very same process repeats in the Epoch of Struggle (1982-present). 
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 2.4  The Neo-Colonial Epoch (1870-1954) 
 
After the war of the Triple Alliance, a disastrous war that ended with the 
loss of fully one-half of the population as well as extensive territory, the 
Paraguayan government was forced to rebuild a devastated country from the 
ground up.51  With everything of value either destroyed or stolen, economic 
recovery was essential for the country.  This rebuilding effort began with the Ley 
del 15 de Octubre de 1876 that limited post-war land grants to a single hectare.  
The intention of this law was to guarantee the availability of peasant labor for the 
reconstruction of the country. When peasants had their own land upon which they 
could grow subsistence crops and raise small animals, there was little incentive 
for the peasant to work elsewhere.  Total land grants to campesinos between 1876 
and 1885 numbered 541 lots, only 400 of which were granted without cost and all 
of which never exceeded one hectare, hardly sufficient for supporting even the 
smallest of families. 
In addition to labor availability, capital for public works projects was 
generated from the massive sale of public land made possible by the Ley de la 
Venta de los Yerbales del Estado de 1881 and expanded in the Ley de Tierra de 
1883.  The logic of such a concession (the reversal of the Aug 1st decree of 1854) 
was a result of the need for financial backing for rebuilding the country as well as 
the presence of very many of the legionnaires from Brazil, Argentina and 
Uruguay who remained in the country after the end of the war.  It was a rare 
                                                 
51 One estimate suggests that the pre-war population of 560,000 was reduced to 231,000.  This 
would amount to a loss of 58.75% of Paraguay’s population by the war’s end (Bertoni and 
Gorham 131). 
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 moment for the historically xenophobic and nationalist Paraguay.  After years of 
resisting foreign influence and even legally barring foreign ownership of land in 
the country, foreign capital was actively sought in exchange for the only resource 
left in the country after a devastating war, land.  The war had finally opened 
Paraguay to European influences, including modernization.  As Carter and 
Galeano (53) point out, the country was shattered politically, socially, and 
economically.  The only solution to Paraguay’s problems appeared to be the 
modernization offered by foreigners: their capital and their call for progress and 
civilization.   
The logic provided for the reversal of national strategy was reported in La 
Reforma in 1884: 
El pais tenia que empezar por ser ganadero antes que agricultor 
en la verdadera extension de esta palabra; como se necesita ser 
agricultor para llegar a ser industrial.  Asi se han formado todos 
los paises y la razon indica que el Paraguay ha de seguir el mismo 
camino. (La Reforma) 
 
[The country has to begin with ranching before farming in the real 
sense of the word; just as it is necessary to be a farmer before 
becoming an industrialist.  This is the path that other countries 
followed in order to develop (into modern states) and that rationale 
suggests that Paraguay ought to follow the same road.] 
 
Selling large portions of the nation’s territory was a risk but one which the 
Paraguayan government was forced to take.  Unable to bootstrap itself to a 
recovery from the effects of the war and the scarce labor market, Paraguay sought 
to industrialize by capitalizing on the only viable resource in the country, land.  
This sale of land was truly massive considering that between 1870 and 1914 
twenty-six million hectares were sold to foreign interests.  Three corporations 
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 alone controlled five million hectares and employed 9,000 laborers.  The largest 
of these was the deceptively named La Industria Paraguaya that purchased 2.5 
million hectares and employed 5,000 laborers (Fogel, Luchas 26).52  Between the 
years 1811 and 1914 the Paraguayan government sold nearly 26 Million hectares 
of land (Fogel, Luchas 27).   
In combination with La Ley de la Venta de los Yerbales del Estado de 
1881, the Ley de Tierra de 1883 and La Ley del 15 de Octubre de 1876, the Ley 
de Peonaje Forzoso de 1871 made it possible for foreign companies to force 
peasants into labor on their ranches, farms and storage and processing plants 
(Fogel, Luchas 27).  The new economic system was defined by extensive land 
holdings, natural resource extraction (primarily yerba mate, tannin, and lumber) 
as well as cattle ranching.  In stark contrast to the mixed economy of small and 
large agricultural units, the post-war system was completely dominated by large 
companies such as La Industria Paraguaya, Mate Larangeira and Obraje Barthe. 
The investment of foreign capital permitted the rapid exploitation of the 
abundant natural resources of Paraguay for the first time.  Land sales and leases to 
these companies extended economic activity to the furthest reaches of the virgin 
forests of the nation at a scale never before imagined.  Utilizing both forced and 
unforced labor, these companies opened up remote and otherwise inaccessible 
areas of the country for colonization. 
                                                 
52 By 1930, 19 corporations would possess or control more than half of all Paraguayan territory.  
One Argentine company, Carlos Casada, would control fully one-seventh of the entire country 
and, as many other large companies invested in Paraguay, maintained its own railroads, ports, and 
even issued its own money, completely free from interference by the Paraguayan government 
(Fogel, Luchas 31). 
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 The process began with removing hard-wooded timber, yerba mate, and 
tannin bearing trees.  Peasants were offered heavily forested and remote plots of 
land to colonize by these large foreign companies.  Peasants would remove the 
resources, selling them to the companies at a miniscule return for the work 
involved.  The peasants were encouraged to deforest their lots, planting 
subsistence crops as the forest receded.  Sharecropping arrangements ceding up to 
50% of each peasant’s crop to the true titleholder of the land were common 
(Fogel, Luchas 28).  Since the great majority of land was owned or managed by 
industry, peasants had no alternative but to continue to work on lands that were 
provided for them within financial arrangements that benefited the landowners.   
When the forest cover had been completely removed and the land 
degraded to the point that corn, bean and yucca yields significantly diminished, 
the peasants were evicted from the land, the land was fenced off and cattle were 
introduced.  The peasants were offered plots in increasingly distant and rugged 
locales to repeat the same process time after time.     
 Peasants who did not participate as labor in this system found themselves 
increasingly marginalized and without land for purchase or rent for their sons and 
daughters.  As Carlos Pastore summarizes the period following the War of the 
Triple Alliance: 
Como a comenzemos de siglo XVII, el desequilibrio entre la 
produccion ganadera y la agricola produjo un grave deterioro al 
pai s (pero esta vez) no fueron trasladados los ganados, como se 
hiciera tres siglos antes, sino las gentes.  La ganaderia extensivo 
desplazo a la agricultura y provoco el exodo de la poblacion rural.  
La gran propiedad desalojo a los campesinos. (Pastore 257) 
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 [As the 17th Century, the disequilibrium between cattle ranching 
and farming produced a strong disruption in the country (but this 
time) it wasn’t the cattle that were moved, as was done three 
centuries ago, but the people.  The expansive cattle ranches 
displaced other forms of agriculture and caused the exodus of the 
rural population.  Large land holdings have displaced peasants.]   
 
Peasant appeals for land quickly mounted as they were evicted from the 
once-state-now-privately-owned lands they occupied.  These peasants quickly 
encountered legal and institutional mechanisms that assured their removal in favor 
of the new owners of the land (Fogel, Luchas 28, Riquelme 1). 
The new agrarian/political scheme concretized by the Ley de Tierra de 
1883 resulted in a nationalist backlash as many disenfranchised voices protested 
the sale of native territory to non-nationals.  While elite class interests were 
clearly allied with foreign capital and benefited greatly (the president of the 
Paraguayan republic himself was represented on the board of La Industria 
Paraguaya), all other sectors of the society were excluded from the economic 
benefits.  By 1887, real nationalist sentiment began to arise throughout the 
country. This discontent found concrete expression in the appeals of peasant 
farmers for the return of their land.  Pacific protests that objected to the post-war 
exclusion of Paraguayan citizens from land ownership escalated into violent 
social protest by 1900 and a revolution in 1904.  
Fallout from this period of Paraguayan history has an important effect 
upon attitudes about land tenure in Paraguay today.  In many cases, peasant land 
occupations have reflected this nationalist sentiment.  Peasants’ land occupations 
have targeted land owned or controlled by foreign agencies, persons of foreign 
ancestry or landowners with foreign last names.  In the case of Capi’ibary, for 
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 example, the 5,000 hectare property owned and managed by the Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) as a forestry project was selected in part 
because of the conspicuously foreign character of its owner/manager.  Present day 
land reform protest arguments that rely upon nationalism and that demand the 
expropriation of land from foreigners in the national interest conveniently 
combine the land attitudes developed under de Francia and C.A. Lopez with a 
backlash against foreign occupation after the War of the Triple Alliance.  
In fact, the end of the short period of foreign domination of Paraguay 
ended when Paraguayan politicians were able to mobilize peasant discontent to 
forge a revolution challenging not only the foreign-interest dominated political 
and social establishment, but land tenure practices as well.  Sporadic protests by 
peasants displaced from newly sold state lands were supported by the liberal 
opposition party, El Partido Liberal Radical Autentico (PLRA).  The party in 
power, the Colorado party or La Asociacion Nacional Republicana (ANR) was 
strongly allied with big industry against the interests of peasants and opposition 
politicians alike. In 1903, a large group of peasants was forcibly removed from a 
property in the department of Concepcion (Carter and Galeano 55-6).  These 
peasants had occupied for many years and were forced to abandon their homes 
and livelihoods.  The property had belonged to the state but had been sold and the 
new owner evicted the peasant squatters.  The opposition saw its chance and 
backed the peasant protests that arose and spread throughout the country. 
The Revolution of 1904 was followed by legislation that addressed the 
land distribution inequities in the country.  The Ley de la Colonizacion y del 
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 Hogar de 1904 was the first to make it possible for peasants to lay legal claim to 
state lands.  The law authorized the creation of agricultural colonies with lots of 
up to twenty hectares and pastures of up to four square kilometers for each family.  
These lots were to be paid for over a period of five years by the peasants who 
worked them.  However, this was an impossibility for peasant subsistence farmers 
who could not raise enough money by means of farming to purchase the land in 
the short time provided.  The Ley de la Colonizacion y del Hogar de 1904, 
anticipating this difficulty, imposed a 10% surcharge each year beyond the fifth 
year that the peasant has not fully paid his debt off to the state.  At that point, the 
state had the option to merely rent the land to the peasant at a yearly rate of 10% 
of the land’s value. 
Although not functional, the principle of the Ley de la Colonizacion y del 
Hogar de 1904 established an important precedent in the history of Paraguayan 
land tenure: the government will respond to popular demands in order to 
legitimize peasant demands for land.  Never before had the Paraguayan peasant 
had a voice in governance nor had he or she imagined that it was possible to 
challenge the elite control of land.  Today’s land reform struggle is predicated, in 
principle, upon the Revolucion of 1904, and the ability of peasants to argue for 
change.  Yet, adumbrating future failures in the land reform struggle, the peasants 
would find that the inability to craft legislation themselves would blunt the effect 
of their concerted efforts.  Protests, much like revolutions in Paraguay, have a 
tendency to pass power from one elite group to another rather than to empower 
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 the masses of disenfranchised peasants who still today constitute a majority of the 
Paraguayan population.  
While claiming to address peasant needs after the revolution, La Ley de la 
Colonizacion y del Hogar de 1904 only made it more difficult for peasants to own 
land.  It was still better to squat on state land than it was to attempt to purchase it. 
Fewer than 10,000 hectares or 500 lots were transferred to peasants by means of 
this law between 1904 and 1918 (Fogel, Luchas 31).  However, the Liberales had 
succeeded in co-opting the peasantry in the process of overthrowing the rule of 
the Colorados.  Now, this newly empowered elite group moved to consolidate its 
power by ridding itself of its dependence upon popular (peasant) support. 
The Paraguayan government, having finally abandoned its fear of foreign 
influence and fully aware of the tight post-war labor market actively encouraged 
foreign colonization of its territory by those who could purchase land with the Ley 
del 6 de Octubre de 1903.  From the period following the War of the Triple 
Alliance to 1903, 17,000 immigrants were registered in the country; whereas, 
between 1903 and 1937, 26,000 immigrants entered the country (Palau 152).  
Drawn by the preferential treatment offered by the Ley del 6 de Octubre de 1903 
of the 11 colonies founded in the country from 1900 to 1920, nine of those were 
composed of foreign immigrants (Fogel, Luchas 29).  Encouraging foreign 
immigration was viewed by the Paraguayan government `as a better option than 
granting land to peasants at this time for two reasons.  First, these immigrants 
from Germany, Brazil, Argentina, and other nations represented the modern 
workforce and modern agricultural practices the government believed were 
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 necessary for recovery from the war.  Second, this was a way of importing skilled 
labor with no cost to the country; in fact, these immigrants paid for their land and 
brought more capital and possessions with them thus further enriching the country 
(Fogel, Luchas 29).53  
Eventually, native agricultural colonization numbers surpassed those of 
immigrant colonization.  By the end of the 1920s, 55 more settlements were 
placed in the remote Paraguayan forests.  These settlements were founded with 
both public and private support, but, and most notably, they were composed in 
their majority by Paraguayan peasants rather than by foreign immigrants (Carter 
and Galeano 55).  This apparent policy shift in colonization efforts did not signal 
a change in political or social policy as much as it reflected the recognition of 
peasant occupations as agricultural colonies.  This regularization or legalization 
of the peasant occupations is a recurring theme throughout 20th Century 
Paraguayan history and must be discussed at this point.54
The extra-legal (as opposed to illegal) peasant occupation of land in 
Paraguay has been both an historical fact and an economic necessity.55  As a 
                                                 
53 The success of these immigrant farmers to this day can be attributed less to their modern 
farming practices than to the financial and technical assistance and adequate planning of these 
settlements in stark contrast to campesino settlements or asentimientos which have always lacked 
nearly any institutional assitance, such as road development and maintenance, potable water, 
sanitation, or social and political organization. 
54 Carter and Galeano argue that governmental recognizition of peasant occupations has resulted in 
a more powerful bargaining position for peasants as precedents accumulate but, negatively, that 
the land granted in such legalizations has been reduced from twenty hectare lots in early 
legislation to the five to ten hectare lots granted at present (56-6).  I would note that land lot grants 
on the basis of area occupied would be reduced in accordance with two factors: time of occupation 
and density of forest.  My personal experience has led me to believe that clearing heavily forested 
lots of an acre with several other men and sowing crops would take four months for each hectare.  
Unless the peasant has occupied the land for several years it will be difficult to clear more than 
five hectares unless the forest cover is thin.    
55 Paraguayan land tenure practices have always been dominated by informalidad, or the practice 
of effecting land ownership and transactions under circumstances not specifically addressed by 
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 result of historically unequal land distribution, peasants have always occupied 
land that was not their own. Whether that land belonged to the state, Paraguayan 
private or foreign private owners, native tribes or other campesinos was of little 
importance.  Ever aware of the economic contribution of the peasants to both state 
coffers and the elite class that owed its wealth to transporting, manufacturing and 
adding value to primary agricultural products, the state traditionally turned a blind 
eye to squatting, although conflicts occasionally erupted when peasants occupied 
land belonging to a member of the elite class or when the owner of such a 
property had or could purchase political influence. 
Throughout the history of Paraguay, most instances of agricultural 
settlement or asentamientos have been legalizations of extant peasant 
occupations.  The constant pressure of the latifundia (created after the war), the 
abundance of state land, and the scarcity and small size of peasant land holdings 
make land occupation an economic necessity for the Paraguayan peasant.  The 
20th Century policy of economic expansion through agricultural settlement 
amounted to little more than an orderly label for the haphazard legalization of the 
de facto peasant land occupation program.56
While the postwar immigrant settlement programs did reap some benefits, 
their effect upon the economy of Paraguay was small.  A total of 43,000 
immigrants were registered between 1870 and 1937.  In contrast to hundreds of 
                                                                                                                                                 
law.  The distinction between the extra-legal ownership of land (an ownership not recognized 
under Paraguayan law) and an illegal ownership of land (an ownership expressly prohibited) has 
operated as an important distinction throughout Paraguayan history. 
56 More importantly, the revolution of 1904 (catalyzed by the 1903-4 occupation/struggle in 
Concepcion) set a precedent for peasant occupations: land is for the taking if you struggle for it.  
The peasant’s present belief in the right to land ownership as outlined in the 1992 Constitution can 
be traced to this moment in Paraguayan history. 
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 thousands of peasants, their ability to “modernize” the Paraguayan economy was 
limited.  In addition, there were notable failures including a colony of 888 
Linconshire Farmers (1872-73) and the 479 colonists of Nueva Australia that 
finally waned to a total of only fifty colonists (Fogel, Luchas 29).  
After the Revolution of 1904, peasants viewed themselves in a new 
relationship to the land and to the society: they were citizens with a role and 
rights.  The primary right was the right to land.  Between 1910 and 1920, the first 
farmers’ organizations formed in the districts of Limpio, Luque, Itá, all districts 
that surrounded the capital.  At that time, anarcosindicalistas or anarchist unions 
dominated the agendas of these first farmers’ groups (Riquelme 2-3).  These early 
farmers’ groups quickly dissolved due to individualist farming and marketing 
practices of the Paraguayan farmer and political persecution of anarchism with 
which these early groups were linked (Riquelme 2-3). 
Political instability was extreme in the Liberal era following the 
Revolution of 1904.  Twenty-one different governments held power from 1904 to 
1922.  Political instability eventually evolved into armed political conflict and a 
civil war that lasted from May 1922 to June 1923.  The resolution of political 
disputes by force permitted a consolidation of power that had never taken place 
after the 1904 Revolution and was the foundation of a period of stability that 
lasted until the outbreak of war with Bolivia in the Chaco War of 1932.   
In spite of the political insecurity of the period, this instability did not 
greatly affect the rural countryside. In fact, administrations more concerned with 
preserving their tenuous alliances focused upon the capital, Asuncion, and other 
 82
 urban centers largely ignoring the countryside.  This left the latifundistas in a 
position of nearly complete control over the occupancy of the rural lands they 
owned and the peasants who worked them or rented them and even gave them 
control over those peasants who lived adjacent to these massive landholdings.  
The strong hand of latifundial interests in this political climate was the primary 
force in the suppression of peasant organization and land occupation in this 
period.   
Despite the new strength of the latifundistas and their wealth, the 
campesinos’ political position continued to strengthen from 1904 to 1932 when 
the outbreak of war drew the attention of campesino and terrateniente alike to the 
cause of national defense.  After having expropriated less than 10,000 hectares 
between 1904 and 1918, the Paraguayan government expropriated 27,521 
hectares between 1918 and 1925 and another 19,145 hectares between 1926 and 
1935 (Fogel, Luchas 32).  While land expropriation grew from 1904 to 1926 it 
only diminished between 1926 because the 1926 law traded off expropriation for 
the peasant’s right to pay a rent on occupied land.  The Ley de Homestead 
(1918)57 permitted the expropriation of state and private lands in lots of ten 
hectares under the condition that such occupations were organized and composed 
of more than one hundred adults (Fogel, Luchas 32).  While the Ley Sobre la 
Creacion, Fomento y Conservacion de la Pequena Propiedad (1926) recognized 
the fact of peasant occupation and declared peasant squatters legal, unevictable 
renters if they paid up to 50% of their agricultural harvests to the landowners. 
                                                 
57 This law, like every other land reform law, suffered from a lack of funding and clear 
bureaucratic responsibility and was, therefore, little utilized. 
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 The Revolution of 1904 demonstrated the power in the numbers of 
campesinos in the country but efforts to placate peasant land demands were 
coupled with strict social and political controls.  For, as Fogel notes, government 
reforms were far from effective owing to the still-functional foreign 
monopolization of land.  From 1920-1935, irregular groups of peasants would 
rally behind sometimes-messianic leaders to challenge this system through 
occupations and violence (Fogel, Luchas 33).   
The diminished number of land expropriations allowed pressure to build in 
the countryside until President José P. Guggiari responded to the social conflict 
by dissolving all associations and organizations in the country by presidential 
edict in 1931.  The suppression of organized political and social activity was the 
eventual key to preventing the peasants from organizing a program of occupation 
on a larger scale from that point until the Revolution of 1989.  
The legal inability to organize was followed by the strong sense of 
nationalism spurred by the outbreak of the Chaco War in 1932-1935.  There was 
very little opportunity to form political or social opposition to the regime and very 
little desire to be branded anti-nationalist.  In addition, tens of thousands of 
young, male peasants were drafted into service, physically removing the 
manpower behind peasant land occupations. However, this sacrifice eventually 
contributed greatly to the cause of land reform.  Paraguay depended heavily upon 
its rural peasantry to supply the manpower to win that brutal war.  As a result, 
campesino efforts in the successful war effort further contributed to the positive 
image of the peasant and his role in service to the state.  
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 Bolivia’s standing army, military equipment and three to one population 
advantage were offset by the rugged individualism of Paraguayan peasants who 
were accustomed to deprivation as a way of life.  The first skirmishes of the war 
were fought by peasants armed with machetes and one castoff Argentine Mauser 
rifle for every three to seven men (Zook 167).  In the heat, dense brush, and mud 
of the Chaco, lightness, mobility, and fortitude were the requirements for success. 
Paraguay lost an estimated 40,000 men and Bolivia an estimated 60,000.  The 
Chaco War remains, to this day, the bloodiest conflict in all of South America. 
Recognized after the war as heroes, peasants, nevertheless, returned to the 
minifundia as poor, disgruntled, second-class citizens.  
To this day, veterans of the war and their descendants feel strongly about 
their claims to the ownership of land as promised and sometimes delivered by 
Alfredo Stroessner de Matiauda, 1954-1989.  During the Stroessner regime, 
veterans of the Chaco War were publicly decorated with medals and given land in 
an attempt to gain popular support for Stroessner’s young government.  Later this 
recognition of the sacrifices of the Paraguayan peasant in the war was equated to 
the peasant’s contribution to the state in the process of opening the agricultural 
frontier.  Landless peasants were called upon by the administration to colonize the 
rugged frontier, contribute to the economy and improve the landholdings of the 
elite by settling, clearing and moving to a new settlement, thereby creating prime 
cattle-ranching land out of the forest.  Even today, peasants recall the sacrifices of 
their fathers and grandfathers in the Chaco War and invoke the promises of the 
state to recognize those sacrifices with support. 
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 Although Paraguay won the war and established a northern boundary on 
the Chaco desert that was favorable to Paraguay, the conflict was disastrous.  
Shortly after the war ended, Eusebio Ayala, President of Paraguay (1932-36), was 
overthrown in a coup in 1936.58  Colonel Franco came to power, invited by the 
Army that had overthrown Ayala.  Coming to power in what is known as the 
February revolt, Franco led a coalition of soldiers, veterans, students, and others 
as the President of Paraguay and the head of the Partido Revolucionario 
Febrerista (PRF).  The Franco government made concessions to rural peasants 
(ex-combatants in his social coalition) by expropriating more than 200,000 
hectares of land and distributing it to 10,000 peasant families (Fogel, Luchas 33). 
Now, the cause of landless peasants was associated with the military 
contributions of the Veteranos del Guerra del Chaco.  After the Chaco War, the 
popular view of the role of the campesino in the society was redefined.  Just as the 
society itself became dominated by militarism, so too was instilled the idea of the 
landless hardworking peasants who sacrificed so much for the country for so little 
in return.  The notion of land as a military prize and the social obligation of the 
nation to provide for its hardworking children and defenders, was constructed in 
this moment and endure to this day as powerfully operative terms in the 
argumentative arsenal of today’s peasant struggles. 
   The Febrerista regime passed the Decreto-Ley Sobre la Reforma 
Agraria (1936) that, in the eighteen months of Febrerista control, granted a 
hectarage (now disputed) between 130,000 (Fogel, Luchas 33) and 200,000 
                                                 
58 He was seen as too conciliatory to the Bolivians after the Chaco War and was overthrown by 
rightist members of his own cabinet and the Paraguayan Army. 
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 (Barua; Carter and Galeano 57) to peasants.  This effectively mobilized the large 
numbers of only recently demilitarized peasants who had to be dealt with and 
sided the Febrerista regime with the peasants and decidedly against the foreign 
latifundista interests in the country.  In fact, land explicitly identified for 
expropriation consisted of los latifundios de los enclaves agroindustriales (Fogel, 
Luchas 33).  Thus, for the first time in the history of Paraguay, a law was passed 
that favored peasants over the transnational corporations that dominated the 
Paraguayan economy.  This was attributable to the social and political instability 
following the Chaco war that necessitated political alliances with the peasant 
masses in order to maintain control. 
When Franco ordered Paraguayan troops to abandon the advanced 
positions in the Chaco that they had held since the 1935 truce, the army revolted 
in August 1937 and returned the Liberals to power. A new president, Félix Pavia, 
signed a peace treaty with Bolivia on July 21, 1938, fixing the final boundaries 
behind the Paraguayan battle lines. In 1939 the Liberals, recognizing that they 
would have to choose someone with national stature to be president if they 
wanted to hold onto power, picked General Estigarribia, the hero of the Chaco 
War who had since served as special envoy to the United States. Estigarribia 
quickly realized that he would have to adopt many Febrerista ideas to avoid 
anarchy. Circumventing the die-hard Liberals in the National Assembly who 
opposed him, Estigarribia assumed “temporary” dictatorial powers in February 
1940, but promised the dictatorship would end as soon as a workable constitution 
was written. He began a land reform program that promised a small plot to every 
 87
 Paraguayan family.  Granting land to the peasantry solicited popular support for 
Estigarribia’s unstable regime.  In fact, the instability of this period (1936-1948) 
is clearly demonstrated by the necessity that compelled successive and short lived 
governments to distribute 19,000 individual parcels of land varying between ten 
and twenty hectares (Riquelme 2-3). 
After his death in an airplane crash, Estigarribia was replaced as president 
by Higinio Morinigo, who ruled from 1940 to 1948 (Lewis 180).  While Morinigo 
continued to grant land to the peasantry the outbreak of World War II eased 
Morinigo's task of ruling Paraguay and keeping the army happy because it 
stimulated demand for Paraguayan export products, such as meat, hides, and 
cotton, and boosted the country's export earnings. More importantly, United 
States policy toward Latin America at this time made Paraguay eligible for major 
economic assistance. A surge of German influence in the region and Argentina's 
pro-Axis leanings alarmed the United States, which sought to wean Paraguay 
away from German and Argentine influence.59  At the same time, the United 
States sought to enhance its presence in the entire Southern Cone region and 
pursued close cooperation with Brazil, Argentina's traditional rival. To this end, 
the United States provided Paraguay with sizable amounts of funds and supplies 
under the Lend-Lease Agreement as well as loans for public works, and gave 
technical assistance in agriculture and health care. The United States Department 
of State approved of closer ties between Brazil and Paraguay and especially 
                                                 
59 The first Nazi party founded in South America was founded in Paraguay in 1931. German 
immigrant schools, churches, hospitals, peasant cooperatives, youth groups and charitable groups 
were transformed at this time into centers of political activity.  All of these organizations displayed 
swastikas and portraits of Adolf Hitler (Baruja 14).  
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 supported Brazil's offer to finance a road project designed to reduce Paraguay's 
dependence on Argentina.60
With the financial backing of the United States, Morinigo had enough 
capital to solidify his rule by satisfying the demands of peasants with the 
expropriation of nearly 950,000 hectares of land between 1940 and 1947 (Carter 
and Galeano 57).  Yet, playing the same bait and switch game that began with the 
Revolution de 1904, Morinigo ignored the Estatuto Agrario established by the 
Estigarribia regime as Ley No. 1060 de 1940 and went so far as to sign El Decreto 
No. 2947 that formally illegalized “intruso” or the peasant squatter (Palau 152).  
Peasants gained a small amount of land but ended up ceding far more in legal 
rights to more land.  A coup attempt in December of 1946 weakened Morinigo’s 
government, which finally fell in March of 1947 when a civil war erupted.61
The demise of the Morinigo government left control of the country in play 
between the two major political parties: the Colorados and the Liberales.  The 
Colorado party emerged victorious after a bloody struggle lasting six months.62  
                                                 
60 This project culminated in the Puente de Amistad that commercially linked Brasil with Paraguay 
for the first time and created the first major land route for trade between Paraguay and any other 
country.  The vast desert of the Chaco Boreal limited trade with Bolivia to the northwest; trade 
with Brasil had been limited by the thick forests and deep and fast running Parana River to the 
north and east.  Historically, Paraguay had utilized the Pilomayo river which defined its southern 
boundary with Argentina.  Without a bridge, ferries and barges were utilized to transfer products 
either into Argentina or down the Pilcomayo and through the Rio de la Plata which was also 
controlled by Argentina.  The development of the Puente de Amistad was an important step 
towards Paraguayan economic independence.  The site of the bridge is marked by the Ciudad del 
Este, once named Ciudad Presidente Stroessner but changed after the fall of the dictator in 1989.  
The city is the heart of economic activity in the country, dwarfing the capital, Asuncion in wealth 
and commerce if not in population. 
61 Alfredo Stroessner Matiauda was the commander of the artillery regiment, General Brúgez, in 
the crucial battle of this civil war.  This was the important first step in an ascent to power that 
would eventually lead to Stroessner’s 38 year rule of the country. 
62 Ultra-rightist Colorados concerned about the weakness of the Moringo administration and the 
possible outbreak of anarchy and national dissolution favored annexation of Paraguay by 
Argentina (a strong, stable militarist state at the time). Encouraged by Argentina’s support of and 
aid to Paraguay during the Chaco War, Romero Pereyra sought and received financial support 
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 Instability continued to plague the country even after the conclusion of a civil war 
that, for the first time since before the Chaco, saw a single party in power.  In fact, 
after the fall of the Morinigo government, Paraguay saw 18 presidents between 
1947 and 1953. 
 
2.5  The Postcolonial Epoch (1954-1989) 
 
This instability came to an end with the election of Alfredo Stroessner 
Matiauda as president of the country in 1954.  Stroessner ruled the country as a 
dictator for 35 years until 1989 when he was overthrown in a coup and exiled to 
Brazil.  The longevity of his administration depended upon a number of factors 
including foreign aid,63 economic expansion, brutal repression of opposition, and 
a new approach to the land tenure inequities in the country.  Stroessner paid 
particular interest to the land reform issue, especially in the early stages of his 
presidential career.  His regime was in serious trouble in 1958 when a guerrilla 
                                                                                                                                                 
from both Argentina and Brazil that allowed them to emerge victorious in the civil war (Baruja, 
Paiva and Schaffroth 14). 
63 Stroessner benefited from the United States’ positon on communism in the 1950s and 1960s.  
The United States supported authoritarian, anticommunist regimes in order to avoid the emergence 
of a left-wing regime in Paraguay.  Such a regime was perceived to be ideally situated at the 
geographical center of the South American continent for providing a base of operations for 
revolutionary political activity in that region. While in Paraguay during his 1958 tour of Latin 
America, U.S. Vice-president Nixon praised Stroessner for opposing communism more strongly 
than any other nation in the world. The United States supplied Paraguay huge amounts of foreign 
aid from 1947 until 1977.  Monies supplied to Paraguay by the United States via the Alliance for 
Progress program accounted for nearly 40 percent of Paraguay's budget during the Kennedy 
administration.  In addition, the United States supplied about $750,000 worth of military hardware 
and trained more than 2,000 Paraguayan military officers between 1947 and 1977. Paraguay 
regularly voted in favor of United States policies in the United Nations (UN) and the Organization 
of American States (OAS). Influenced by Paraguay's support for the United States intervention in 
the Dominican Republic in 1965, the United States became friendlier to Stroessner in the mid-
1960s under President Lyndon B. Johnson. New United States-supported military governments in 
Brazil and Argentina also improved United States-Paraguay ties. Stroessner, probably the United 
States' most dependable ally in Latin America, once remarked that the United States ambassador 
was like an extra member of his cabinet (US Library of Congress). 
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 insurgency, organized and supported by exiled Liberales and Febreristas who 
provided small bands of armed men across the border from Argentina. Venezuela 
generously supported these groups, as did the Cuban government under Fidel 
Castro.  The peasantry, rather than responding to the calls for revolution, 
supported Stroessner.  The py nandi, or barefoot ones, were irregular peasant 
troops critical to countering this threat to the regime’s rule.  After the peasants 
proved so useful and with the intention of solidifying his rural support, Stroessner 
formalized the long practice of governmental land grants to the peasantry with the 
foundation of the Instituto del Bienestar Rural (IBR) in 1963.  The IBR is a 
government agency whose primary mission is to facilitate the transfer of state and 
private land to peasants who desire to farm that land.  With a budget provided by 
Congress, the IBR funded the negotiation, purchase, or lease of land and the 
organization, planning, establishment and maintenance of agricultural colonies or 
asentamientos. 
The successful function of the IBR formally established the ability and 
need for the state to “regulate” the land market by transferring both state lands 
and unproductive private land holdings to the peasantry.  Today many peasant 
protestors call for the government to use the IBR as an instrument of social 
justice.  The continued existence of the IBR in Paraguay encourages peasants to 
invade and occupy private properties and, after the fact, solicit the support of the 
IBR.  This amounts to asking the IBR to compensate the landowner for the land 
and redistribute the property to the peasants.  The IBR has functioned since 1963 
to make the peasantry dependent upon the state for land while, in turn, 
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 guaranteeing the political support of the rural peasantry, who comprise more than 
half of Paraguay’s population.    
Thus, it was with the intent of buttressing his popular support and 
solidifying his tenuous hold on power that Stroessner institutionally formalized 
the historically informal process of land reform.  Up to this point in Paraguayan 
history, peasants would occupy land illegally, obligate the legal owners of the 
land to instigate removal tactics, then protest their subsequent treatment resulting 
in an adjudication by the Paraguayan state.  In theory, under the auspices of the 
Stroessner regime, the IBR would represent the Paraguayan peasant in 
negotiations with both the Paraguayan government and private landowners in 
order to regulate and improve the efficiency of land reform in the country.  
However, under the Stroessner administration, the primary function of the IBR 
was to initiate state control of an informal sector of the economy.  By regulating 
the land expropriation mechanism, the state could give the campesinos enough 
land to assuage their mounting demands, formally control the price of land, and 
forestall peasant initiative.  In addition, the Paraguayan government’s new control 
over land and its price permitted adherents of the Colorado Party and the 
dictatorship to expropriate large amounts of land whose titulation was informal 
(never recognized by the state) or which never received titulation as public 
commons.  The theft of the commons by local politicians permitted Stroessner to 
undermine the financial support for political opposition, and reward the party 
faithful with grants of once-commons-land or legal title to land, while opponents 
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 of the dictatorship found their untitled lands confiscated by the state.64  In many 
cases, peasants were unduly affected by the land transfers as they were robbed of 
pasturage for their animals or even robbed of their own land and were thus further 
impoverished (CIPAE 27-33).65   
Despite the abuses of land titulation under the Stroessner regime, the 
distribution of public land played a key role in Paraguay’s economic growth over 
the past 30 years.  This intensification occurred in two diametrically opposed 
strategies.  First, the institution of what have been called the nuevos latifundios, or 
new large estates, enabled the speedy modernization and transformation of the 
estancias into agribusinesses that exported cotton, soybeans and cattle.  The 
concentration of state resources to provide land, infrastructure, judicial protection 
and credit permitted the regime’s closest allies to compete on the agricultural 
world market benefiting the latifundistas as well as their protectors, the 
functionaries of the state (Carter and Galeano 61-2).  The second strategy was to 
redistribute state land that was not easily exploited to peasants. Thus, remote state 
land holdings without road access, with mountainous features, with sandy or 
shallow soil unfit for farming or with no tenable access to potable water were 
expropriated for peasants.  The peasants “opened up” these lands, building roads, 
bridges, and farms without any significant state assistance.  This two-pronged 
approach concentrated the state’s resources in the hands of the elite class while 
                                                 
64 These land possessions granted by the dictator to his adherents are now referred to as tierras 
malhabidas or ill-gotten land (CIPAE 27). 
65 CIPAE, El Comite de Iglesias para Ayudas de Emergencias (a non-profit legal group for the 
representation of peasants in Paraguay) estimates that between 1989 and 1993 12% of all land 
conflict in the country was the result of the irregular transfer of commons lands (CIPAE 28). 
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 simultaneously satisfying the demands of peasants for land and exploiting the 
self-sufficiency of the peasantry. 
 In addition, peasants were further exploited, as they were encouraged to 
participate in the crop diversification pioneered by the latifundistas.  The state, 
through the Ministry of Agriculture, taught peasants how to plant alternative cash 
crops such as cotton.  With seed, credit and technical support provided by the 
state and with new land to farm, peasant labor explosively contributed to cash 
exports.  However, the prices peasants received from the acopiadores, or cotton 
cooperatives, amounted to pennies on the dollar of the value the agribusinesses 
(who owned the cooperatives) were receiving for their products.       
Without formal recognition of their exploitation but suffering from 
poverty, peasant-farmers, helped by the Catholic church, organized alternatives to 
the statist system of peasant exploitation.  Peasant-farmer’s organizations 
reappeared in the early 1960s, followed  (1969-1975) by the more formalized 
Ligas Agrarias Cristianas (LAC) or the Christian Agrarian Leagues, las 
Juventudes Agrarias Cristianas (JAC) or Christian Agrarian Youth and las 
Comunidades Eclesiales de Base (CEB) or Foundational Ecclesiastical 
Communities. 
These organizations quickly spread to all parts of the country.  The 
founding principle of the Ligas Agrarias was to apply Christian ethical principles 
to the society and its structures.  This was an important challenge to the system of 
exploitation whereby peasants borrowed money from a patron at 5% per month, 
grew and sold their cotton to the patro n at a price he set, and used that money to 
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 pay down their debt at the town store (also owned by the patro n).  The 
development of the almacén de consumo, or the household store,66 permitted el 
trueque, or bartering, the extension of informal lines of credit (without interest) 
but, most importantly, the elimination of the acopiadores and local patrones who 
greatly marked up the retail value of the goods and foodstuffs required for 
survival.  These patrones were usually the presidents of the seccionales, or the 
seccionaleros partidarias who served the regime as the bottom feeders in the state 
apparatus (CIPAE 28).  The communitarian lifestyle, including the sharing of 
common lands and participation in a buying cooperative, removed tens of 
thousands of peasants from the control of local patrones and, more importantly, 
from participation in the state economy.  
With the accusation that the Ligas Agrarias were communist enclaves, 
they were dissolved in 1976 with physical repression, abductions and 
assassinations of the leaders of these groups. These repressions are remembered 
as the Pascua Dolorosa or the Sad Easter as the forceful dissolution of these 
groups took place between April and May of 1976.67  Even today, peasants talk 
about this repressive period and the dictatorship’s re-invocation of Guggari’s 
                                                 
66 The almacen del consumo is a common feature in Paraguay today.  Each Paraguayan peasant 
stores various items in their own homes that they resell to their neighbors at a modest profit.  This 
permits peasant to cut out the middleman, or the patron, and to benefit rather than pay the retail 
markup for daily goods.  
67 Perhaps the most memorable event of the Pascua Dolorosa was the attack on the Colonia Jejui 
on February 8, 1975.  The colony was attacked at midnight by several battalions of Paraguayan 
army infantry resulting in an unknown number of dead and more than 600 imprisioned.  Thirty 
leaders, including Catholic priests, were jailed and tortured for a period of six months.  The 
colony’s land was later sold by the IBR to a private owner who utilized the 23- hectare lot for 
raising cattle.  Today, Asociación Campesina San Isidro del Jejui is representing the colony’s 
survivors in court in a bid to return the land to its rightful owners (“Recuerdan 27 Años ” 1+). 
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 emergency decree banning all public organization.68  Local patrones enforced the 
law ruthlessly and demanded that any group of more than five persons associating 
publicly could only do so if that meeting included the local seccionalero.69
Peasant protest was further diminished by an economic expansion that 
achieved an average growth rate of 8% through the 1980s.70  A growing economy 
meant jobs.  A peasant who owned only a few hectares of land could supplement 
his income with changa or day labor to improve his family’s standard of living.  
With few peasant protests governmental repression of peasant organization was 
eased in the early 1980s and small farmers committees were organized and 
permitted to operate without excessive pressure. This trend was greatly aided by 
the efforts of non-governmental organizations.   
 
2.6  The Epoch of Struggle (1982-present) 
 
Beginning with the softening of Stroessner’s rule in the country, peasant 
protest activity spontaneously re-awakened, on six short years after the massacre 
of the Pascua Dolorosa.  The present epoch in Paraguayan history, tracing its 
origins from the re-awakening of peasant protest in 1982 to the present, inherits a 
long history of peasant struggles for land.  This inheritance exists as a set of 
linguistic and social practices, established during these struggles, which serve to 
constrain or enable protest activity today.  Present protest activity in Paraguay is 
                                                 
68 President Jose P. Guggari outlawed public meetings in a presidential decree in 1931, a law that 
was periodically enforced until the Revolution of 1989. 
69 In addition, the peasants greatly feared the pyrague, or the peasant spy paid by the government 
as an informant to root out political opposition in the countryside. 
70 Two factors account for this amazing economic growth rate: the new agrarian ecomomy and the 
Itaipua dam project, 1973-1982 (US Library of Congress). 
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 largely dependent upon the historical conditions of its making.  More specifically, 
ideas about land, citizenship, justice, social class and history structure today’s 
struggle and determine the nature and success of peasant protest activity within 
the broader historical landscape of Paraguayan history.  
By the early 1980s, many informal social groups including small farmers’ 
groups, neighborhood commissions as well as church and other community 
groups existed throughout the country in a climate of rising expectations and 
economic opportunity.  However, a rapid economic reversal as well as other 
factors contributed to a sudden burst of social discontent.  Protest organizations 
arose out of the cultural memory of the Ligas Agrarias and manifested themselves 
through the informal organizations of the rural countryside.  These social groups 
petitioned for the fundamental right of the Paraguayan citizen to own land, the 
right to credit, technical assistance from governmental sources, the liberty of 
association and an end to repressions. 
 Four basic factors drove these nascent organizations into conflict with the 
state: the closing of the agro-economic frontier, uncompetitive farming practices 
and the fall of world cotton prices in an emerging global market, agrarian 
unemployment as a result of an economic recession, and the increasing cost of 
land (CIPAE 18). 
Despite years of IBR sponsored agricultural colonization projects, the land 
available to the state for peasant transplantation had been exhausted.71  There was, 
simply put, no more land in the hands of politically well-connected commercial 
                                                 
71 All of the nearly 132 new agricultural settlements since 1989, none of which were proposed or 
planned by the IBR, were the products of peasant struggles. The IBR was prompted to assist 
peasant settlement once those lands had already been occupied (Riquelme 2). 
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 interests that such interests desired to sell.  There was no longer anywhere to 
transplant the peasant population in order to assuage the socio-economic pressure 
of the latifundial subdivision of land and the consequent impoverishment of the 
peasants.   
Paraguay’s entry into the world market and the opening of its economy 
between 1989 and 1992 featured an economic strategy akin to shock therapy, 
immediately compelling Paraguayan agriculture to modernize in order to compete 
in the world marketplace. The Agricultural Census of 1991 revealed that only 
21% of peasant farms of less than five hectares owned a traction animal and a 
plow and only 28% of those same farms possessed hand-operated pesticide 
sprayers (Borda, Economi a 74).72  Thus, a great number of peasant farms lacked 
even the basic necessities for subsistence farming let alone the basic tools of the 
modern, efficient agribusinesses with whom they compete.  In addition, the 
peasant’s main cash crop, cotton, became less and less viable as international 
cotton prices fluctuated, and exploitation by the country’s cotton purchasing 
monopoly systematically robbed the peasant of any value the crop might have.  
Yet, without the ability to compete efficiently and to diversify into other products, 
the Paraguayan peasant was trapped in what Esteban Areco has called una 
esclavitud blanca or a white [cotton] slavery (Areco 17).  
A prolonged economic stagnation quickly followed the boom years of the 
late 1970s and early 1980s.  With the completion of the Itaipua dam in 1983 and a 
                                                 
72 An independent study conducted in 1983 revealed that although 30% of peasant farms surveyed 
owned plows, only 33% of those farms owned metal plows, suggesting that only 10% of all 
peasants owned metal plows.  In addition, that study also revealed that only 10% of peasant farms 
owned an ox cart (the primary means of agricultural transport) (Campos, Nikiphoroff and Silvero 
40). 
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 precipitous fall in world cotton prices, the Paraguayan economy shrank and 
unemployment skyrocketed from 6% in 1983 to 15% a year later (Carter and 
Galeano 63).  Thus, peasant families that maintained their tenuous position above 
extreme poverty could no longer use changa as a means of supplementing a 
meager farm income and they could not afford to buy land to augment that 
income and occupy the labor idled by unemployment.73   
Complicating the economic picture for the peasant was an increase in land 
value.  Average land values rose 66% between 1975 and 1986 and doubled in the 
rural countryside.  Latifundial tendencies strongly impacted the Paraguayan 
peasant even despite the Stroessner regime’s apparently generous distribution of 
land.  Paraguay maintained a population growth rate of 2.8% throughout this 
period, culminating in a doubling of rural households between 1962 and 1992 
(GTZ 48).74  The little land that peasants already possessed became increasingly 
inadequate for their needs as their families grew and higher land prices made it 
impossible to buy more.  
The Stroessner regime titled 12,383,885 hectares of land (23,817,737 total 
hectares or nearly 52% of all the land in the country) between 1957 and 1987 
                                                 
73 Even peasants who did manage to find day-labor suffered as a result of stagnating and then 
falling wages between 1981 and 1984.  According to a study conducted in 1985 by CEPAL (el 
Centro Estadistico Paraguayo) real wage increases made throughout the 1970s were lost in four 
short years between 1981 and 1984.  Changes in real wages were as follows: -1.9% (1981), 0.3% 
(1982), 0.9% (1983), and –19.1% (1984) (Gonzalez 23). 
74 Rural paraguyan households more than doubled from 205,528 in 1962 to 411,856 in 1992.  Note 
that this number does not include rural to urban flight by which the rural superpopulation relocates 
in urban centers.  Urban households nearly tripled, growing from 122,780 in 1962 to 855,547 in 
1992 indicating that large numbers of rural peasants migrated to form urban households during 
this period (GTZ 64).  
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 (Carter and Galeano 174).75  Little of this land was titled to peasants as the 
percentage of all arable land represented by latifundia or land holdings of more 
than 1,000 hectares actually grew from 78% in 1991 to 82% in 1991 (Palau 
172).76  So, the wealthy exploited the political apparatus of the state to their 
advantage and used the IBR to enrich themselves by obtaining legal title to land 
of communal, dubious, or state origin.  At the same time, peasant minifundia grew 
from 89,658 or 36% farms of less than five hectares in 1981 to 122,750 or 39.9% 
farms of less than five hectares in 1991.  This pattern was repeated in the category 
of the slightly more prosperous peasants whose land holdings exceeded the 
minimum for extreme poverty with more than five hectares but less than ten.  This 
stratum of the peasantry also increased under the Stroessner regime.  Rural farms 
of more than five and less than ten hectares represented 19.6% of all farms or 
48,881 entities in the 1981 census.  Yet, these same farms represented 21.6% of 
all farms or 66,605 entities in 1991 (Carter and Galeano 174).     
Years of economic expansion (1972-1983) had acclimated a peasant 
society to newly achieved economic expectations.  Diminishing economic 
opportunities drove peasants to invade latifundias, occupying land and demanding 
state recognition of the peasant’s right to gainful employment and economic 
opportunity via land ownership.  Between 1983 and 1986 15,000 peasant families 
were involved in more than 50 land occupations (Fogel, Luchas 54).  The violent 
                                                 
75 The FAO estimated in 1994 that 7.1 million hectares of arable existed in Paraguay of which 
total slightly more than 2 million hectares was actually under cultivation.  A total of 5 million 
hectares or 71% of arable land was left idle while a peasant population of 2.5 million was utilizing 
a mere 6.2% of land under cultivation (Fogel, Luchas 57). 
76 Fogel reports that the soybean acreage of agro-industrial farms tripled between 1982 and 1989 
(Fogel, Luchas 53). 
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 repression of peasants that followed as well as an unstable economy provoked a 
crisis of legitimacy in the government of Alfredo Stroessner de Matiauda, who 
had ruled Paraguay for 35 years.  He was overthrown in a military coup that 
occurred over the 2nd and 3rd of February of 1989. 
The real function of this new level of organization was to give voice to the 
long repressed social disorder in the rural countryside.  The effect of the 
organization was to increase the number of protest activities as well as the scale of 
each land occupation and protest.  Sixty-seven of the 98 peasant land occupations 
in which CIPAE (Comite de Iglesias para Ayudas de Emergencias) extended 
legal aid involved more than 50 families (CIPAE, Conflicto 22).  Organizations 
enabled an enormous increase in protest activity throughout the country.  Many 
years of unfulfilled promises made by the Stroessner regime, the IBR, and the 
Ministry of Agriculture (MAG) as well as the mounting economic pressures 
forced thousands of peasants to seek economic opportunities beyond their 
minifundia.  Shortly after the fall of the dictatorship, there was an increased sense 
of agency in the rural countryside.  It was as if the dictator had been the symbolic 
obstacle to the realization of the economic freedom peasants throughout Paraguay 
dreamed of. 
New organizations were either constructed and directed by rural peasants 
or they were created in their interests.  Peasant groups and peasant-interest groups 
were united not by the fall of the dictator and the expectations of political freedom 
that arose as a result of that fall; rather, peasant groups and peasant-interest 
groups were united by a long history of land tenure practices that had created a 
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 culture wherein peasants asked for and received land from the national 
government in recognition of their economic contribution to the nation’s agrarian 
economy.  Each national revolution, starting with the Revolucion de 1904, resulted 
in newly constructed and weak governments that pacified the peasantry and 
buttressed popular support with land reform.  The protest activity that follows the 
fall of the dictator from 1989 onward follows this historical patter.  It is not so 
driven by new political freedoms as much as it is driven by a paradigm that has 
become historically instantiated in social practices that, in spite of the dearth of 
state land that could be given to peasants, drives peasants to seize and occupy 
private land holdings in imitation of the paradigm.    
Piven and Cloward point out the historical nature typical of social 
struggles: 
 
Ongoing struggles for power continually stimulate efforts by 
contenders to promulgate and enforce rules which either proscribe 
the use of specific political resources by their antagonists, or define 
conditions limiting their use…Once objectified in a system of law, 
the rules forged by past power struggles continue to shape ongoing 
conflicts by constraining or enhancing the ability of actors to use 
whatever leverage their social circumstances yield them. That is 
why new power struggles often take the form of efforts to alter the 
parameters of the permissible by challenging or defying the 
legitimacy of prevailing norms themselves. (Piven and Cloward, 
Breaking 346-7) 
 
Today’s social struggles are largely shaped by past conflicts.  The 
decisions taken, rules made and social practices habituated in the past both enable 
and constrain present struggles.  In the case of the Paraguayan land reform 
struggle, it is quite apparent that historical definitions of land, land ownership, as 
well as private and public property practices have shaped the Paraguayan 
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 peasant’s notions of land in a manner that is largely universal amongst the 
peasantry.  
The historically inscribed and ideological nature of the peasant struggle 
for land accounts for the widespread agreement amongst peasants and their 
supporters about the need for social organizations to address the issue.  The real 
strength of these organizations has been their widespread and collective nature.  
Land occupations have been largely spontaneous affairs.  Groups of peasants 
associated by family or pueblo spontaneously rally together to invade a property.  
Usually it is only after this initial protest spark that peasant organizations rally to 
the cause, offering to represent smaller groups in the process of negotiating with 
state, local and private entities.  Prior ideological agreement about the need for 
struggle allows these small, spontaneous entities to obtain access to other 
organizations and services via their association with larger peasant organizations.  
Thus, ensconced within a network of many groups who all recognize the 
historical impetus for land reform, even small groups of peasants can receive 
support from non-governmental organizations, ecclesiastical organizations, 
unions, and political parties (CIPAE 63).  
However, the coalescence of many different social organizations driven by 
a shared historical impetus for changing land tenure practices in Paraguay has also 
constrained the effectiveness of social protest as well.  The ideology of land 
reform, defined by such concepts as the rejection of foreign ownership of land, 
itinerant farming practices, state patronage of the peasant need for land, squatting 
as a social norm and the ethos of land ownership (the one who works the land, 
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 owns the land) offers a broad and sometimes vague platform for coordinating and 
agreeing upon protest methods, demands, and goals.  In the struggle for land 
reform in Paraguay, there are at least five basic levels of peasant or peasant-
interest organization that can be identified as the following: official or state 
organizations, non-governmental organizations, national peasant organizations, 
local peasant organizations and informal peasant organizations. 
Official or state organizations include the following three government 
agencies: El Instituto de Bienestar Rural (IBR), Cre dito Agricola de Habilitacion 
(CAH), and El Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganaderia (MAG).  The IBR’s 
primary function is to facilitate the relocation of the peasant super population to 
the agricultural frontier.  After the disappearance of that frontier, the IBR was 
forced into the role of mediator between peasant protesters occupying land and 
the state, local and private interests attempting to remove them from that land.77  
MAG’s primary function is to transfer technology to all sectors of the agricultural 
economy including peasants. This ministry’s efforts have been almost a complete 
failure.  A 1983 study demonstrated that 93.6% of all peasant farms surveyed 
received no technical support at all in the area of crop management, a number that 
improves marginally for technical support in the area of animal management at 
90% (Campos, Nikiphoroff and Silvero 197-199).  The CAH’s record is no better.  
As of 1983, 91% of all farms received no form of agricultural credit.  By 1991, 
after eighteen years of work, that figure had decreased to only 90% (Borda, 
“Conjuntera Econo mica” 43).  The state representation of peasant interests was a 
                                                 
77 All of the nearly 132 new agricultural settlements since 1989, none of which were proposed or 
planned by the IBR, were the products of peasant struggles. The IBR was prompted to assist 
peasant settlement once those lands had already been occupied (Riquelme 2). 
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 dismal failure.  The real responsibility for the representation of peasant rights in 
the struggle fell upon others.  
Non-governmental organizations have been crucial to the development of 
peasant organizations at all levels.  The most important NGOs are CIPAE and 
ALTER-VIDA, two NGOs dedicated to the support of rural peasant causes.78  The 
primary mission of CIPAE has been to aid peasants with organizational training 
and free legal defense.  ALTER-VIDA’s primary mission is to inform and aid 
peasants in the area of sustainable development.  Each of these NGOs has 
provided financial aid to peasant groups as well as, and more importantly, 
information for self-organization and mobilization.  
Informal peasant organizations are defined as those organizations whose 
primary function is not the struggle for land reform but that can contribute to the 
struggle by providing a platform for organizing local communities and or 
discussion of land reform issues.  These organizations sometimes but not 
necessarily come into service of the struggle.  Informal peasant organizations are 
the most common local organizations in rural pueblos, compani as and barrios that 
often serve as the most important means of organization at the local level.  Such 
groups have fed the membership of, supported the formation of, worked in 
                                                 
78 Dozens of non-governmental organizations are dedicated to the aid of the rural peasant.  The 
following constitute a representative example: La CODEHUPY está conformada por la 
Asociación Americana de Juristas; Asociación de Familiares y Víctimas del Servicio Militar; 
BASE ECTA Base de Educación Comunicación y Tecnología Alternativa; CEJIL; CDE Centro de 
Documentación y Estudios; CMP Coordinadora de Mujeres del Paraguay; Comisión Nacional de 
Derechos Humanos y por Nunca más al terrorismo de Estado; CODEHUCO coordinadora de 
Derechos Humanos de Cordillera; Coordinadora de Pueblos Nativos de la Cuenca del 
Pilcomayo; CONAPI Coordinadora Nacional de la Pastoral Indígena; DECIDAMOS Campaña 
por la Expresión Ciudadana; DNI Derechos del Niño Internacional; Fundación Kuña Aty; 
FUNPARE fundación para la reforma del Estado; gestión Local; INECIP; Luna Nueva; MOC 
Movimiento de Objeción de Conciencia; Pastoral Social; SEFEM Servicio de Formación y 
estudio de la mujer; SERPAJ Paraguay; Sobrevivencia-Amigos de la tierra; TierraViva-A los 
pueblos indígenas del Chaco y Amnistía Internacional Paraguay. 
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 conjunction with and, in the case of the comisiones vecinales or neighborhood 
associations, sometimes transformed into local and national peasant organizations 
in the land reform struggle when a local land issue was common to all members 
of the informal local group.  Other informal peasant organizations include clubes 
de amas de casa (mothers clubs),79 comites de agricultores (local farmers’ 
committees),80 and clubes de jovenes (young peoples clubs).81   
The informal organizations have, for the most part, functioned on an ad 
hoc basis to solicit the aid of government agencies in order to address the most 
immediate communal needs of the barrio, pueblo, or compani a.  However, in 
many cases the comisiones vecinales have not only fed the ranks of and supported 
local peasant organizations but, in many cases, have transformed from ad hoc 
organizations to local peasant organizations committed to land reform.  Gonzalez, 
Casaccia, Va zquez and Velazquez report that many of the comisiones vecinales 
                                                 
79 Clubs de Amas de la Casa were formed in parallel with the Comites de Agricultores 
(encouraged by the church) for the primary function of educating peasant women in areas of 
health, sanitation, and child welfare.  Formally and informally, extension agents from SEAG 
(Servicio de Extension de Agricultura y Ganaderia) would organize and provide technical 
expertise for these groups. 
80 Farmers’ committees begin under the auspices of el Servicio Tecnico Interamericano de 
Cooperacion Agricola (STICA) as a project of MAG carried out by Servicio de Extension 
Agricola and Ganaderia (SEAG) beginning in 1955.  Small farmers groups are organized to aid in 
the transmission of technical support and credit (Gonzalez 97). 
81 Los comisiones vecinales originated in the seccionales (the local political representation of the 
Colorado party).  Comisiones vecinales consisted of local political units whose function was to 
collection petitions for and participate in local public works projects as well as staffing political 
events and even staffing elections.  The comisiones vecinales guaranteed fidelity to the Colorado 
Party (ANR) and permitted local communities to trade that political allegiance for government 
support and the funding of infrastructure projects in the rural countryside.  Participation in the 
comisiones vecinales has been described as “poniendo su camisa Colorado,” putting on one’s red 
colored shirt to show allegiance to the Colorado Party (whose color is red as opposed to the blue 
of the opposition Partido Liberal).   
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 that transformed themselves into local pro-land reform groups were formally 
connected with national peasant organizations (73).82  
Local peasant organizations take two basic forms: groups that have 
evolved from informal organizations and collections of minifundistas who have 
invaded a property and organize themselves to petition its expropriation and 
titulation.  An example of the former is the case of the communities Juan de Mena 
and Cleto Romero.  These two communities were long established and suffered 
minifundizacion or land repartition below the level of subsistence.  As explained 
in the words of an individual peasant from Juan de Mena: 
Cuando comenzamos algunos de nuestros padres contaban con 
dos hectareas en aquel tiempo, y cuando sus hijos crecian y se 
casaban se quedaban todos en esas dos hecta reas.  De ahi  comi an 
todos.  Y cuando ya no se podia, cuando ya no habi a alternatives, 
solamente quedaba luchar…y en este momento trabajamos con el 
Comite de Agricultores… y ahi nacio  la idea, en el Comite de 
Agricultores.  Pero, encontramos que no podi amos plantar nada 
porque no teni amos tierra. (Fogel, Luchas 80)   
 
[When we started some of our parents had only two hectares (of 
land) at that time and when their children grew and married they 
all stayed together (living) on those two hectares.  From there 
(those two hectares) they all ate.  And when they couldn’t 
anymore, when they had run out of alternatives, all that was left 
was to fight … and in that moment we worked with the farmer’s 
committee … and the idea came from the farmer’s committee.  
But, we found that we could not plant anything because we didn’t 
have any land]. 
 
                                                 
82 Examples of the interconnection of the four levels of peasant protest groups and their variation 
are the following: Las Comisiones Vecinales de Limoy (in the Department of Alto Parana) and 
Potrero Angelito (in the Department of Canindeyu) were directly linked to the national protest 
organizations the MCP (El Movimiento Campesino Paraguayo) and ONAC (La Organizacio n 
Nacional Campesina).  On the other hand, la Comision Vecinal de Minga Pora was connected to a 
departmental peasant organization La Asociacion de Agricultores de Alto Parana  (ASAGRAPA) 
which was in turn associated with another national organization, La Coordinacion Nacional de 
Productores Agricolas (CONAPA).   
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 Thus, the idea of the struggle for land was given public voice by means of 
the farmer’s committee.  The farmer’s committee eventually evolved into a 
comision vecinal, which included all of the members of the community of Juan de 
Mena.  The growing insufficiency of the land owned by the peasants to provide 
for even their most basic needs in both Juan de Mena and Cleto Romero was 
sharply contrasted by the presence of a latifundia of 40,000 hectares consisting of 
a cattle ranch and forest reserves belonging to the company Union Paraguayo, 
S.A.  Union Paraguayo’s property lay between Juan de Mena and Cleto Romero, 
another peasant pueblo with the same land scarcity pressures. 
Each of these communities rented small plots of land from Union 
Paraguayo, for pasturage and cultivation.  Peasants would clear the forest and 
grow tobacco for a period of time until pasture grasses established themselves and 
the peasants would be moved on to clear another forested plot.  This permitted the 
company to expand the land available for ranching with no expenditure for 
clearing the land; in fact, exploiting the peasants for the task made it possible for 
this land clearing to be performed at a significant profit.83  
                                                 
83 In the “colono” system, latifundistas, or large landowners, encourage small farmers or landless 
peasants to clear frontier land for agriculture and temporary settlement.  These landowners take a 
portion of the harvest as rent or establish steep rents that are paid before planting in order to 
guarantee payment and place the entirety of the risk of crop failure on the peasant.  After a short 
period, usually one to two years, the peasants are moved on to open up more forest and the old 
plots are taken over by grasses and converted to cattle farms (Patridge 10).  This practice has 
pervaded the practices of the peasant farmer to the point that even small land owners themselves 
believe that only newly cleared land, with its high fertility, known as “rosado” can be used for 
cash crops.  Older land, or “cocue cue” as it is called in Paraguay, is viewed by the peasant farmer 
as only capable of supporting low-income crops such as mandi’o and poroto or cassava and beans.  
This is a system of exploitation that has been employed since the conquest and which continues to 
be employed today.  
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  Once they had identified their task and organized themselves, peasants 
from both Juan de Mena and Cleto Romero initiated occupations of Union 
Paraguaya’s land.  By means of coordination with and the support of three non-
governmental organizations, El Centro Paraguayo de Coopertivistas de 
Cordillera (CPCC), El Pastoral Social Cordillera (PSC) and El Comite de 
Iglesias para Ayuda de Emergencias (CIPAE) the peasants were able to petition 
the IBR for the legal expropriation of 5,000 of the 40,000 hectares possessed by 
Union Paraguaya.  The first forcible evictions of peasants occurred in 1989.  
With the fall of the dictator in February of 1989, peasants initiated seven months 
of protest activity in the Paraguyan capital.  After being attacked by Paraguayan 
security forces with dogs and dispersed, public opinion turned in favor of the 
peasants and action was taken upon their petition as the Congress promulgated 
Ley 08/89 in September of 1989 and a Presidential decree for measurement and 
division of up to 5,000 hectares.84  A lethargic and corrupt legal system slowed 
action on the issue until 1992 when all efforts to resolve the dilemma came to a 
halt with the adoption of the new national constitution.  Five thousand hectares 
was finally divided amongst 600 peasant families from the pueblos of Juan de 
Mena and Cleto Romero in December of 1993 after eight years of struggle.   
Yet, the struggle did not end so easily.  On November 20, 1995, José 
Martínez was assassinated in el Asentamiento Guido Almada I, Distrito de Juan 
de Mena.  Martinez was a member of La Organización de Lucha por la Tierra 
(OLT) who continued to struggle with Unión Paraguaya, S.A in the tit-for-tat 
                                                 
84 Fogel notes that the presidential decreed ordered the peasants themselves to pay the costs of 
travel and support for the state functionaries sent to measure and divide the land (Fogel, Luchas 
95) 
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 challenges that followed the expropriation of the immediate domain of the land 
occupation.  Access to roads, markets, political actors and other infrastructure 
required to run the new settlement still remain largely under the control of the 
latifundista.  The presumed assassins were armed civilians in the service of Unión 
Paraguaya.  Representatives of the new settlements complain that paramilitary 
groups funded by Unión Paraguaya circulate freely throughout the settlements 
trespassing on private land, erecting checkpoints, asking for documentation and 
threatening the leaders of the new communities.  No official police action has ever 
been taken upon these reports or the murder of José Martínez (U.S. Department of 
State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1997: Paraguay).  The OLT 
remains the dominant social organization in the new communities and a 
permanent fixture in the ongoing struggle to secure not only ownership but free 
access to land for the peasants of the new settlements born out of the struggle for 
land. 
It is clear that even local peasant groups that are well organized from the 
beginning tend to evolve from an informal organization based in the community 
to a regional or national organization with the aid and direction of non-
governmental organizations.  In the case of Juan de Mena and Cleto Romero, 
these communities began in comisiones vecinales, which evolved into the OLT 
over a period of eight years.  The OLT is a regional peasant organization that is 
also a member of La Mesa Coordinadora Nacional de Organizaciones 
Campesinas (MCNOC), the largest peasant organization in Paraguay. 
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 The second type of local peasant organization reinforces this pattern.  
Even without initial organization, peasant organizations that have been formed 
spontaneously by diverse members of a region without prior organization evolve 
in the same way.  This second method involves an initial invasion of a property, 
then an attempt to organize and petition for the legalization of that occupation.  
This process is exemplified by the case of Capi’ibary in the Department of San 
Pedro.  The peasant organization, la Mesa Coordinadora del Asentamiento 
Agroforestal de Capi’ibary eventually formed out of the spontaneous invasion of 
a forest reserve of more than 19,000 hectares owned and jointly managed by el 
Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganaderi a (MAG) and the Japan International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA).  The first occupations occurred in January of 1990 
(although peasants continued to join the occupation up to and including 1992).  
One peasant relates the diverse and spontaneous nature of the occupation:  
Vine a esta ocupacion en 1992, pero despues de tres desalojos la 
gente vino de distintos lugares, de La Colmena, Caaguazu, Fina-i, 
SIDEPAR, la mayoria se traslado aca  porque las tierra no servian, 
en los asentamientos que abandonaron.  De distintos lugares se 
llego a este asentamiento. (Fogel, Luchas 104) 
 
[I came to this occupation in 1992, but after three evictions the 
people came from all over (to join us), from La Colmena, 
Caaguazu, Fina-I, SIDEPAR, the majority moved here because 
their land was no good in the settlements they abandoned.  
(People) came from all over the place to join this colony]. 
 
Peasant organization arises to justify the presence of the peasants and the land 
invasion itself, not vice-versa.   
The first repressions occurred quickly in the same month the occupations 
began.  The Paraguayan infantry supported by local police invaded the settlement 
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 on January 20, 1990.  Every single rancho was burned as the armed forces 
invaded the settlement and physically evicted the peasants from the property.  
Beatings of both men and women, imprisonment of the peasant leaders and the 
burning death of one child (Aldo Brizuela) were the result.  The peasants were 
evicted again in June of 1990 and also in 1991, 1993, and twice in 1994 (Fogel, 
Luchas 104-107).85  Three times, the settlement was invaded, the peasants were 
beaten, the leaders were jailed and the rest were removed to live under tarps along 
the river Capi’ibary, located approximately two miles from western edge of the 
settlement and five miles from the town of Capi’ibary.  In September of 1994, the 
peasants initiated an occupation of the Plaza de la Independencia (directly in 
front of the national congressional building) for ten months and 17 days.  This 
occupation involved at any given time up to 300 peasants living under tarps and 
occupying the plaza 24 hours a day.  
A large part of the problem was that the peasants were invading a forest 
reserve that was jointly managed by a Japanese agency.  The state authorities 
argued that they could not break a treaty with the Japanese to reforest the reserve.  
Authorities (primarily MAG) dismissed the peasant claim to the land on the basis 
of the special status of the reserve as well.  As early as 1992, the peasants 
discovered and pointed out that agents in MAG were planting and harvesting 
marijuana in extensive cultivations throughout the reserve as well as depredating 
the reserve of its most valuable lumber in rollotrafico.86  They clamored for 
                                                 
85 These events were confirmed in my own interviews with the leaders of the Asentamiento 
Capi’ibary in August of 2001. 
86 Rollotrafico is the practice of illegally harvesting valuable lumber from state or private land.  In 
most instances, rollotrafico is committed by servants of the state who, in their capacity as 
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 justice but received only detentions and evictions until eighty peasants blocked 
and surrounded MAG employees en flagrante while harvesting lumber with large 
equipment.  Although MAG officials were loathe to surrender their lucrative 
clandestine harvesting operation, the peasants blackmailed the agency into signing 
a document in support of their petition for the land, permitting the employees, the 
equipment and the evidence of wrongdoing to exit the scene.  
Not only did the peasants demonstrate that the state was not executing its 
responsibility for the preservation of the environment but the peasants planted 
30,000 tree seedlings in beds for transplantation and made a formal proposal to 
the Director of El Servicio Forestal Nacional (SFN) that they were planning “un 
asentamiento agroforestal,” or an ecologically planned settlement.  As proof, they 
offered the presence of the 30,000 seedlings and suggested that once granted their 
lots, they would dedicate at least half of that land to a forest reserve, using the 
other half for cultivation.  With the adoption of this ecologically friendly rhetoric 
the rather disorganized collection of peasants became la Mesa Coordinadora del 
Asentamiento Agroforestal de Capi’ibary in December of 1992 representing more 
than 500 peasant families or approximately 3,000 peasants who occupied the 
forest reserve at that time. 
The problem of rollotrafico persisted as local political agents as well as 
employees of the Servicio Nacional Forestal quickly filled the vacuum left in the 
absence of MAG.  Seccionaleros from the pueblo Capi’ibary organized the theft 
of lumber from the reserve by various groups of peasant occupants.  Internal 
                                                                                                                                                 
caretakers of vast plots of state owned properties, utilize their office to depredate the very forests 
they have been given the responsibility of protecting.  The very fact that this crime has a specific 
name indicates its widespread practice.  
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 struggles erupted including assassinations of peasant leaders, petitions for 
enforcement of the rule of law to state authorities and, finally, armed 
confrontations between the peasants themselves.  In the culminating instance, 100 
peasants armed with machetes and a few firearms confronted a group of their 
colleagues whose illegal lumber harvesting undermined their argument for the 
establishment of an ecologically sensitive settlement.  
In July of 1993, the leaders of la Mesa Coordinadora del Asentamiento 
Agroforestal de Capi’ibary (MCAAC) attended the congress of the Coordinacion 
Nacional de Trabajadores (CNT) (one of the largest and most important unions in 
the country) at which meeting they made national contacts (most notably with 
CIPAE, which began to train them in organizational strategies).  In 1994, the 
peasants received the support of La Organizacion de la Lucha por la Tierra 
(OLT).87  Finally, through the efforts of Dr. Digno Britez of CIPAE, El Servicio 
Nacional Forestal (SNC) and the IBR abandoned legal action against the peasants 
and permitted the measurement and assignation of plots for 585 families over a 
total of 6,000 hectares renamed La Colonia Agroforestal de Capi’ibary.  As of 
August of 2001, the lots remain untitled and the peasants remain squatters on state 
land (Ruiz, Interview). 
La Mesa Coordinadora del Asentamiento Agroforestal de Capi’ibary 
evolved throughout the conflict, finally resulting in the fracturing of the group 
into smaller units organized by family and barrio in the asentamiento.  As of July 
of 2001, those groups and their membership were as follows: La Organizacion de 
                                                 
87 In fact, the leader of the OLT, Cesar Melgarejo and six local leaders were jailed in 1994, 
resulting in the occupation of the Municipal building of Capi’ibary and a senatorial intervention 
that freed the prisoners (Fogel, Luchas 106). 
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 la Lucha para la Tierra (OLT), with 300 members in La Colonia Agroforestal de 
Capi’ibary; El Comite de Productores Kokue Poty (CPKP), with 55 members; La 
Asociacion Campesina de La Colonia Agroforestal de Capi’ibary (ACAP), with 
100 members; La Asociacion Campesina de Desarrollo Integrado (ACADEI), 
with 30 members and La Asociacion de Productores Organicos (APRO), with 8 
members (Fogel, Luchas 119, Rui z, Interview).88
The evolutionary pattern of the struggle for land in the Reserva 
Agroforestal de Capi’ibary resulted in the spontaneous formation of a unified 
peasant group and then the fragmentation of that group into smaller, local and 
national groups.  Several of these local groups maintain links to national groups 
(ACADEI and the OLT are members of MCNOC the largest peasant organization 
in the country).  However, in contrast to the examples of Juan de Mena and Cleto 
Romero (who have adhered unanimously to the OLT), the La Mesa Coordinadora 
del Asentamiento Agroforestal de Capi’ibary disintegrated with the ending of 
hostilities.  These two cases are paradigmatic examples of successful peasant 
protest in Paraguay and, for that reason, bear importantly upon the definition of 
success in future land struggles.  First, it is important to note the real difference in 
the outcomes of these two struggles.  In Juan de Mena and Cleto Romero, armed 
confrontations with the latifundista La Union Paraguaya remain as threats even 
to this day; whereas, in the case of La Reserva Agroforestal de Capi’ibary, all 
hostilities ended as soon as the IBR and El Servicio Nacional Forestal (SNF) 
                                                 
88 Membership numbers represent only heads of households and must be recalculated to include 
spouses and dependents who also work in the fields and, in some cases, even possess their own 
land.  These numbers should be multiplied by 6 to represent the average number of household 
members represented by a single socio of a group. 
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 retracted their claims to the land.  It may be important to note that the difference 
in the evolutionary trajectories of these two cases may have affected their 
outcomes.  
In the case of Capi’ibary, the peasants no longer required organization and 
discipline to achieve the goal of the struggle.  Smaller, more individual goals 
divided the inhabitants of the settlement.  El Comite  de Agricultores Kokue Poty 
focused their efforts upon the construction of a food cooperative and a dairy 
project, while others focused upon well-drilling projects (those who lived furthest 
from the Rio Capi’ibary) and others sought individual privacy (more than 100 
families in the settlement belong to no organization whatsoever).  Whereas, in the 
case of Cleto Romero and Juan de Mena, constant hostilities and threats are 
traded between employees of La Union Paraguaya and peasants, notably the 
peasant leaders of the OLT. 
Important lessons about organization and the long-term nature of the 
struggle can certainly be learned by comparisons of today’s struggles with those 
of Capi’ibary and Cleto Romero and Juan de Mena.  The very same struggles 
have repeatedly occurred in the intervening years.  In the past year alone hundreds 
of peasant occupations have been reported in the media, and there are certainly 
more that have gone unreported.  Similar patterns of invasion, occupation, 
desalojo and resistance over a long-term struggle have appeared in various 
locations throughout the country. 
However, there may be important differences between the struggles in 
Capi’ibary and Cleto Romero and Juan de Mena and contemporary protests.  The 
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 1980s and early 1990s were an important and successful period in the Paraguayan 
land reform struggle.  Successes like those of Capi’ibary and Cleto Romero and 
Juan de Mena had never before been seen in Paraguayan history and influenced 
many imitators.  However, very few successes have been achieved since that time 
and nothing on the order of 5,000 hectares of land granted to protesting peasants 
has been seen since Capi’ibary.89    
Piven and Cloward’s analysis of poor people’s movements provides an 
important clue to understanding the striking success of Capi’ibary and Cleto 
Romero and Juan de Mena and the relative dearth of successful protests since.  
They point out that social protests by the poor consist of little more than the 
withdrawal of the consent to be governed or, as they put it, “a negative sanction, 
the withdrawal of a crucial contribution on which other depend, and it is therefore 
a natural resource for exerting power over others” (Piven and Cloward, Poor 
People’s 24).  However, the power of this negative sanction is limited by the 
inability of the poor to withdraw any crucial resources from the society in order to 
force other social groups to comply with their demands.  Simply put, the poor 
have nothing to bargain with.  In the present case, the Paraguayan peasant 
controls no resource whose withdrawal threatens the stability or integrity of the 
society; therefore, peasant protest does little but exhaust the limited resources of 
the peasant.  Nevertheless, the protests by the peasants of Capi’ibary and Cleto 
Romero and Juan de Mena did manage to successfully compel the government to 
                                                 
89 There are some comparable struggles including, most notably, the Antebi Property which 
consists of  220,000 hectares that the national government has agreed, in principle, to expropriate 
but which has been stalled by a lack of political interest and funding.  It will take many years 
before this property is expropriated for the peasants if ever. 
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 respond.  How?  I would like to suggest that an important exception to Piven and 
Cloward’s rule of modest resources (if I may coin the term) afforded these 
particular protests a unique opportunity to succeed. 
Piven and Cloward note that timing and serendipity can be essential to the 
success or failure of social movements by the poor: 
But protest movements do not arise during ordinary periods; they 
arise when large-scale changes undermine political stability.  It is 
this context, as we said earlier, that gives the poor hope and makes 
insurgency possible in the first place.  It is this context that also 
makes political leaders somewhat vulnerable to protest by the poor.  
At times of rapid economic and social change, political leaders are 
far less free either to ignore disturbances or to employ punitive 
measures. (Piven and Cloward, Poor People’s 28) 
 
Thus, the success of the protests at Capi’ibary and Cleto Romero and Juan 
de Mena could be attributable to the instability of government at the time of the 
protests.  When examined in this light, el Dia de Perros and the long occupation 
of the Plaza de la Independencia seem to have occurred at time of high instability 
in the Paraguayan government.   
El Di a de Perros occurred immediately after the fall of the dictator.  Still 
in the infancy of its control and vulnerable to a coup of its own, the public display 
of repressive techniques strongly identified with the defunct and vilified old 
regime threatened to undermine the moral authority of the Rodriguez regime.  
Quickly caving into the demands of the wronged peasants was an expedient 
decision calculated to differentiate the new regime from the old.  Ultimately, the 
decision had little to do with the plight of the peasants and a great deal to do with 
the instability of the new government.  The success of the Capi’ibary protests 
likely had far more to do with political instability than successful strategy given 
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 the timing of the protest’s success.   The protests at Capi’ibary lasted from 1990 
to 1994.  This period coincides with the first national, democratic elections in the 
nation’s history in 1993.  Juan Carlos Wasmosy won the presidential election on 
May 9, 1993 by a margin of just over 7% in an election that featured many 
irregularities.   With an estimated one million of the total of two million voters, 
peasants constituted the most important voting block in the nation.  In addition, 
Wasmosy represented the first Paraguayan president not affiliated with the 
military in nearly a century, only adding to the instability of his government even 
after he was elected.  A strong case can be made that the peasants of Capi’ibary 
were not repressed in 1993 by the ruling Colorado party in order to cultivate votes 
for the election of that same year and that those same peasants were granted 6,000 
hectares of land the following year in order to buttress support for a civilian 
president who survived two separate military coup attempts during his five year 
term.    
On the other hand, the expansion of the organizational capabilities of 
national peasant organizations as a result of the successes of Juan de Mena and 
Cleto Romero on the one hand and Capi’ibary on the other may importantly 
qualify Piven and Cloward’s rule of modest resources and its important exception 
in the case of socio-political instability.  It is important to note the utility of local 
organization that Juan de Mena and Cleto Romero received from the La 
Organización de Lucha por la Tierra (OLT) and that Capi’ibary received from La 
Mesa Coordinadora del Asentamiento Agroforestal de Capi’ibary (MCAAC).  
The MCAAC even sent a representative to the congress of the Coordinacio n 
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 Nacional de Trabajadores (CNT) in order to seek national recognition, which 
turned out to be crucial in the negotiations with the IBR and the SNF.  It is 
important to note that with the aide of the CNT and more formal coordination and 
organization, the protests at Capi’ibary were successful in half the time of the 
protests at Juan de Mena and Cleto Romero.  There may be some merit to the idea 
that organizational skills and tactics made the Capi’ibary protests more effective 
more quickly than the less organized protests by the peasants of Juan de Mena 
and Cleto Romero. 
If organization did indeed contribute to the efficiency of the Capi’ibary 
protests, then the land reform struggle is heading in the right direction.  The La 
Mesa Coordinadora Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas (MCNOC) and the 
Federacion Nacional Campesina (FNC) are two umbrella organizations that have 
developed the power to call peasants from across the country to protest marches.  
The effectiveness of these groups was demonstrated in the March 13, 2001 protest 
that rallied 50,000 peasants to the capital and the August 28, 2002 protests that 
coordinated roadblocks in eleven different departments. 
With this new level of organizational strength, peasant squatters have 
abandoned the tactic of direct negotiation with government authorities.  Even with 
the aid of NGOs like CIPAE only 50 of a total of 149 cases between 1989 and 
1993 resulted in the legalization of the squatting community.  In lieu of legal 
efforts, peasants have adopted a coalition building strategy which allies local 
groups and causes with national groups and causes.  Local groups meet with and 
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 petition with national groups such as the MCNOC and the FNC90 who then place 
local demands upon their national agendas when country-wide mobilizations 
bring legislators and other state officials to the bargaining table in exchange for 
local group participation in national protest activity.91   
Thus, a relationship of mutual support has developed into an expansion of 
the medida de fuerza or show of strength, which the peasants of Capi’ibary and 
Juan de Mena and Cleto Romero utilized to little real effect in their struggles.  
The peasants of Capi’ibary endured ten months and 17 days of protest, living 
under tarps in La Plaza de la Independencia in front of the National 
Congressional Building and the peasants of Juan de Mena and Cleto Romero to 
spend seven months of living under tarps in various plazas throughout the city.  
However, the achievement of the goals of the protests came not from these 
physical displays, but from other factors. 
Today, peasant protest for land reform takes two distinct forms.  Locally, 
these protests take the form of land occupations and a limited number of protest 
rallies.  Nationally, these rallies take the form of protest marches and roadblocks.   
In addition, national peasant organizations mobilize many smaller local peasant 
organizations for shows of strength that challenge the government to act upon 
demands issued by those same national organizations.  However, national peasant 
                                                 
90 The MNCOC and the FNC are the two largest national peasant organizations in the country.  
Many others exist as well including the CNLTV (Coordinacion Nacional de Lucha por la Tierra y 
la Vivienda), the MCP (Movimiento Campesino), the ONAC (Organizacion Nacional Campesina), 
the UNC-ONONDIVEPA (Union Nacional Campesina), and the CONAPA (Coordinacion 
Nacional de Productores Acricolas). 
91 This has proven a more expedient means of engaging the Paraguayan legislature than the legal 
route which passess through the mediation of the IBR.  The legal system has demonstrated 
strategic sloth, bogging down legal proceedings to purposesly enervate the land reform struggle by 
taking years to process the appropriate paperwork. 
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 organizations have little to do with initiating peasant land occupations, local 
roadblocks or the local organizations permanently occupying la Plaza de la 
Independencia.  Such protest activity has continued, unabated since the mid 
1980s. 
There are an estimated 300,000 sintierras in the Paraguayan countryside.  
Young men and women without an adequate education and without prospects 
save only the ability and desire to cultivate the earth inhabit these communities.  
From the peasant’s perspective, cultivation of the soil is a right, a responsibility 
and a way of life.  A study conducted by the European Union and the Republic of 
Paraguay in the Department of San Pedro, denominated Proyecto ALA studied 
peasant farmers of the region from January 1993 to June 1998 and determined 
that the peasants participated in an agrarian culture that equipped them with the 
following skills: 
1) Ellos saben manejar una finca de 10 hectareas con una gran 
diversidad de cultivos y actividades. ¿Cua ntos ingenieros seri an 
capaces de hacerlo tan bien? Conocen aquellos trucos del manejo 
de pequenas areas de tierra para hacerlas producir mucho 
durante muchos anos, cuando la agricultura mecanizada de 
monocultivo en finca de tamano parecido desemboco en pasturas 
pobres…justamente por el mal manejo del los suelos.  Con su area 
reducida, los campesinos acostumbran mantener mayor diversidad 
en la finca lo cual es provechoso para la rotacion de parcelas y 
para mantener posibilidades de reciclaje de nutrientes: producen 
ma s a un costo menor. (Programa ALA 83) 
 
[They know how to manage a farm of ten hectares with a great 
diversity of crops and activities.  How many engineers are capable 
of doing so well?  They [the peasants] know the tricks for 
managing small plots of land in order to make them produce a lot 
over many years, while monocultural, mechanized agriculture in 
farms of a similar size leaves impoverished pasturage as a result of 
the poor management of the soil.  With a reduced area, peasants 
are accustomed to maintaining a greater diversity on the farm that 
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 is convenient for the rotation of parcels and for preserving the 
possibility for the recycling of nutrients: they produce more with 
fewer costs]. 
 
2) Son depositarios de conocimientos milenarios sobre plantas 
medicinales, a rboles del bosque, plantas ornamentales, relaciones 
biologicas entre diferentes especies (sic), etc…Cuando en el 
Proyecto ALA realizamos las primeras pra cticas de manejo de 
bosque, donde era prioritario proteger del machete las plantitas 
pequenas de especias forestales valiosas del bosque, los 
campesinos sabi an identificarlas mejor que los tecnicos 
entendidos.  Ellos conocen de su entorno y conocer el entorno no 
es precisamente ignorancia. (Programa ALA 83) 
 
[They are depositories of knowledge thousands of years old about 
medicinal plants, forest trees, ornamental plants, biological 
relations between different species, etc…. When we realized the 
first forest management practices in the ALA Project, it was a 
priority to protect the valuable seedlings from the machetes (as the 
planting area was being cleared).  The peasants knew how to 
identify those plants better than the experts did.  They know their 
environment and knowing one’s environment is not exactly 
ignorance]. 
 
3) Para manejar los suelos, con las limitaciones tecnicas que tienen, 
han sabido adaptar me todos de mejoramiento gracias a epocas de 
descanso, cobertura con arbustos, etc.... (Programa ALA 83) 
 
[In order to manage the soil with the technical limitations they 
have, they have learned to adapt (soil) improvement techniques 
discovered during periods of neglect, coverage with bushes, etc...]. 
 
The Proyecto ALA study concluded that not only were peasants culturally 
equipped for farming but that farming was more economically feasible that 
finding employment in other fields.  The study discovered that, with proper 
management, a family of seven (two adults and five children) could generate a 
total of 10,850,000 Guaranies or approximately $1,550 each year on the farm 
(Programa ALA 94).   This monthly income of 778,000 Guaranies or just over 
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 $111, which compares favorably to the 1996 monthly minimum wage of 531,000 
Guaranies or nearly $79 per month (Programa ALA 94).   
 The peasant is not afraid of hard work on the farm with little money.  In 
fact, he or she would make considerably less money by leaving the farm and 
traveling to the departmental or national capital to look for a minimum wage job 
that promises 531,000 Guaranies each month, but which, in actuality, will pay far 
less.  To the peasant, there is no alternative but to struggle for land in order to 
preserve his or her ties to the family, to the community, and to the land and the 
cultural practices that it embodies.  Nearly every young male and female peasant 
wants to emulate the lifestyle epitomized by Juvencio Francisco Gi menez A., the 
owner of a ten-hectare farm in Ara Pyahu in the former Asentamiento Capi’ibary.   
Hoy di a, 2 anos y medio despues, mi chacra es una finca de 
aprendizaje, digno de mostrar a cualquier persona, ya sea 
campesino o tecnico de otras institutions u ONG.  Tengo 7 
hectareas desmontadas haciendo chacra sin quema, con curvas de 
nivel y cultivo en foga las 7 hectareas.  En total tengo 4 hectareas 
de naranjo tardio, 3 de reforestacion con paraiso gigante, cortina 
rompeviento con eucalipto y paraiso gigante, una hectarea de 
rozado sin quema con cultivos de banano, mamo n, mango y 
enriquecimiento con arboles nativos, 2 hecta reas de reserva de 
bosque natural.  Adema s poseo variados cultivos de subsistencia y 
de renta.  En la parte de animales menores poseo una gran 
cantidad de pavos, patos, guineas, gallinas, y cerdos. Tambie n 
tengo algunas lecheras, y un pequeno colmenar.  Ademas poseo un 
horno para aprovechar el corte hecho en las chacras y en el 
rozado sin quema.  Tambien adopte  una tecnologi a de Proyecto 
Post-Cosheca que es el secadero de granos que esta  teniendo 
ahora mismo espigas de mai z.  En mi chacra trabajamos todos por 
igual, mi esposa, mis hijas y mis hijos que desempenan el trabajo 
igual que cualquier agricultor.  Solamente les cuento como estoy 
trabajando en mi chacra y estoy feliz con mis 10 hectareas y no la 
venderia ni por todo el oro del mundo: AMO MI CHACRA! 
(Programa ALA 38) 
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 [Today, two years later, my farm is a model farm, I am proud to 
show any person, whether peasant or extension agent from other 
institutions or an NGO.  I have seven hectares cleared without 
slashing and burning, with contour farming throughout the entire 
seven hectares.  In total, I have four hectares of late-market orange 
grove, three hectares reforested with giant paradise trees, 
windbreaks of eucalyptus and giant paradise trees, one hectare of 
virgin, unburned soil with bananas, papaya and enriched with 
native trees, two hectares reserved for natural forest.  In addition, I 
have various subsistence and cash crops.  In terms of small 
animals, I have a great number of turkeys, ducks, guinea hens, 
chickens and pigs.  I also have some dairy cows and a small 
beehive.  I also have an oven for taking advantage of the trimming 
(of trees) done in the farms and in the virgin, unburned plot (in 
order to make charcoal).  I have also adopted the technology of the 
Post-Harvest Project, a grain dessicator that has ears of corn it right 
now.  On my farm, we all work as equals: my wife, my daughters 
and my sons who participate equally in the work like any other 
farmer.  I can only tell you that I am happy on my farm with my 
ten hectares and that I wouldn’t sell it for all of the gold in the 
world: I LOVE MY FARM!] 
 
Now, while this may be a highly idealized portrait of the results of 
redistributing land to peasants, it is a fair representation of the goal in the 
mind of many of the sintierras clamoring for land.  They feel strongly 
that, if given the chance to own land, they can prove themselves through 
hard work and benefit themselves, their families, and their communities, 
as well as their nation’s economy.  
A long history of land inequity founded in the initial conquest of 
the nation has structured the use, distribution, and struggle for land even to 
the present day.  History is essential for understanding this phenomenon.  
Today’s concepts of land and land ownership were established in the past 
and re-emerge as cultural attitudes today.  The peasant belief in the 
dictum, “he who works the land, owns the land” grows directly out of a 
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 long history of governmental concessions to peasants capped by the three 
decade long IBR colonization program that ended scarcely ten years ago.  
While the peasantry is not taught the history of land tenure practices in 
Paraguay, their culture has adapted to historical changes and instantiated 
them as real social practices.  Today’s peasant land invasions are the 
culmination of a long series of battles for the exclusive control of the 
majority of arable land in the country.  Land ownership is today in 
Paraguay just as important a marker of wealth and citizenship as it was for 
the hacendados under the colonial rulership of Spain 500 years ago. 
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 III. Peasant Protest Activity and the Complex Character of Land Reform 
Argumentation 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
 Today’s protest strategies in the Paraguayan land reform struggle have 
been both enabled and constrained by historical precedents.  The way that the 
peasant looks at land has been historically determined: the expectation that 
peasants are farmers, the central importance of land ownership in small scale 
agriculture, and the patronizing relationship between peasant as citizen and the 
national government as patron are all dimensions of the current situation that 
carry heavy imprints from the past.  The history of land politics in Paraguay has 
created a set of expectations about land, citizenship and politics in the minds of 
peasants.  Modern peasant protest has manifested itself as a set of demands upon 
the national government to meet the historical expectations of peasant society 
about the management and politics of land in the country.  Yet, historical 
reflection alone is not sufficient to draw a complete picture of the nature of the 
struggle.  Any study of peasant protest behavior must address the demands and 
argument strategies growing out of the historical expectations that were already 
explored in the previous chapter.     
 Paraguayan history, culture, and language contribute to land reform 
arguments.  The various protests, marches, land invasions, and demands are in 
themselves actions whose meaning lies in their argumentative content.  The 
answer to the question, “What is the character of land reform struggle?” is public 
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 argument.  Another question, “What form or forms does it take?” can be answered 
in like manner. 
 This chapter of the dissertation identifies the public arguments employed 
in the Paraguayan land reform struggle.  In this task, it will be important to 
examine the different sources of argumentation, making distinctions between the 
peasants themselves and the organizations that represent them.  In addition, I will 
identify the specific material, economic and cultural contexts for these arguments.  
My analysis of the public arguments for land reform will focus upon six primary 
areas: 1) argument strategies, 2) the sources of argumentation, 3) the different 
media for these arguments, 4) the specific content of arguments offered for land 
reform, 5) the material factors and the cultural context(s) constraining 
argumentation, and 6) the coherence of the arguments themselves.  
 The compound nature of peasant land reform protest activity reveals five 
basic argument strategies in Paraguay: land occupations; protest marches; 
highway blockades; occupational protests; and verbal arguments delivered to 
crowds, legislators, and the news media.  Each of these forms of protest is 
commonly used in combination with another.  In many cases, different sectors of 
the land reform struggle use different methods of protest to achieve the same goal.  
While these forms of protest are varied, it becomes evident that peasant protest 
has two distinct aspects: the discursive and the non-discursive.   
 Surprisingly, verbal argument may be less important than non-discursive 
forms of argumentation.  Traditional analyses of protest argument strategies have 
focused on the verbal elements of protest activities.  However, in the case of the 
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 Paraguayan land reform movement, illiterate peasants who often speak only 
poorly the language of those they confront have consistently employed non-
discursive rather than discursive strategies in their protest.  Non-discursive protest 
involves the use of the body to convey a message of protest.92  For example, the 
protestor who sets up a tent in La Plaza de la Independencia and lives there for 
five months beneath a banner calling for land reform conveys far more than the 
mere message of the banner itself.  The protester’s determination, willingness to 
make sacrifice, visible impoverishment, and suffering communicate a clear 
message to legislators, journalists, and the public.  A protester who participates in 
a roadblock serves a synecdochical function.  He or she represents on the smaller 
scale of the individual act the critical impact of the land reform struggle upon the 
greater society, including, but not limited to the economic effect (as commercial 
traffic grinds to a halt for the five to six hours the highway is closed).  Also 
represented in the act of the roadblock are the determination of the peasantry, the 
potential for violence in the struggle, as well as the symbolic breaking of the 
social contract (if the government does not support and uphold the law in the 
defense of the peasants, then the peasants will not support and uphold the law in 
recognition of the system of governance).  Non-discursive forms of protest are a 
complex technique for conveying multiple symbolic messages in an effective way 
for a largely illiterate population. 
                                                 
92 Kevin Deluca has pointed out the physical and non-discursive nature of protest activity utilized 
by such groups as Earth First!, Act Up and Queer Nation.  Arguing that physical bodies transcend 
the traditional limits of rhetorical analysis, Deluca suggests that such argumentation is grounded in 
a form of argument that is deliberately non-rational and extra-linguistic (Deluca 12). 
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  While peasants employ both discursive and non-discursive arguments, the 
use of non-discursive arguments is necessary because it is the only route left to 
the peasant for self-expression.  As I will demonstrate, the peasantry is so deeply 
dominated economically, politically, socially and ideologically, that discursive 
arguments have been co-opted by the hegemonic regime of the state.  Non-
discursive attempts at self-expression, on the other hand, present a new challenge 
to a very old system of domination and provide opportunities for expression that 
lie outside of the cultural territory colonized by the state apparatus.   
 This chapter will explore specific argumentation strategies featured in the 
Paraguayan land reform struggle.  Part one traces the evolution of argument 
themes over time, showing how peasant demands and state responses have shifted 
in response to each other, as well as how major historical events have enabled and 
constrained specific lines of argumentation in the struggle.  Part two elucidates 
the multivocal quality of the struggle, showing how various actors, operating on 
national, international, and grassroots levels, articulate distinct arguments and fill 
unique protest roles.  Part three considers how physical sites of protest activity 
shape arguments in the land reform struggle, while part four investigates the 
rhetorical ontology of the struggle, focusing on the role of counter-argumentation 
 
3.2  The Evolution of Argument Themes 
 
 While the specific arguments offered in the course of the struggle have 
changed little in the last 480 years, recent argument strategies have emphasized 
different protest tactics in response to the evolution of exigencies in the rhetorical 
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 context.93  Three basic argument strategies have defined the land reform struggle 
since the colonization of Paraguay in the 16th Century: the social argument, the 
historical argument, and the economic argument.  Each of these strategies is still 
prominent in today’s struggle. 
The social argument strategy is premised on the idea that the proper 
management of the state’s resources and the recognition of peasant rights via the 
enforcement of the Constitucion Nacional 1992 and its legal precedents94 will 
result in the settlement of all land disputes in the favor of the peasants.  I use the 
term “social” here to categorize the argument strategy because that term indicates 
domain of the arguments as perceived by the peasants who employ them.  
Arguing for land reform in purely social terms, the peasantry strengthens its 
argument by attributing the rampant corruption, nepotism, graft, embezzlement 
and the private use of state property by state functionaries as well as politicians to 
the breakdown of the relationship of the state to the peasantry.   
                                                 
93 One must accept the notion that anti-globalization arguments are in their basic character, no 
different than nationalist arguments developed after the end of the War of the Triple Alliance. 
94 Article 128 of the Constitucion Nacional de la Republica del Paraguay 1967 recognized the 
peasant’s right to contribute to the national economy: “Esta Constitucion consagra la Reforma 
Agraria como uno de los factores fundamentales para lograr el bienestar rural, que consiste en la 
incorporacion efectiva de la poblacion campesina al desarrollo economico y social de la Nacion. 
A este efecto se adoptaran sistemas justos de distribucion, propiedad y tenencia de la tierra, se 
organizaran el credito y la asistencia tecnica y social; se fomentara la creacion de cooperativas y 
de otras asociaciones similares; y se promovera el incremento de la produccio n, su 
industrializacion y la racionalizacion del mercado, de modo que permita a la poblacion 
campesina lograr su mejoramiento economico, como garantia de su libertad y dignidad, y como 
fundamento del bienestar nacional” (Constitucion). [This Constitution consecrates agrarian reform 
as one of the fundamental factors for achieving rural wellbeing, which consists of the effective 
incorporation of the peasant population in the social and economic development of the nation.  To 
this end, fair systems of distribution, ownership and land occupation have been adopted; credit and 
technical and social assistence have been organized; the creation of cooperatives and other similar 
associations have been promoted; and the improvement of production, industrialization and 
management of the market have been promoted in a way that allows the peasant population to 
realize economic gains, as a guarantee of liberty and dignity and as a foundation for the national 
wellbeing]. 
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  Peasants argue that the IBR ought to function properly as the defender of 
the peasant right to land ownership.  In their view, not only the IBR, but the 
Banco de Desarollo Rural (BDR) and MAG should also identify and support 
peasant needs.  This line of argument receives support from the notion that the 
implicit social contract between the peasantry and the rest of the Paraguyan 
society is abrogated by government corruption.  The implicit social contract is as 
follows: if the peasants demonstrate responsible execution of their duties to the 
state as they did in the Chaco War and the War of the Triple Alliance and at 
present with their economic contribution to the state, the state will take 
responsibility for caring for the needs of the peasants, principally, supplying them 
land.  The peasant believes that “los Asuncenos viven del sudor de los 
campesinos,” an image the peasant takes pride in (a common expression of the 
peasantry is hay que trabajar para vivir)!  Peasant distaste for government 
officials is evident in such labels as “chupadores del sangre del campesino” and 
jataivy guasu, phrases that translate as “bloodsuckers” and “ticks.”95  Asuncenos 
say the same thing with shame of knowing that their relative prosperity is derived 
from the shameless exploitation of the peasantry.  An uncaring and unresponsive 
government is labeled as sinvergüenza, cara dura or irresponsible by peasants 
who have historically endured their second-class status in the Paraguayan society.   
                                                 
95 The devaluation of non-peasant workers as a means of contrasting and reinforcing the strong 
work-ethic of the peasants is seen in many forms but name-calling is certainly the most prevalent.  
Agronomists with el Servicio de Extension de Agricultura y Ganaderia (SEAG) are viewed as 
lazy because they explain farming but fail to “get their hands dirty.”  Denigrating nicknames take 
the form of nicknames for the agronomists.  I worked with two agronomists in the the Department 
of Guaira whose nicknames were Para Nada [good for nothing] and Ingeniero Tavy [Blockhead 
Engineer].  Foreigners are called gringos (Peace Corps Volunteers are referred to as El Cuerpo de 
Paseo, [the group that passes through]) and light skinned, urban Spanish-speakers are referred to 
as Asuncenos, meaning people who don’t work for a living but who live off the labor of the 
peasants.  
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  Even when the government offers aid to the peasants it is usually an empty 
promise.  Both parties, government officials and peasants alike, understand that 
the second-class status of the peasantry permits this practice of lying to the 
peasant when confronted.  This is reported by a group of peasants who were 
occupying land in Colonia Nanemaitei in 1990: 
 “Nosotros fui mos enganados por las autoridades y los diputados que 
participaron en el desalojo realizado.  Ellos nos prometieron y nos hicieron 
firmar un documento en donde supuestamente se aseguraba que nuestros ranchos 
no serian destruidos” [We were tricked by authorities and the politicians who 
participated in the eviction that occurred.  They promised us and made us sign a 
document in which it was supposedly guaranteed that our shacks would not be 
destroyed] (CIPAE 66).  Afterward, the shacks were destroyed and the peasants 
were not permitted to return to the site.   
 The peasantry labels government functionaries who lie to peasants in order 
to dismiss them as “irresponsible” (the term “responsible” refers not only to one’s 
ability to keep a promise made, but it also implies knowing one’s place in the 
social hierarchy and accepting the responsibility of filling that position in an 
unstable society which requires each Paraguayan to play his or her role lest the 
whole society fail).  Often, the peasant’s preoccupation with the fulfillment of 
governmental responsibilities rests upon his strong belief in the task of societal 
maintenance and role definition rather than upon personal gratification or 
enrichment.  This attitude is typified in a letter sent to the Paraguayan Camara de 
Senadores on July 4, 1989 by peasants of Juan de Mena and Cleto Romero: 
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 Que nuestro problema plantea una cuestion social grave y de 
urgente solucion, dado que nuestras familias subsisten en 
condiciones de extrema pracariedad general que se agudiza con la 
carencia de tierra y el transcurso del tiempo, configurando ello 
una situacion que reclama tambien soluciones Justas enmarcadas 
en principios de Justicia y equidad social, consagrados en la 
Constitucion y las Leyes. (Fogel, Luchas 229) 
 
[Since our problem is a serious social question, it requires urgent 
resolution, given that our families eke out a living in extremely 
precarious conditions that worsen with the scarcity of land and the 
passage of time, creating a situation that also requires just solutions 
underlined by the principles of justice and social equality, 
consecrated in the Constitution and the law].  
 
 This social argument strategy is a direct response to the Paraguayan 
disappointment with democracy.  This letter is a reflection of the high 
expectations that followed the overthrow of the dictator, General Rodriguez’s 
decision to yield power to a democratic government in 1990, the drafting of a new 
constitution in 1992, the election of a democratic government in 1993 and 
continued reform.  However, without the bogeyman in the form of the dictator to 
blame for all of the nation’s social ills, it has slowly become apparent to all 
Paraguayans that government corruption is endemic.  In the wake of the 
dictatorship, rather than reform the corrupt political structure that enriched 
Stroessner and his lieutenants, the government was colonized by political bosses 
who fought and still fight to defend their turf.  Controlling individual ministries or 
subdivisions of ministries, these politicians and government servants utilize state 
funds and institutions to enrich themselves and maintain control over their 
institutional domains.   
 Social argument strategies in the Paraguayan land reform struggle are calls 
for the fulfillment of implicit and explicit social contracts, largely made possible 
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 by the dialectical swing from a culture of repression under the 35 year Stroneato 
to the openness promised by a democratic system.  Social arguments are calls for 
social equity and justice in a social and political system that has long been 
accustomed to ignoring the material needs of the majority of its population for 
more than 500 years. 
 Social arguments offered by peasants for agrarian reform emphasize the 
natural circumstances of the peasant as a citizen farmer and member of the body 
politic.  However, the reality is that land ownership has been the historical 
privilege of the elite class.  Even to this day, land functions as a resource base for 
the political elite in Paraguyan society.  Peasant farming has traditionally been 
tolerated through a practice of benign non-enforcement of private property law.  
This has permitted peasants to survive their second-class status while making 
significant contributions to society in the form of labor and agricultural 
production.  The peasants’ long historical experience of squatting, first in the 
ka’aguygua and in informal asentamientos before the war and their struggles for 
land in the era of the great foreign oligopolists has provided a rich storehouse of 
memories that serves as a basis for contemporary protest arguments. 
 Squatting existed until the end of the War of the Triple Alliance and the 
Chaco War, when foreign interests purchased government and private latifundia 
and insisted on evicting the peasants who squatted that land.96  The peasantry as 
well as those members of the elite who were dispossessed of their lands viewed 
                                                 
96 The Ley de Peonaje Forzoso de 1871 forced peasants off their own farms in the post-war labor 
shortage.  This was followed by the Ley de la Venta de los Yerbales del Estado de 1881, which 
permitted the sale of land to foreigners.  That law was significantly expanded in the Ley de Tierra 
de 1883.  These laws established penalties for squatting, forcing more peasants off the land and 
into the labor market.   
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 these land sales as a loss of the cultural patrimony.  The domination of the 
Paraguayan territory and economy by large foreign corporations such as La 
Industria Paraguaya introduced an attitude of isolationism and even xenophobia 
into a nation that had been isolated by practice under de Francia from 1812 to 
1840 and isolated by law under C.A. Lo pez from 1844 to 1862.  The sudden 
capitulation to foreign domination, from which Paraguay did not completely 
recover until after the Chaco War (1933-1936), was a wound to the national pride 
still felt today. 
 Today, foreigners still own large parcels of land and the peasants feel a 
strong sense of national outrage that foreigners can deprive Paraguayans of access 
to their patrimony, land.   
Los privilegios de los extranjeros siguen vivos y cada vez ma s 
fuertes en nuestro pais.  Hasta en la escuela se prestan para 
campanas en contra nuestra.  Algunas maestros dicen que en el 
Paraguay los campesinos no queremos trabajar, y por ese motivo, 
el gobierno, preocupado por el sistema agrario o la problematica 
agraria, permite la llegada del los extranjeros. Podemos decir 
tambien que los privilegios para los extranjeros constituyen un 
atentado contra la soberania nacional. (…) Cuando los descalzos, 
pobres, sin dientes, con hijos barrigones, y delegados se juntaron 
en Juan E. O’Leary para reclamar tierras, ocuparon la propiedad 
de Englewart, aleman (…) alli  llegaron las fuerzas armadas.  
Fuerzas policiales y del ejercito con uniforme de combate 
actuaron alli , y ya se conocen las consequências, con la muerte de 
Francisco y Aurelio.  Cuando fueron creadas estas fuerzas, sus 
funciones eran distintas: resguardar la soberani a nacional y el 
orden pu blico. Ellos fusilaron a campesinos paraguayos porque 
estos querian trabajar.  El campesinado no puede hacer otra cosa, 
porque no tiene profesion.  Si  no tiene tierra, no puede trabajar, y 
puede (sic) morir de hambre junto a su familia. (Go nzalez 246) 
 
[The privileges of foreigners continue and grow each day more 
powerful in our country.  They even stretch to the schools where 
they campaign against us.  Some teachers say that the peasants in 
Paraguay don’t want to work, and, for that reason, the government, 
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 concerned about the agrarian system or the agrarian problem, has 
allowed the entry of foreigners.  We can also say that privileges for 
foreigners constitute an assault upon the sovereignty of the nation 
…When barefooted, poor, toothless, skinny (peasants) with 
swollen-bellied children gather in Juan E. O’Leary to reclaim land, 
(or) they occupy the property of Englewart, (a) German…the 
armed forces arrive on the scene.  Police and army forces with 
combate equipment take action there, and the consequences are 
already known with the deaths of Francisco and Aurelio.  When 
these forces were created, their functions were distinct: to protect 
the national sovereignty and the public order.  They fired at 
Paraguayan peasants because they (the peasants) wanted to work.  
The peasantry cannot do anything else because they have no other 
skills.  If they don’t have land, they can’t work and they will die 
together with their families]. 
 
 This argument descends from the historically nationalist and even 
xenophobic attitudes developed by an occupied Paraguay after the War of the 
Triple Alliance.  The belief that the peasantry has been and continues to be 
displaced from their rightful lands is a universal attitude among both Paraguayan 
peasants as well as their countrymen in the cities.  It is noteworthy that every 
single Paraguayan peasant I have ever spoken with has remarked upon the wealth 
of the nation’s land resources and the lamentable greed of foreigners who have 
stolen that land from the Paraguayan people.  Another important feature of this 
line of argument is that it absolves the Paraguayan government of responsibility 
for appropriate land distribution.  The government land policy is not perceived as 
adversarial, but as enabling foreign immigration and investment out of a concern 
for the agrarian wellbeing.  I have even heard the repressive tactics of the police 
and military in support of the property rights of foreign land owners described as 
misguided not evil.  Amanzio Ruiz, a victim of some of the most brutal police 
tactics of the post-dictatorship during the desalojos at Capi’ibary, refused to 
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 ascribe a motive to the government’s longtime refusal to support the peasants’ 
right to occupy land in La Reserva Agroforestal de Capi’ibary.  In response to the 
question, “¿Porque el gobierno no apoyo a la peticion de los campesinos de 
Capi’ibary para tener su tierra propia en esa epoca?” [Why did the government 
not support the peasants’ petition for their own land during that period of time?], 
he responded, “No se .” [I don’t know] (Ruiz, Interview). 
 While the Paraguayan peasant truly has trouble imagining how he or she 
can be so thoroughly disenfranchised, immigrants have found Paraguay’s 
traditionally private society, lack of government administration, lax banking laws 
and susceptibility to bribes quite attractive.  From disaffected Nazis like Joseph 
Mengele to Mennonites, Taiwanese, Arabs, Chinese, Japanese, Brazilians and 
Australians, Paraguay has become a haven for those with a penchant for cheap 
land and few laws.  The steady influx of foreign capital has been a boon to the 
national economy and a point of friction with the peasantry who see their 
historical right of access to land for the purpose of agricultural production further 
eroded.  The peasant views access to land as a right earned by the desire to work 
the land, with such labor making an economic contribution to the nation.  In terms 
of rural social values, the peasant can make no greater contribution to his or her 
nation than to work his or her own land independently.  This belief is a strong 
counterpoint to the memory of foreign possession and extraction of national 
resources that began after the War of the Triple Alliance and continues to this 
day. 
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  This argument is famously reflected in Article 114 of the Constitucion 
Nacional 1992 of Paraguay:97
La reforma agraria es uno de los factores fundamentales para 
lograr el bienestar rural. Ella consiste en la incorporación efectiva 
de la población campesina y al desarrollo económico y social de 
la Nación. Se adoptarán sistemas equitativos de distribución, 
propiedad y tenencia de la tierra. (Conferencia Epi scopal 
Paraguaya, 120) 
 
[Agrarian reform is one of the fundamental factors in the 
achievement of rural wellbeing.  This consists of the effective 
incorporation of the peasant population and the economic and 
social development of the Nation.  A fair system for the 
distribution, ownership and titulation of land will be adopted]. 
 
 With the formation of the IBR and the eastward agricultural expansion 
that occurred between 1963 and 1985, there was little reason to employ this line 
of argument.  However, since the stagnation of the Paraguayan economy 
beginning in 1982, and rising unemployment, this argument has become far more 
effective.98  It is important to remember that the audience for peasant arguments is 
not solely comprised of civil servants but the urban population of the country as 
well.  Urban residents have tended to respond to arguments that touched upon 
their own interests and not to those arguments that treated issues unique to the 
peasant experience.  This anti-foreign and nationalist argument stratagem has a 
broad appeal in the country because it is strongly grounded in the nation’s history.   
 Broad based argument strategies have proven critical in recent national 
political struggles.  The union of the urban population and the peasantry has been 
instrumental in supporting what would have otherwise been merely rural uprisings 
                                                 
97 It first appeared in the Constitucion Nacional de la Republica del Paraguay 1967. 
98 1982 signalled the end of construction on the Itaipua Dam project and the artificial 
augmentation of the Paraguayan economy with international loans that were distributed 
throughout the economy to Paraguayan contractors. 
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 in the coup attempt of 1996 and later during the Marzo Paraguayo of 1999.  In a 
more recent case of rural uprising without urban support, a massive peasant 
demonstration with the intention of marching to the capital of Asuncion was 
attacked by the Paraguayan Armed Forces on July 18, 2002 in order to prevent 
that mass of peasants from igniting protest in the capital and potentially receiving 
support from urban Paraguayans (many of whom are peasants who moved to the 
capital in search of employment.  Ultimately, each attempt to link rural protest to 
urban centers and the sympathetic population living there has failed.   
 Gaining momentum as a potential tool for uniting urban and rural 
populations are economic arguments that invoke the preservation of social 
agreements and norms, potentially even norms shared by all Paraguayans; 
however, the actual arguments employed in the land reform struggle have stressed 
the peasant’s contribution to the national welfare rather than the government’s 
failure to live up to its obligations within the social contract. Social arguments 
offered by peasants in support of agrarian reform and land reform have 
emphasized the natural circumstances of the peasant as a farmer and contributor 
to the national economy rather than more universal, pan-national themes.   
 As articulated in the Paraguayan land reform struggle, the economic 
argument for land reform has always made the point that agricultural expansion is 
a way of life representative of rural Paraguayan culture.  One group of 
Paraguayan farmers expresses the economic necessity for land reform in this way: 
En nuestro group tambien hemos visto que yvy tuja, yvy’i (tierra 
vieja, minifundio), son la realidad.  Por ejemplo, en la zona de 
Cordillera, hay gente que tiene 5 Has., y viven alli de cinco a diez 
o quince mienbros de una familia, sin ningun apoyo tecnico o 
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 crediticio.  Por este motivo ya no pueden desarrollarse como 
agricultures en su profesio n.  Por eso much gente emigra al 
extranjero, o form los cordones de la miseria en las distintas 
ciudades. (…) Se pretende llamar reforma agraria a la entrega de 
tierras que se vino haciendo. (…) Nosotros diremos (…) que no se 
cumplio con la mision encomendada por el Estado paraguayo 
para que el I.B.R. sea el instrumento de la reforma agraria en todo 
el pais. (…) Por esto la gente se organiza y toma tierras.  Y sobre 
ellos se lanza a los cuatro vientos acusaciones de todo tipo, 
diciendo que aqui comenzo  la guerrilla y la subversion. (Go nzalez 
247) 
 
[In our group we have also seen the (the problems of ) old land and 
small plots, they are a reality.  For example, in the Cordillera area, 
they are people who have only five hectares of land with which to 
support five, ten or fifteen family members without any technical 
or credit assistance.  This is why they cannot become better 
farmers.  For this reason, many have emigrated to foreign 
countries, or have formed lines of misery in different cities…the 
provision of land that has been done has been called agrarian 
reform…we say…that the mission entrusted by the Paraguayan 
state to the IBR as the instrument of agrarian reform for the whole 
country has not been completed…This is why people organize and 
take land. And they are attacked from all sides with types of 
accusations, saying that here starts guerrilla warfare and 
subversion]. 
 
 Unable to survive in the precarious conditions of their lives as farmers on 
ever diminishing plots with ever growing families, peasants make the case that 
they do not want to seize land but that they have to.  When they do, peasants take 
care to avoid the idea that they are confronting the state.  In fact, the peasants feel 
that they are assisting the state to finish the job that the IBR couldn’t finish.  
Peasant protests for land as well as land invasions and occupations are 
remonstrations for social justice within the boundaries and practices of the state 
from the peasant’s point of view.  
 For the Paraguayan peasant, economic livelihood is intimately linked to 
the idea of land ownership.  Thus, peasants argue for the national expropriation of 
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 land for redistribution to the peasantry in order to address the economic ills of the 
nation.  The assumptions of this argument are that the forcible expropriation of 
land is a necessity of life for peasants suffering under the impoverishment that 
results from minifundizacion or diminishment of peasant land holdings with the 
growth of demand in each generation of rural farmers and that the Paraguayan 
economy is largely dependent upon the agricultural production of the peasantry.  
Leon Lugo Irala, of the Asentamiento El Triunfo, Repatriacion explains his 
economic relationship to the land in this way: 
Mi capital es mi finca, nuestro trabajo, en su integralidad, que 
mantiene la economi a de la familia, asegura el futuro de mis nietos 
y el mio tambien.  Mi finca esta hecha para darme productos a 
corto, mediano y largo plazo.  Estos arboles en crecimiento son 
mis ahorros, que podre utilizar luego en cualquier momento si  
fuera necesario.  Tengo la produccion a mediano plazo como la 
mandarina, naranja y yerba mate, que pronto va a producir.  Yo 
me considero rico en mi finca, con mis a rboles, mis cultivos, mis 
animales, y especialmente mi familia, que siempre nos ayudamos 
en todo. (Programa ALA 19) 
 
[My capital is my farm, (and) our work, in its purpose, is to 
maintain the household economy, assure the future of my 
grandchildren as well as my own future.  My farm is designed for 
short, medium and long-term production.  Those trees growing 
there are my savings and can be used at any moment if becomes 
necessary.  I have medium-term production such as, nectarines, 
oranges and yerba mate that are going to produce soon.  I consider 
myself rich on my farm with my trees, my crops, my animals and 
especially my family, and this always helps us in everything]. 
 
 A peasant with sufficient acreage becomes a self-sufficient, self-made 
entrepreneur whose “capital” is land itself.  Like a good entrepreneur, the good 
farmer has a good business plan and contributes to the nation’s well being by 
creating wealth. 
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  Further refining that position, peasant arguments point out that the 
economic expansion of the 1970s and early 1980s was a result of expanding the 
agricultural frontier (most economists argue that it was largely the result of the 
construction of the $18 billion Itaipua dam project) and that “latifundias 
improductivas” are a disservice to the state.99   Paraguay, as a small, poor country 
surrounded by larger neighbors with larger populations and a variety of natural 
resources must depend its only natural resource, the rosado (virgin land that has a 
dark, red color and is highly productive for agriculture) in order to compete with 
those other nations. 
 A final economic argument employed in this line of reasoning is that 
Paraguay’s present economic problems are largely the result of the government’s 
lack of support for the peasantry.  Given access to land, and sufficient technical 
assistance as well as fair rules for international competition,100 the peasantry will 
gladly fulfill their role as the base of the Paraguyan economy and the foundation 
of the Paraguayan society.  This argument is a direct response to the 
modernization efforts of the Paraguayan government, its entry into MERCOSUR 
and its opening to international trade since the end of the Stroneato.  The neo-
liberal economic position of the government has focused upon infrastructure and 
support for agroexports such as cotton and soybeans.  The peasantry has 
                                                 
99 As defined in Article 116 of the Constitucion Nacional 1992. 
100 The FNC has made price supports for cotton and an agricultural exemption from MERCOSUR 
the basis of its national campaign following the cotton crisis of 1993. 
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 historically targeted local markets with traditional crops including mandi’o, ka’a 
he’e, avati, and kumanda [yucca, sugar cane, corn, and beans].101
 The peasantry has countered the government’s argument by arguing that 
the peasant actually has natural advantages in agricultural production: cheap 
labor, native knowledge, and a will to work.  Candido Barreto of the 
Asentamiento Kira’y made this point in a meeting of peasant leaders with 
agricultural agents: 
Porque el clima depende del hombre, del uso que le da a los 
recursos.  Su manejo esta  en nuestras manos, nos educamos para 
cuidarles y tenemos la oportunidad de recuperarlos de a poco, ya 
que todo es un proceso.  Todos debemos mirar y concientizar a 
nuestras familias, a los vecinos, a nivel nacional. (Fogel, Luchas 
100) 
 
Because the climate depends on mankind, the use of which 
provides (natural) resources.  Their management is in our hands, 
we educate ourselves to care for them and we have the opportunity 
to recuperate them little by little, since everything is a process.  All 
of us ought to take a look and make our families, neighbors and 
(people) at the national level aware. 
 
Anteriormente medio con vergüenza decia yo que era agricultor.  
Pero ahora lo cuento con orgullo.  Porque un agricultor esta casi 
en mejores condiciones que un ingeniero, que es un mensualero.  
En cambio un campesino con sus 10 hectareas mucho ma s puede 
capitalizar con una diversificacion correcta, para tener un buen 
nivel de vida.  El campesino puede lograr a largo plazo altos 
ingresos por hectarea en el sistema agroforestal.  Por tanto es un 
orgullo ser agricultor, si sabemos manejar nuestra tierra – bosque 
– madera – chacra y tambien las malezas. (Fogel, Luchas 100)  
 
[Before, I would call myself a farmer half in shame.  But now I say 
it with pride.  Because a farmer is almost in better shape than an 
agronomist, who is salaried.  Instead, a peasant with his ten 
hectares can capitalize much more on correct diversification in 
                                                 
101 With intense government management since the 1970’s cotton has become the single most 
important crop for peasants, who grow it as their only source of income.  Government support of 
this crop has been unwavering in the face of a drastic decline in world cotton prices and falling 
yields (more will be discussed concerning cotton in chapter four). 
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 order to achieve a better life.  The peasant can achieve, over the 
long-term, high income from each acre in an agroforestry system.  
Meanwhile, it is an honor to be a farmer, if we know how to 
manage our land — forest — lumber — farm and also the weeds]. 
 
 Given proper support, the occupation of farmer can be something that not 
only makes a significant contribution to the national economy but it is also 
something one can be proud of.  This economic argument strategy assumes that 
the reason peasants are not perceived as contributors to the national economy is 
because they have not received proper attention.  Given that attention, every 
peasant farmer can make a contribution like Candido Barreto has.  These three 
argument strategies, the social, the historical and the economic, have evolved as 
the struggle has shifted over time.  Simple demands for land have transformed 
into long lists of broader demands, which, while always including the transfer of 
land from the hands of the elite class to the peasantry, also includes demands for 
social and political as well as land reform.102
 The most recent and intense phase of the land reform struggle in Paraguay 
has transformed in a relatively short period (1989 – 2002) from an unorganized 
and spontaneous grab for land after the fall of the dictator to a series of social 
protests mobilizing peasants more effectively than they have been mobilized since 
the Chaco War.  With a new level of organization and sophistication, national 
peasant organizations are now articulating demands for political change 
unthinkable a mere thirteen years earlier when the country was still ruled by the 
most ruthless and longest tenured dictator in South America in the last half of the 
20th Century.  A chronology of argumentation can be constructed that 
                                                 
102 The earliest argument in the land reform struggle was the physical argument made by squatters 
and squatting communities, “the land is ours because we farm it.” 
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 demonstrates a progression from NIMBY struggles to a real concern with the 
general principles of governance of the nation including many themes not directly 
related to land reform, including 1) the favorable mediation of land disputes, 2) 
the promulgation and support of asentamientos, 3) the legalization of land 
invasions, 4) the outright granting of land to peasant groups, 5) demands for 
changes in agrarian policy including technical support, price supports, and credit, 
and finally 6) political demands for democratization, anti-globalism, anti-
privatization and a change of government.  The struggle can be measured in three 
stages: Early, Middle and Late. 
  In the initial phase of the struggle (post-Stroessner), NIMBY movements 
were constituted by peasants petitioning for land.  Particular struggles such as the 
conflicts in the asentamiento Capi’ibary and the struggle in the asentamientos of 
Juan de Mena and Cleto Romero typify this class of protest activity.  At this point 
in the struggle, the only consciousness of land reform as a social issue of national 
breadth was exhibited by regional peasant organizations whose function was to 
coordinate the protest activity initiated and sustained by the local groups.  
Argument strategies employed at this time were typified by the social, historical 
and economic categories of argumentation and constituted mere calls for land. 
By 1994, the first national protests were initiated.  The identification of land 
reform as a nation-wide social concern and the failure of the IBR to foster 
development in the asentamientos that had been granted spurred new arguments.  
Calls for land grants were paired with demands for services, including access to 
education, sanitation, and technical support.  The formation of the first truly 
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 national peasant organizations permitted the coordination of the separate demands 
of many different local peasant groups.  The MCNOC, in particular, brought local 
groups into dialogue with NGOs and international representatives of radical 
ideologies in order to reorganize the struggle for land reform. 
The late phase of the land reform struggle has been exemplified by the 
sharp division between local and national peasant organizations and the 
ideological drift from the original NIMBY motivations for land to more abstract 
goals.  In the face of the government’s inability to follow through with signed 
agreements and promises of land concessions, new rural legislation and the 
extension of ministerial level services including sanitation, technical training, law 
enforcement, and others to the rural population, peasant demands have taken on a 
fiercely moral tone by calling for an end to the corruption, party politics and 
social inequity the national peasant organizations see as the impediments to 
enacting the accords already agreed upon.  The land reform struggle has shifted 
from the mere demand for land, employing traditional arguments to a demand for 
cultural and structural changes in the government.  Since 2001, the movement has 
emphasized demands for changing the leadership of government ministries, the 
structure of rural credit financing and even the position of the presidency itself, 
viewing these goals as necessary for land reform.  In this late phase of the land 
reform struggle, national peasant organizations have defined the agenda and have 
moved to incorporate local peasant groups and local protest activity into their 
national organizational structure. 
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  The union of national peasant organization leadership and landless rural 
peasants has enabled the development of new arguments and protest tactics and 
constrained peasant self-representation in the struggle.  In its most recent phase, 
the land reform struggle has seen a pronounced disarticulation of peasant 
protestors from the leadership of the protest organizations that ostensibly 
represent them and the intellectuals who support protest as a means of social 
reform.  Consequently, peasant protest activity has often distinctly contrasted 
leadership ideology.  This organizational gap can be discerned along synchronic 
and diachronic axes as there are distinct spatial as well chronological 
disarticulations in the function of organized protest.  A focus on the various actors 
involved in the struggle can help to elucidate this disarticulation as well as the 
origins of competing arguments and ideologies within the struggle. 
 
3.3  Actors and Sites of Argument 
 
 While the non-discursive or physical forms of argument utilized in the 
land reform struggle in Paraguay are often the most sensational, verbal argument 
is, in almost all cases, combined with physical argumentation.  These two forms 
of argument strategy are interdependent and yet, often work in a uniquely 
disarticulated manner in the Paraguayan case.  It is not always evident that the 
body of verbal arguments and the body of physical arguments are coordinated or 
even articulated in a way that either the protestors themselves have planned or can 
explain.  Any functional description of the Paraguayan land reform struggle 
requires an analysis that identifies each of these forms of argumentation, discusses 
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 the curious disarticulation of the two and explains the relationship between the 
them.   
 The disarticulation of these two forms of argument is either synchronic 
(spatial) or diachronic (temporal).  Synchronic disarticulation occurs when the 
different parties or actors participate in different aspects of the protest activity.  In 
Paraguay, it is not uncommon for different groups of peasants or peasant groups 
and their representatives to employ the physical and the verbal components of 
protest activity sometimes even hundreds of miles apart.  During the August 2, 
2001 protests in which 30,000 peasants participated in 10 roadblocks distributed 
throughout the country, Belarmino Balbuena, the head of the MCNOC, and other 
peasant leaders met with a congressional delegation to issue a list of demands. 
 Diachronic disarticulation of peasant protest activity occurs most often 
when spontaneous peasant activity results in acts of physical protest that are later 
organized and represented in a verbal manner.  This is a common occurrence in 
the case of spontaneous land occupation.  In the case of Capi’ibary, peasants 
“heard” that there was land available for the taking, joined group of squatters, and 
later formed an association for communicating with the local and national 
authorities in the form of verbal demands justifying the occupation (Narcisco 
Rui z interview). 
 The disarticulation of verbal argumentation from physical argumentation 
is a defining feature of the land reform struggle in Paraguay.  Among the factors 
that bifurcate the peasants’ argumentative media are geography, education 
(particularly illiteracy) and culturally determined leadership/organizational 
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 methods.  Yet, perhaps the most important factor that distinguishes this dualistic 
character in the struggle is the ontology of the struggle itself: three very different 
sets of social actors are participating in the struggle with distinctive social 
ontologies.  The different sectors involved in land occupations, protest marches, 
and demands for reform have demonstrated little ability to coordinate their 
personnel, resources, methodologies and even arguments.  All too often a 
functional division of labor reigns in the land reform struggle: intellectuals write 
in the press, national peasant organization leaders remain in the capital city, 
meeting with politicians, making arguments and issuing demands, while landless 
peasants grimly man their road blocks or march through the streets only moments 
away from another confrontation with riot gear armed police, military and para- 
military forces. 
 These three groups, while all commonly devoted to the land reform 
struggle, have vastly different experiences of that struggle and make different 
contributions to the success or failure of that struggle as well.  Alain Touraine has 
pointed out that intellectuals, while espousing the cause of participatory 
democracy, often fail to make tangible contributions to this cause.  He argues that 
“A larger number of intellectuals have turned into ideologues of democratic 
institutions and have identified them with general principles rather than with 
social forces or with specific social problems” (Touraine, Return 144). This 
insight has relevance in the Paraguayan case, as Paraguayan intellectuals discuss 
land reform quite often.  Forums on the issue are common and speakers from 
other nations are invited to discuss the future prospects for rural development in 
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 Paraguay and cases in their own nations.  Peasants never attend these meetings.103  
One can almost always find a public discussion of the “problema de la tierra” in 
the capital city.  Furthermore, editorials in newspapers and magazines are filled 
with editorials about the “problema del la tierra.”  However, it is important to 
note that none of these editorials are written in a language that even some of the 
peasants could read, if they read newspapers or magazines or even if they could 
read.  In addition, the rarefied air of these discussions not only neglects the 
participation but the very existence of the peasantry.  In a July 28, 2001 
discussion entitled, Reforma Agraria en Nunavut, which focused on the 
establishment of the territory of Nunavut in Canada, the intellectuals gathered 
seemed puzzled when I asked the question, “How might this offer a legal 
precedent to the problem of the sintierras in Paraguay?”  They did not see the 
connection. 
 Peasants themselves hold meetings to organize roadblocks, invade 
properties, and protest their inability to purchase land without input from 
members of the socio-economic elite, or, for that matter, often without input from 
clergy or their own leaders.  Peasant leaders, while they travel to visit 
asentamientos or protests in the countryside, are situated in the national capital, 
live in nice homes and achieve a standard of living that their clients, the 
peasantry, can only dream of.  
 The structure of protest activity itself reveals the different experiences of 
the struggle for each of these social sectors.  The two most common patterns of 
                                                 
103 Upon seeking out the presence of peasants and/or peasant leaders at half a dozen such events 
held in Asuncion, I was disappointed to discover not a single person with even a rural background 
in attendance. 
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 protest involve 1) a local occupation by peasants that national peasant leaders hear 
about and extend assistance to and which intellectuals can potentially aid with 
pro-land reform articles in the press that sensitize the public to the issue104 and 2) 
national marches organized and funded105 by the national peasant organizations 
that distribute funds to local peasant groups to assist the mobilization of smaller 
organizations to participate in national protests.  Intellectuals, again, support the 
peasants in the struggle but without ever participating in a protest or meeting with 
protest leaders.  In either case, there is a significant difference in the participation 
of each of these social groups in the course of protest activity.  Peasants organized 
by national groups often cannot identify or simply do not understand the demands 
(issued by peasant organization leaders in the Capital) of the protest.  Conversely, 
national peasant organization leaders often do not understand or have no stake in 
the local struggles that they represent.  The intellectual class has a better 
understanding of national and international politics than they do the lives of a 
peasantry whose homes they have never visited and whose language they often do 
not speak themselves.   
 These differences in practice and experience of the struggle culminate in 
the very different types of argument offered by each of these sectors of the land 
                                                 
104 It is important to note that the contribution of intellectuals to the Paraguayan land reform 
struggle, while asserted to be in the interests of the peasants, often serves quite the opposite 
purpose of exploiting the public’s attention in order to publish articles in the press.  Intellectuals 
do not visit the countryside, have little understanding of the peasant perspective and are often 
misinformed about even the facts of the struggle.  Nevertheless, the public discussion of land 
reform in the public press does aid the cause of the peasants by lending the credibility of 
intellectuals to the cause. 
105 Some national peasant organizations (the FNC and the MCNOC) have received cash payments 
for terminating peasant protest activity.  This money is used (in addition to enriching peasant 
leaders) for paying the cost of transportation and feeding peasants who are invited to asked to join 
protests.  
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 reform struggle. I will define the arguments offered by each group and discuss the 
context for each.  The first is the international, comprised of international 
political, journalistic as well as academic sources of argument.  The second is the 
national/popular, comprised of peasant organizations, trade unions, interest 
groups and other associations of national breadth.  The last source of argument for 
land reform is the, local, which is typified by individuals and families of peasants 
as wells as local associations such as farmers’ committees, neighborhood 
committees and cooperatives.   
 Each of these sources of argument must be understood and accounted for 
if one is to develop a picture of the public debate concerning land reform in 
Paraguay.  The disarticulate nature of the struggle owes itself to the fact that each 
of these groups participates in the struggle with different resources and through 
different media.  This results is a clear division of labor amongst three separate 
groups: physical protest falls to the peasants at the local level while verbal 
confrontation in the form of public argument falls to leaders of the national 
organizations.   Paraguayan intellectuals such as journalists, the representatives of 
NGOs, and international organizations such as Amnesty International critique the 
government and promote reform at abstracted levels of academic conferences, 
books and editorials in the press.106
                                                 
106 Some of the more visible groups in Paraguay include: The United Nations Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO), El Banco Mundial, the Japanese International Cooperation 
Agency (JICA), Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), El Banco Inter-
Americano de Desarollo (BID), Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarollo (PNUD), La 
Fundacion Moises Bertoni, Comite de Iglesias para Ayuda en Emergencias (CIPAE) and Alter 
Vida. 
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  Thus, the Paraguayan struggle for land reform, while sharing the goals of 
reform and protest, is constituted by groups of vastly different social actors 
utilizing distinct social/cultural resources to articulate different arguments.  I will 
examine each of these classes of argumentation in some specific detail as I 
identify the actors utilizing them. 
3.3.1 International Actors 
 
 International arguments for land reform find their primary expression 
through the agency of journalists, Paraguayan intellectuals, and NGOs who 
promote reform as a solution to the widespread poverty in the country. These 
arguments are found in journals, magazines, newspapers, television interviews, 
academic conferences and reports.  These public arguments for land reform are 
centered around a resistance to modernization/globalization and the perceived 
foreign influence upon the nation’s course of development.  Many of the 
journalists and intellectuals who promulgate these arguments have been trained in 
universities both within and beyond Paraguay and have developed a global 
perspective of the nation and of its social problems.  An example of this broader 
perspective is evident in the following example taken from a popular liberal 
magazine as it summarizes the international argument: 
El debate que puede sernos útil trata acerca del modelo de 
globalización que estamos presenciando y sufriendo. Porque nadie 
que piense en la igualdad como valor positivo puede estar en 
contra de la globalización del bienestar de la gente, de la 
globalización de los Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales, 
de la igualdad de oportunidades, etc....  El punto es, precisamente, 
que el actual modelo de globalización está produciendo 
exactamente lo contrario. Aumenta la brecha entre ricos y pobres, 
tanto al interior de los países como entre las naciones, coloca en 
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 igualdad de condiciones a los Estados con los inversores 
aumentando en forma increíble el poder de estos últimos, degrada 
el medio ambiente y la calidad de vida, etc…. (Mosqueira 1) 
 
[The debate that can be useful to us deals closely with the 
globalization model that we experience and suffer.  Because no 
one who thinks about equality as a positive value can stand against 
globalization for the well-being of the people, for the globalization 
of economic, social and cultural rights, for equal opportunity, 
etc….  The point is, precisely, that the actual globalization model 
is producing exactly the contrary effect.  It is increasing the gap 
between the rich and the poor, within as well as between nations, 
equally promoting those states whose investors have increased 
their power to an incredible degree, degrading the environment and 
the quality of life, etc…].107
 
 Paraguay is a country with a long history of suspicion of and resentment 
for foreign commercial investment.  The legacy of Paraguay’s nearly complete 
capitulation to the foreign investors (primarily composed of the war’s victors) 
who disenfranchised the Paraguayan people of their political and economic rights 
after War of the Triple Alliance remains in the popular consciousness.  
Paraguay’s speedy entry into the global market after the fall of the dictatorship in 
                                                 
107 There is widespread agreement amongst all sectors of the land reform struggle on the class 
characteristics of the struggle.  Peasants, heads of social organizations and international groups all 
reach the same conclusion as the World Bank in its World Development Report 2000/2001: 
Attacking Poverty:Voices of the Poor. The report was developed through interviews with the poor 
themselves in developing nations.  “… Opportunities are unevenly distributed, and that those who 
started with advantages had been able to exploit them, while the poor found it difficult or 
impossible to do so.  In terms of security, conditions for poor people had become worse in most 
countries and at most sites.  Heightened insecurity variously affected livelihoods, property, and 
personal safety.  In discussing institutions, poor people did not give high ratings to government 
officials and political leaders, and NGOs were mentioned less and less highly rated than might 
have been expected.  Poor people indicated repeatedly, and in many contexts, that they trust  
and rely on their own local, informal institutions for support in crisis and in daily life, and rank 
them high in importance even while recognising their limitations.  The message from the poor is 
that outside organisations and development policies designed for their benefit have been less 
significant than is usually assumed by those who work in development agencies.  The reasons for 
the lack of opportunities, increased insecurity, and flat or downward trend in wellbeing differed by 
region.  There were, however, common themes: people said that they miss out on many 
opportunities because of the need to have connections.  
and because of their lack of information, assets, credit, skills and business acumen.  Repeatedly, 
their message was that  .it is the rich who benefit. from policy changes. Particularly in Eastern 
Europe, Central Asia and Latin America, poor people spoke about macro-economic and political 
change” (World Bank 45).   
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 1989 has staggered the once internally directed economy and rekindled a historic 
xenophobia inscribed by nearly 500 years of continuous colonization.108
 The conclusion reached by Paraguay’s intellectual left resonates with the 
national popular sentiment that globalism has severely damaged a once vital 
internally oriented economy and has distorted the traditional relationship between 
the peasantry and the urban population of the country.  The fact that peasant 
farmers cannot compete within the global market is accepted as a fait accompli.  
From their perspective, poverty and indigence are the result of losing agricultural 
employment in the new global market where it is now cheaper to import food 
products than to grow them.  For the intellectual and political left, Paraguay’s 
entry into the global capital market impoverishes not only the majority of 
Paraguayans (the largest sector of the country’s economy is agricultural) but the 
nation as a whole:109
Decimos que es un modelo también sectario porque no busca ni le 
importa el desarrollo de todas las regiones del mundo (ni de los 
países) por igual. Parte de la base de que todas son iguales. No 
toma en cuenta las asimetrías y diferencias. Así, el país o la región 
que no reúne las condiciones mínimas, queda al margen de la 
actividad financiera, de las telecomunicaciones, del transporte y 
del comercio. Al gran capital no le interesa desarrollar regiones ni 
                                                 
108 This colonization began with the subjugation of the native peoples by the Spanish.  It was 
continued as the neo-colonial practice of Indian and peasant subjugation to the political and social 
order of the criollo governments that followed independence.  This was followed by the economic 
conquest of the country after two economically disasterous wars (The War of the Triple Alliance 
1865-1870 and the Chaco War 1932-1935) and the more recent plunge of the nation into a global 
capitalist market in which Paraguay possesses no competitive advantage. 
109 While the United States imports about $40 million per year from Paraguay, U.S. exports to 
Paraguay approached $450 billion in 2000, according to U.S. Customs data.  More than a dozen 
U.S. multinational firms have subsidiaries in Paraguay. These include firms in the computer, 
agroindustrial, telecom, and banking and other service industries. Some 75 U.S. businesses have 
agents or representatives in Paraguay, and more than 3,000 U.S. citizens reside there. U.S. 
economic influence continues to expand as in November 1998, U.S. and Paraguayan officials 
signed a memorandum of understanding on steps to improve protection of intellectual property 
rights in Paraguay, and in 2001 Paraguay improved enforcement efforts against contraband and 
piracy activities (US Department of State, Background Notes: Paraguay 2001). 
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 países. Quiere sacar el mayor provecho posible de lo que ya 
existe. (Mosqueira 1) 
 
[We call this a secular model because it ignores and devalues the 
equal development of all of the world’s regions (or even nations).  
Whereas, it is fundamental that at the bottom, all are equal.  It (the 
globalization model) fails to take asymmetry and difference into 
account.  Thus, any nation or region that cannot meet the minimum 
requirements remains at the margins of financial activity, of 
telecommunications, of transport and commerce.  The world’s 
investors are not interested in developing the world’s regions and 
individual nations.  They want to extract as much profit as possible 
from the opportunity that exists].   
 
For the left, global capitalism is nothing less than a new form of imperialism or 
colonialism: 
Uno de los argumentos más comunes que escuchamos es que la 
globalización no es nueva, que se inició cuando Marco Polo llegó 
a la China (dicen unos), con el Imperio Romano (afirman otros) o 
con el descubrimiento de América. (Mosqueira 1) 
 
[One of the arguments most often heard is that globalization is not 
a new phenomenon; rather, it began when Marco Polo arrived in 
China, according to some.  Others point to the Roman Empire or to 
the discovery of the Americas]. 
 
Identifying the global capitalist economic system as neo-colonialist and relating 
that neo-colonialist regime to land tenure practices stems both from Paraguay’s 
specific experience following the wholesale distribution of land to foreign 
interests following the War of the Triple Alliance as well as international trends.   
 These arguments are articulated as a part of the land reform struggle at the 
international level through conferences on poverty, land reform, the rights of 
Native Americans and others. For example, in the formal proclamation of the 
Primer Encuentro International Campesino of 1996, we see the explicit 
articulation of this economic model, colonialism and the peasant struggle for land.  
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 Note the similarity of the language and argument to Mosqueira’s argument, even 
though the two are causally unrelated: 
1.1 A nivel mundial, el modelo econo mico neoliberal 
prevaleciente, junto con sus relaciones sociales e interestatales, es 
la mayor causa del empobrecimiento de los campesinos y de los 
pueblos rurales en general. (La Via Campesina 1) 
 
[1.1 At the global level, the neo-liberal economic model is 
dominant with its social and international network as the main 
cause of the impoverishment of peasants and of rural peoples in 
general].  
 
1.2   Este sistema economico trata a los pueblos y a la naturaleza 
como medios para obtener el fin, el cual es la acumulacion de las 
riquezas en las manos de una pequen a minoria…Los que sufren 
ma s los impactos negativos son los pueblos ma s pobres. Los 
efectos negativos de este modelo economico se sienten de una 
manera ma s aguda en el Tercer Mundo. (La Via Campesina 1) 
 
[1.2  This economic system treats the environment and people 
alike as means to an end, the accumulation of wealth in the hands 
of small minority.… Those who suffer the most from the negative 
impact of this system are the poorest communities.  The negative 
effects of this economic model are felt most severely in the Third 
World]. 
 
2.2  La tenencia de la tierra, la riqueza y el poder es incrementada 
efectivamente en las manos de los grandes latifundistas y las 
corporaciones transnacionales. Los programas de ajuste 
estructural (PAES) dejan a los gobiernos nacionales incapaces de 
desarrollar poli ticas efectivas para promover la democracia y el 
desarrollo sostenible. Las politicas que favorecen a los 
monocultivos agricolas para la exportacion toman prioridad sobre 
aquellos que podrian servir para promover la seguridad 
alimenticia de los niveles regionales y nacionales, asi como 
tambien para promover su produccio n sostenible. (La Via 
Campesina 1) 
 
[2.2 Land ownership, wealth and power are effectively 
concentrated in the hands of the great latifundistas and 
transnational corporations.  Structural adjustment programs (SAPs) 
leave national governments incapable of developing an effective 
politics for the promotion of democracy and sustainable 
development.  Agricultural monoculture targeting exportation is 
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 politically favored over those (agricultural programs) that could be 
used to promote alimentary security at both the regional as well as 
national level which would also support sustainable development]. 
 
 Thus, the concentration of land, in the form of latifundia, is the primary 
means of controlling resources in developing nations.  The profit-taking model of 
agro-business with its high input, high production, low cost agricultural 
commodities both prevents the peasant from competing in the market and robs the 
peasant of access to the land to supply his or her own family with food.  
 Globalization impoverishes the poor by excluding them from the means of 
production (seen here as the combination of land but, also very importantly, 
access to markets) is also a cultural scourge: note how both Moisquera and the 
Primer Encuentro International Campesino documents point out the difference in 
values between a globalist economy that reduces people and land to resources as 
opposed to an implied, native model of valuing individual human beings for an 
intrinsic worth that cannot be measured in economic terms110. 
 Again, the conflation of the economic changes promoted by global 
capitalism’s rapid implementation in Paraguay and the social changes resulting 
from the new system of economic organization are seen as parallel to the 
introduction of colonialism to the Americas.  The colonialist reference in the anti-
globalist argument reinforces the international-local connection in a way that is 
not directly apparent to the struggle’s participants.  It is difficult for any 
participant in the struggle to see how changing Paraguayan national fiscal policy 
or opening Paraguayan markets to competition ultimately prevents peasants from 
                                                 
110 It must be noted here that there are no sufficient grounds for arguing the existence of a “natural,” a-
historical and pre-Columbian economic model that valued human dignity above that of the capitalist model. 
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 accumulating enough capital to buy land for their children and, thus, reproduce 
their way of life.  However, the neo-colonial argument that neatly conflates 
globalism and colonialism allows participants to draw a picture of a struggle 
between poor landless peasants fighting better equipped police and military forces 
in an exact parallel to their ancestors’ struggle against the Conquistadores 500 
years ago.111   
 Nevertheless, these arguments are often less than representative of the 
interests or experiences of the Paraguayan peasant in whose name most of these 
arguments are made.  Consider Gladys Benegas’ impassioned argument for the 
defense of the resources of the poor including genetic materials: 
15. La cumbre de Doha confirmó la ilegitimidad de la OMC 
[Organizacion Mundial de Comercio]. La supuesta “Agenda de 
Desarrollo”, sólo defiende intereses transnacionales. Mediante 
una nueva Ronda de negociaciones, esta institución avanza en su 
objetivo de convertir todo en mercancía. Para nosotras y nosotros 
los alimentos, los servicios públicos, la agricultura, la salud, la 
educación y los genes no deben ser tratados como meras 
mercancías, y las patentes no deben ser utilizadas como arma 
contra los países pobres y los pueblos. Rechazamos cualquier tipo 
de comercio y patentes sobre la vida. (Benegas 28) 
 
[15. The summit at Doha confirmed the illegitimacy of the WTO 
[World Trade Organization].  The supposed “Development 
Agenda” only defends transnational interests.  By means of a new 
round of negotiations, this institution advances its goal of 
converting everything into market terms.  For we, our foodstuffs, 
                                                 
111 Such a picture oversimplifies the complexity of the situation and papers over problems 
including the hybridization of Native American and European/colonialist cultures.  Peasants are no 
more Native American Indians than Midwestern farmers in the United States even though the 
Paraguayan peasant has preserved some of the linguistic and social practices of his or her native 
ancestors.  The rhetorically constructed nature of peasant identity is nowhere more apparent than 
in the perjorative view that peasants themselves hold of the few Native peoples who remain in 
Paraguay.  Ironically, the peasants highly value any Native American linguistic or social practice 
that they identify as their own, while, on the other hand, reviling any such practices espoused by 
Native Americans with purer bloodlines and more traditional culture.  The popular expression 
“Que indio” is a common expression of disgust for a person who is without manners, culture or 
education of any kind and possesses the character of an enormous insult.   
 160
 public services, agriculture, health, education and genes ought not 
to be treated as mere commodities, and patents should not be used 
as a weapon against poor countries and peoples.  We reject any 
type of commerce and patents over life]. 
 
 This is a good example of the abstracted level of argumentation that 
international actors employ in the course of arguing for reform.  These are 
arguments that would be wholly unrecognizable to any peasant and which, in their 
scope and specific examples, fail to make a contribution to a useful public 
discussion of land reform in Paraguay.   
 A final source of international argument comes from the Catholic church.  
Catholicism is perhaps the most widespread and important social institution in the 
country following only the government; 98% of all Paraguayans are Catholic and 
nearly 100% of peasants are Catholic. 
 Liberation Theology has been introduced into the country and has been 
disseminated through the mass media in national newspapers, periodicals and 
transmitted via radio and television as well as through the media of the sermon 
and study groups.  Individual peasants as well as peasant organizations routinely 
look to church leaders to defend their rights.  A high percentage of peasant leaders 
hold important positions as lay clergy in their local churches.112  Liberation 
theological arguments for land reform parallel those made by other international 
organizations.  An excerpt follows: 
                                                 
112 In the Colonia Independencia, where I have spent more than three years living as a Peace 
Corps volunteer and as a researcher of the land reform struggle, 100% of the leaders of the local 
farmer’s committees have also served as lay clergy in their communities at one time.  I believe that 
this is a result of the peasant’s faith in the Church and in the value of the education provided by 
the Church to its lay clergy.  It only makes sense in the peasant mind for the community member 
who has been educated to represent the community. 
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 Two types of large landed estates survive to this day from the 
colonial period: the hacienda (or fazenda, in Portuguese), raising 
cattle and a diversity of crops for local use or sale; and the 
plantation, raising a single exportable crop. Initially, Indians were 
given as slaves to the landholders. Later, the “freed” natives were 
tied to the landowners through debts brought on by a subsistence 
wage system. The shortage of good land off the estate made it easy 
for the landlord to attract or coerce labor onto his estate.  
 
This pattern continues today with an underclass largely descended 
from the Indian and African slaves, along with other dispossessed 
groups. The haciendas and plantations are noted for their 
inefficient husbandry. Landowners face few social or economic 
pressures to become good managers, and often live in the cities 
leaving the estates to be run by overseers. Consequently, the 
landowners often do not make large profits, but that is not their 
objective. Their primary concern is the maintenance of the two 
paramount features of the status quo, which go hand in hand. First, 
labor is very cheap, because workers have no alternative place to 
employ themselves, even though massive tracts of good land are 
held nearly idle by the land barons. Second, the cost of holding on 
to huge estates -- i.e., the taxes charged by the public for the 
privilege of retaining possession -- are low or effectively 
nonexistent. Strong incentives for good stewardship are as absent 
as the landlords.  
 
There is also little incentive for productivity; most of the 
population has no share in the fruits of the land or the profits of the 
estates. The colonial system of land tenure discourages the creation 
of capital, with most of the surplus from the land going to purchase 
luxury goods that are produced at the expense of more useful 
manufacturing or more often are imported, thereby straining the 
country's balance of payments. 
 
Indeed, the primary purpose of holding vast amounts of land, as 
Andre Gunder Frank writes in On Capitalist Underdevelopment, 
“is not to use it but to prevent its use by others. These others, 
denied access to the primary resource, necessarily fall under the 
domination of the few who do control it. And then they are 
exploited in all conceivable ways, typically through low wages.” 
(Andelson and Dawsey 2) 
 
 Although this argument differs from others by not explicitly identifying 
globalism as the culprit for the economic woes of the peasant, it identifies neo-
 162
 colonialism as a historical phenomenon and exposes its classist character.  
However, as much of the intellectual participation in the land reform struggle, it 
fails to recognize the real circumstances of peasant life.  It offers no solution to 
the problems experienced each day by peasants, nor makes demands of any sort.   
 In fact, the contribution of intellectuals to the Paraguayan land reform 
struggle constitutes the weakest of the interest groups promulgating arguments in 
support of the struggle.  In all, there are three primary liabilities in the argument 
of Paraguayan and other intellectuals: they don’t unify the struggle; they don’t 
create a need for action; and they are not answerable. 
 The arguments offered by intellectuals don’t unify the struggle because 
they are not heard by the peasants themselves nor do they reflect any of the real 
conditions of the struggle.  These arguments are most likely to be heard or 
conducted in the presence of those least affected by and least interested in the 
outcome of the struggle.  In addition, these arguments don’t create a need for 
action.  The abstract level of the argumentation, definition of problems and issues 
such as “globalism,” “poverty,” and “the developing world” defines the problems 
in such a broad scope that they are truly insurmountable.  Furthermore, discussion 
of the issue in these terms distances the discussion so far from the lived 
experience of the peasantry that it is difficult to make concrete connections to any 
particular protest, struggle or conflict.  Finally, these arguments issue no demands 
nor do they offer any solutions or suggest possible outcomes.  These arguments 
remain within the rarefied air of academics and intellectuals who do not 
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 participate in discussion with nor are they read by the politicians and peasants 
who are the actual actors involved in the struggle.      
 
3.3.2 National Actors 
 
 Access to the media is one of the primary reasons for the top-down 
approach to land reform reflected in the arguments offered by international 
arguments as well as in those arguments offered by the leaders of national 
organizations in the country.  Eladio Flecha, leader of the Federacion Nacional de 
Campesinos (FNC) exemplifies this form of argumentation in the name of 
peasants who call for land reform in Paraguay: 
… el campesinado en este momento se va dando cuenta que como 
país dependiente, la base del imperialismo es la existencia de 
latifundios, entonces la postura antiimperialista de los compañeros 
campesinos y para golpear la base misma del imperialismo, se 
debe atacar los latifundios. (Flecha 1) 
 
[… at this time peasants understand that imperialism is the 
foundation of national dependence; therefore, in order to take an 
anti-imperialist position and to attack imperialism, the latifundia 
must be attacked]. 
 
It is evident in the language of peasant leaders like Flecha, that they have 
been strongly influenced by the anti-globalist arguments offered by international 
organizations as well as by the political and social left in Paraguay.  There simply 
are no organic sources of anti-colonial or anti-globalist arguments in the 
experience of the Paraguayan peasant.  This leadership rhetoric is strongly 
distinguished from the language and reasoning of the average peasant.  As the 
Paraguayan land reform struggle has evolved, leadership rhetoric and peasant 
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 rhetoric have diverged.  It is important to note that the conflation of globalism and 
colonialism and the identification of the foundation of globalism in the latifundia 
is exactly the same argument made thousands of miles away at the Primer 
Encuentro Internacional Campesino in Mexico.  In fact, speaking about the Third 
Congress of the Federación Nacional Campesina, Flecha acknowledges that 
influence: 
Y para nosotros es de suma importancia la profundización de los 
debates entre los 400 delegados presentes y allí colaboró 
fundamentalmente…la participación de los delegados 
internacionales a través de la experiencia que ellos tienen, en la 
lucha contra el neoliberalismo y el empobrecimiento de los 
sectores populares en otros países. (Flecha 1) 
 
[And of the greatest importance to us (La Federacion Nacional 
Campesina) is the deepening of those debates among the 400 
delegates present and there to establish a fundamental 
collaboration…(with) the participation of the international 
delegates through their experience in the struggle against neo-
liberalism and the impoverishment of the working class in other 
countries]. 
 
Finally, Flecha employs the familiar language of Marxism, another international 
import: 
La Federación Nacional Campesina, es una organización que a 
pesar de su característica, se define como una organización de 
clase, una herramienta de lucha, una herramienta de presión, 
autónoma, democrática, combativa y clasista. Dentro de esos 
criterios se desarrolló el III Congreso Ordinario y pudimos 
profundizar los debates políticos e ideológicos dentro de nuestra 
organización campesina y creemos que los dos sectores 
productivos de nuestro país, son los campesinos y los obreros, 
sobre los cuales descansa la economía del país. (Flecha 1) 
 
[The National Federation of Peasants is an organization that, in 
spite of its nature, defines itself as a class organization, a tool for 
struggle, a tool for pressure, autonomous, democratic, combative 
and class consciousness.  Within these criteria the Third Ordinary 
Congress has developed and we have deepened our political and 
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 ideological debates within our peasant organization and we believe 
that the two productive sectors of the nation, the peasants and the 
workers, are the foundation of the country’s economy]. 
 
While the national popular and the international sources of argument share 
much in common, in fact, many of the arguments employed by national 
organizations within Paraguay are directly imported from international sources, 
the difference in the two argument fields lies in the specific character of the 
national popular arguments.  National peasant organizations actually employ 
arguments distinct from international sources and, when they do employ 
internationally generated arguments, they often demand much more than a general 
rejection of the global capitalist economic model; they demand specific 
concessions that would contribute to that end.  
 There is an obvious tension between the international brand of the land 
reform argument and the national popular themes of protest.  As James Petras has 
pointed out in the case of non-governmental organizations that support populist 
reforms such as land reform, there is a struggle between the national organizations 
and the NGOs over the focus of collaborative work.  National popular 
organizations “focus on local projects rather than structural changes (land 
reform); the emphasis on self-exploitation and survival strategies (self-help) 
instead of comprehensive, publicly funded health, education, and housing 
programs” (Petras).  At the level of the national popular, the struggle is not solely 
ideological but pragmatic as well.  The representation and participation of the 
peasants themselves tends to ground the idealist component of international 
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 arguments that so quickly cast blame on the industrialized world and its global 
capitalist model. 
 The very purpose of national peasant organizations is to bridge the gap 
between a peasantry ignorant of its rights and an intelligentsia that not only can 
posit a structured program of rights but that has access to the public media and 
even to the government itself.  While arguments for a fair and equitable 
distribution of land in a country where 98% of all arable land is owned by less 
than 1% of the population might seem self-evident, it is important to note that 
Paraguay is one of only three Latin American nations to have never enacted an 
agrarian reform policy in its entire history.113  There is simply no precedent 
available to the peasant for securing his or her rights.     
 In fact, the national popular land reform argument is quick to foreground 
its inclusive and dialogic nature as the mediator between international sources in 
the land reform struggle and the peasantry.  Note that even as Flecha is defining 
the struggle in a Marxist terminology that no peasant in the country could 
understand he is quick to note that the conclusions of the conference were reached 
through a discussion including all 400 members of the Congress and that the 
result was collaborative in nature. 
 The spirit of collaboration was implemented in the first and most 
important result of land reform arguments at the level of the national popular, the 
                                                 
113 Only Paraguay, Uruguay and Argentina are the only three Latin American nations that have 
never enacted a national agrarian reform.  Argentina and Uruguay have been exempted from the 
pressure by the presence of a substantial middle class comprising mid-sized farms and have thus 
avoided the latifundial pressures and associated class conflict that have so often supplied the 
impetus for land reform initiatives in the region (Kay 3).  Paraguay has opted for settlement 
programs to relieve the social pressure for land reform, which worked for several hundred years 
until the recent spate of invasions began in 1989.  
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 Constitucion Nacional 1992 of Paraguay.  Peasant groups (Mainly from San 
Pedro de Ycuamandiyu, but from other areas as well) wrangled a seat at the 
constitutional convention by exploiting their relationships with workers’ unions 
and the new sense of openness following the end of the Stroneato.  Represented 
by the la Central Unitaria de Trabajadores (CUT) in the Convencion Nacional 
Constituyente, peasant groups gained major concessions as interest groups were 
convened to write a new Constitucion Nacional in December of 1991.  The 
process culminated in the Constitucion Nacional 1992, which was ratified by the 
Paraguayan Congress on July 20, 1992.114  The Constitucion Nacional 1992, 
while modeled upon and heavily influenced by extant Latin American 
constitutions and a neo-liberal and globalist vision, did represent the voice of the 
peasantry however problematic that representation was.  
Peasant participation was made possible by the rhetorical posture of the 
new regime that recognized and defined institutions for addressing the needs of 
the peasantry in particular.115  It is important to note that no peasant nor peasant 
organization themselves sat on the commission but that peasant groups 
approached la Central Unitaria de Trabajadores (CUT), the nation’s largest trade 
union, to form an alliance and to represent the rights of both workers and 
peasants.  The union accepted this offer, identifying an alliance with the largest 
group in the country and a group that also contested the privileges of capital and 
                                                 
114 The creation of the Constitutional Commission in December of 1991 was the first moment in 
Paraguayan history that could be said to have translated the mandate of the people into national 
law.  Previous constitutions of 1940 and 1967 were nothing more than political tools designed to 
support the dicatatorships of Estigarribia and Stroessner, respectively.   
115 Having overthrown Stroessner in 1989, the Rodriguez government appealed to a broad 
coalition of anti-Stroessner sectors including the largest, the peasantry.  In addition, Paraguay has 
a long tradition of coalition building by means of including the peasantry during periods of great 
political instability following revolutions, particularly following the Revolution of 1904. 
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 business as an important ally in the struggle to define the law in the Paraguay that 
emerged from five hundred of years of elite political control. 
The language of the Constitucion Nacional 1992 captures the spirit of the 
moment after the fall of the thirty-eight year dictatorial regime of Alfredo 
Stroessner de Matiauda.  It is a document explicitly intended to express the rights 
of individual Paraguayans as well as of social sectors such as the peasantry.  It 
also outlines the responsibility of the government in the protection of these rights, 
and in the case of the peasantry, the right to a fair and rational agrarian system: 
Articulo 114: La reforma agraria es uno de los factores 
fundamentales para lograr el bienestar rural.  Ella consiste en la 
incorporacio n efectiva de la poblacio n campesina al desarrollo 
econono mico y social de la nacion.  Se adoptaran sistemas 
equitativos de distribucio n de la propiedad y tenencia de la tierra.  
Se organizan el credito y la asistencia tecnica, educacional y 
sanitaria, se fomentara la creacion de cooperativas agricolas y de 
otras asociaciones similares y se promovera la produccion, la 
industrializacion y la racionalizacion del mercado para el 
desarrollo integral del agro. (Conferencia Episcopal Paraguaya 
120-3) 
 
[Article 114: Agrarian reform is one of the basic factors for 
achievement of rural wellbeing.  This consists of the effective 
incorporation of the rural population in the economic and social 
development of the nation.  This will require the adoption of a fair 
system of distribution of ownership and management of land.  This 
will also require the provision of credit, as well as technical, 
educational and sanitary assistance; in addition, the formation and 
support of agricultural cooperatives and other similar associations 
will promote production industrialization and rationalization of the 
market, which is integral to the development of agriculture]. 
 
The Constitucion Nacional 1992 also directly addresses the land reform 
struggle.  In this document, we see a smooth fusion of the internationalist 
rejection of latifundia as the tools for disenfranchisement of the peasant populace 
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 and the peasants’ own relationship to the land as a tool for rational exploitation, or 
a means for survival.  The Constitucion Nacional 1992 states: 
Articulo 116: Con el objetivo de eliminar progresivamente los 
latifundios improductivos, la ley atendera  a la aptitud natural de 
las tierras, a las necesidades del sector de poblacion vinculado 
con la agricultura y a las previsiones aconsejables para el 
desarrollo equilibrada de las actividades agricolas, 
agropecuarias, forestales e industriales, asi como el 
aprovechamiento sostenible de los recursos naturales y de la 
preservacion del equilibrio ecologico.  La expropriacion de los 
latifundios improductivos destinados a la reforma agraria sera  
establecidos en cada caso por la ley, y se abonara  en la forma y en 
el plazo que la misma determine. (Conferencia Epi scopal 
Paraguaya 123-4) 
 
[Article 116: With the objective of the progressive elimination of 
large, unproductive land-holdings, the law regards the natural state 
of the land, the needs of that sector of the population dependent 
upon agriculture and the available knowledge for balanced 
development.  This development will take the form of the 
sustainable development of natural resources and the preservation 
of ecological balance.  The expropriation of large, unproductive 
land-holdings for the purpose of agrarian reform will be 
established in all cases by the law and will be realized in the form 
and in the place that the law deems appropriate]. 
 
Thus, much more specifically than a mere ideological rejection of the 
latifundia, the Constitucion Nacional 1992 identifies a peculiar Paraguayan 
practice, the historical tradition of squatters’ rights tied to productivity.  Land is 
not truly perceived as private but as a national trust whose function is to 
contribute to the national wellbeing through economic production.  “Los 
latifundios improductivos” [unproductive landholdings] contrast the “aptitud 
natural de las tierras” [natural character of the land] which is to serve “las 
necesidades del sector de poblacion vinculado con la agricultura” [the needs of 
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 the sector of the population dependent upon agriculture] in order to contribute to 
the nation.  
This is an ancient land tenure practice that has been repeated throughout 
Paraguayan history.  Peasant land invasion had been tacitly tolerated from 1535 
until 1870 in order to stimulate the economy.  Stroessner’s institutionalization of 
the tacit practice in the form of colonization codified an explicit social practice in 
the national popular consciousness: land will always be available to those who 
wish to work hard and contribute to the good of the nation.  This is exactly the 
sentiment found in article 116 of the Constitucion Nacional 1992 of Paraguay. 
These two articles in the Constitucion Nacional 1992 have been the heart 
of the Paraguayan land reform struggle.  They have been used to provide a legal 
basis for challenging private landowners whose landholdings exceed their ability 
to claim to be utilizing the land as a national, agricultural or forestry resource.  
This has led to land occupations which, following the Brazilian strategy of the 
CST (Campesinos Sem Terra), have coordinated large occupations of land in 
which hundreds of peasants enter private land and quickly establish crops, upon 
which basis they can claim to be making effective use of the land and gain 
constitutional immunity from prosecution.  After the occupation has been 
established, political pressure is applied at both the local and national level to 
legalize the holding and grant title to the land for the campesinos. 
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 3.3.3 Grassroots Actors 
 
On August 2, 2001 an estimated 30,000 peasants blocked highways in ten 
different states issuing a list of demands: 
1) Cumplimiento de acuerdos y compromisos del Gobierno nacional con el campo. 
[The recognition of accords and promises of the National Government with the 
people of the countryside (including agreements for land reform and technical 
services for peasants as last promised by congressional leaders on March 14, 
2001)]. 
 
2) Apoyo a los proyectos de producción agrícola.  
[Support for agricultural production projects (through the auspices of MAG as 
well as local projects appealing for government aid)]. 
 
3)  Justicia por crímenes cometidos contra campesinos.  
[Justice for the crimes committed against peasants]. 
 
4)  Cese de persecuciones a dirigentes campesinos.  
[An end to the persecution of peasant leaders]. 
 
5)  Por mayor presupuesto para la salud, educación, agricultura y obras públicas.  
[A greater portion of the budget committed to health, education, agriculture and 
other public projects].      
    
6)  Definición y ejecución de una política de desarrollo nacional en base a la 
producción agropecuaria.  
[The definition and execution of a national politics of development based upon 
agriculture and animal husbandry].   
                                                                                                                      
7) Contra el modelo de transición neoliberal, antipopular y anticampesino. 
[Abandonment of neo-liberal, antipopulist and antipeasant governance]. 
 
8) Contra las privatizaciones, desempleo y corrupción.                                 
 [An end to the privatization of state monopolies, unemployment and corruption]. 
 
These demands were delivered to members of congress by Belarmino Balbuena, 
the leader of the national peasant organization MCNOC, in the company of 
several leaders of large, local peasant organizations.  No peasants, outside of the 
leadership of the organization, participated in the formulation of the demands or 
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 their delivery.116  Most of the peasant participants in the bloqueos would 
understand and agree with demands 1-5 but would have great difficulty 
understanding, let alone, deliberating upon demands 6-8.  Yet, the average 
peasant protestor put his or her life on the line for all of these demands. 
 There is a large social difference between the leaders of peasant 
organizations and the many ordinary members of such organizations.  Peasant 
leaders congregate, hold meetings, eat and communicate with the press and the 
authorities of the state, apart from other peasants.  This is not so radically 
different from the experience of social movements in the United States and 
Europe, where the important leaders of social movements become alienated from 
the ordinary members of those movements as movements evolve and bureaucratic 
structures separate leaders from the rank and file.   
 Robert Michels has theorized that such behavior is common within 
political organizations.  Michels invokes what he calls the “iron law of oligarchy” 
to describe this behavior.  Arguing the “society cannot exist without a ‘dominant’ 
or ‘political’ class,” he suggests that “the majority [within any organized group] is 
thus permanently incapable of self-government” (Michels 390).  These oligarchic 
tendencies within the MCNOC are not unique to that organization and, if they 
                                                 
116 I spent the entire day of August 2, 2001 interviewing Balbuena, other leaders of the 
organization as well as peasants participating in the protests as they moved through the MCNOC 
headquarters and on to vehicles where they were transported to several of the many protest sites 
throughout the country.  As I spoke with the non-leadership members of the organization it 
became obvious that decisions about the nature of the protest and the language of the formal 
documents presented to Congress were completely in the hands of the leadership who debated the 
issues in Guarani in the rear courtyard as I interviewed the peasants who milled around in the 
front courtyard.  Even arguments made to interviewers such as myself and the news media were 
concentrated upon the leadership who spoke good, clear Spanish.  Only after I introduced myself 
in Guarani and chatted for a while with peasants in that language did I get the opportunity to 
interview peasants who were not members of the leadership.  The peasants thought it very curious 
that I, an American, would spend my time chatting with the lowest members of the organization 
rather then with the leadership.   
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 prove widespread, call into question the ability of the MCNOC or the Paraguayan 
land reform struggle as a whole to represent the peasantry or even to succeed as a 
movement.  
 These bureaucratic and oligarch cal structures are not immediately evident 
even in the largest of peasant land reform organizations such as the MCNOC.  
Ostensibly, all members of the Paraguayan land reform struggle and of the 
MCNOC are peasant farmers.  However, in reality, the peasant leaders I had the 
opportunity to speak with and to visit on their farms fell into two categories: 
active and inactive members.  Active members were those peasants who were 
active in peasant organizations—visiting the main office in the capital city, 
attending meetings, attending training or visiting their socios or other members of 
the group.   As a result of this work, they don’t have time to work at home on 
their own farms (often a twenty-four hour a day, seven day a week responsibility).  
Returning home from time to time, the active members of peasant organizations 
depend on their socios who work in minga to maintain the farms of active 
members.  This, however, most certainly results in a drop in income that must be 
supplemented by other means, presumably with a salary from the organization 
itself or from donations from the active socios.  Inactive members spend the vast 
majority of their time on the farm and have little to no time to devote to 
organizational activity.  Attending rallies and protests only when called upon, the 
average member of the land reform struggle must rely upon his or her 
representatives to inform him or her of the issues concerning the struggle.   
 174
  The oligarchcal character of the MCNOC became quite evident when I 
interviewed that organization’s leader, Belarminio Balbuena.  The odd mixture of 
social informality and peasant deference to leadership makes organizational 
oligarchy a less than obvious, if universal phenomenon amongst the peasantry.117  
The first time I approached MCNOC’s headquarters in Asuncion (a small home in 
the middle of an ordinary neighborhood with a front and back patio) I merely 
clapped my hands as I entered the front patio of the house (a traditional method of 
entry to a rural homestead) and a young woman came out to inform me that “Oke 
hina el karai,” the senor was sleeping.  I politely explained my desire to interview 
Sr. Balbuena and the young woman awoke the leader of tens of thousands from 
his nap on the back porch to sit, talk and drink tererre with a stranger. 
 Sr. Balbuena was well accustomed to interviews, speaking with strangers 
and articulating himself in both Spanish and Guarani .  Other peasants attending 
the interviews I conducted with Sr. Balbuena declined to speak in his presence.  
After conducting interviews throughout the country for 2 ½ months and listening 
to peasant arguments, it became evident that individual peasant arguments differ 
quite substantially from the arguments offered by the leadership of peasant 
organizations. 
                                                 
117 While working with one comite de agricultores in La Colonial Independencia, I encountered 
the same phenomenon.  The leader of the comite was known as Jose Aguara or Jose the Fox.  He 
was untrustworthy and actually disliked by the other members of the comite who elected him their 
leader, year after year.  After inquiring, I discovered that he was chosen solely on the basis of two 
traits: “one’e pora la castellano ha oikua la kuatiane’e” [he has good Spanish and he knows how 
to read].  The peasants didn’t trust him but felt that la mita paragua’ype, people from the city, 
would respect him. 
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  In an interesting contradiction, the individual Paraguayan peasant is 
ordinarily invisible in the course of public land reform argument.118  This 
exclusion applies equally to the ability of an ordinary peasant to communicate his 
or her views on land reform to a journalist as to the leader of the peasant 
organization of which he or she is a member.  Individuals are subordinated to the 
organization itself as represented through the person of the leader or leadership of 
the group.  Michels’ iron law of oligarchy contributes to an explanation of how 
individuals within a group are systematically silenced.  On another level of 
analysis, not only do organizational practices constrain the broad participation of 
peasants in their own organizations, but Paraguayan culture itself contributes to 
the phenomenon. 
 In the mind of the Paraguayan peasant, it would be a contradiction to 
define a category of the land reform argument labeled “peasant arguments” which 
differ from those arguments offered by peasant leaders and peasant organizations 
in the name of individual peasants who are occupying land and manning 
roadblocks, the physical component of protest activity.  The rule of the nembotavy 
rules peasant attitudes, “Lo mbarete oreko kuera la yvy ha xe, ha xe nembotavy.  
Xe da rekoi la yvy.” [The powerful have the land and me, I am only an ignorant 
peasant.  I don’t have any land] (Rogelio Martinez, Personal Interview).  Peasants 
believe that their lack of education limits their ability to contest at the level of 
argument.  Individual peasant arguments for land reform that differ from those of 
the national peasant organizations do exist.  They are, in fact, copious, too 
                                                 
118 The exception to this rule is found in those cases of successful physical protest that result in 
peasant deaths when the immutable fact of their lives and deaths becomes evident. 
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 numerous for this work to list.  Comprised of an assortment of individual and 
particular land disputes, many peasant demands fall into the (Not In My Back 
Yard) NIMBY category of social struggle.  However, and at the same time, 
peasants demonstrate a national level of conscious about the land reform issue.  
Peasants simultaneously articulate their own land concerns and those of other 
peasants throughout the nation.  Amanzio Ruiz, a land-squatter, member of the 
MCNOC and participant in the struggles for land in the Asentamiento de 
Capi’ibary, puts it this way, “Todos somos pobres.  Lo que tenemos, tenemos 
porque luchamos.  Es asi  en todo el pai s” [We are all poor.  What we have, we 
have because we fought (for it)] ( Rui z, Personal Interview).  
 Alain Touraine argues that this distinction between the articulation of the 
struggle by intellectuals as opposed to members of the movement themselves 
constitutes an important break in the nature of organized social conflict.  Touraine 
posits the difference between mere social struggles and real social movements 
(where social movements are uniquely capable of achieving real, lasting social 
change) as an issue of agency: in social struggles, actors participate in the 
society’s decision making process; in social movements, actors “seek to transform 
the relations of social domination” that structure the conflict and its outcome 
(Touraine, Return 64).  In the case of a social movement, the role of the 
intellectual is to foment self-analysis by presenting an image of the group to itself 
for judgment (Touraine, Return 97).  By making the social actors in the struggle 
more aware of themselves and their stakes in the struggle, namely their relations 
to state and society, the intellectual “should produce intelligibility among actors 
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 and thus increase their freedom” (Dubet and Wievidrka 59).  The goal of the 
intellectual is to create, within the membership of any social movement a capacity 
for self-analysis that focuses upon “historicity,” or the set of social relations that 
structure the conflict (Touraine, Voice 143, 149).  For, as Touraine qualifies his 
analysis, “The main condition for social movements to take shape is the 
consciousness that we are entering a new type of social life” (Touraine, “An 
Introduction” 780) 
 The radical differences between peasant perceptions and representations of 
the conflict and perceptions and representations of the conflict by intellectuals 
becomes important in light of Touraine’s distinction between social struggles and 
social movements.  Given the fact that peasants are the primary actors in the 
conflict, protesting, marching, and invading and occupying property, we should 
question, not the contribution of intellectuals to the society, but their contribution 
to this particular conflict.  It would seem that, given the need for coherence and 
concerted action, the contributions of intellectuals could and ought to take on a 
central role in the land reform struggle.  
 Intellectuals perceive the Paraguayan land reform struggle as a historical 
opportunity to challenge the status quo.  Writing articles, attending lectures and 
speaking to groups constitutes a real and even concerted effort to challenge the 
historicity of the conflict at its highest level of meaning in terms of “citizenship,” 
“good governance,” “participatory democracy,” “rural interests,” “elite social 
domination,” “globalism” and finally, “social reform.”  All of this is ostensibly 
correct.  However, Touraine’s point is that the conflict will never rise above the 
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 level of struggle unless its primary actors, the peasantry (estimated at a much as 
55% of the entire population), are informed of the real stakes of the struggle.119 
Since intellectuals don’t directly or indirectly communicate with peasants, they 
simply do not contribute to the construction of a real social movement in 
Touraine’s terms. 
Given that the intellectuals do not contribute to peasant perceptions of the 
conflict, where do peasant develop their argumentative strategies?  Doug 
McAdam and Dieter Rucht have collected research demonstrating that protest 
strategies can develop as intermovement links within a single country (McAdam 
and Rucht 61-62).  In the absence of an intellectual current motivating the primary 
actors in the Paraguayan land reform struggle, it is important to look at the 
movement in terms of the experiences of the primary actors themselves. 
  The single largest factor shaping peasant attitudes towards the struggle is 
a historically situated language and culture that is shared by the approximately 2.5 
million peasants in Paraguay.  The most natural peasant arguments for use in the 
land reform struggle are cultural in nature and express peasant values.  They are 
expressions of the daily rules of life that have defined rural Paraguayan culture for 
hundreds of years.  However, as arguments based within the peasant experience 
they are ineffective as public arguments.  The targeted audience for these 
arguments, the urban Paraguyan population (including politicians and government 
servants), does not participate in or have an understanding of the subsistence 
agricultural lifestyle of the peasantry.  Since this audience has little to no 
understanding of the cultural logic of such peasant arguments, thus, effective 
                                                 
119 Rachel Neild estimated the peasant population at 55% in 1991 (Neild 40). 
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 communication with a targeted audience tends to be limited.  Three examples of 
such peasant arguments include the 1) lo jataivy guasu, 2) lo sinvergüenza, and 3) 
hay que ser responsible.  
 Lo Jataivy Guasu (the blood suckers).  This argument points out the 
traditional exploitation of peasants who have been too ignorant to take ownership 
of what is theirs, namely Paraguay.  Peasants have historically not understood 
their rights and have been guided by la mita paragua’y pe or Asuncenos, city 
dwellers, to the detriment of their own interests.  Lo jataivy guasu is a popular 
phrase that compares the systematic exploitation of the peasant to the jataivy 
(tick) that lives on the cow that works to feed both animals.  The tick does nothing 
but benefit from the work of the cow.  The peasants see themselves as the cow 
and see the urban population as ticks that feed on their sweat and blood to enrich 
themselves at the expense of the peasant who works in the field as the middle men 
sit in air conditioned offices.  The peasantry is aware of the “free ride” and 
exploitation by means of usury, monopolization of land, transport and other 
means of production.  The urban public, however, views the peasants as lazy, 
uneducated masses who require shepherding.  This argument fails because the 
urban populace does not see the deplorable conditions the peasantry suffers as a 
result of their exploitation as cheap labor for the latifundias. 
 Sinvergüenza a (person with shameless behavior).  This argument boils 
down to the belief that land rightfully belongs to those who work it (los 
responsables).  From the peasant’s perspective, the function of the government is 
to give land to those who work so that all Paraguayans can benefit (the peasant 
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 does this knowing that he or she is robbed of much of the value of his or her labor 
upon which the city-folk for their livelihood but such is the food chain).  The 
peasant is happy to maintain the status quo, to sell his or her cheap labor to the 
greater benefit of others.  However, to violate the social contract, that is, to not 
provide land to the peasants whose sweat, blood and sacrifice have built the 
society that the urban population dominates is to bring shame upon themselves for 
their unethical behavior.  This argument fails because the popular image of 
peasants as ignorant, illiterate and lazy supplies rationalizations for their 
impoverished condition.  Urban Paraguayans don’t have to face the fact that their 
prosperity is premised upon the misery and destitution of millions of peasants.  
 Ser responsible (Be responsible).  The implicit social contract for the 
peasant is that of debt-obligation.  Peasants send their sons to military service to 
pay their debt to the state and each peasant is willing at any time to contribute 
what he or she can to the state when needed.120 “Hay que ser responsible!” is the 
cry of self-identification for the Paraguayan peasant.  Only a man or a woman 
who works hard can expect support from his or her community as well as the 
nation.  The lessons of the Chaco War and the War of the Triple Alliance are 
important here.  The nation has the right to call upon its citizens to make extreme 
sacrifices and they have.  More than half of the entire Paraguayan population died 
in a futile defense of the nation led by a foolish egomaniac with great aspirations.  
During the Chaco War, under-armed peasants managed to defeat a much larger 
                                                 
120 A famous instance of this occurred during the Chaco War when the Paraguayan army was 
forced to fight a better equipped Bolivian force.  The Paraguayan government called upon the 
peasantry to contribute horses to the cause.  Of their own free will, the peasantry supplied the 
Armed Forces with more than  100,000 horses as a contribution to the nation. 
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 and better equipped Bolivian force under inhuman conditions in which more 
casualties were attributed to dehydration than to combat .121   Peasants expect land 
and other concessions from the government because they have already earned 
them.  They have proven their worth to the nation as laborers and expect the state 
to reciprocate.  This argument fails because urban Paraguayans do not understand 
the transparently clientelistic character of rural Paraguayan society.  They believe 
that such overtly clientilistic obligations are an artifact of the 19th Century and not 
a modern social practice.  While clientelism thrives in the urban Paraguayan 
culture as well as the rural, the lack of subtly in the rural version of this social 
practice marks it as quite a different thing in the eye of the urbane Paraguayan 
citizen.  Thus, the public demands of peasants for the reciprocation of a social 
contract, a crude and transparent form of the clientelism with which the urban 
Paraguayan is familiar, is misunderstood as merely aprovechoso or opportunistic. 
 The arguments offered by individual peasants in the personal interviews I 
conducted have little connection to the daily lives of urban dwelling politicians 
and bureaucrats to whom they have been addressed .122  Peasants offering such 
culturally grounded arguments appear merely incoherent or wholly ignorant of the 
nation’s economic necessities from the point of view of these urban Paraguayans.  
Contributing to the inability of the peasants to directly communicate their own 
arguments is the fact that the most effective arguments that could be offered by 
the peasants, to address non-rural Paraguayans, such as latifundia, government 
                                                 
121 Only one in seven Paraguayan infantry soldiers went into the field of battle with a rifle. 
122 I collected interviews in three separate periods Sept 1993 – Dec 1995; June 9, 2000 – August 
15, 2000; and August 2, 2002 to August 28, 2002.  Interviews were primarily conducted within 
three different departments: Asuncion, Villaricca, Capi’I Bary and the Colonia Independencia. 
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 corruption, and the need for agricultural credit, infrastructure and other forms of 
economic support have been co-opted by the national peasant organizations who 
express these arguments more articulately and in good Spanish. 
 Linguistic and educational barriers also problematize peasant 
communication with non-rural Paraguayans.  Most peasants are primarily 
Guarani  speakers and often only speak Spanish as a jopara.123  This prevents 
them from accessing almost all public information which is available only in 
Spanish.  Most Paraguayan television and radio transmissions are in Spanish as 
well as books, magazines and newspapers.  In addition, the low level of education 
and high illiteracy rate of peasants contributes to their inability to develop a 
sufficiently complex understanding of their situation.  Given the lack of 
educational investment or opportunity for peasants to obtain the mental training or 
theoretical tools for recognizing the condition of their lives, the structure of their 
relations to the state and the complexities inherent in the prospect of land reform, 
it is understandable that their attempts to communicate those concepts are often 
less than coherent. 
 Furthermore, given the peasant’s own dearth of confidence and/or lack of 
experience in the arena of competitive argument, when peasants are exposed to 
public arguments in favor of land reform, those arguments quickly colonize the 
peasant consciousness.  This occurs regardless of the ability of those arguments to 
conform to the perceived reality of the peasant’s life or circumstances.  With no 
other way to express him or herself, the peasant will repeat arguments without 
                                                 
123 Jopara is the hybrid language that mixes Spanish and Guarani.  The jopara is constrasted with 
the Porteno spoken in urban centers.  
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 fully understanding them.124  It is enough for the peasant to know that these 
arguments are in support of his or her position.  Thus, the peasant is alienated 
from his or her own real, lived experience of the very conflict over land that he or 
she ostensibly is driving.  The peasant rejection of MERCOSUR, state 
privatization and globalism are examples of the displacement of the peasant as a 
self-conscious actor in the struggle. 
 Another constraint on the ability of peasants to participate in the 
construction and delivery of arguments in the course of public protest is that they 
are out of the decision making loop and are often the last to know the positions 
and arguments of their own national organizations as well as the counter 
proposals offered by the government.  Living in isolated communities, often 
hundreds of miles away from the capital city, the peasants themselves do not 
participate in the daily activities of the national struggle.  A national protest 
activity may occur over the course of three days; after which, the peasants disband 
and return home as negotiations may be carried on by their leaders and ostensible 
representatives for several more days to weeks.    
 Important factors limiting their participation in the deliberations that 
follow the actual protests are primarily a result of the substandard state of rural 
                                                 
124 This mimicry is a survival technique developed by a peasantry that has endured hundreds of 
years of dictatorial regimes and the repression of free speech.  Peasants have learned to identify 
the political and economic opinions of the dominant classes and reproduce them when asked for 
their opinion.  Some linguistic clues provide insight into this class of speech.  Political speech is 
referred to in Guarani as a-ne’embegue, or slow speech.  It is understood that political discussion 
employs a process of conscious reflection and code/creed switching.  The ability to cause one’s 
speech to shift from one ideological position to another, that is to say from approval of one 
political party to another, is referred to by the peasants as a-cambia la camisa, or the changing of 
the shirt (this refers to the recent practice of distributing T-shirts with colors representing the 
country’s political parties: red for for the ANR, blue for the PLRA, rainbow for the the PEN, 
etc…).  Peasants are well adapted to identifying and mimicking the ideological positions of their 
interlocutors, including peasant leaders, intellectuals and even other peasants.  
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 transportation, the inaccessibility of communication technology, the physical 
distribution of peasant households and costs.   
No communication links exist which connect the rural countryside with 
the capital.  While some phone service is available, that service is sporadic, 
outside of the locality of the peasants themselves (phone offices are located in 
larger municipalities separated from the asentamientos and compani as where the 
peasants actually live by rudimentary roads.125  Travel on such rural roads is 
seasonal.  Road conditions are poor and   roads often lack bridges, pavement, or 
even basic maintenance restricting their use to the dry season.126  Furthermore, the 
constant demands of the farm permit peasants only allow extended travel outside 
of the primary growing season, spending more than three days away from the 
farm not only is unusual for a peasant but can create an economic liability with 
livestock and crops to attend.127  Travel is expensive.  The pasaje or ticket cost 
from rural settlements to the capital is a multi-step process performed with great 
                                                 
125 It is remarkable to note the growth of cell phone access in Paraguay.  In fact, some peasant 
leaders do possess phones.  This is seen primarily as a security precaution rather than as method of 
structuring the dissemination of information from the national to the local peasant organizations.  
Several factors limit the use of cell phones as an answer to the communication problems isolating 
local peasant organizations and individual peasants from close contact with national peasant 
organizations as well as with other local organizations: 1) cost (phone service costs roughly 
$30/month or $360/year while the average peasant family earns between $800-$1000/year.  A cell 
phone could cost as much as 45% of a peasant’s yearly income); 2) peasants are often 
uncomfortable with technology and the presence of a phone doesn’t mean that it will be cared for 
or even used at all; 3) Coverage is sporadic and often not available in the Paraguayan countryside.  
126 While living in Paraguay, I was many times forced to travel ten to fifteen kilometers through 
mud that reached my knees in order to seek bus service.  In fact, the hike into and out of the 
asentamiento Capi’ibary is five kilometers through sand, across a stream with no bridge that 
becomes impassable after a rain and up a fifteen degree slope in either direction for 2 ½ 
kilometers. 
127 Although most of the country is north of the Tropic of Cancer, the growing season is 
interrupted by one or more frosts each year.  With a growing season of approximately 10 months, 
peasants are only free from the constant demands of subsistence farming for about 2 months of the 
year.  
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 expense to the peasant.128  Initially, the peasant pays for passage from the 
compani a to a transportation hub (usually a small urban center within 1-4 hours of 
the companias), then from that hub to the capital, then, within the capital, for bus 
service to the peasant’s destination.  I have estimated the total average cost to a 
peasant making such a journey at 1 ½ to nearly 2 day’s labor129 or 15,000-19,000 
Guaranies 130 without including the cost of food and drink in the calculation.  In 
addition, transport price hikes far exceed inflation and impact peasants 
disproportionally as long distance travel (from the colonias to the capital) 
experiences the largest cost increases.131
There are also cultural barriers that make travel difficult for the culturally 
isolated peasant.  A peasant who speaks little Spanish and who has been raised in 
the rural countryside may never have traveled outside of his or her compani a or 
asentamiento before.  In addition, fear of embarrassment or loss in the process of 
conducting business and getting directions in Guarani constitute a significant 
obstacle for the average peasant.  Finally, travel to the Capital city of Asuncion 
inhabited by more than 1,000,000 people presents the difficulty of orientation to 
                                                 
128 When traveling with peasant leader Amanzio Ruiz, I discovered that Amanzio was losing time 
for working on his farm.  Upon returning to Capi’ibary, he informed me that he could not guide 
me through the asentamiento because he had work to do.  I offered to help him but he declined 
stating that I had important work to do as well, to tell the story of the peasants to the people of the 
United States.  It is common for peasant leaders to receive an abono from the community they 
represent.  This abono serves to pay for the cost of travel, food and lodging as well as the value of 
the time the farmer has lost working on his own farm (approximately 10,000-12,000 Guaranies or 
about $2.00/day).  
129 Daily labor wages are 10,000-12,000 Guaranies each day, for 10 hours of labor.  8,000 
Guaranies/day is not unheard of in the rural countryside where labor is abundant and employment 
is scarce.   
130 The initial stage of travel will cost 1,500 to 2,500 Guaranies each way.  Travel from the hub to 
the capital will cost between 12,000 to 15,000 Guaranies.  Local bus service within the capital 
costs 1,500 Guaranies. Such a trip will cost 15,000 to 19,000 Guarani es each way.  
131 Pasaje increased by 10% for medium distance travel (less than 100 kilometers) and by 15% for 
long distance travel (between 100 to 200 kilometers) (“Empresas Brasilenas” 18).  
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 the peasant.  Having lived all of one’s life within the same small area does not 
enable the peasant to culturally or physically navigate the barriers imposed by 
such things are pedestrians, buildings, traffic and other physical facts of urban life 
that are unknown to rural culture.132
 Finally, the peasant is disinclined to participate at all in the one’embegue 
de lo mburuvicha kuera [the discussions among the leaders].  The peasant culture 
is defined by a top-down leadership model, within which dissent is discouraged 
and self-censorship is prevalent.  Individual peasants rarely speak up in groups.  A 
collectivist mentality pervades peasant organizations, protests and events in which 
all members must follow their orders desde arriba, “from above.”   The 
contradiction exhibited in the function of a group designed to express the needs of 
peasants to the Paraguayan society, which, in turn, prevents individual members 
from expressing themselves can be found in the words of the peasants themselves: 
Estamos analizando los problemas que existen en la aplicacion de 
la reforma agraria.  El campesinado es un sector my grande de 
nuestro pais.  Al hablar de reforma agraria se habla del 
campesinado, en general; se habla de la politica misma hacia el 
sector campesino.  Pero lamentablemente, los que debemos hablar 
de reforma agraria no tenemos la palabra, y nostros somos los que 
sabemos donde no aprieta el zapato. (Go nzalez 242) 
 
[We are analyzing the problems that exist in the application of 
agrarian reform.  The peasantry is a very large segment of the 
nation.  To speak of agrarian reform is to speak about the peasantry 
in general.  One may also include the political treatment of the 
peasantry here.  But regrettably, of those who should be talking 
about agrarian reform, we lack the words and we are those who 
understand where it hurts]. 
                                                 
132 I once traveled with some peasant leaders I was working with in the Colonia Independencia, 
Guaira to an agricultural conference held in Asuncion.  The peasants were reluctant to spend the 
amount of money that it required to travel by bus across the city (550 Guaranies/trip or about 
$0.25).  Unable to conceptualize the urban as opposed to rural distances, involved in traveling 
through the Capital, he insisted that we walk in order to save money.   
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While arguments that are offered by the peasants themselves, expressed in 
their own language (either Guarani or jopara), and grounded in their own, lived 
experience of rural life are available, the arguments that are truly operationalized 
in the land reform struggle are those of the national peasant organizations which 
have monopolized the best individual peasant arguments and ignored the rest.  
This is owing to the success of the sensationalized public demands made by 
national peasant organizations as opposed to the more reasoned analyses of 
NGOs, academics and other internationally oriented groups or the nearly 
impenetrable linguistic and cultural barriers between peasants and their urban 
Paraguayan audience.  Even when the same argument is being made, the 
discourse of a peasant leader interviewed at a roadblock captures the public’s 
interest much more than a fair analysis of the rural economy published by a 
Paraguayan academic, or the muted voice of the real peasant who, humbled before 
the news cameras, mumbles a few inarticulate words in Guarani .  On the other 
hand, national peasant organizations often take credit for and eventually come to 
represent local groups of peasants who, as Guarani  speakers, are more than 
willing to allow the sophisticated, Spanish speaking leader of a national 
organization to speak on their behalf to the media or to the Congress.   
 It would be erroneous to arrive at the conclusion, as James Petras has, that 
the success that national peasant organizations have played in shaping the national 
debate on agrarian reform has emerged from the peasantry organizing from below 
(Petras 2).  For, while local peasant organizations may have provided the impetus 
for the mobilization of peasants in the past, this is not the case today.  Over time, 
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 the value of local participation or organization from “below” has become less and 
less important to the struggle as the roles of protester and leader have ossified in 
accordance with Michels’ “iron law of oligarchy” (Michels 389-90).  Beginning 
with the formation of the Ligas Agrarias in the 1960s, and culminating in the 
dominance of two organizations in the land reform struggle: the MCNOC and 
FNC, the importance of the national peasant organization has increased as the site 
of the struggle and, as a result, the arguments for the struggle have changed over 
time to reflect the character of this new site of struggle.  Today, the land reform 
struggle has less to do with peasants and more to do with the organizations that 
represent them.   
 Despite the fact that I have collected more than 100 interviews with 
peasants over a period of two years, I have been forced to come to the conclusion 
that an in-depth discussion of the individual attitudes, opinions and verbal 
arguments of the peasantry themselves has little bearing upon the actual verbal 
arguments employed in the struggle for land reform in Paraguay.133  Far more 
important and effective for the land reform struggle have been the non-discursive 
arguments offered by the peasantry.  The next section explores this physical 
dimension of protest activity by highlighting the various sites where the struggle 
unfolds. 
 
 
 
                                                 
133 This will be discussed further in chapter 5 when a model will be introduced to describe the 
phenomenon. 
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 3.4  Shifting Sites of Protest Activity 
 
 It is an oversimplification to suggest that peasant land invasions are the 
only form of resistance to legally recognized land tenure practices in Paraguay.  
Struggles over land possession have taken four primary forms, each with its own 
specific historical trajectory and historical context.  Although the problem of 
minifundia and the consequent pressure to invade and occupy latifundia is the 
most dramatic land tenure challenge, in reality, only 66% of all land tenure 
challenges in a study performed by CIPAE between 1989 and 1993 constituted 
land invasions and occupations (CIPAE, Conflicto 17).134
At least three distinct geographic shifts have occurred in the Paraguayan 
land reform struggle as a historical struggle.  The earliest form of the struggle was 
land occupation or squatting, a traditional practice predating colonial rule as a 
socio-agricultural practice.  While protests erupted from time to time between the 
foundation of the Paraguayan state in 1811 and the mid 1960s, they were sporadic 
in nature and often motivated by political forces external to domain of the 
struggle, peasant life.135  The site of struggle between the foundation of the 
republic and 1963 was the individual squatter’s plot/latifundista’s ranch.  The 
cause of the struggle was the loteamiento, or the legal titling of land that was 
occupied by peasants but owned by another.  Peasants have always squatted land 
in Paraguay, but after the two failed wars, massive government land sales 
                                                 
134 In the same study, CIPAE discovered that 12% of these land conflicts were conflicts over 
access to campos communales while 11% were conflicts over colonizacion and loteamiento with 
the remaining 11% constituted by other types of land conflicts (CIPAE, Conflicto 17). 
135 The Revolution of 1904 is a good example of the political rather than social impetus driving 
land reform as, in the case of 1904, the desire of the Liberales to overthrow the Colorado 
government. 
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 transferred huge tracts of land where the passive ownership practices of the 
Paraguayan government were quickly exchanged for new, foreign owners jealous 
of their investments and quick to remove squatters from their new possessions.  
Another wave of government land sales in the 1960s (primarily to Brazilian and 
Argentine interests) provoked large-scale evictions of peasants who had occupied 
their plots for generations.  This is a practice that persists to this day.  Fully 50% 
of peasants own no title to their land (Palau 153).  Peasant land struggles 
amounted to the largely individual efforts of peasants to resist their eviction from 
land with the support of Paraguayan security forces.  The peasants lost nearly all 
of these battles and were forced to relocate to other, less habitable areas where 
absentee landlords neglected to defend their property. 
After the foundation of the IBR in 1963, the site of the struggle shifted 
from simply squatting on land in the countryside to more organized forms of 
protest directed as appeals to the IBR and to the Paraguayan government.  
Peasants petitioned the government for the right to participate in agricultural 
colonization as small landowners.  Peasant organizations created at the level of 
the neighborhood, compani a, or even family would organize to petition the 
government for such land grants.  In fact, of the approximately 132 asentamientos 
that have been founded under the mandate of the IBR since 1989, none were 
initiated by the IBR itself.  All of the 132 established settlements since 1963 were 
initiated by peasants who squatted and/or petitioned for the their establishment 
(US Library of Congress).136
                                                 
136 These numbers can only constitute guesses, as the IBR was notorious for its poor records.  It is 
likely that there are, in fact, many IBR settlements for which no paperwork exists and others that 
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 Beginning in 1963, peasants merely petitioned for the establishment of 
new asentamientos.  Often identifying idle latifundial land, peasants filed the 
appropriate paperwork with the IBR as well as with the appropriate local 
authorities in order to expedite the expropriation, individual right to purchase, or 
loan for land purchase of the property.  After 1963 and the establishment of the 
IBR, the site of the struggle clearly shifted from squatting on the land itself to the 
buildings and offices of government institutions and politicians. 
Attempts by peasants to organize themselves on a larger scale and to shift 
their land reform tactics from the political and governmental institutions of power 
to the geography of the rural countryside where they were most comfortable were 
not successfully carried out until the fall of the dictatorship in 1989.  The first 
attempt at national organization through the auspices of the Catholic Church in 
the form of the Ligas Agrarias (1969-1976) was brutally repressed by the 
Stroessner administration after seven short years.  In 1989 however, the fall of 
Stroessner’s 35 year-old regime left a power vacuum in the rural countryside just 
as the peasant land demands exceeded the availability of state land reserves for 
the IBR’s colonization program.  In the chaos immediately following the coup, 
peasants rushed to seize land in truly huge numbers.  Overwhelmed by the scale 
of the invasions and disoriented by the coup, local and national authorities could 
not respond quickly and decisively enough to dislodge the peasants’ initial 
                                                                                                                                                 
only exist on paper.  The casual attitude of the IBR was motivated by corruption; a significant 
portion of the IBR land grants were distributed to members of the Colorado Party, the Paraguayan 
government and Paraguayan Armed Forces.  One director of the IBR is quoted as saying of the 
record keeping, “Se dice que 8 millones de hecta reas de tierra publicas fueron entregadas.  Esto 
es probablemente un poco exagerado, pero no lo se” [it is said that eight million hectares of land 
was distributed (by the IBR). This is probably a little exaggerated, but I don’t know] (Neild 41).   
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 occupations. The peasantry had, for the first time in Paraguayan history, 
organized themselves and seized the power to define the site of struggle: the 
unproductive latifundia in the rural countryside throughout the country.   
In response to the footholds established by peasants who squatted land in 
the thousands between 1989 and 1994, local authorities had to resort to other 
means than the traditional practice of violent eviction by local police with the 
support of the Paraguayan military.  In the unstable socio-political environment 
following the coup, authorities could no longer explicitly exert brutal force to 
evict peasants.  The use of such force re-invoked the specter of the Stroessner 
dictatorship implying the use of arbitrary force and illegitimate rule.  With 
Stroessner recently overthrown, the authorities could not risk exposing themselves 
to the same fate by repeating Stroessner’s brutal methods.   
Thus, local authorities and individual landowners resorted to the tactic of 
the judicial order for eviction.  These legal orders transformed what would have 
otherwise appeared the continuing oppression of landless peasants into the 
eviction of illegal squatters.  In addition, the shift of the site of struggle from the 
squatter’s camps to the courtroom clearly benefited wealthy landowners and 
politicians who controlled judicial decisions with their economic and political 
influence.137
                                                 
137 The rhetorical shift from the use of force upon peasant squatters to the legal definition of 
squatting as an illegal activity has been enshrined in Article 116 of the Constititucion Nacional 
1992 which clearly provides the courts the right of determining the resolution of land disputes and 
the treatment of latifundios improductivos: “Seran establecidos en cada caso por la ley y se 
abonara en la forma y el plazo que la misma determine” (Art. 116).  [They (the priciples for 
appropriating unproductive latifundios) will be established in each case by the law, whose result 
will be appropriate to the circumstances as required]. 
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  In response, peasants took to the streets in the form of protest marches and 
dared the police to physically challenge their presence in the streets of the cities of 
Paraguay.  This final and decisive shift of the site of the land reform struggle 
moved the locus of activity from the courts to a public venue where government 
security forces have unsuccessfully challenged peasant protests in Asuncion and 
other large cities throughout the country.  Prior to the coup of 1989, peasants were 
too intimidated by the brutal posture of the Stroessner regime to gather in public 
and appeal to the populace.  Beginning with the public occupations of plazas in 
Asuncion as early as March of 1989,138 these activities evolved into the first truly 
national peasant protests of 1994, which signaled a permanent shift of the site of 
the struggle from the rural environs of peasant land invasions and the halls, 
offices and backrooms of politicians, bureaucrats, and judges to the public 
spectacle of nationally coordinated protest marches, road blocks, and urban land 
occupations centered upon Asuncion.  National peasant organizations are 
permanently housed in the capital where peasants from all parts of the country 
travel in order to participate in the primary venue for the land reform struggle, 
protests mounted in Asuncion and its environs. 
 
3.5  The Rhetorical Ontology of the Struggle 
 
 In order to understand the non-discursive nature of peasant protest activity 
in Paraguay, one must examine the relationship between the Paraguayan peasant 
                                                 
138 On June 14, 1989, the 500 peasants struggling for the expropriation of Juan de Mena and Cleto 
Romero protested in front of the Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganaderia from 9:00 to 3:00 
represented the first public protests following the coup that overthrew President Stroessner on 
February 2, 1989. 
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 and the Paraguayan society.  The origins of the land reform struggle, while 
historically complex, lie in a rupture in the system of signification within the 
Paraguayan society.  A semio-structural rift has developed between the daily 
conditions that the peasant farmer finds him or herself in and the ideological 
description of peasant life within the society.  These ideological expectations are 
defined in language and social practices such as stories, songs, turns of phrase and 
representations of peasant life in the media.   
 This song from the Chokokue Purahei or the Song of the Peasant 
illustrates the national image of the Paraguayan peasant: 
Ei... yvypóra che rekópe oime che kéra yvoty. 
Ei... ha che páype ahavi'u añañua ipoty kuru. 
Ko'ãga, che karretape araha mba'e repy, che syva ry'ái poty. 
hi'ánte! tekove oisambyhýva ñande retã raperã 
vokóike, hesaho ñanderehe cho kokue tyre'ÿ eta 
uperõ omimbíne jaipotáva yma guive, ñande escudo moñe'ê hára. 
 
[Oh, I am a man of the earth caressed by dreams that bloom. 
Oh, I awaken to protect it and see it flower. 
Now, I travel in my ox cart selling the flower of the sweat of my 
brow. 
May it guide the nation! 
Sometimes I think about the hardships suffered by each of us in 
lonely misery. 
And then with its beautiful world with its desire for justice and 
peace. 
But it will make the arms of our civilization shine brilliantly]. 
 
The peasant is represented as the hard working economic and ethical foundation 
of the republic.  The peasant lives by the sweat of his or her brow (a marker of 
honesty and perseverance) and understands his or her place in the society.  The 
work ethic and anonymity of the peasant is the essential component of an honest 
and hardworking Paraguayan society as a whole.   
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  This image of the peasant as the economic and ethical base upon which 
the society is built originates in the sacrifices made by the peasantry during the 
War of the Triple Alliance and the Chaco War as well as the subsequent economic 
systems of Indian slavery, the hacendados, the colono system and sharecropping.  
To this day, the largely agricultural economy of Paraguay has depended upon the 
labor of the peasantry.   
 The glorification of the contribution of the peasantry to the nation was a 
central ideological feature of the militaristic regimes that succeeded the 
Estigarribia regime after the Chaco War.  The image of the noble peasant came to 
metonymically represent the nation as a whole.  Military ceremonies, land grants 
and other symbolic activity promoted the peasant as the basic component of 
Paraguayan society.  That this image is still viable is evident in the currency that 
features a noble peasant armed only with a machete.  This figure appears as ready 
to work on his rural farm as he is to defend the nation when called upon. 
 The irony of this representation is that the peasantry was nearly as 
economically exploited after the Chaco War as before.  The rhetoric ennobling the 
peasant’s sacrifices and glorifying the peasant’s economic contribution to the 
nation is sharply contrasted by the actual life of the rural peasant.  The peasant, 
who has sacrificed to the nation and who makes his or her economic contribution 
to the nation, receives absolutely nothing in return in the form of education for his 
or her children, land of one’s own, healthcare for his or her family, infra-structural 
improvements for the marketing of farm products, credit, technical assistance or 
even fair prices for his or her labor or farm products.  
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 Peasants who complain about this circumstance are deemed lazy, shiftless, 
untrustworthy, uncivilized, incapable persons who have failed to achieve the 
peasant ideal (an ideal that nowhere exists in reality).  Thus, peasants are defined 
by a set of cultural norms that have been created outside of their own life 
experience and they find themselves in the untenable position of having to 
reconcile one’s supposed heroic peasanthood with the harsh reality of a life 
defined by ignorance, illiteracy, powerlessness and poverty. 
The semiotic keystone of socio-economic participation in Paraguayan 
society and the peasant identity is land and land ownership.  Historically, 
Paraguayan (and even foreign) landowners have experienced both full 
participation in the society as well as economic independence by means of the 
wealth generated through land ownership.  The owners of large tracts of land have 
only been able to exploit the peasantry that was landless and, thus, dependent 
upon the haciendas and, later, latifundias for employment.  Hundreds of years of 
exclusion from and exploitation at the hands of landowners have created a rural 
ideology of land identity that equates full citizenship with land ownership.  Thus a 
peasant is, in essence, one who does not own land.  The only means that a peasant 
has of fulfilling the socially prescribed role of the heroic peasant is to own land.  
In the peasant’s own thinking, land ownership divides peasants who contribute to 
the society from those peasants who merely depend on the society to provide 
them with work. 
Excluded from full participation in the dominant Paraguayan socio-
economic system and constrained by an argument field that defines peasants as 
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 lazy, shiftless, untrustworthy, uncivilized, incapable persons, the peasants are 
forced to find an alternative means of describing their difficult and contradictory 
lives and the status of secondary citizenship that they endure. 
In order to describe the peasant’s identity and, thereby, the source of 
peasant argumentation, an ontology that explains the mediation between the social 
actor’s real conditions of existence and the ideology provided to that actor to 
interpret it must be developed.  A first step in developing such an ontological 
explanation involves coming to grips with the social system that gives meaning to 
a peasant’s life.  This system has two principal parts: language and social 
practices.  While many theorists have described the social construction of reality, 
fewer have dealt with the ways in which those realities function as a critical 
tension between perception and reality.  Linguistically, Jacques Derrida has 
described that tension as a series of “ruptures,” gaps in the system of signification 
or the inability of language to carry out the role of mediation between real 
experience and interpretation.139  Points of rupture occur, according to Derrida, 
when actors become aware that their language no longer represents primary 
experience.   
Michel Foucault’s work, on the other hand, describes the intricate web of 
social and linguistic systems that work to prevent such an event from occurring.140 
                                                 
139 In Writing and Difference, Derrida explores the purely symbolic/linguistic aspects of the 
traditional materialist critique of representation.  The author demonstrates the capacity for 
representation to break down as a linguistic/symbolic function with out reference to the material or 
the object of reference itself.  This work has made an important contribution to the sophistication 
of analyses of culture whose simple materialist critique has, under the label of vulgar Marxism, 
been too easily dismissed. 
140 Michel Foucault introduces the concept of the episteme in The Archaeology of Knowledge, a 
concept which describes the multiplicity of social forces employed the process of culture 
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 Foucault’s “episteme” or what Lyotard and Thebaud have called a language game 
is a system of language and cultural practices that shape and constantly reshape 
the social actor’s experience of his or her world.  Thus, the peasant’s daily 
response to his or her life-conditions is mediated by an ideology or a system of 
socially legitimated ideas transmitted over time in the form of arguments and key 
terms that the social actor uses to interpret his or her world and one’s relationship 
to that world.  Ordinarily, a social actor faced with a material hardship describes 
that need in terms provided by the episteme or the hegemonic system and 
addresses the need by means of actions legitimated by that same system.  
Describing or addressing material concerns outside of legitimate language or 
actions will be defined as deviant behavior and social actors engaging in such 
behavior will be physically and ideologically constrained by “legitimate” social 
authorities empowered in the name of the society. 
Within this semiotic framework, protest activity for the Paraguayan 
peasant becomes almost impossible.  Faced with the harsh economic realities of 
landlessness and starvation, the peasant has only recourse to a rhetoric provided 
by the State to describe his or her plight: poor peasants are lazy and rich peasants 
are noble.  Given that this makes no sense from the peasant’s own perspective, 
there exist linguistic and social practices that reinscribe conformity for the peasant 
who questions the rationality of the system by providing a rationale for 
suppression.  There are five basic tropes that perform this function: the 
                                                                                                                                                 
formation.  These processes are later exemplified in the author’s in-depth analyses of human 
sexuality and of madness in The History of Sexuality and Madness and Civilization. 
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 nembotavy, the opa rei, la ley de lo mbarete, lo ate’y, and La mita o-ke se hape 
ari. 
The term nembotavy is a term meaning “to make oneself stupid.”  A 
peasant who challenges authority in Paraguay will often be told that the 
“problem” is his or her own fault.  This is a powerful accusation as peasants have 
been conditioned to accept the blame as, Xe nembotavy or my mistake.  This is a 
disempowering term for the peasant.  It invokes the technological and cultural gap 
between the conquistadors and the native Americans at the time of the conquest.  
Today, this trope functions to reify the domination of the white, Europeanized 
Asunceno as opposed to the backward, illiterate, Guarani  speaking and ignorant 
peasant.  Invoking the colonial dyad (conquistador/indio) defines peasants as 
uncivilized and uneducated and infantilizes them as persons who are too 
uneducated even to make decisions for themselves.  
The term opa rei is best translated as a combination of the fait accompli 
and the preservation of an inequitable status quo.  A peasant who asks for social 
or political change will often receive the reply, opa rei el asunto! or the thing is 
done.  The phrase opa rei is used to describe any set of circumstances in which 
peasants have been exploited socially or economically without any recourse to 
challenge the status quo.  The peasant is forced to say Opa rei, no ma s! or That’s 
the way things have always been!  The opa rei is an explicit recognition of the 
peasant’s lowly, disempowered status in Paraguayan society. 
The term ley de lo mbarete refers to the privileged class in Paraguayan 
society.  It also refers to the “law of the jungle” as mbarete means “power” or 
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 “strength” in Guarani .  A common answer to the question, “Why do the peasant 
protests fail?” is, “Imbarete los autoridades!” or “the authorities were strong.”  
The peasantry uses the term lo mbarete to describe the elite social class whose 
members control the fate of the peasants, literally deciding in some cases whether 
the peasants live or die.  The ley de lo mbarete dictates that the peasants cannot 
challenge their domination by lo mbarete. 
The terms ate’y, and La mita o-ke se hape ari translate literally as “lazy” 
and “he who wants to sleep by the road.”  However, these phrases have a broader 
meaning in terms of describing the peasant character in Paraguay.  Peasants often 
identify themselves as ate’y or explain their inability to improve their lives by 
attributing their problems to Xe a-ke se kuri hape ari [I was sleeping by the road].  
Peasants view hard work as the only means of self-improvement.  The peasantry 
has accepted the image of the drunken Indian (a figure also invoked here in the 
United States), traditionally offered as a rationale for the inequitable distribution 
of power and wealth in the nation.  Peasants have been conditioned to view 
themselves as men and women who cannot fully adapt to civilized society or to 
manage its vices.  Invoking the phrases ate’y, and La mita o-ke se hape ari 
describe, not only the culture gap between the Europeanized urban centers and the 
rural countryside, but evidence the power of the former to dictate the identity of 
the latter.  The myth of the drunken peasant who can be found sleeping in or 
beside the road and who is presumed to be too uncivilized to work hard and make 
a contribution to the society is just that, a myth.  This distorted image of the 
selfish, drunken peasant who has caved in to the pressures of poverty and 
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 ignorance is a fiction.  It is the antithesis of the ideal heroic peasant who supports 
and grounds the whole society through sacrifice and hard work.  
The Paraguayan peasant lives a daily identity conflict.  On the one hand, 
he or she works hard, makes great sacrifices and endures working conditions 
inconceivable in the industrialized world.  On the other hand, the peasant has 
ideologically charged terminology to describe his or her plight: “Lo mbarete 
oreko kuera la yvy opa mbae.  Ha xe; ha xe nembotavy.  Xe da rekoi la yvy.” [The 
powerful have the land, and me, I am only an ignorant peasant.  I don’t have any 
land] (Rogelio Martinez, Personal Interview).   
In the context of these ideological constraints, social protest emerges as 
individual or collective expression of a social actor’s or a social group’s life-
conditions by “non-legitimated” means.  These non-legitimated means of social 
protest take the form of marches, pickets, rallies, sit-ins and even editorials and 
other publications that form a body of counter-cultural activity that can be 
characterized as defiant, impolite, and even violent and deviant at times.  Social 
protest activity is typified by the unwillingness of the participants to define their 
life-conditions through legitimated, uncontroversial means of language and 
expression. 
The site of this ideological struggle in social protest is two-fold.  First, the 
protesters must find a way of expressing their life-conditions outside of the 
dominant ideology or dominant language/argument structures that fail to 
adequately express/resolve their distress.  Secondly, protesters must legitimate 
that non-hegemonic position and resist the socio-political and economic pressures 
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 brought to bear upon the protesters in an attempt to de-legitimize their rhetorical 
stance. 
The function of governmental and civil authorities is to protect the 
viability of the material system of relations by forcing protesters to participate 
within the normal parameters of the social system (usually defined as economic 
activity).  This is accomplished by transforming the social argument into 
authorized terminologies and keeping discussion constrained within prescribed 
argument fields.  
 Robert S. Cathcart describes this as the first move in what he calls the 
social process of reciprocity or dialectical enjoinments in the moral arena 
(Cathcart 87).  Cathcart suggests that social struggles can be conceived in terms of 
Burkean dramatism: 
On the one hand, for a movement to come into being there must be 
one or more actors who, perceiving that the “good order” (the 
established system) is in reality a faulty order full of absurdity and 
injustice, cry out through various symbolic acts that true 
communion, justice, salvation cannot be achieved unless there is 
an immediate corrective applied to the established order.  On the 
other hand there must be a reciprocating act from the establishment 
or counter rhetors which perceives the demand of the agitator 
rhetoric, not as calls for correction or re-righting the prevailing 
order, but as direct attacks on the foundations of the established 
order. (Cathcart 87) 
 
In the Paraguayan case, there is great pressure on the protesters to abandon 
their “illegitimate” self-description and activity.  Non-hegemonic self-description 
and social action are a direct challenge to the dominant ideological concepts of a 
society.  Ideas about citizenship, expression, rights, laws and every other aspect of 
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 society are predicated upon an economic and material reality that are intertwined 
and cannot easily be changed nor challenged. 
On a material level, a protest march by the peasantry can be defined in the 
interest of the society as economically unproductive, which diminishes the 
peasants’ own productive capacity and that of other workers who are made idle by 
a lack of primary materials for their own work.  On a more abstract level, 
everyone in the society is potentially affected by a peasant who fails to engage in 
economically productive activity because that peasant, as a producer of primary 
materials, will not be able to employ others in the production of the products of 
consumption that peasant eventually must forgo in the process of protesting rather 
than earning capital. 
Linguistically, the social movement is pressured by various means 
including the media, negotiations with industry and government, and legal and 
social precedent to define itself in the terms that socio-cultural precedent dictates.  
Public authorities commonly deride peasants as drunken, stupid louts who, 
incapable of organizing such large numbers of individuals, are controlled by 
others.  In contrast, the peasants work hard to define their protest marches and 
roadblocks outside of those economic terms, for example, by framing their protest 
messages with an idiom of human rights.  With this move, peasants elevate their 
resistance beyond mere demands for land concessions, adding an additional layer 
to the struggle that presses to define the meaning of their protest activity in a bid 
to control the “historicity” of society.  According to Touraine, such a maneuver 
contains the seeds of social movement, since in his scheme, the difference 
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 between mere action and the meaning attributed to action underlies the important 
distinction between mere social struggles and real social movements. 
A social movement thus defined is in no way a response to a social 
situation.  On the contrary, it is the social situation that is the 
outcome of the conflict between social movements fighting for 
control over cultural models, over historicity…a social movement 
is a conflictual action through which cultural orientations, a field 
of historicity, are transformed into forms of social organization 
defined by general cultural norms and by relations of social 
domination. (Touraine, Return 66) 
 
In the attempt to redefine themselves as more than drunken, stupid louts 
incapable of organizing, peasants seek to change the cultural models upon 
which the Paraguayan society has been constructed. 
Arturo Escobar identifies the real target of social movements in much the 
same way as the “Hegemonic discourse [that has] transformed the system 
thorough which identities were defined” (Escobar 65).  These definitions 
circumscribe and constrain the ability of these identity groups to participate in a 
public argument over the validity of social norms.  Escobar points out that labels 
such as  “the ‘illiterate,’ the ‘landless peasants,’ ‘women bypassed by 
development,’ the ‘hungry and malnourished, ‘those belonging to the informal 
sector,’ ‘urban marginals,’ and so forth” disqualify such groups from participation 
in the process of social deliberation (Escobar 65).   
 The attempt by peasants to apply non-dominant ideological, linguistic and 
physical approaches to a social conflict is countered by institutional authorities 
who attempt to rhetorically circumscribe those definitions of the activity in order 
to safeguard the function and dominance of an extant socio-economic regime.  
Hence, peasants who rejected attempts to negotiate with President Go nzalez-
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 Macchi on his terms during the national protests of June of 2002 were defined as 
lazy, defiant, or self-interested all terms designed to inscribe them in an economic 
system.  A description of peasants in purely economic terms echoed the 
hegemonically inscribed nature of the arguments offered by the president and 
clearly favored the dominant commercial interests that backed him.  The 
successful attachment of such labels to protests groups would reduce any action 
taken by the protesters as the action of an angry mob rather than the action of a 
group of people who legitimately disagree with a status quo represented by the 
position of the presidency.   
 
3.6  The Role of Counter-argumentation 
 
 Since the emergence of the national peasant organization and the 
institution of mass protests, the key site in the Paraguayan land reform struggle is 
the interaction between peasant protestors and the state.  The dynamic of this 
interaction unfolds communicatively on both verbal and physical levels.  An 
examination of state counter-argument strategies and peasant responses will 
illustrate the disarticulation of protest activity as the struggle evolves over time.   
 
3.6.1 Government Counter-arguments and Peasant Response 
 
 While traditional arguments (the historical, the economic and the social) 
have long constituted the central text for demanding land reform in Paraguay, 
government authorities have developed a number of counterarguments that have 
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 required an adaptive response on the part of peasant protestors.  Two examples of 
this adaptation strategy are the ecological caretaker argument and the political 
argument. 
 In two notable cases, peasants have attempted to squat land that had been 
or was designated to become an ecological reserve.  In such cases, the Paraguayan 
government has argued that such land was reserved for the purpose of ecological 
preservation and thus removed from the exigencies of economic production.  
Peasants are widely perceived as practicioners of slash and burn agriculture and 
are held responsible for the country’s high deforestation rate.141  In the case of 
Capi’ibary (1989-1994), this was clearly a fiction promulgated by functionaries 
of MAG who enriched themselves by exploiting lumber from the reserve.  The 
more recent and still emerging case of El Parque Nacional de Yvyturuzu presents 
a more complex situation. 
 El Parque Nacional de Yvyturuzu was established as a national park on 
land already occupied by as many as 30,000 residents or about 5,000 peasants 
families.  The 24,000 hectare area was designated a forest reserve in 1991.142  The 
first wave of colonization of the area occurred in the early 1960s.  Conflicts have 
already begun and may intensify with the introduction of permanent forest rangers 
                                                 
141 “Paraguay has one of the highest rates of deforestation in the world. Every year, 10% of the 
remaining forest cover is lost, threatening the future of unique ecosystems” (USAID) 
142 The west half of the Yvytyruzu reserve, constituted by the Cordilera Yvytyruzu and its 
immediate foothills, was sold to German colonists and politically organized as the Colonia 
Independencia in the 1920s.  After the Germans had exploited the best land and the soil lost its 
fertility, the land was either sold to peasants in irregular agreements without titulation or it was 
squatted by peasants who were willing to occupy the large, semi-arable tracts left by the Germans.  
This land is only semi-arable as its soils are shallow, sandy, rocky or so hilly as to risk severe 
erosion.    
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 whose powers include the power of arrest if a peasant fells a single tree within the 
park boundaries. 
 In both cases the peasants have argued that they are the natural caretakers 
of the Paraguayan countryside as the traditional denizens of that region of the 
country.   The argument was articulated by a member of La Colonia el Triunfo of 
the Asentamiento de Capi’ibary: 
Asi  en El Triunfo tenemos en cuenta nuestro territorio que es 
nuestra comunidad en su conjunto, nuestra gente, para nosotros el 
objectivo es el hombre y no la plata, el territorio, nuestra gente, 
los bienes y otros valores culturales, defendemos nuestras 
costumbres, entonces la comunidad pra cticamente actua como un 
ejercito en defensa de todo eso que hace a la comunidad en su 
conjunto. (Fogel, Luchas 193) 
 
[Thus it is in El Triunfo that we take into account that our 
nation/land is a whole community, our people, for us the objective 
is the man and not the money; the land, our people, goods and 
other cultural values, we defend our customs, hence the 
community functions like an army in defense of everything that 
makes a community in its complexity]. 
 
En este contexto parece ganar mas fuerza una propuesta 
agroecologica, y en el caso de la colonia no plantean simplemente 
la oferta tecnologica referida a algunos rubros sino al sistema 
productivo en su conjunto que tiene tres components basicos: 
hortalizas, frutas, y animals menores y lo que es ma s importante 
sin el uso de agrotoxicos.  La produccion agroecologica de la 
comunidad tiene Mercado diversificado, ya que comercializan en 
la feria de Ciudad del Este, en la feria de Minga Guazu  y esta n 
negociando acuerdos con supermercados de la zona. (Fogel, 
Luchas 193) 
 
[In this context, an agro-ecological proposal would seem to have 
more weight, and in the case of the colony this is not simply in 
reference to technology specific to some crops but a system of 
production that, as a whole, has three basic components: 
vegetables, fruits and small animals, and above all abandoning the 
use of agrochemicals.  (Such) an agriculturally productive 
community would have a diversified market (strategy), already 
they have sold products in the market of the Ciudad del Este, in the 
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 market of Minga Guazu  and they are negotiating accords with 
supermarkets in the region]. 
 
As we can see, this is a much more sophisticated argument that has combined 
elements from the traditional historical, social and economic arguments of the 
past. The argument becomes clearer when it is broken down into its three 
constituent parts: 
1) The core argument for the peasantry is the notion that the 
peasants have historically functioned to maintain the traditional 
balance of nature; this balance entails the peasantry taking 
extracting natural resources only as they need them (a rational land 
exploitation).  They see this as a sustainable practice, which, if 
passed on from one generation to the next, serves to reproduce 
their culture and to provide their children with livelihoods as 
well.143  
 
2) Even those peasants who do not practice sustainable agriculture 
only require training, which the state should provide. 
 
3) Latifundia function with the sole purpose of resource extraction 
for sale of timber, yerba mate, coffee, soybeans, or cattle in the 
international market.  In addition, other non-rational uses of the 
land are the cultivation of marijuana and the depredation of the old 
stands of timber known as rollotrafico are other commercial 
practices engaged in by latifundistas.   
 
 The peasants argue that all of these latifundial practices deface and 
degrade the land without rational exploitation.  They even admit their 
participation in the process.  As a peasant attending an agroforestry training in the 
Asentamiento Mandu’ara explains: 
Que  fa cil era aplicar la chacra sin quema. Era solamente 
necesario el machete y algunas jornadas ma s de trabajo por 
                                                 
143 In the peasant mind, culture and land are conflated concepts that harken back to the pre-
colonial native concept of the tekoha (Fogel, Luchas 19).  While it would be naïve to attribute any 
causal and ideological link between the tekoha and the concept of private property, one can argue 
that the cultural residue of the tekoha has probably survived in the quotidienne social practices of 
the mestizo peasantry as a form of resistance to and in tension with the dominant land tenure 
practices.  
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 hectarea.  Sembrar entre los yuyos cortados y picados finamente 
era muy simple.  Lo que pasa es que nunca hemos probado hacer 
esto.  Estamos acostumbrados al uso del fuego para limpiar con 
mayor facilidad. (Programa ALA 55) 
 
[It was easy to apply farming without burning.  All that was 
necessary was a machete and a couple of days of work for each 
hectare.  Planting between the cut down and chopped up weeds 
was very easy.  What happens is that we (the peasants) have never 
tried this (farming without burning).  We are accustomed to using 
fire to clean (a forested plot) with the greatest of ease]. 
 
However, the peasants of El Triunfo argue that while the peasants may 
have burned the forests, they were not doing so by choice.  A leader of the 
Colonia El Triunfo argues that the peasants were not culpable: 
Y ese se sigue usando en nuestro sistema tradicional, las colonias 
campesinas no tienen autonomia, no tienen autoridad propia, los 
que Mandan son los que viven en los centros urbanos, dos or tres 
tipos, aunque haya 1.000 familias no tienen la ma s mi nima 
autoridad en su pueblo, en su lugar.  Por eso proponemos un 
modelo nuevo, respeto mutuo, para eso hay que tener una 
herramienta de poder. (Fogel, Luchas 194) 
 
[And this is what is done in our traditional system. The peasant 
colonies don’t have autonomy; they have no authority of their own. 
Those who give the orders live in urban centers, only two or three 
individuals, and even though there might be one thousand families 
(in the colony), they have the least amount of authority in their 
own town, in their own place.  This is why we propose a new 
model, (based upon) mutual respect.  In order to have this, one 
must have the instruments of power]. 
 
The peasants of El Triunfo argue that they have been coerced into ecologically 
irrational farming methods. The belief that the peasant only knows how to 
deforest is premised on the knowledge that native farming practices employed 
slash and burn agriculture (Programa ALA 55). 
 Peasants argue that granting peasants lots of “ecologically reserved” land 
from the hands of state authorities or private companies will only preserve that 
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 land.  Rational exploitation is for the peasantry a circular argument defined as 
extracting from the land only what you need to survive just as the peasants claim 
they themselves do.  Irrational exploitation is, by implication, the extraction of 
natural resources for any purpose other than mere survival and perpetuation of the 
peasant culture.  This includes any industrial application, absentee management, 
and non-agricultural resource extraction. 
 The evidence provided for this conclusion is ample from the peasant 
perspective.  It is common for the peasant invaders of latifundia or state land to 
discover large plantations of marijuana cultivated either by the land owners 
themselves or by government servants responsible for management, supervision 
or compliance with legal resource extraction practices.  A peasant encounter 
group member expressed the peasant viewpoint concisely, “…muchas tierras no 
estan trabajadas agricolamente.  Son utilizadas para la extraccion de Madera, 
para especulacion y tambien para plantar drogas…” [much land is agriculturally 
fallow.  They (these unexploited lands) are used for logging, real estate 
speculation and they are also used to plant drugs] (Go nzales 248).144  
 I interviewed another peasant who claimed that all of the ecological 
damage caused to the forests of Paraguay has been the result of latifundistas and 
not the peasantry.  He claimed that only large landowners could afford to deforest 
                                                 
144 This research seminar brought together many incipient social groups (at both the national and 
regional level) including La Comision Central de Horticultores (CCH); Servicio Arquidiocesano 
de Comercialization (SEARCO); Cooperativas Ojopoin y Lima; Consejo de Comites de 
Agricultores-Area Defensores del Chaco, Diocesis de San Pedro; Comite de Argicultores , 
Coordination Zonal San Ignacio; Organizacio n Campesina del Norte (ONC); Moviemento 
Campesino Paraguayo (MCP), Organizacion Nacional Campesina (ONAC); and La Union 
Nacional Campesina Onondivepa (UNC). This seminar entitled, “Seminario sobre 
Organizaciones Campesinas” was conducted by El Centro Interdisciplinario de Derecho Social y 
Economia Politica (CIDSEP), from November 21-22, 1987 in Ypacarai. 
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 huge tracts of land.  In contrast, “¿Que puede hacer un pobre campesino con una 
azada y un machete?  No puede echar 100 hectareas del monte en mil anos!” 
[What can a poor peasant do with a hoe and a machete?  You couldn’t clear 100 
hectares of forest in a thousand years (that way)] (Colman, Personal Interview).  
 Arguments representing the peasant as the ecological caretaker of the 
forests did not exist until foreign interest in ecology redescribed the forests as 
something positive to be preserved.  The ecological argument was an essential 
modification of the land reform struggle’s argumentative strategy.  When 
latifundistas and state entities argued that they were caretakers of the ecology, 
peasants were forced to abandon historical and economic arguments in order to 
address this new discourse.145  The development of this line of argumentation was 
not easy for the peasantry.  It is the first demonstration of their ability to recognize 
the importance of argument itself in the struggle.  In order to adopt this argument, 
the peasants had to arrive at the conscious conclusion that argument itself rather 
than historical truth would decide the outcome of their struggle.  This 
consciousness of the importance of argument became even more visible as the 
impetus of the movement shifted from local and regional peasant organizations to 
national organizations who where not as restricted in their argument by education 
and cultural background. 
                                                 
145 The idea of preserving the environment is quite foreign to the average Paraguayan peasant.  For 
the majority of Paraguyans, even to this day, the forest is a maleza to be beaten back, with every 
trace extinguished.  An example of this is the Paraguayan practice of house cleaning which 
includes removing all trees from within ten to fifteen yards of a home and then, each morning, 
meticulously sweeping the entire dirt area surrounding the house in order to remove any trace of 
organic matter.  This starkly contrasts our own North American ideas of property adornment with 
grass and trees.  In fact, the peasants prefer to plant non-native trees shrubs in pots or as flower 
gardens near their homes because native species, no matter their beauty, are considered weeds. 
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  Ramon Fogel noted the important role that NGOs have had in facilitating 
the modification of peasant argument strategies by assisting in peasant 
organizational and communication efforts.  Fogel noted that in the case of 
Capi’ibary, in particular, NGOs assisted peasants in the formation of their own 
argument strategies: 
La ge nesis del conflicto se da cuando grupos campesinos toman 
conciencia de la necesidad de actuar para apropiarse y usar una 
fraccion de tierra controlada por otro; en esta fase el grupo se 
transforma en actor con capacidad de formular sus demandas y 
movilzarse en su prosecucion.  En esta fase es importante el apoyo 
de grupos externos, tales como el CIPAE; este apoyo es crucial en 
la fase de maduracion del conflicto en la medida que se perfilan 
major las posiciones de intereses y el diseno de estrategias. (Fogel, 
Luchas 188) 
 
[The conflict originates when peasant groups become conscious of 
the need to take action in order to appropriate and use a parcel of 
land controlled by another; in this phase, the group is transformed 
into an actor with the capacity to formulate its demands and to 
mobilize itself toward that goal.  In this phase, the assistance of 
external groups such as CIPAE is important; this assistance is 
crucial in the mature phase of the conflict in the way they outline 
the positions and interests and the design of strategies].  
 
 With the establishment of the national peasant organization as the primary 
vehicle for the land reform struggle in Paraguay, a steady re-articulation of 
arguments has occurred.  Organization within the national peasant groups as well 
as assistance from NGOs have improved peasant to peasant communication and 
enabled a shift from the strategy of NIMBY struggles that employed traditional 
argument strategies.  These shifts include arguments addressing the political 
regime and the international economic system into which Paraguay was being 
integrated.   
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  Stymied by the government’s tactic of reaching verbal agreements with 
national peasant organizations and paying off peasant leaders in order to dispel 
the physical threat posed by large, national peasant protests, peasant organizations 
have modified their tactics.  These organizations have recognized that reaching 
agreement for land reform results in little when the root causes of the struggle lie 
in the corruption of government administrations and in government policies 
largely designed to disenfranchise peasants by refocusing the economy on agro-
exporters (largely latifudial agricultural enterprises) and industry.  National 
peasant organizational leaders identified the pressure of international and foreign 
bodies such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and 
MERCOSUR as root causes of the social inequities creating the latifundia.  The 
removal of the protections once afforded peasants and their products in the 
internally oriented agricultural market of Paraguay were at the root of not local 
problems but national problems involving the political structure as well as 
economic problems owing to global capitalism. 
 However, improved organizational and communication practices have led 
not only to adaptive argumentation strategies in the area of verbal contestation, 
but to a greater capacity to engage in non-verbal argument strategies as well.  
 
3.6.2 Police Repression and the Rhetorical Valence of Physical Protest 
 
 The most striking conclusion of this study of the Paraguayan land reform 
struggle is the relative success of non-verbal forms of protest as opposed to verbal 
forms of protest.  With an increased organizational capacity since the inception of 
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 widespread, mass protests in 1993, national peasant organizations like the 
MCNOC and the FNC have employed non-verbal protests strategies to gain major 
concessions from the Paraguayan government and have developed a successful 
non-verbal strategy in the process.   
 Traditionally the struggle has employed land occupation as its primary 
form of non-verbal or physical protest.  However, the most successful physical 
argumentation strategy has resulted from confrontations with the police and 
military in the course of protest marches and roadblocks.  The history of the 
Paraguayan land reform struggle has been a series of failures punctuated by 
stunning victories resulting from an excessive application of force by government 
authorities.  There is a direct correlation between protest incidents resulting in the 
death of peasants and government concessions to peasant demands in the face of 
public criticism of repressive tactics.  The best known of these incidents are the 
Di a de Perros, in the case of Juan de Mena and Cleto Romero, the series of 
desalojos and the escalation of physical protest strategies in the case of 
Capi’ibary; the deaths of protestors in the Plaza de la Independencia in the case 
of the Marzo Paraguayo; and the death of Calixto Cabral in the case of the 2001 
state privatization protest.   
 Saul Alinsky codified the protest strategy that the peasants have 
employed, in their case unconsciously, as “smashing the plan” in his influential 
social protest primer, Reveille for Radicals (Alinsky 150).   Alinsky points out 
that in cases in which the protestors are far weaker than the opposition, it is 
important to realize that the opposition strategy is predicated upon the anticipated 
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 reaction of the protestors.  His theory of “smashing the plan” is premised on the 
idea that successful protest from a position of weakness is possible if protests can 
resist the urge to react to the opposition’s strategy.  He urges protestors to “follow 
a plan of your own” in order to confound the opposition and to obtain a sense of 
agency in the course of a conflict (Alinsky 150). 
 Alinsky’s prescription to take actions in order to illicit a reaction has 
notable explanatory power in the case of physical protest in Paraguay.  Rather 
than following the formula of 1) protesting, 2) making demands, 3) receiving 
assurances, 4) and disbanding all in response to governmental actions, peasants 
have resorted to sit-ins, roadblocks, extended protest marches and occupations of 
public areas all without responding to government orders to clear such areas and 
disband.  In not responding to government demands in predictable ways, the 
peasants have taken control of the situation and forced authorities to react to the 
continued presence of the peasants rather than the other way around.  
 The most notable examples of this strategy occurred in the cases of the 
“Di a de perros,” June 23, 1989, the armed confrontation of peasants with 
rollotraficantes in Capi’ibary in 1991, and the death of Calixto Cabral in Nueva 
Londres, near Coronel Oviedo during a June 4, 2002 protest.  In the case of the 
“Di a de perros,” peasant protestors from the asentamientos Juan de Mena and 
Cleto Romero were attacked by police and dogs as they marched to confront 
legislators in the congressional building.  This repressive action was viewed 
unfavorably as news and photos of the attack were widely available in the media.  
The Rodriguez administration’s use of force was a tactic inherited from the 
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 repressive practices of the Stroessner administration.  The public, flush with the 
idea of liberation from the dictatorship and sharply critical of all repressive 
practices, responded dramatically to the event.  Under the dictatorship 
approximately 3000 people were murdered for their political beliefs.  
Paraguayans, even 13 years after the overthrow of Stroessner, have responded 
strongly to oppose government repression, which they see as a return to 
dictatorship.146 In the words of one of the participants: 
Lo de los perros fue cuando salimos de la Catedral para dirigirnos 
al Congreso para realizar ahi  las gestiones…El azuzar a los 
perros contra nostros fue un grave error de Rodriguez, aunque 
ellos negaron enseguida, dijeron que no tuvieron nada que ver, 
que los perros eran de la Chacarita.  Todos rechazaron esa 
repression.  Los legisladores se asustaron y vinieron a apoyarnos 
automaticamente; los que estaban dudando de nuestra causa se 
convencieron.  Al final solo tres legisladores votaron en contra.  
Con la ayuda de los perros la ley de expropiacion enseguida paso  
al Ejecutivo y el Presidente la promulgo. (Fogel, Luchas 94)   
    
[The event with the dogs occurred when we left the Cathedral in 
order to travel to the Congress for our protest…. The setting of the 
dogs on us was Rodri guez’s big mistake, even though they (the 
Rodri guez Administration) quickly denied involvement (they said 
they had nothing to do with it), claiming that the dogs were from 
La Chacarita (a shanty town beside the Congressional building).  
Everyone was appalled by this act of repression.  The legislators 
were scared and quickly came to our aid; those who doubted our 
cause were convinced.  In the end, only three legislators voted 
against (us).  With the help of the dogs, the law of expropriation 
was quickly offered to the Executive Branch and the President 
approved it].   
                                                 
146 The Oviedo rebellion of 1995 and the Marzo Paraguayo of 1998 are two of the most famous 
instances in which the Paraguayan public rose up in solidarity to oppose a return to a dictatorial 
regime and repression.  In 1995, President Wasmosy was forced to flee to the US Embassy when 
General Lino Oviedo refused to step down and moved to overthrow the government.  Paraguayans 
took to the streets to resist Oviedo in a show of solidarity against the reinstatement of a military 
regime in the country.  In 1998, eight student and peasant protesters were killed and more than 100 
injured as protesters were fired upon by police and military barricades separating protesters from 
the Congressional building.  General Oviedo was accused of ordering that attack as well as the 
assassination of Vice President, Argana in support of then President Raul Cubas.  The public rose 
up against Oviedo and Cubas forcing both to flee the country.  
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 The legislators quickly caved into peasant demands because public favor 
had shifted to their cause.  The squatter communities of Juan de Mena and Cleto 
Romero were allocated 7,000 hectares147 of land by the Paraguayan Congress 
under Ley 08/89 on September 5, 1989, little more than two months after the 
incident (a miracle of efficiency by the standards of the Paraguayan Congress).148  
 In the case of the Asentamiento Capi’ibary, San Pedro, peasants occupied 
land that was managed by the Ministerio de Agricultura (MAG) as the Reserva 
Forestal Capi’ibary.  The peasants argued that their farming practices were more 
sustainable and more economically productive than MAG’s exploitation of the 
forest reserve.149  While charged with the duty of protecting and preserving the 
environment, MAG agents actually engaged in depredatory practices, including 
rollotrafico (the illegal harvest and sale of hardwoods) and the planting of 
marijuana in the reserve.  The peasants pointed these practices out to local 
authorities as well as the Congress to no avail.  It was not until the peasants 
physically imposed this argument that it was heeded.  The peasants were evicted 
                                                 
147 This figure was later reduced by Executive Order No. 395 on October 5, 1989 to 5,000 
hectares.  
148 The legalization of land occupations take on order of seven to ten years of legal wrangling if 
they occur at all.  The squatter community of Nueva Germania, San Pedro spent 14 years 
appealing for the legalization of their land occupation to no eventual result.   
149 While the idea of exploiting an environmental reserve may appear oxymoronic the practice is 
common and is referred to as clientelismo del Estado, or the occupation of government posts for 
the purpose of personal enrichment.  In Paraguay, a long history of small public salaries and the 
responsibility for managing land, money, personal paperwork, and deeds has created a culture of 
corruption.  Public servants both expect and are expected to enrich themselves by directly selling 
their services (nearly every public servant expects a croqueta, or bribe, even for performing only 
the services the State already pay them for.  Croquetas are also taken for illegal activities as well, 
such as expediting paperwork, falsifying information, and overlooking prejudicial information), 
selling access to government resources (police protection, heavy machinery, and forests) or by 
selling government assets as if they were their own (gasoline, machinery, foodstuff, land, and 
lumber).  It is important to note just how normal and acceptable corruption is in dealings with 
servants of the state.   
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 twice in 1990, in 1991, in 1993, and twice again in 1994 (Fogel, Luchas 104-
107).150  When the peasants resisted the forced desalojos, they were beaten, the 
leaders jailed and the rest of the peasants removed from the property to live under 
tarps along the river Capi’ibary, located approximately two miles from western 
edge of the settlement, or to the town of Capi’ibary, located some five miles to 
the west of the settlement.   
 In an escalation of the physical protest strategy, the peasants initiated an 
occupation of the Plaza de la Independencia, directly in front of the national 
congressional building, in September of 1994.  This occupation lasted ten months 
and seventeen days, involving up to 300 peasants at any given time, living under 
tarps and occupying the plaza 24 hours a day.  Having learned their lesson from 
the Dia de Perros, the authorities resisted the urge to forcibly evict the peasants 
from the plaza. 
 Finally, the peasants forced the government’s hand as nearly 200 peasants 
blocked the exit of trucks loaded with illegal timber of exiting the reserve and 
then hid in the forest with machetes and hoes to surprise the Engineer in charge of 
the illegal project when he returned to remove the evidence of his crime.  The 
peasants forced him to sign a document from the Vice-ministerio de Recursos 
Naturales recognizing the peasants’ claim to 5000 hectares of the Reserve (Fogel, 
Luchas 107).  Later, more than 100 peasants again surprised and threatened more 
MAG agents who were forced to flee for their lives (Fogel, Luchas 112).   
                                                 
150 These events were confirmed in my own interviews with the leaders of the Asentamiento 
Capi’ibary in August of 2001. 
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  With the physical threat to their lives, authorities had no choice but to 
confront the peasants with physical repression or to concede the land to the 
peasants. The instability of the new Wasmosy regime, weakened as a result of its 
conflict with the Armed Forces, could not risk the destabilizing effect of a public 
confrontation with the peasants. With no palatable alternative, MAG could only 
save face with a magnanimous concession to the demands of the poor peasants 
who, as it turned out, were in dire need of land after all.  A public repression of 
the peasants at that time would have been propitious for the coup plotters in the 
Paraguayan Armed Forces who later in 1995 and again in 1996 attempted coup 
d’etat against the Wasmosy regime that failed primarily because the plotters could 
demonstrate no compelling moral reason for unseating president Juan Carlos 
Wasmosy.  In all likelihood, such a bloody confrontation would have precipitated 
an early and more successful coup d’etat.151
 In the case of Calixto Cabral, a peasant participating in organized protests 
demanding the destitution of President Gonzalez-Macchi and the repeal of Ley 
1.615, the legitimacy and integrity of the state almost collapsed.152  After several 
                                                 
151 Lino Oviedo later attempted to destabilize the Wasmosy government in just this way in the case 
of peasants who were protesting for land in the district of Yhu in the department of Caaguazu, 25 
to 30 peasants invaded and occupied land belonging to Pedro Anciaux in 1996.  This land 
occupation was not motivated by any struggle for leadership.  It was led by two Senators and the 
head of the armed forces.  Peasant witnesses identified Antonio Alvarez Alvarenga and Silvio 
Ovelar as the senators who opened the gates to the property and exhorted the peasants to enter and 
to take land for themselves. General Lino Oviedo was quoted as encouraging the group, “Go 
ahead, don’t worry about it.  I’ll make it legal” (“Responsabilizan al Gobierno” 12). 
152 The reform of the state via Ley 1.615 legalized the sale of national industries, which would 
have resulted in the dismissal of tens of thousands of employees from the inefficient State 
monopolies such as telephone, electricity, and cement as well as a banking reform that would have 
eliminated the Banco de Desarollo which exists as an important source of credit for medium and 
large scale agricultural production (including co-operatives uniting many smaller farms) in the 
rural countryside.  In an alliance with the Central Union de Trabajadores (CUT) the (Mesa 
Coordinadora Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas) MCNOC and the (Federacion Nacional 
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 weeks of protests including marches and roadblocks, peasants from many 
different areas of the country nucleated in a march whose destination was the 
capital.  On the day of June 4th, 2002, an estimated 5000 peasants were marching 
in a group organized in the Department of Caazapa when they were blocked by a 
police barricade outside of the departmental capital of Coronel Oviedo.  It was 
reported that attempts by police to impede the peasants’ advance upon the 
national capital by threats were ignored and the police fired upon the peasants as 
they re-boarded vehicles of transport, crossing barricades that police had 
abandoned in the face of so many vehicles.  One peasant was killed and another 
gravely injured as the police opened fire, dispersing the protest. 
In the several weeks of protests prior to this confrontation, the leaders of 
the MCNOC, the FNC, and the CUT had repeatedly met with Congress and 
representatives of the executive branch to no avail.  Days before a deadly clash 
between military troops and the peasants, Marcial Go mez of the FNC pointed out 
the physical nature of the argument made by the protesters, “Si el Gobierno 
reprime a los luchadores sociales va a ser como tirar nafta al fuego, esto quiere 
decir que habrá una explosión social en nuestro país” [If the Government 
represses the social protesters, it would be like throwing gasoline on a fire; this is 
to say that there would be a social explosion in our country] (“Campesinos 
Endurecen” 1+).  Here Gomez makes explicit the non-discursive force of the 
protests by noting that while the peasants may not be the equal of the state in 
                                                                                                                                                 
Campesina) FNC formed a political alliance in an attempt to force the executive branch to freeze 
the legislation, which was promulgated by executive order.  
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 terms of the discursive contest, the strength of the peasants’ position lie in the 
extra-verbal nature of the protests.  
Immediately upon receiving news of the clash and the death of Cabral, 
protest leaders announced an end to the dialogue with the Executive branch they 
labeled, “el Gobierno criminal” (“Campesinos Echan” 1+).  President Go nzalez-
Macchi announced an indefinite delay in the privatization program in response to 
the public pressure generated by the confrontation in Nueva Germania and the 
death of Calixto Cabral (“Campesinos” 1+).  Quick government action defused 
the crisis and prevented a “social explosion” of the sort predicted by Gomez. 
This protest is typical of the mixed results of physical protest strategies 
employed in the Paraguayan land reform struggle.  While the results of physical 
argument have proven successful in a number of protests, many other cases exist 
in which protesters have been murdered, forcibly evicted, and beaten in 
confrontations with police, military and paramilitary groups opposing land 
reform.  Peasants engage in physical forms of protest at great risk to their physical 
wellbeing. 
Examining the different, specific forms of argumentation as well as the 
origins and structures of the arguments employed in the Paraguayan land reform 
struggle constitutes an important step in the process of defining that struggle.  An 
investigation of the specific argument strategies, the sources of argumentation, 
and the means for expressing these arguments has revealed that they are complex 
phenomena in their own right.  Examined as a whole, the Paraguayan land reform 
struggle is a complex matrix of historical arguments, competing interests and 
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 social hierarchies.  The struggle has not been constituted by the participation of a 
single interest group, the use of a single line of argumentation, nor an agreement 
upon a single economic benefit.  The polyvocal nature of the struggle has featured 
many different specific arguments for land reform and different material factors 
enabling and constraining argumentation have had a demonstrable impact upon 
the coherence of the struggle as a whole.  While the ability of the struggle to bring 
together different groups, interests and arguments under the rubric of land reform 
is unquestioned, it remains to be seen whether the argumentative strategies 
employed in the struggle will guarantee success.  The next section will address the 
question of success by examining the goals of the Paraguayan land reform 
struggle, definitions of success, and real outcomes of the struggle.  
 
 223
  
IV. Success or Mere Struggle? 
 
The Paraguayan land reform struggle is a complex and multifaceted 
phenomenon.  The study of the struggle is complicated by its protean nature.  It is 
difficult to answer even simple questions, such as what qualifies as successful 
land reform protest?  Does the answer include the concession of land?  Even in 
cases where the peasants do receive land, does this change the real conditions of 
the struggle?  On the other hand, protest demands for agricultural credit, cotton 
seed, and debt forgiveness have been conceded to protestors, almost on a yearly 
basis.  Do these constitute real gains?   Are participants in land reform protest 
struggling for land, or are they perhaps seeking other goals that may be less 
immediately apparent?   
As I noted in the previous chapter, there are four distinct interest groups 
comprising the Paraguayan land reform struggle: the peasantry, national peasant 
organizations, Paraguayan intellectuals and international interests including 
NGOs and the Catholic Church.  Given this diversity of stakeholders, it is not 
surprising that the struggle has variously been defined as a conflict over the 
redistribution of land, ethnic and cultural recognition, environmental 
conservation, modernization, and anti-colonialism and anti-globalism.  The many 
participants, sympathizers and beneficiaries of the struggle have varying ideas 
about the very nature of their collective venture.  A brief discussion with a rural 
peasant will reveal that the peasant who either participates or sympathizes with 
the struggle will tell you that the root of the struggle is respect, “hay que trabajar 
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 para vivir y lo mburuvicha kuera do ombiapoi kuera!”  [We have to work just to 
survive while the bosses don’t work at all!]  The same discussion with a national 
peasant organization leader will reveal that the root of the struggle rests in the 
importance of organizing in order to gain land concessions.  That same discussion 
with a representative of the church or an NGO will reveal yet another view, that 
the land reform struggle is really a contest over neo-liberalism and the 
establishment of democracy.  Finally, an educated member of the Paraguayan 
urban middle-class is likely to see the struggle as a fight for social justice and 
economic redistribution.   
This radical ambiguity is the direct result of the ideological rootlessness of 
the Paraguayan land reform struggle.  As Piven and Cloward point out, in 
inequitable societies such as Paraguay there is no vantage point from which the 
poor peasant can express him or herself in order to challenge the status quo. 
Thus the class struggles that might otherwise be inevitable in 
sharply unequal societies ordinarily do not seem either possible or 
right from the perspective of those who live within the structure of 
belief and ritual fashioned by those societies.  People whose only 
possible recourse in struggle is to defy the beliefs and rituals laid 
down by their rulers ordinarily do not. (Piven and Cloward 2) 
 
This conundrum is manifest in he Paraguayan case.  Those who are most directly 
affected by the land reform issue in Paraguay, the peasants are those least capable 
of organizing and confronting the state in order to plead for redress of the issue.  
As a result, peasants have not been able to adequately represent themselves as 
actors in the struggle.  As Piven and Cloward note, “Still, neither the frustrations 
generated by the economic change, nor the breakdown of daily life, may be 
sufficient to lead people to protest their travails.  Ordinarily, when people suffer 
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 such hardships, they blame God, or they blame themselves” (Piven and Cloward 
12).  Add to this lack of analytical capacity for articulating their situation and the 
barriers of race, class and language that isolate the Paraguayan peasant from the 
Paraguayan state, and the difficult challenge facing peasants becomes clear.   
 The Catholic Church, NGOs, national peasant organizations and 
intellectuals have all attempted to contribute to raising the peasant’s 
consciousness of his or her own circumstances.  For as Piven and Cloward have 
also pointed out, “For a protest movement to arise out of these traumas of daily 
life, people have to perceive the deprivation and disorganization they experience 
as both wrong, and subject to redress” (Piven and Cloward 12).  The Catholic 
Church, NGOs, national peasant organizations all have their place in this process. 
However, these contributions have a mixed record of effectiveness. 
 Fogel noted that in the case of Capi’ibary, NGOs were essential in the 
process of raising peasants’ self-awareness: 
La genesis del conflicto se da cuando grupos campesinos toman 
conciencia de la necesidad de actuar para apropiarse y usar una 
fraccion de tierra controlada por otro; en esta fase el grupo se 
transforma en actor con capacidad de formular sus demandas y 
movilzarse en su prosecucion.  En esta fase es importante el apoyo 
de grupos externos, tales como el CIPAE; este apoyo es crucial en 
la fase de maduracion del conflicto en la medida que se perfilan 
major las posiciones de intereses y el diseno de estrategias. (Fogel, 
Luchas 188) 
 
[The conflict originates when peasant groups become conscious of 
the need to take action in order to appropriate and use a parcel of 
land controlled by another; in this phase, the group is transformed 
into an actor with the capacity to formulate its demands and to 
mobilize itself toward that goal.  In this phase, the assistance of 
external groups such as CIPAE is important; this assistance is 
crucial in the mature phase of the conflict in the way they outline 
the positions and interests and the design of strategies]. 
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This holds true for the case of all external participants involved in the 
struggle.  By external, I mean those participants who do not directly experience 
the socio-economic deprivations driving peasant participation in the struggle.  The 
Catholic Church was certainly the first external group to organize and raise the 
consciousness of peasants.  The work of the Catholic Church in this area began in 
the mid 1960s and did not end until the Pascua Dolorosa of 1976.  After that 
particularly brutal repression, the Catholic Church implemented its liberational 
theology in smaller groups.153  Yet, the effectiveness and influence of the Catholic 
Church, international organizations (who sometimes offered training to peasants) 
and NGOs are limited to the incipient stages of the Paraguayan land reform 
struggle. 
As the struggle matured, national peasant organizations gained control of 
the struggle with their uncontested ability to claim the right of representation for 
the peasant masses.  Today, the function of NGOs, the Catholic Church and other 
international organizations are subordinated to the national peasant organization, 
which now mobilizes these groups as resources in the struggle.  
However, in the process of the concientizacion del campesino, raising the 
consciousness of the peasant, real questions linger about peasant self-
representation.  That the Paraguayan land reform struggle can exist at all after 
                                                 
153 This teaching was primarily in the form of the catequizacion, the religious training received by 
individual peasant leaders who lead their local congregations as catiquistas, or lay clergy.  The 
great shortage of Catholic clergy in Paraguay has led to the practice of teaching the catechism to 
the leaders of peasant communities.  In turn, the catequistas lead weekly church meetings and 
classes on church doctrine, in place of Catholic priests who appear monthly in the communities to 
lead Mass and to give Confession.  This gives the Catholic Church direct access and ideological 
influence over the entire peasant community as well as its leaders.  This has been used by the 
Catholic Church to promote the doctrine of Liberation Theology, as well as land reform and 
democratization in peasant communities throughout rural Paraguay.  
 227
 more than 500 years of oppression and socio-cultural domination of the 
Paraguayan peasant is remarkable.  What is remarkable, however, is the idea that 
the Native American turned mestizo peasant can imagine, let alone express, 
another socio-economic system, another way of living, and mobilize in several 
social and international sectors to pursue that vision.  With previous chapters 
having elucidated the multifaceted nature of the Paraguayan land reform struggle 
and explored its historical context, next it is appropriate to engage normative 
issues and ponder to what extent the struggle can be considered successful given 
the serious constraints placed upon the main actor in the struggle, the peasant.  
At first glance, it would appear that the Paraguayan land reform struggle is 
not a social movement at all.  From this vantage point, it is a collection of 
atomized, unrelated, co-opted or unreflective violent protest activity not 
constitutive of a social movement.  However, Leland Griffin warned about the 
tendency of critics to “atomize” social movements in the course of their study 
(Griffin 187).  In contrast, Griffin advocates a “dynamic” analysis of the social 
movement that adequately presents the inherently synthetic nature of these 
movements (Griffin 188).  Furthermore, resource mobilization theorists also resist 
the tendency to atomize these social struggles by applying techniques such as a 
“rational actor model” that views individual protestors as “individuals capable of 
weighing the relative costs and benefits of movement participation and opting for 
participation when the potential benefits outweigh the anticipated costs” 
(Buechler 218).  Resource mobilization has rejected atomizing techniques for an 
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 analysis of social movement at the level of the group, emphasizing structures, 
patterns and organizational dynamics (Buechler 218).   
Yet, merely discussing the relations between the different interest groups 
constituting the struggle may elucidate a site of struggle but not its nature.  
Alberto Melucci and other theorists of the new social movements suggest that this 
“new” type of social movement is inherently less organized as “a form of 
collective action” (Melucci, “Symbolic” 795).  The new social movement is not 
defined by its character to organize as much as it is defined by the effect of the 
struggle, which “breaks the limits of the system in which the action occurs” 
(Melucci, “Symbolic” 795).   This sort of struggle does not merely seek to address 
grievances but goes further to press for profound change “constituting a 
fundamental challenge to the dominance of the socio-political norms,” which 
ultimately constitute a means of expressing and experiencing “a different way of 
naming the world” (Melucci, “Symbolic” 801).   
In a similar vein, Alain Touraine argues that social conflicts take on an 
ideological dimension when protestors thematize their status as social actors as an 
essential component of resistance.  The ideological component of the struggle is 
essential to both Touraine’s definition of the social movement as well as to his 
criteria for the success of such a movement.  On the one hand, Touraine classifies 
social “struggles” as mere conflicts resulting from “institutional pressures, or 
social and economic demands within a society” (Touraine, et al. “Anti-nuclear” 
4).   Real social movements, on the other hand, link the atomic element of the 
struggle, in such a way that constitutes collective “actors in the class war for the 
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 control of historicity,” or the means by which a society creates and controls social 
values, norms and practices (Touraine, et al. “Anti-nuclear” 4).   
Touraine places the emphasis of a real social movement on the 
consciousness of individual protestors and views the protest organization as a 
means of building consciousness.  He illustrates this in his study of the anti-
nuclear movement in France during the mid 1970s.  Touraine’s “sociological 
intervention” sought to transform the individual, NIMBY protests against nuclear 
power into a real social movement that would challenge “those apparatuses which 
have acquired the power to impose patterns of behavior upon the people 
according to their own interests,” including the centralized and hierarchical 
energy bureaucracy that forced its policies on the French citizenry using 
techniques of police control and surveillance (Touraine, et al. “Anti-nuclear” 4).  
Unfortunately for Touraine, the movement failed, participation ebbed and there 
was no successful challenge to the authority permitting the nuclear program to 
continue.  Touraine re-conceived the anti-nuclear movement as a mere struggle 
whose organizational structure was exploited more by those with NIMBY 
interests opposing the construction of a nuclear plant in their own communities or 
exploited by those who opposed specific politicians or the political process in 
general (Touraine, et al. “Anti-nuclear” 22).  Touraine attributed the failure of the 
anti-nuclear movement to attain the status of real social movement to its inability 
to move beyond the idea of merely preventing the construction of nuclear power 
plants to the idea of challenging the very process by which the determination to 
construct such plants was made. 
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 I would like to adopt Touraine’s emphasis upon ideology and individual 
protestor consciousness as elements differentiating successful from unsuccessful 
movements or real social movements from mere struggles.  As a consequence, I 
will not focus on the formal structure of the Paraguayan land reform struggle, its 
physical constitution or its ability to gain concessions in accordance to its 
demands in order to analyze its nature or to define its success.  As Piven and 
Cloward suggest, despite the abundance of scholarly work focused upon the 
organizational nature of social movements, the key feature of social movements 
(at least social movements composed of the poor and the disenfranchised) is the 
varied nature of protest activity and not the structural integrity of the movement. 
Whatever the intellectual sources of error, the effect of equating 
movement with movement organizations—and thus requiring that 
protest have a leader, a constitution, a legislative program, or at 
least a banner before they are recognized as such—is to divert 
attention from the many forms of political unrest and to consign 
them by definition to the more shadowy realms of social problems 
and deviant behavior. (Piven and Cloward, Poor People’s 5) 
 
What then is there to examine if we downplay the significance of the 
structural element of the Paraguayan land reform struggle?  The Paraguayan case 
(and possibly other instances of protest activity in developing nations 
characterized by great socio-economic disparities) presents an interesting 
challenge to the prevailing criteria for success of collective protest.  Studies of the 
structural and institutional facets of collective protest have equated organization 
with efficiency and effectiveness.  A move beyond the exclusive structural 
emphasis in social movement analysis enables a more nuanced examination of the 
success of this and perhaps other movements of similar character. 
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  Because Touraine’s definition of the social movement is linked to the 
successful conduct of collective protest, it is important to discuss success as a 
criterion differentiating mere struggles from true social movements.  Accordingly, 
an evaluation of the success or failure of the Paraguayan land reform struggle will 
shed light on the collective ideology of the struggle and its ability or inability to 
conduct a collective conflict at the level of historicity. 
Criteria for the success of a social movement have been variously defined.  
The most basic criteria for success have been 1) is the movement sustainable and 
2) does the movement achieve its goals?  Such criteria flow from instrumental 
views of rhetorical practice and outcome-oriented approaches to the study of 
movement phenomena such as Resource Mobilization. (See Griffin; Zald).   
Other, more complex analyses of the success of the social movement include 
Touraine’s idea of collective protest achieving the highest level of social meaning 
in the struggle for control of historicity and Habermas’ analysis of the collective 
social movement’s role in defending and enlarging the “public sphere” (Touraine, 
et al. “Anti-nuclear” 4; Cohen and Arato 527).  The Paraguayan land reform 
struggle as well as other social movements in underdeveloped nations find it 
extremely difficult to meet the criteria for success set down by theorists such as 
Alain Touraine and Jurgen Habermas.  The nature of Paraguayan society militates 
against the very existence of a public sphere and the illiterate condition of the 
Paraguayan peasant complicates greatly the task of self-reflective identification of 
the social movement’s macro-social goals by protest actors.   
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 This leaves us with the most basic criteria for evaluation of the 
Paraguayan land reform struggle.  Can such a struggle, located in a developing 
nation and composed largely of illiterate peasants be evaluated in terms of 
sustainability and goal achievement?  Let us examine this question by considering 
the struggle’s record of institutional success; whether or not the acquisition of 
land as a concession from the state constitutes an actual or false perception of 
success; and finally, whether or not land grants and other protest demands are 
appropriate goals for the struggle. 
 
4.1  Institutional Successes in the Struggle   
 
 
 Collective protest has yielded some spectacular concessions from the 
leaders of governmental institutions.  The struggles in the Asentamiento de 
Capi’ibary gained 5,000 hectares of land; in the separate communities of Juan de 
Mena and Cleto Romero, 5,000 hectares was gained; 3,000 hectares were gained 
in El Asentamiento Zapattini Cue and the 2001 protest march prevented the 
privatization of the state telephone monopoly ANETLCO, saving thousands of 
jobs.  Yet, even with such concessions, the exigence driving protest activism in 
Paraguay persists and may have even intensified. 
A discussion of either the sustainability or the successful conclusion of the 
Paraguayan land reform struggle is problematic.  It is easy to point out that the 
future offers little opportunity to satisfy the abundant need for land on the part of 
the estimated 300,000 landless Paraguayans.  The point was passed long ago 
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 when a mere redistribution of state land reserves would have satisfied peasant 
land requirements.  Furthermore, given the population growth rate,154 any mere 
distribution of land for the purpose of occupying idle rural laborers would quickly 
succumb to minifundial pressures.155  Future subdivision of the land would 
reconstitute the initial dilemma and multiply the number of land-seeking peasants 
in 35 years by a factor of ten.156   It would be more appropriate to discuss the 
longevity of the Paraguayan land reform struggle in terms of the informal social 
precedents and the formal legal achievements the struggle has established to 
enable future protest activity.    
Informally, the greatest achievement of the struggle has been the tacit 
acceptance of protest activity.  The persistence and ubiquity of the land reform 
struggle has conditioned Paraguayan national institutions such as the national 
security forces and the presidential, congressional and ministerial arms of 
government to accept some protest activity as “normal.”  Prior to the first 
successful struggles in Capi’ibary, Juan de Mena and Cleto Romero, peasant 
attempts to organize met with brutal repression and made public protest activity a 
                                                 
154 The Paraguayan population growth rate was a whopping 2.8% between 1950 and 1992 and 
accelerated to 3.2% between 1982 and 1992 (GTZ 45). 
155 The average rural family in Paraguay is composed of 8-10 children and two adults.  The 
generational redistribution of land requires that an initial land parcel of ten hectares be re-divided 
into five two hectare parcels in order to endow a peasant’s sons with land.  The subsistence nature 
of peasant farming practices disallows the possibility that a peasant can accumulate enough capital 
to purchase more land.  This re-division of land occurs each 15 to 30 years as each successive 
generation of peasant farmer matures and requires land to practice farming.  No conclusive studies 
of Paraguayan minifundia exist but I estimate that the average peasant parcel in a minifundial land 
endowment system would shrink by 60% every 35 years or just less than 2% each year.  In 
combination with the huge gap between inflation (averaging 18%/year) terms of trade deficits 
peasant farmers experience a cost of living increase each year in addition to a 2% loss of land area 
each year.  This is an absolutely untenable economic situation.  
156 In 35 years, two adult generations of Paraguayans would be seeking land because land grants 
would have been completely exhausted by subdivision leaving.  Given an estimated total of 
300,000 sintierras and an equal number of landed peasants at present, thirty-five years would 
produce three million landless peasants by 2039. 
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 risky and dangerous proposition.  The resistance of the brave peasants to the 
repressive tactics of state authorities in the land struggles at Capi’ibary, Juan de 
Mena and Cleto Romero beginning in the late 1980s clearly demonstrated to state 
authorities that the repressive model once successfully employed by the dictator 
Stroessner to crush the Ligas Agrarias in the Pascua Dolorosa would no longer 
work. 
Following upon the implicit tolerance of protest activity, the Paraguayan 
land reform struggle has achieved success in the establishment of legal 
protections for protest activity.  The most effective of these protections involves 
securing the legality of the movement in the Constitutional Nacional 1992.  The 
Constitucion Nacional 1992 states: 
Articulo 114: La reforma agraria es uno do los factores 
fundamentales para lograr el bienestar rural.  Ella consiste en la 
incorporacio n efectiva de la poblacio n campesina al desarrollo 
economomico y social de la nacion.  Se adoptaran sistemas 
equitativos de distribucio n de la propiedad y tenencia de la tierra.  
Se organizan el credito y la asistencia tecnica, educacional y 
sanitaria, se fomentara la creacion de cooperativas agricolas y de 
otras asociaciones similares y se promovera la produccion, la 
industrialicion y la racionalizacion del mercado para el desarrollo 
integral del agro. (Conferencia 120) 
 
[Article 114: Agrarian reform is one of the basic factors for the 
achievement of rural well-being.  This consists of the effective 
incorporation of the rural population in the economic and social 
development of the nation.  This will require the adoption of a fair 
system of distribution of ownership and management of land.  This 
will also require the provision of credit, as well as technical, 
educational and sanitary assistance; in addition, the formation and 
support of agricultural cooperatives and other similar associations 
will promote production, industrialization and rationalization of the 
market, which is integral to the development of agriculture]. 
 
Articulo 116: Con el objetivo de eliminar progresivamente los 
latifundios improductivos, la ley atendera  a la aptitud natural de 
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 las tierras, a las necesidades del sector de poblacion vinculado 
con la agricultura y a las previsiones aconsejables para el 
desarrollo equilibrado, asi como el aprovechamiento sostenible de 
los recursos naturales y de la preservacio n del equilibrio 
ecologico.  La expropriacion de los latifundios improductivos 
destinados a la reforma agraria sera establecidos en cada caso 
por la ley, y se abonara en la forma y en el plazo que la misma 
determine. (Conferencia 123) 
 
[Article 116: With the objective of the progressive elimination of 
large, unproductive land-holdings, the law regards the natural state 
of the land, the needs of that sector of the population dependent 
upon agriculture and the available knowledge for balanced 
development.  This development will take the form of the 
sustainable development of natural resources and the preservation 
of ecological balance.  The expropriation of large, unproductive 
land-holdings for the purpose of agrarian reform will be 
established in all cases by the law and will be realized in the form 
and in the place that the law deems appropriate]. 
 
Articles 114 and 116 of the Constitucion Nacional 1992 have been the 
heart of the Paraguayan land reform struggle.  They have been used to provide a 
legal basis for challenging private landowners whose landholdings exceed their 
ability to claim to be utilizing the land as a national, agricultural or forestry 
resource.  This has led to land occupations that have employed the strategy of 
large, spontaneous land invasions. Peasants enter private land and quickly 
establish crops, upon which basis they can claim to be making effective use of the 
land and gain constitutional immunity from prosecution.  After the occupation has 
been established, political pressure is applied at both the local and national level 
to legalize the holding and grant title to the land for the peasants. 
Sometimes this strategy has been effective, and sometimes it has failed. 
When it works, the government either negotiates a price with the owner of the 
land or expropriates the property outright in the interests of the state.  This is an 
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 unjust process because these latifundistas or large landowners are themselves 
usually involved in governance and any such conflict of interest is resolved in the 
interest of the land owner.157  
Ordinarily the Constitution is overlooked and another law is emphasized, 
Article 142 of the Paraguayan Codigo Penal (1997): 
El que individualmente o en concierto con otras personas, 
ingresara a un inmueble ajeno, sin el consentimiento del titular, en 
violencia y clandestinidad y se instalara en él, será castigado con 
pena privativa de la libertad de hasta dos años o con multas. 
(Fogel, Luchas 134) 
 
[He who individually or in concert with other persons who 
trespasses a private property without the consent of the titled 
owner, in violence and secrecy and takes possession of such 
property, will be punished up to two years of imprisonment or with 
fines]. 
 
At best, even when the peasant is granted possession of the land, the 
owner is commonly rewarded with an outrageous compensation for land far 
beyond its market value.  At worst, peasant petitions are rejected and the matter is 
turned over to the local authorities who are completely subject to the influence of 
the wealthy land owners.  The usual result is that a local judge signs an order of 
eviction and the peasants are evicted by the local police with the occasional 
support of national troops when the occupation is too large to handle safely with 
police alone. 
                                                 
157 It is a noted practice of corrupt politicians to accept cheap land deals in the names of close 
family members in exchange for political influence.  Thus, these large landowners are often the 
ministers of government themselves who are responsible for interpreting the law.  In a recent 
investigation of the president of the Camara de Diputados, Carlos (Cale) Galaverna was found to 
be a man of modest means; however, his brother in-law was discovered to be in possession of a 
5,000 hectare tract of forested land whose origin could not be explained.  
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  It is obvious that even the Constitucion Nacional 1992 itself is not 
actually a document that empowers the peasants and the movement; it is a 
document that recognizes the political pressure for land reform but that chooses to 
defer the responsibility for that reform to some future and vaguely described 
action.  Article 116 is exemplary: 
Seran establecidos en cada caso por la ley y se abonara  en la 
forma y el plazo que la misma determine. (Conferencia 123) 
 
[They will be established in each case by the law, whose result will 
be appropriate to the circumstances as required]. 
 
Both the Catholic Church and the Paraguayan intelligentsia have 
challenged the ambiguity of this text.  The Catholic Church pointed out that such 
ambiguity maintained the socio-political status quo of the nation and 
demonstrated little effort to provide a guideline for social development that 
Paraguay so desperately required in its transition to democracy. 
Una inspiracion, al mismo tiempo neoliberal y estatista, hace que 
contemos con un ley fundamental, que no reconociendo con 
claridad las tendencias asociativas y operativas propias de nuestra 
gente, sobre todo las de los campesinos, mantienen la poli tica 
social y economica sin definiciones precisas sometidas al vaive n 
de las circunstancias y de las interpretaciones contradictorias, lo 
cual puede conspirar contra el adecuado desarrollo de nuestra 
sociedad. (Conferencia 53) 
 
[An inspiration, neo-liberal and statist at the same, that makes it 
necessary to depend on basic laws that don’t recognize with clarity 
the associative and functional tendencies of our people, especially 
those of the peasants, they define political and socio-economic 
themes without precise definition and submit these (issues) to 
vagaries of circumstance and contradictory interpretations, which 
can work against the adequate development of our society]. 
 
Juan Carlos Mendonca, a professor of law at the Universidad Nacional de 
Asuncion argues that of all of the defects of the Constitucion Nacional 1992, the 
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 worst is “el ambiguedad que padece el proyecto” [the ambiguity the project 
suffers from] (Mendonca 20).  To make his point, Mendonca points out that the 
definition of “latifundias improductivas” is very problematic from a legal 
standpoint:  
Nos quedamos sin saber que es “latifundio” para el Proyecto,: si 
cualquier extension de tierra improductiva, por minuscula que sea, 
o solo aquella porcion de tierra que excede el limite de extension 
establecido por la ley, aunque sea productivo.  Sabemos que la 
norma juridica, como enunciado prescriptiva, es va lida o no es 
valida, sin estar sujeto al valor de verdad—puede ser veradero or 
falso….  (Mendonca 40-41)   
 
[We remain without an understanding of what a “latifundio” is in 
the Project: whether (it is) any area of unproductive land, of small 
size perhaps, or only the portion of the land that exceeds the size 
limit established by law, whether or not it is productive.  We 
cannot understand how a juridical norm such as prescriptive 
explanation is valid or invalid without being subjected to the test of 
truth—whether it is true or false…]. 
 
Thus, the Constitution excludes the peasants themselves from participation 
in land reform by explicitly stating that any application of constitutional law will 
be performed by the juridical structures already in place.  Rather than empower 
projects like the Paraguayan land reform struggle, the Constitucion Nacional 1992 
actually makes it illegal for them to make interventions on their own; rather than 
guarantee rights, this document serves as an indefinite deferment of rights.  
Without setting forth any specific institution or mechanism for implementing the 
law, there is no practical application for that law! 
The best the members of the struggle can do is to force the issue by 
organizing, supporting and aiding land occupations and thus creating the impetus 
for an application of the law.  This tactic often fails as the gap between 
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 constitutional justice and a judicial system financed by frontier cattle barons 
collide.  Here is a typical example: 
On November 11, three armed civilian security guards reportedly 
killed Gumersindo Pavon Di az, a peasant laborer, on land that had 
been expropriated in 1996 from a businessman who had rejected 
the Government's offered price and was seeking judicial redress. 
Rural peasants responded violently, burning down buildings owned 
by the real estate company that operates on the land. Landowner 
Roberto Antebi stated publicly that the security guards had found 
Pavon Diaz trying to steal a horse, and that the shooting was 
accidental. The authorities arrested one of the guards; two 
remained at liberty. The cases were pending at year's end. (U.S. 
Department of State, 1998 Country Report) 
 
This example illustrates vividly how dependence upon the judicial and 
political system of the government for fair representation or for progress on land 
reform is extremely precarious.  At the moment, Paraguay is being shaken to the 
core by conflicts between the judicial, legislative and executive branches at the 
highest levels of government.  This instability in governance is so acute that the 
assassination of the vice-president, and the impeachment of the president for 
implication in that murder come as little surprise.  Paraguay’s fragile, newly 
democratic political system has difficulty functioning at the highest levels of 
government and cannot be expected to do so at the local level.  In realistic terms, 
this makes the legal strategy of the Paraguayan land reform struggle, realistically, 
a dead end.  In fact, the passage of the new Agrarian Code has reinforced and 
further constrained the legal rights of the peasants to invade and occupy land 
declared illegal and unproductive under the auspices of the Constitution.  Under 
the new code, the conditions for violation of private property and the punishment 
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 for trespassing is clarified, not the right of peasants to identify and petition for the 
expropriation of latifundial land holdings. 
In addition, the Ley de Marchodromo was passed in 2000.  The Protest 
Law sets specific limits on the time and place for legal protest: 
El derecho a la manifestación en el microcentro de la ciudad será 
permitido recién a partir de las 19:00 hasta las 24:00 horas en 
días laborales, y en días domingos y feriados, desde las 6:00 hasta 
la misma hora del día siguiente. Los lugares permanentes para 
reuniones públicas se establecen en sólo tres plazas: Uruguaya, 
Democracia y Armas. (Riquelme 1) 
 
[The right to protest in Downtown (Asuncion) will be permitted 
from the hours of 7:00 PM to 12:00 Midnight on working days and 
on Sundays and holidays, from 6:00 AM to 6:00 the following day.  
The fixed sites for public meetings have been established in only 
three parks: Uruguaya, Democracia and Armas].  
 
Peasant organizations argue that the restrictions of the law limit the two most 
important aspects of their protest activity: 1) the ability to demonstrate to the 
public via disruption rather than in small, inconspicuous plazas with little 
visibility; and 2) the ability to demonstrate to the public at an appropriate hour.  
As Quintín Riquelme notes, “¿Quién escuchará nuestros reclamos a las 19:00 
horas?” [who will hear our protests at 7:00 in the evening?] (Riquelme 1).
Thus, the achievements of the Paraguayan land reform struggle in the form 
of longevity have been tempered by the measured responses of the Paraguayan 
State.  Nevertheless, the right to public protest has been secured, even if it has 
been secured within strict limits.  The sustainability of the movement will be 
discussed at greater length in the concluding chapter of this dissertation. 
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    4.2 More Land = Hollow Victory? 
 
As the evaluation of the Paraguayan land reform struggle in terms of 
success or failure cannot be solely determined on the basis of institutional 
response to protest pressure, let us now examine the struggle’s potential for the 
successful achievement of its stated goals.  
Even when peasants organize an occupation, successfully lobby for 
political action, receive a favorable ruling and actually get legal title for the 
members who occupy the land, they do not achieve a victory.  One must ask, 
“what happens after peasants are granted land?”  A recent study noted that while 
land redistribution had an impact on farm output, it had a limited impact on 
household income in six Latin American countries including Paraguay (Lopez and 
Valde s).  Why is this?  Joeseph Stiglitz of the World Bank argues that “successful 
agricultural production requires not only labor and land, but also capital and 
know-how (technology).  Poor tenants are often lacking in all three and simply 
granting them land does not resolve the other two gaps” (Stiglitz 3). 
Thus peasants are provided land but little else.  I have personally seen 
peasants with nothing more than a machete, a hoe, 10,000 Guarani es ($1.50) and 
the clothes on their backs leave to prepare plots of land for their families.  Yet, the 
conditions of their lives do not improve.  Settlers face colonization of hostile 
forest without potable water, sanitation, or basic public services including 
medical, educational and infrastructural support.  
Rogelio Martinez, a very poor man with eight children and no land of his 
own, exemplifies the challenge faced by peasants who choose to make a life in a 
 242
 new asentamiento.  His father-in-law allowed him to farm on one-and-a-half 
hectares of his own land.  Rogelio was granted a plot of land through the IBR.  
With 100,000 Guaranies, a machete, a hoe, food and other necessities, he set out 
with several other men to occupy an asentamiento in San Pedro de Ykua de 
Mandijy in the northern part of the country.  He explained to me how difficult it 
was to clear the forest.  He spent weeks clearing and burning trees.  For a while 
they survived using the food they brought with them, and by killing and eating the 
wildlife of the forest.  However, another challenge was water.  Wells in the area 
require pumping equipment, as their average depth is some 30 meters or 80-90 
feet (too deep to be safely dug by hand).  There was no potable water source and 
the men had to send out one of their number each week to retrieve water.  Passage 
to and from the settlement was difficult.  There were no roads in the settlement 
itself and one had to walk a great distance to reach a road.  Even then, the road 
was unimproved.  When the roads became impassable in the rainy season, they 
resorted to drinking rainwater they collected but suffered hunger because they 
could not supplement their rations.  The entire settlement was abandoned after 
three months.  It was simply impossible to establish an agricultural settlement 
without more support (Rogelio Martinez, Personal Interview). 
 In the case of Rogelio and his companions, they were lucky because they 
did not have to submit their families to the same conditions they suffered.  
However, in most cases, the entire family experiences the deprivation of opening 
up the forested frontier without proper roads, medicine, food, water, or access to 
education.  Even in long established settlements, these deprivations continue.   
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 When I visited the Asentamiento de Capi’ibary in 2001, it had existed as 
an established agricultural settlement that was benefiting from the assistance of 
the IBR for six years.  Still, the number of deficiencies was astounding.  There 
were no improved roads in the site, only carreteras or sandy paths worn down by 
the passage of carretas or oxcarts.  The residents still traveled to the river with 
their oxcarts to fill water barrels from the river.  While CORPOSANA had 
constructed a water tower and a deep well to provide potable water on the site, the 
pump house had long sat in a state of disrepair as the peasants refused to pay the 
coima or bribe asked by officials to properly maintain the facility.  Access to the 
main road was along five miles of sandy carretera.  It is remarkable to note that 
all traffic and all supplies enter the settlement by this means.  In addition, the path 
is intersected by the river Capi’ibary (from which the settlement draws its name), 
which floods and cuts off access to the settlement for a significant portion of the 
year.   
The settlement is not unlike others in that the presence of a school is 
notable.  It might strike the reader as odd that, in a largely illiterate population, 
education is viewed not only as a necessity but a right.  Peasants fiercely defend 
their ability to educate their children, even if that education fails to pass the sexto 
curso or sixth grade.  There are several very nice, one room schoolhouses serving 
the Asentamiento of Capi’ibary.  However, these schools were constructed by the 
residents themselves and the salaries, the rubros, of the maestros, or teachers, are 
paid by the community and not by the state.   
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  The peasants of the Asentamiento de Capi’ibary as well as several 
hundred official, unofficial and even illegal agricultural settlements live a life of 
struggle that last well beyond their initial protests for land.  Their very existence 
in such precarious circumstances constitutes a daily struggle.  This is a cycle of 
existence that appears to offer little hope for change.  Life in the Paraguayan 
campo is hard.  I have personally seen children scarred by frequent attacks of 
leishmaniasis.  The average peasant suffers from permanent parasitic infections.  
Forest dwellers deal with the common presence of piques, botflies, malaria (on 
the northern frontier), hemorrhagic dengue fever, yellow fever, and malnutrition.  
50% of all peasants are suspected of being infected with the always-fatal Chagas 
virus.  Their homes are infested with the vector insect, an assassin bug that prefers 
to live in the walls of the traditional mud and bamboo batten constructed huts that 
many peasants still live in today.  
Given all of these hardships, the peasantry fights for land and a right to 
earn their living under these conditions.  They do this with little help from the 
state and its specific departments who do little more than prey upon the ignorance 
or the naiveté of the peasant.  For example, Paraguay, at present, offers the 
cheapest electricity in the world.  With the construction of two of the three largest 
dams in the world in that country, the Itaipua and the Yacreta dams, on the 
Paraguay River, the state has promised to provide electricity to every resident of 
the nation, including the peasantry.  However, it has been common practice for 
state electricity workers to charge peasants for the erection of power lines and 
individual service that, in many cases, has already been paid for by the state.  In 
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 addition, when leaders representing the Asentamiento de Capi’ibary confronted 
officials of the IBR to ask for the provision of public utilities including electricity, 
they were told only that, “Los campesinos deben ampliar sus tierras para 
enfrentar los desafios del Mercosur” [The rural poor had better expand their 
landholdings in order to compete in MERCOSUR] (“No Hay Condiciones” 4).   
 When determining the relative success of the Paraguayan land reform 
struggle, one must take into account the long-term effects of the movement.  This 
requires addressing the question, “Does attaining land improve the peasant’s 
lives?”  Even when peasants do acquire land, it comes with a heavy price, 
enormous physical challenges and deprivations.  In many cases, the peasant who 
protests for land has, in a sense, only begun his or her struggle.  While there are 
some settlements proximal to extant public resources such as water, electricity, 
and medical services, most are not.  The bulk of land settlements in Paraguay are 
far from the centers of civilization in the country.   
Take for example the case of the emerging struggle of Yvyturuzu in the 
state of Guaira.  Approximately 5,000 peasant families there are fighting to attain 
permanent possession of land that they are presently squatting.  At present, there 
are more than seven miles of unpaved and road  (impassable during the rainy 
season) leading into the region.  It requires two hours to travel into town (when 
the roads are passable).  The single bridge along that span is destroyed each time 
heavy rains fall.  Other areas have no bridge and no egress during the rainy 
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 season.  There is a single nurse in a nearby community who serves the needs of all 
of the estimated 30,000 residents.  There is no potable water in the region.158   
Finally, because the roads are so poor, most peasant families rely upon 
local patrones (bosses) and acopiadores (cotton processors) to pick up and ship 
their agricultural products.  Nearly everyone plants cotton.  Without any resources 
of one’s own, the Paraguayan peasant is trapped in a system of cotton farming 
that Esteban Areco has called “la esclavitud blanca” or cotton slavery (Areco 4). 
New and old settlers of occupied lands endure great hardships that do not 
ease over time.  While some public services are provided to peasants, they find it 
difficult to thrive in a system that benefits capital at the expense of labor.  
Government loans are made available to peasants to plant government-supported 
cash crops. Cotton is the most important cash crop in Paraguay.  More than 
300,000 rural families comprising approximately two million persons depend 
upon this crop.  Thus, at least 2/3 of the 2.5 to three million rural peasants in 
Paraguay are directly dependent upon the cotton crop while the remainder is 
indirectly dependent upon that crop to generate and distribute income in the rural 
countryside.   
Participation in cotton farming, as with any other enterprise, requires 
capital investment.  The primary reason peasants turn to cotton is because of the 
availability of credit.  The great majority of small farmers obtain loans through a 
                                                 
158 As a Peace Corps volunteer in the area (1993-1995), I constructed and taught the construction 
of wells and well sanitation.  Peasants were unable to finance the required costs to initiate and 
maintain these wells.  When I first returned after seven years, none of the more than twenty 
sanitized wells I had established remained operational.  Christino Barua, a local peasant I trained 
in well construction, explained “Opa rei.  Xe nembotavy xe ra’a.” [I ran out of money.  I am just a 
poor, stupid peasant]. 
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 local patron who charges at least 5% interest per month over the primary growing 
season (which for cotton is seven months, amounting to 35% interest).  More 
recently, MAG has provided credit at rates varying between 18% and 25%.  In 
addition, the middleman, either a campesino’s patron or an acopiador, will set his 
price in an oligarchic system that assures his profit at the expense of the peasant.  
While international cotton values in 2002 hovered around $0.75/kilo, peasants are 
likely to receive only 800 Guaranies per kilo or $0.114/kilo of cotton sold from 
the farm. 
Cotton farming is inefficient and unprofitable for the Paraguayan peasant.  
Most peasants make an investment equal to 120% of the value of the cotton crop 
produced!  Compounding this loss is the fact that debt payments of up to 35% on 
the principle and inflation between 10-20% further erode the peasant’s economic 
situation.  Cotton is the primary crop on approximately 533,000 hectares of land, 
affecting 250,000 farming families who depend on the crop (for the most part) as 
their sole means of support (U.S. Department of State, 1998 Country Report). 
I discussed cotton profits with twenty two members of the farmers’ 
Comite Ko’e Rory of Santo Domingo, La Colonia Independencia, Departamento 
del Guaira.  Working out the average input and production of each step in the 
process of cotton production, the committee developed an analysis of cotton 
production in the region.  The average cost of inputs per hectare of cotton 
production during 2001 were as follows:159  
                                                 
159 These cost estimates were reached by the farmer’s committee of Ko’e Rory, by averaging the 
cost of rented and purchased materials as well as the value of labor (which was calculated at 
15,000 Guaranies/day).  Labor, while performed by family members themselves is valued as 
changa or wage labor.  Thus, the value of any labor performed on the family farm is calculated as 
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 1) El arado (soil preparation) $20.  Planting cotton in eastern Paraguay 
(where the rich clay soils produce high yields) requires mechanized plowing using 
a tractor rather than the use of oxen and a plow.160  The high cost of soil 
preparation results from the need of many peasants to rent equipment from a local 
patron whose monopoly permits him to overcharge the peasants.161
2) La siembra (planting) $8.  Not only do many peasants lack the 
equipment to safely distribute the seed, but they often must plant twice as poor 
germination rates and adverse weather often necessitate replanting a portion of the 
crop.  Poor germination rates are the result of peasants being provided the worst 
quality of seed or even expired seed while being charged full price.162  Planting 
requires three adult laborers working one full day and reseeding requires one adult 
laborer working one day.  
3) Semilla (seed) $25-$40.  The need to replant as well as the poor 
germination rates of the low quality seed provided to peasants often requires 
peasants to double their planting investment.163  Poor germination rates require 
                                                                                                                                                 
the value of the labor that a peasant or any member of his or her family could earn by engaging in 
wage labor off the farm. 
160 It is important to note that only 60% (167,378 of 307,221) of all agricultural enterprises in the 
country possess spraying equipment and only 61% possess animal traction equipment essential for 
agricultural production  (Fogel, Pobreza 684). 
161 Only 7.4% of all small agricultural enterprises (less than 20 hectares) receive finance assistance 
from the CAH through MAG (Fogel, Pobreza 684). 
162 In addition, the timing of cotton planting is very precise.  Cotton must be planted in a two-week 
period between late September and early October in order to take advantage of the end of the 
winter drought and late October rains.  If the rains are late the seed dries out in the heat of the 
fields.  The seed cannot be planted in the rain, as the clay soil does not permit work under those 
conditions.  Finally, if the seed has been planted or replanted too late, the May/June rains will ruin 
the crop at harvest. 
163 In addition to the direct cost of seed, many peasants pay the price for handling the pesticide 
covered seeds with their bare hands.  Peasants cannot afford the additional expense of planting 
equipment and recruit their own children, as young as 3, to work in the field by placing seed in 
holes prepared by the parents with hoes.   
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 peasants to place 5-7 seeds in each prepared hole in order to allow 2-3 plants to 
germinate. 
4) El Raleo (plant thinning) $8.  As a result of planting and replanting and 
the use of 5-7 seeds placed in each hole, each planting must be inspected and 
when more than two plants have germinated the excess sprouts must be removed 
by hand.  Three adults working one day are required to carry out this task. 
5) El Aporque (hilling up the plants) $5.  After the plants have been 
thinned, the farmer needs to push soil up around the base of the plant to prevent 
its being blown over and to promote root development.  Two adults are required 
in a full day of work to perform this task. 
5) La carpida (weeding) $20-$35.  This is the most difficult aspect of 
planting cotton.  Peasants carry out weeding manually, that is, by removing each 
weed or potential weed with a hoe by hand.  It takes three working days for one 
peasant to hoe one hectare of land.  Depending on the amount of rain during the 
season the number of carpidas can vary between three and five per season. 
6) Venenos (pesticides) $45.  As of 1994, the cotton boll weevil became 
the 105th and most problematic of the many pests that attack the cotton plant in 
Paraguay.  Peasants are required to apply pesticides at least three times each 
growing season.  Depending on the climate and the conditions of nearby crops 
and forests, that number can reach five required pesticide applications each 
season.  Pesticides to combat more intense insect infestations are produced in 
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 Brazil and sold in Paraguay.  The most common of these cotton pesticides is an 
organophosphate labeled Azodrine that possesses an LD 50 of only eight.164  
7) Aplicacion de venenos (pesticide application) $8.  This is very 
dangerous work as well.  Uneducated peasants don’t adequately understand the 
dangers of pesticides and don’t protect themselves during the application of the 
poisons.  I have personally seen peasants apply pesticides in bare feet while 
drinking yerba mate with their free hands.  
8) La Cosecha (harvest) $40.  The harvest was described to me by one 
Felix Benitez as “Ipohyitei” [extremely hard work!] (Benitez, Personal 
Interview)!  The Benitez family offers a good example of the amount of work that 
harvesting cotton requires.  The Benitez family consists of Felix, the father, 
Elodia, the mother, and three children ages twelve, eight and six.  The entire 
family works for six straight days, sunup to sundown, during the first harvest.  
Even the smallest of children is to be found in the fields with a sack tied around 
his or her waist.  Children are very helpful during the harvest because they can 
more easily reach the capullos or bolls closest to the ground.  The second harvest 
follows some three weeks later.  This harvest is not as intense but requires some 
2-3 days of intensive labor.  The final harvest occurs six weeks after the initial 
harvest.  This requires approximately one day of familial labor. 
                                                 
164 The LD 50 scale measures the relative toxicity of a pesticide using lab animals to produce a 
figure calculated as the number of micrograms per pound of body weight will be required to kill 
half a population.  Azodrine’s LD 50 of 8 means that a mere 1,200 micrograms can induce death in 
a 150 lb. person.  While the likelihood of ingesting this much pesticide without drinking it is low, 
it must be noted that Azodrine, as an organophosphate is stored in the human fat tissues and 
accumulates in the body.  Thus, accumulating the 1,200 micrograms (or less to induce sickness) is 
not out of the question as the average farmer applies 2-5 liters of the product on the average farm 
over a period of many years.   
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 9) El Arranque y Quema (removal of the crop) $15.  As cotton has many 
insect pests (105 different species of insect prey on the crop in Paraguay), each 
plant must be pulled from the soil and burned at the end of the season.  Cotton 
pests often reside in the plant’s capullo, tallo, and raices during the cool season to 
await next year’s crop.  A failure to properly sanitize each field will result in an 
infestation the following year.  This is difficult and time consuming as the cotton 
plant has a tap root that can extend as much as five feet into the ground.  Given 
that nearly 4,000 plants occupy each hectare, this is a labor-intensive activity.  
The arranque y quema requires three adults working for two days to properly 
perform this task. 
The total investment in a year’s crop is approximately $194.00 per 
hectare. Given an average yield of 1,000 kilos per hectare (as estimated by the 
FNC) and an average price of 800 Guaranies per kilo, on average, a peasant will 
generate 800,000 Guaranies per hectare of cotton or $114.38 per hectare.  
Deducting costs of $194.00 per hectare, each peasant loses $79.62 per hectare.  
With an average of 2.5 hectares of cotton planted per peasant family, this results 
in a net loss of  $199.05 each year.  Finally, we must include the interest to be 
paid on an average principal of 800,000 Guaranies borrowed either wholly or in 
combination from the CAH or the local patron.165  An average of 25 percent 
interest on 800,000 Guaranies produces a loss of 200,000 Guaranies or $28.57.  
                                                 
165 It is a common peasant practice to borrow money to cover living expenses as well as the 
material costs of cotton production.  Thus a peasant will borrow 800,000 to 1,000,000 Guaranies 
and receive little more than 800,000 to 1,000,000 Guaranies in return, just enough to recover his 
or her debts. 
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 Added to the net loss for the year, the average peasant family accrues a loss of 
$227.62 per year on each cotton crop. 
Why would farmers work in such a way as to lose rather than earn capital 
in the planting of cotton?  There are four primary reasons: 1) government support 
of cotton farming with investment capital and public propaganda, 2) cash payment 
for the crop, 3) success in the past, and 4) a spirit of independence. 
 
4.2.1 Government Support.  
 
The Paraguayan government has promulgated cotton production for many 
years.  Nearly the entire function of the MAG is devoted to cotton production.   
The entire colono system was premised upon cotton farming.  Beginning with the 
foundation of the IBR in 1963 the Paraguayan government’s systematic 
acculturation of peasants into the culture of cotton farming resulted in a nation 
that by 1992 was devoting nearly half of its labor force directly or indirectly to the 
production of cotton (US Library of Congress).  The Paraguayan government has 
taken drastic measures to support an industry that has always produced yearly 
infusions of capital in this cash-starved country that runs yearly trade deficits and 
whose first freely elected president was the owner of a cotton processing plant 
and, as a consequence, one of the wealthiest men in the nation.166   
To this day, the Paraguayan government spends an outrageous amount of 
money to subsidize the cotton industry.  In 2001, MAG requested 25 million 
                                                 
166 In the 1992 election, two of the three most legitimate nominees for president were owners of 
huge cotton processing cooperatives.  The Partido Colorado candidate and eventual winner of that 
election, Juan Carlos Wasmosy, and the Partido Encuentro Nacional, Guillermo Caballero 
Vargas, were two of the most influential of the cotton magnates in the country. 
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 dollars to finance the 2002-2003 cotton season.167  The CAH reported a loss of 20 
million Guaranies or nearly 3.5 million dollars in unpaid debt that year (“CAH 
recupera” 1+).  Between March of 1999 and December of 2001, the Gonzalez-
Macchi administration was forced to restructure 90 million dollars of peasant debt 
that could simply not be paid back by peasants who make no profit on the crop 
(“Ultimatum al Gobierno” 1+) 
Government propaganda motivates peasants to plant this crop and hides 
the enormous theft of labor that enables a system of virtual “cotton slavery” 
(Areco 4).  The acopiadores, or cotton factories, use media campaigns, free 
liquor, seeds, and insecticides that are, in some cases delivered right to the 
peasant’s own farm.  Finally, when the cotton is ready to be marketed, the 
acopiadores will pick it up from the farm or contract local patrones. This is made 
economically feasible by the enormous profit realized on each individual farmer’s 
crop.  Cotton, from the peasant’s perspective, is not only the only crop that 
guarantees cash payment each season, but it is the only crop for which guaranteed 
financing is available and which investors will deliver, literally, to the door of the 
peasant’s home. 
 
4.2.2 Cash crop farming. 
 
For many years, peasants lived a life of relative self-sufficiency in the 
Paraguayan countryside.  Squatting land and occasionally working on the 
                                                 
167 This money will be used to purchase boll weevil traps ($5 million), cotton seed ($5.1 million), 
insecticides ($7.5 million) with the remainder devoted to salaries, incentive programs, other 
materials and loans (“Se Reducen” 23). 
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 haciendas or other latifundial enterprises, the peasants have become integrated 
into and dependent upon the Paraguayan market system.   
Throughout its history, Paraguay has been peopled by distinct racial 
groups: los indios, los mestizos or campesinos, and los blancos or creoles.  The 
separation of these distinct peoples was socio-economic as well.  Indios and 
campesinos rarely owned land, farming only subsistence plots that they squatted.   
Out of necessity, they led simple lives of moderate deprivation.  As peasant Mario 
Espi nola explained, “Ndaipori monga’a karia’y guare.  Ni cinco Guaranies ore 
reko ko’a tiempo ve!  Lo karia’y o-mbiapo heta la karu hagua ha ndaipori ve!” 
[There was no money for anyone.  At that time nobody had even five Guaranies!  
The people worked hard just to eat and nothing was left over!] (Espi nola, Personal 
Interview).     
Since the introduction of the colonization programs of the 1960s and the 
promotion of cotton in concurrence with those programs, the peasant’s economic 
reality has changed significantly.  As will be discussed later in greater detail, 
today’s peasant farmer is trapped in a cash-crop/debt cycle that requires him or 
her to cultivate crops that will produce a cash payment to pay off at least a portion 
of the last year’s debt. 
 
4.2.3 Past success.   
 
Farmers could count on much higher yields in the past.  While today 
peasant farmers can only expect an average yield of 1,000 kilos per hectare, 
farmers in the recent past have experienced far higher yields up to and including 
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 1,800 kilos per hectare.168  The system of colonization permitted the utilization of 
previously unfarmed forest to be opened up for cotton farming.  In peasant 
farming practices, la quema (slash and burn techniques) permit farmers to enrich 
the soil with the organic matter of the burned forest material in addition to the 
nutrients already in the soil.  Typically, the cotton yields in rosado, first year slash 
and burn farming, vary between 1,500 and 2,000 kilos per hectare.   
As long as the frontier remained open and peasants could colonize 
forested land, farming cotton remained profitable.  However, since the closure of 
the open frontier, peasants have been forced to maintain the utility of their small 
farm holdings well beyond their ability to maintain productive agricultural yields.  
Even peasants who do occupy forested land find that their crop yields fall 
significantly after the first three years.  After the first three years, when cotton 
yields vary between 1200-2000 kilos per hectare, average yields fall to 1000-1200 
and then to 500-700 after five years (Comite  de Agricultores Ko’e Rory, Group 
Interview). 
The Paraguayan Ministry of Agriculture has forecast an average price of 
850 Guaranies per kilo of cotton in the country (“Desarrollo Humano” 11).  At the 
present exchange rate of 7,000 Guaranies per dollar, that yield produces a value of 
$0.1214 per kilo for a total of nearly $121.40 per hectare.  Higher average yields 
and an average price of $0.375/kilo in 1995 and $0.428/kilo in 1996 produced 
                                                 
168 MAG estimates 1,200 Kilos/H (“Algodon” 28) while peasant organizations such as the FNC 
estimate average yields of only 1,000 kilos/H (“Campesinos no Aceptan” 18).  In the northern 
departments of eastern Paraguay (San Pedro, Paraguari, Concepcion, Amambay, Canindeyu, 
Cordillera, and Caaguazu) the soils are silicate as opposed to the basaltic soils of the southeastern 
Paraguay and provide far lower cotton yields.  It is important to note that the bulk of all 
occupations and asentamientos have occurred in north east of the country.  El Diario ABC Color 
reported average cotton yields of only 800 kilos per hectare in the department of Paraguari in 
2002 (”Preocupa Situacion” 20). 
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 $533.25/hectare and $449.4/hectare respectively in those seasons (Kevin Burns 3; 
“No Hay Condiciones” 4). With an average investment of $844.95/H, the realized 
benefits of cotton production were -$311.70/H and -395.55/H respectively. With 
an average of 2.5 hectares per peasant family losses amounted to $779.25 and 
$988.875 each year, especially since it requires a nine month period of intense 
labor to bring the product to market.   
The reduction of loss each year is a result of the Guarani’s decline in value 
versus the dollar.169  The Guarani’s loss of 390% of its value against the dollar 
between 1995 and 2002 while wages grew by a mere 50%, means that the real 
loss of peasant input in cotton farming has fallen.  Still, it remains important to 
note that peasant inputs exceed production in cotton.  It is still a losing enterprise.       
 
4.2.4 A Spirit of Independence.   
 
The Paraguayan peasant has a fiercely independent spirit.  The ownership 
of land and the ability to earn one’s own living largely outside of the society of 
influence trading offers a powerful incentive for the Paraguayan peasant to plant 
cotton.  While, on the one hand, planting cotton requires the peasant to commit to 
a subordinate economic relationship with respect to his lenders and cotton 
purchasers, it removes him or her from a clientelist system.  Growing cotton 
enables the peasant farmer to earn his or her own living, to break away from a 
dependency upon changa and the concomitant debt that an employer accumulates 
as a result of offering work to a laborer. 
                                                 
169 The Guarani has lost 390% of its value to the dollar between 1995 and 2003, moving from a 
rate of 1,800 Guaranies to the dollar in 1995 to a rate of 7,000 Guaranies to the dollar in 2003. 
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  In Paraguay, labor has both social as well as economic components.  
Socially, an employee is indebted to an employer for offering work.  This system 
of debt-obligation is well explained by Saro Vera in Darwinian terms: 
El Paraguayo, si no puede mandar, encuentra una linea de 
parentesco con el poderoso.  Si no la encuentra, se amigara con el 
compadre.  El Paraguay es el pais de los compadres.  Es que el 
ciudadano comu n necesita de este respaldo porque no la ampara 
ningu n derecho.  Solamente es objecto de obligaciones y expuesto 
al capricho del hombre de poder.  El paraguayo nunca tuvo voz y, 
mucho menos, voto efectivo.  Se lo ha convertido en esclavo 
dorado por la ficcion libertaria del contrato social de Rousseau.  
La tiene en la medida que un compadre lo ampara.  Con mucha 
razo n el Paraguayo deseara el poder…. (Vera 67-68) 
 
[The Paraguayan, if he cannot lead, finds a line of communication 
with power.  If he doesn’t find it, he makes an alliance.  Paraguay 
is a country of alliances.  The average citizen needs this support 
because no rights will protect him.  He is only subject to 
obligations and exposed to the caprices of men of power.  The 
Paraguayan has never had a voice nor, much less, an effective vote.  
He has been converted into the gilded slave by the liberatory 
fiction of Rousseau’s social contract.  It has him to the degree that 
a friend can help him.  It is with reason that the Paraguayan wants 
power…]. 
 
Growing cotton offers a way to get out of the system of debt/obligation 
incurred through changa.  Withdrawal from an unfair system of exploitation is the 
peasant’s goal.  The peasant doesn’t need protection if he or she has his or her 
own farm, own money and own laborers.  As Vera explains, the ideal for the 
Paraguayan peasant is to become one’s own boss, thereby accruing both the 
economic as well as the social benefits that such an arrangement permits: 
Nadie tiene derecho a imponerse a nadie.  Todos son duenos de 
sus propios actos. Cuando alguien pretende inmiscuirse en el 
procedimiento del otro, este le dira: “pea ningo che problema.  
Eyehecha nde  ne problema reve ha che, che problema reve.” (Este 
es mi problema.  Yo con el mio y tu con el tuyo). (Vera 34) 
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 [No one has the right to impose himself upon anyone else.  Each 
person is responsible for him or herself.  When someone intends to 
involve himself in the conduct of another, this is said: (“This is my 
problem.  I will deal with mine and you will yours”)]. 
 
  Thus, cotton farming presents a two-horned dilemma to Paraguayan 
peasants.  On the one hand, it offers enormous social freedom: freedom from the 
local clientelistic system, including the diminution of the local patron’s power.  
On the other hand the peasant is literally trapped in a system of production that 
provides just enough cash to survive until the next loan becomes available.  Each 
peasant lives with nearly a year’s worth of floating debt that is shifted from one 
year to the next. 
Clientelism has functioned for many hundreds of years, enslaving the 
Paraguayan peasant in a socio-economic system whose most visible feature was 
social.170  The most visible feature of this new form of slavery is economic, 
earning the name cotton slavery.  The future of cotton slavery is uncertain.  A 
single year’s failure to produce a sufficient crop (at least 1,000 kilos/hectare) 
doubles a peasant’s debt and denies him or her access to governmental loans.  
Trapped in this system, the peasant who cannot receive government loans (at an 
average of 22%) must turn to a local patron who will charge 5%/month or 45% 
over the nine months it takes the cotton crop to mature.   
If actual day labor wages are calculated, it becomes obvious that cotton 
farming is far less profitable than working on the haciendas and other latifundias.  
An alternative to cotton is changa or wage-labor.  A peasant can earn 
approximately 15,000 Guaranies each day for his or her labor by working on 
                                                 
170 Clientelism, or clientelismo, is the system of reciprocal exchange of goods and services 
between individuals of unequal status reliant upon face-to-face negotiations (Powell 412).  
 259
 latifundial farms or ranches.  If a peasant were to spend merely six months in 
changa each year (assuming only an average of two working days each week for a 
total of 104 working days each year), he or she would earn 30,000 Guaranies each 
week, 120,000 Guaranies each month and 1,440,000 Guaranies or $205.71 each 
year.  This is much more efficient than the labor-intensive use of an entire peasant 
family by planting 2½ hectares of cotton.   
What is the actual value of peasant labor in cotton farming?  By 
subtracting the material expenditures (seed, plow rental, capital interest and 
pesticides), approximately $126.07, from total cotton production expenditures of 
$194.00, we arrive at a total labor value of $67.93 per hectare or $169.825 per 2½ 
hectare cotton crop.  Given the average rural family of eight (two adults and six 
children) and estimating that each family is required to produce an average of four 
adult units of work each year, the value of a year’s labor per active family 
member is only $42.46.  This starkly contrasts the value of wage labor at $205.71 
each year.  Finally, cotton production requires daily labor for the full period of 
nine months (let us estimate that an average of only four days of labor each week 
are required to produce cotton).  This estimate produces a total of 144 days of 
labor for a daily rate of $1.18.  Daily wage labor, by comparison, produces a daily 
wage of 15,000 Guaranies or $2.14. 
Thus, not only has the system of production managed in effect to lower the 
peasant’s daily wages from the average daily wage of $2.14/day to $1.18/day, but 
it has succeeded in displacing almost the entirety of the inherent risks of farming 
from the cotton industry to the peasant.  Cotton slavery places peasants in a far 
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 more precarious position than landlessness.  The peasant who owns his or her own 
land is heavily indebted and required to assume the risk of yet another cotton crop 
in order to salvage some of that debt.  There is no alternative to cotton for the 
peasant.171  The Paraguayan government has long issued bonds to subsidize the 
cotton industry and has also absorbed the responsibility of guaranteeing peasant 
debt.  However, rather than forgive that debt, recent administrations have merely 
extended the payment period, in effect increasing the debt load of the peasant.  
Thus, peasant debt rises as the government extends payment periods and the 
cotton factories, their investors and owners become wealthy in a system that 
exploits peasants even more than the wage labor contracts recognized by the 
hacendados that have been the primary means of peasant exploitation from the 
time of the conquest until the early 1960s.  
The irony of cotton slavery is that it is made possible by the individual 
peasant ownership of land.  Furthermore, the individual ownership of land is a 
powerful incentive for peasants to willingly subject themselves to this form of 
exploitation.  Eladio Flecha, president of the FNC, points out the power of cotton 
and land ownership as a single phrase, ‘‘Si no hay algodón, el campo se 
empobrecerá y no habrá otra alternativa que llegar a la capital para realizar 
manifestaciones por tiempo indefinido’’ [If there is no cotton in the rural 
Paraguay, it will become impoverished so there is no other alternative but to 
travel to the Capital to protest (for land and cotton subsidies) for as long as it 
                                                 
171 A lack of capital, technical knowledge, and market freedom for planting alternative crops 
makes change impossible for the Paraguayan peasant.   
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 takes] (“Habra Ocupaciones” 8).  The concepts of land and cotton production are, 
today, intimately related in the mind of the Paraguayan peasant. 
 
4.3  Land and Land Reform, the Wrong Goal? 
 
Land ownership is only one challenge facing Paraguayan peasants.  Larger 
issues of political and economic dependence remain unresolved even for those 
peasants whose struggles bring them ownership of small farms.  In light of this 
fact, it appears land scarcity is a symptom of a more profound problem of 
Paraguayan rural and peasant society, the problem of dependency.  
Throughout the entire history of the continent and to the present day in 
Paraguay, systems of patronage at all levels have removed individual Paraguayan 
peasants from the country’s social, political and economic processes.  It must be 
clear by now that obtaining land by means of corrupt state institutions will not 
solve the problems of the peasants of Paraguay.  The problem of land is only the 
most visible inequity in a culture of inequity.  Despite the work of the Paraguayan 
land reform struggle and its successes over the last twenty years, suffering has 
only worsened.  At the present moment small farms consisting of no more than 
five hectares comprise 40% of all farms in the country and farms of more than 
1,000 hectares represent more than 80% of the arable land in the country and the 
situation is actually getting worse (Fogel, Pobreza 39).  Since 1981 the GINI 
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 index for land had increased from 0.921 in 1981 to 0.934  in 1991 (Fogel, 
Pobreza 39).172
A census conducted in 1992 revealed an endemic level of poverty with a 
concentration in the rural peasant population.  The study showed that 64% of all 
Paraguayans live in poverty for a total of 2,885,379 people.  Poverty in the 
countryside was best demonstrated by the proportion of all families in poverty.  
Seventy two percent of all rural families live in poverty, and more than 1,500,000 
Paraguayan peasants did not have access to the basic necessities of life every day.  
In the most remote areas (the primary sites for land distribution) the problem is at 
its worst.  Poverty in the department of Alto Parana  reaches a level of 90% of all 
families (Fogel, Pobreza 22-3). 
The solution to Paraguay’s problems does not appear to be in land reform, 
or at least in land reform as it has been implemented and practiced in the 
Paraguayan land reform struggle.  Land grabs as a protest strategy often entail 
dramatic displays of political resistance, yet such episodes fall short of qualifying 
as comprehensive solutions to the myriad political, economic, and social problems 
facing Paraguayan peasants.  Even when land concessions are made to the 
peasants, it amounts to a temporary solution.  As explained by Amanzio Rui z of 
the Asentamiento de Capi’ibary, after eight years of struggle and sacrifice by 
peasants for land that 5,000 families presently occupy, “We are in a permanent 
state of vigilance.  We only have this land without title.  We have no security” 
                                                 
172 The GINI index is a means o measuring the degree of difference between two variables.  It is 
used by economists as a common measure of resource distribution within a population with scores 
of zero indicating that the society equitably divides wealth and a score of one reflecting a 
completely inequitable society. 
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 (Amanzio Rui z, Personal Interview).  Land titulation is a fiction in Paraguay.  
Only through a constant process of defense of one’s rights as a community and as 
individual peasant citizens can land rights be secured.  As illustrated by the case 
of the land struggle in Yvyturuzu, even those land claims that are old can be 
challenged in a country where land appears to be little more than a socio-
economic spur for the extraction of more peasant resources.   
The social, economic and institutional factors that prevent any poor 
Paraguayan from improving his or her situation are not altered by the acquisition 
of a small plot of land.  It should be obvious at this point that the real beneficiaries 
of the land reform struggle are not the peasants.  The real beneficiaries of these 
social struggles are the middlemen, brokers, investors, cotton cartels, and others 
who benefit from extracting labor from the peasantry and evading the inherent 
risks in the process by sustaining a system of cotton slavery.  
Any criterion for evaluating the success of the Paraguayan land reform 
struggle must not overlook the regressive political and economic effects of the 
concessions made by peasant to secure land ownership.  In societies with great 
socio-economic disparities, the imperturbability of hegemonic systems that have 
operated for, in some cases, hundreds of years overlooks the co-optational nature 
of goal setting and demand creation.  The selection of goals that offer symbolic 
independence from a hegemonic system that still interpolates subjects politically, 
socially, economically and culturally in not a successful strategy.  The failure to 
question the premises of demands like land may be an insuperable problem in 
developing nations.  Movements composed of illiterate citizens who accept as 
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 truth the ideological regime that subordinates them will have serious difficulties 
in both satisfying the masses and achieving goals that will truly alleviate the 
social conditions that motivate those masses to rebel. 
 
4.4  Revisiting Critera for Protest Success 
 
In the case of developing nations, achievements in the areas of self-
representation and nuanced strategy formation should be hailed as criteria for the 
success of social movements.  Escobar, Alvarez and Dagnino have pointed out 
that while social struggles throughout Latin America have achieved varying 
degrees of success in terms of political and social organization, real advancement 
has come in the area of self-representation as an essential foundation in the 
democratic process: 
Los movimientos sociales no solo han logrado en algunas 
instancias transformar sus agendas en politicas pu blicas y 
expandir las fronteras de la politica institucional, sino que 
tambien, muy significativamente, han luchado por ortogar nuevos 
significados a las nociones heredadas de cuidadani a, a la 
representacion y participacion politica, y como consequencia, a la 
propia democracia.  Tanto los procesos mediante los cuales el 
programa de un movimiento se convierte en politica publica, como 
los de busqueda de una nueva definicion del significado de 
terminos como “desarrollo” o “ciudadano,” por ejemplo…. 
(Escobar, Alvarez and Dagnino 18) 
 
[Social movements have not only achieved, in some instances, the 
transformation of their agendas in public politics and expanded 
frontiers of institutional politics, but also, very importantly, they 
have struggled to obtain new significance for inherited notions of 
citizenship, representation in political participation and, as a 
consequence, their own sense of democracy.  Just as these 
movement strategies have been applicable to public politics they 
serve as a search for a new definition for the meaning of terms 
such as “development” or “citizen,” for example…]. 
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This link between the ideology of collective protest and its actual practice 
becomes an important factor in understanding the Paraguayan land reform 
struggle.  If the function of the struggle is to articulate and represent the culture 
and ideology of its membership, then the struggle’s relative failure to obtain 
concessions that both matter to the struggle’s membership and actually address 
the exigencies motivating the struggle, can be better explained.  In this light, the 
apparent failure of the Paraguayan land reform struggle to constitute itself as a 
coherent movement that can pressure authorities into granting concessions is 
eclipsed by a successful campaign to inject a previously excluded language, 
culture and ideology into national political and deliberative discussion. 
Alberto Melucci has pointed out the fact that new social movements are 
difficult to evaluate and understand in terms of conventional analysis because 
“The meaning of the action [of a social movement] has to be found in the action 
itself more than in the pursued goals: movements are not qualified by what they 
do but by what they are” (Melucci, “Symbolic” 809).  For Melucci, identities and 
methods are imbricated within social movement organizations.  There is an 
intimate connection between the structure and methodology of a social movement 
organization’s protest tactics and the culture of its membership.  Evaluating the 
effectiveness of such organizations in terms of their organizational 
accomplishments is wrongheaded: 
They don’t have big leaders, organization seems quite inefficient, 
dis-enchantment has superseded great ideals.  Many observers 
consider these realities, which don’t challenge the political system 
and are not interested in the institutional effects of their action, as 
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 residual, folkloristic phenomena in the big scenario of politics. 
(Melucci, “Symbolic” 810) 
 
Melucci argues that organizational and political efficiency are not nearly as 
important to the nature or success of new social movements as the message and 
methods of such organizations, which function to “present to the rationalizing 
apparatuses questions which are not allowed” (Melucci, “Symbolic” 810). 
Another misunderstanding that arises from the strategies employed by new 
social movements is that traditional analyses of their rhetorical effectiveness do 
not adequately reflect the goals of such strategies.  Richard B. Gregg’s critique of 
protest rhetoric of the 1960s as embodying an “ego function” that “seems 
purposely to ignore the styles of communication that might result in meaningful 
communication with the establishment” is a good example of this sort of 
misunderstanding (Gregg 87).  Gregg described movements such as the Black 
Power movement and the Women’s Liberation Movement as employing a rhetoric 
whose primary function was “self-directed and not other directed” and to 
“constitute self-hood through expression” (Gregg 74).   This was problematic for 
Gregg because successful rhetoric employed appeals addressed to identify 
audiences for the purpose of moving such an audience to accept a rhetor’s 
argument.  By dismissing the “ego function” of protest rhetoric as an impediment 
creating clear channels of communication between protestors and their opponents, 
Gregg ignored the potential value of a self-representative protest strategy. 
Melucci has argued that new social movements employ non-traditional 
protest strategies in successful ways to address new sets of goals.  Abandoning a 
rhetorical model that accepts the existence of interlocutors equally capable of 
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 addressing one another in the process of argumentation, new social movements 
question the premises that ground society and serve as starting points for public 
deliberation: 
But beyond modernization, beyond cultural innovation, movements 
question society on something “else”: who decides on codes, who 
establishes rules of normality, what is the space for difference, how can 
one be recognized not for being included but for being accepted as 
different, not for increasing the amount of exchanges but for affirming 
another kind of exchange? (Melucci, “Symbolic” 810) 
 
The advantages of such a rhetorical analysis are apparent.  In order to 
determine whether or not the Paraguayan land reform struggle has been a success 
or a failure, specific criteria have to be established.  Significant questions have 
been raised in this section about the level of self-awareness of the Paraguayan 
peasant.  Not only have concerns been raised from a theoretical perspective, 
speculating that the struggle may have failed to raise its primary participant to an 
appropriate level of social and political awareness, but the very goals of the 
movement have been called into question.  How can the struggle be called 
successful when successful protest ultimately results in cotton slavery for the 
peasant?  Finally, the cycle of minifundizacion would seem to doom the struggle 
to failure as each successive generation of the peasantry grows both in its 
numbers and its hunger for finite land holdings in a small country.   
Before completely writing off the Paraguayan land reform struggle as 
hopeless, another question of importance arises, “What factors inhibit the success 
of the struggle?”  Both Melucci and Touraine have suggested that unsuccessful 
social struggles like the Paraguayan land reform struggle fail to realize their 
potential to challenge the “rules of normality” or the historicity of the society.  
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 The next section will examine the circumstances preventing the Paraguayan land 
reform struggle from achieving a higher, and more abstract level of struggle in the 
mold of the new social movement.
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V.  Peasants, New Social Movements and Rhetoripolitics 
 
5.1  Introduction 
 
Amanzio Rui z was a man in his thirties when I met him.  He had three 
children and a wife waiting for him at home when we first spoke at the 
headquarters of the MCNOC.  He was eager to return home to work.  He had been 
away from home for about a week, organizing peasants and attending meetings in 
anticipation of a nationwide protest.  I traveled with him to his home in the 
Asentamiento Capi’ibary, the site of one of the more famous peasant land reform 
struggles and a victory and inspiration for many landless peasants in Paraguay.   
It was a five-mile walk from the main road to his house, so we stopped at 
an almacen on the way, where I bought a coke.  He looked at me and asked why I 
put that into my body explaining that we would have everything that we would 
need to eat and drink when we arrived at his house.  He was obviously proud to be 
a landowner and expounded on the many varieties of fruit that grew wild on the 
trees in Capi’ibary.  I was impressed with his respect for nature and even more 
impressed with his work ethic. 
When we arrived at his house, he quickly went to work, building a shower 
for his wife and children.  I offered to help, but was told to go talk to the 
neighbors and to learn about the struggles of the peasants so that I could tell 
others when I returned to my own country.  He finished building the shower as I 
returned and promised to take me into his fields and to show me the community 
projects the next day. 
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 The community had invested in a cattle barn and, with government 
support, had developed a small herd of skinny cows.  Amanzio talked about the 
necessity for more investment and about the hard labor of cotton farming and the 
hope for a big harvest in the coming year.  It was hard to ignore the ubiquitous 
smoke and the clear-cut acreage visible throughout the asentamiento.  The 
peasants had obviously deforested about half of what was once a 5,000 acre 
forested reserve to make carbon, or charcoal that sold for about a $0.10/lb.  
Literally, tens of thousands of mature trees had been felled and burned to make 
way for the cotton that Amanzio and his compadres would begin to plant in 
November. 
Amanzio’s ten-hectare lot would provide carbon for several years until the 
trees are all felled.  The cotton will grow well for the first three to five years, after 
which, production will decline without inputs of fertilizer or disuse of the land.  
When I asked him about the soil, he indicated that he understood that it was 
fragile, explaining that many of the peasants who received land from the 
government in the asentamiento left as cocue cue or unusable, worn out land 
nearby where the soil had turned sandy as a result of intensive farming and was 
filled with nothing but weeds that the cows wouldn’t eat.  “¿Que pasara en diez o 
sea veinte anos, xe ra’a?” [What will happen in ten or twenty years, my friend?], 
I asked him.  He replied, “Vamos a procurar tierra nueva.  Siempre hay mas 
tierra.” [We well get new land.  There is always more land].  
 
 
 271
 This final chapter synthesizes a number of different elements employed in 
the analysis of the Paraguayan land reform struggle.  By summarizing the context 
of the Paraguayan land struggle, examining the ability of the peasant express him 
or herself in the context of the land reform struggle, and situating the struggle 
within the context of the rhetorical social movement theory such lines of inquiry 
will yield a rhetorical model for protest struggles.  Extrapolating from the 
Paraguayan example, such a model will shed light on the nature and success or 
failure of the Paraguayan struggle and may be applicable to other struggles in the 
developing world as well. 
5.2  Conditions of the Struggle 
 
The key factor in any social movement is the movement’s ability to 
identify real objectives that address the social problems generating the impetus for 
the movement.  The purpose of a social movement is to change society by means 
that lie outside of the natural roles of citizens in a society.  Thus, citizens 
participating in a social movement have come to an agreement that the social 
system cannot address their problems and that extraordinary actions must be taken 
to foment change in the existing order.  Protest functions as an instrument for 
pressuring the social system to accept change.      
The real dilemma of the Paraguayan peasant is that little has changed 
despite more than sixteen years of protest.  Thus far, the Paraguayan land reform 
struggle has achieved very limited successes.   Clearly, appeals for land, for 
honesty and leadership as well as government support for the cotton industry have 
failed to spur radical changes in land tenure policy.  Peasant demands, even when 
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 protest activity has successfully forced the society to accede to the demands of the 
protesters, have only reinforced the status quo.  The Paraguayan peasant and his 
or her identity has been so deeply interpolated into the expansionist agrarian 
model of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s that the goals of the movement are nothing 
short of a call for the re-imposition of that system of socio-economic domination.   
Land ownership, while the ostensible goal of the struggle, functions as a 
constraining ideology that prevents the peasantry from envisaging a new socio-
economic model.  Land is a powerful ideograph that has symbolized power since 
the original encomiendas of the conquest.  Each successive Paraguayan socio-
economic system, until the early 1960s was premised on land ownership.  
Ironically, just as peasants began to make some small gains in land ownership 
with the establishment of the IBR, land started to evolve into a means of control.   
Poor peasants have not benefited from land ownership even though they have, in 
many cases, obtained land and the economic freedom that land ownership 
symbolically represents.   
As Paraguay modernized and moved from an internal economy to an 
export economy, its entire economic structure began to change.  Under the 
hegemony of the latifundios, even as recently as the 1950s, denying peasants land 
was an economic strategy that forced down labor costs by compelling peasants to 
choose between service on a latifundio or starvation.  There was no other choice 
than to serve a latifundista by colonizing and preparing inhospitable forest for 
cattle ranching and other resource extraction techniques.  The resources were then 
sold to internal or nearby markets such as Sao Paolo and Buenos Aires.  This 
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 system was predicated upon the exclusion of peasants from land ownership in 
order to compel their labor in these industries. 
In the newly emerging export market, including beef but also soybeans 
and most importantly cotton, the technique of labor compulsion changed.  In the 
1950s latifundistas who rented land to peasants discovered that they could make 
more money by permitting peasants to grow their own cotton than by employing 
peasants on large cotton farms.  A large farm with a large cotton crop assumes a 
great deal of risk.  Latifundistas who once fiercely opposed occupying peasant 
labor by distributing abundant state land, now strongly advocated the distribution 
of land for the purpose of distributing risk.  Latifundistas who once had to openly 
exploit peasants to work their plantations and ranches in order to turn a healthy 
profit could make more money with less risk as acopiadores, local buyers and 
middlemen for international cotton markets.  Buying and re-selling peasant cotton 
at huge profits allowed these large landholders to reduce the intensity of their 
large-scale forestry, ranching and agricultural enterprises as the limited labor 
resources of the peasantry were better applied elsewhere. 
An additional benefit to this economic shift was that the open exploitation 
of the peasantry created an unruly populace and potentially destabilized 
governments that required peasant support in order to remain in power.  Exploited 
peasants were poor workers; while, on the other hand, peasants who had been 
granted land were hard working and self-sacrificing. 
The economic shift was completed as the strong military government that 
emerged in the mid 1950s freed itself from the dominating influence of foreign 
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 latifundistas.  Since the end of the War of the Triple Alliance, in which the 
country accumulated huge foreign debts, and the end of the Chaco War, Paraguay 
had been economically dominated by large foreign corporations.  By 1930, 
foreign corporations owned fully one half of all Paraguayan territory, including 
private highways, ports and even issuing their own currencies (Fogel, Luchas 31).   
Shifting labor patterns depleted these corporations of a source of labor and, 
thereby, their ability to generate capital and power in the country.  This strategy 
can plainly be seen as early as 1950 in congressional resolution No. 1.757 signed 
into law by Roberto L. Petit: 
Ciudadanos extranjeros ocupan clandestinamente dichas tierras, 
con considerable cantidad de ganado vacuno…que pastan en esos 
campos, para luego ser pasados a territorios extranjeros 
eludiendo el pago de los derechos fiscales, y con el siguiente 
perjuicio para la economi a del pais…que existen miles de 
compatriotas que desean repatriarse y para los cuales deben 
habilitarse nuevas colonias agricolas y ganaderias en todos los 
lugares aptos del pais y de conformidad con las disposiciones 
legales vigentes. (Fogel, Luchas 35) 
 
[Foreign citizens clandestinely occupy these lands with a 
considerable quantity of cattle…that graze in those fields for the 
purpose of being transported to foreign lands eluding the payment 
of export duties and causing damage to the country’s 
economy…while there exist thousands of countrymen who wish to 
relocate and those who could establish new agricultural and 
ranching colonies where appropriate and in conformity with the 
laws of the nation]. 
 
Thus, the strategy of agricultural colonization constituted a socio-
economic revolution whereby a new elite class composed of entrepreneurs, 
middlemen, the owners of freight companies, shipping contracts and cotton gins 
displaced an older elite class either composed of or dependent upon the 
domination of foreign corporations and their control of the peasant labor market.  
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 Selling the idea of independence through ownership of land, the new elite deeply 
interpolated the peasant into the new economic model, working toward the 
establishment of agricultural colonization of state lands to support cotton farming 
by individual peasants. 
Today, with the closure of the agricultural frontier and a new scarcity of 
land, the peasantry is mounting stronger and stronger protests for the 
redistribution of the large land tracts that have remained under-utilized within the 
new economic system while their owners have made their money either directly 
or indirectly through cotton farming (and, more recently, through the Itaipua and 
Yacreta dam projects).  Peasants, although living in a system of exploitation in 
which they lose money by growing cotton each year, march in the streets 
demanding land re-distribution, cotton subsidies, as well as political and social 
change.  
The peasantry is caught in an extraordinary dilemma; they can only 
articulate demands for the reconstitution of a system that ruthlessly exploits them.  
Peasants are over-determined within a socio-economic system that defines the 
very language they have available for explaining their condition.  Tommy 
Stromberg describes the weakness of challenges to a hegemonic state in Paraguay 
in his analysis of the April 1996 coup attempt: 
Civil society in Paraguay is very limited and fragile, with only 
sporadic signs of organization and of articulation of demands. It 
lacks continuity and, thus, also the ability to put pressure on the 
political institutions. Another deficiency of Paraguayan politics is 
the absence of a strong party on the left of the political landscape. 
Political apathy is prevalent in Paraguay since people in general 
perceive the democratic institutions, together with the armed 
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 forces, as one single apparatus, instead of as tools for political 
participation. (Stromberg 4.1.1) 
 
The position of the political left is very weak in Paraguayan politics if it 
exists at all and the Paraguayan land reform struggle represents the most resilient 
counter-political movement in the society since the Civil War of 1947.  The post-
Stroessner political environment has made strides toward democratization; yet, 
there remains a lag between the institution of a structural democracy and a civil 
conception of democratic representation.  State reforms have not yet 
fundamentally transformed  the political practices that are largely imbedded in the 
minds of the Paraguayan people themselves.  Yet, as Stromberg points out, the 
distance between the idea of democracy and its actual practice is only growing:  
In order to consolidate democracy, the civil society would have to 
attain a greater level of participation in state affairs….  Paraguay 
demonstrates a case where, in terms of origin, the institutions are 
daily becoming more and more legitimate, while, in terms of 
results produced (social deterioration) democracy is becoming less 
and less legitimate. The obstacle to civic development is the 
miserable economic conditions of much of the citizenry. They are 
not in a position to benefit from civic education since their needs 
are of a much more immediate character. (Stromberg 4.1.1) 
 
The absence of a civil society and the presence of the state in daily life has 
facilitated a top-down model for dissemination of information and state ideology.  
This is most evident in the constant peasant demand for greater 
representation/participation in the neo-liberal economic model that is succeeding 
the neo-colonial practices of the past.  Given the present peasant experience with 
cotton, one would think that peasant demands would be directed at liberating 
peasants from cotton slavery.  Quite to the contrary, peasant demands reinforce 
their ties to that crop and the exploitative practices that accompany it.  Rather than 
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 arguing against the logic of the market, i.e. that peasants lack the technological 
sophistication to compete in a world economy, peasants demand greater 
participation in agricultural markets with technical assistance rather than 
suggesting alternatives to that neo-liberal economic policy.   
 The politics of neo-liberalism were popularized by the fall of the 
dictatorship (1989), the free elections of 1992 and Paraguay’s entry into 
MERCOSUR in 1985.  The Paraguayan government’s ideological commitment to 
MERCOSUR was convenient since many wealthy Paraguayans were already 
gaining their living with export-oriented agriculture.  However, just as in the 19th 
Century when the owners of hacendados exploited peasant labor in order to both 
maximize personal gain and monopolize wealth, the merchants who control the 
price, transport and handling of agricultural products produced by peasants 
exploit peasant labor to maximize personal gain and monopolize wealth today.  
The whole of Paraguayan society, including peasants, has been inundated with 
promises of wealth and glory following the integration of Paraguay into 
MERCOSUR and, thereby, the world economy. 
The peasantry has been specifically targeted with much of this propaganda 
in order to obfuscate the real relationship of the peasantry to the world economy, 
an exploitative relationship that centers around the utilization of cheap labor.  
Within a larger economic system and its concomitant competitive pressures, 
peasants are not viewed as private citizens, but as a pool of labor, property of 
those who wish to compete in the new markets that MERCOSUR offers.  Looking 
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 toward a more competitive Paraguay, one that could compete in MERCOSUR and 
beyond, Daniel Campos explains what must be done with the peasantry: 
Este proceso de modernizacion trata de esta manera de adecuar 
las potencialidades institutionales del Ministerio de Agricultura 
(MAG) a los nuevos desafios de la globalizacion de las economi as 
y la mayor exigencia de competitividad y eficiencia en los 
mercados regionales, especificamente en el MERCOSUR.  Dentro 
de este contexto, el MAG reconoce la necesidad de replantear el 
modelo de desarrollo rural campesino que estuvo vigente hasta el 
ano 1989.  Este reconocimiento es debido a que en el modelo 
anterior no se han contemplado los aspectos ambientales, 
culturales y racionalidad de la economi a campesina con su 
potencialidad para ser transformada y reactivada a traves de un 
proceso de reconversion productivo con mayor competitividad y 
eficiencia en articulacion a los mercados comunitarios, 
districtales, departamentales, nacionales y regional-
internacionales (MERCOSUR). (Campos 135) 
 
[This process of modernization attempts to utilize the Ministry of 
Agriculture to address the new challenges of globalization of the 
economy and the greater need for competitiveness and efficiency 
in regional markets and, especially, in MERCOSUR.  Within this 
context, the Ministry of Agriculture recognizes the necessity of re-
establishing the model of rural development that has been in place 
since 1989.  This recognition is required because the older model 
had not considered environmental and cultural aspects as well as 
the rationalization of the peasant economy with its potential to be 
transformed and reactivated through productive change with 
greater competitiveness and efficiency in relation to local, district, 
state, national and regional-international (MERCOSUR) markets]. 
 
Intellectuals, like Campos, form one important source of land reform 
arguments; however, Paraguayan intellectuals represent the international aspect of 
the struggle and function primarily to translate the ideology of globalism to the 
Paraguayan peasant without an adequate concern for the effects of such an 
economic transformation upon the peasantry and without regard to the 
participation of the peasantry themselves in the decision to “transformar y 
reactivar” [transform and start the recovery of] the peasant economy.  In these 
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 terms, as Paraguay modernizes, the peasant economy must modernize as well and 
the Ministry of Agriculture is one of the primary tools for that task because the 
peasantry cannot manage themselves.   
Intellectuals like Campos justify this paternalistic attitude with the logic of 
economic necessity.  As the primary governmental representative throughout the 
countryside, MAG and the agronomists who administer the ministry’s programs 
have the responsibility not only to carry out the program explained by Campos 
above but to educate the peasants about the necessity and the benefits of 
modernization.  Thus, through propaganda spread directly via the practice and 
advertising of the national agricultural strategy as well as the indirect effect of 
other government programs that promote intensification of cash crops, by 
providing “free” seed or low interest loans, peasants have come to identify their 
plight with their lack of a competitive advantage and a real need to embrace 
globalism. 
Even those internationalists who explicitly favor peasant demands in the 
land reform struggle have adopted the neo-liberal position.  For example, Carlos 
Fernandez Gadea, the sitting president of the Paraguayan supreme court, while 
arguing for the redistribution of land in Paraguay invokes a neo-liberal rhetoric: 
Quiero senalar que el tema de TIERRA, es fundamental en la politica 
agraria de mi pai s [Paraguay].  No podemos olvidar que existe una 
VERDADERA LEGION DE SIN TIERRAS, que deambulan por el campo 
en espera de que el ESTADO pueda hacer efectiva su promesa 
constitucional, de atender las necesidades primarias de estos sujetos 
agrarios, de esta poblacio n campesina, que es elemento dinamico de la 
produccion agraria.  Mientras no hay soluciones a estos problemas, no 
existira tranquilidad, no habra  nuevas inversiones, y los niveles 
productivos como en muchos rubros seguiran bajando por todos estos 
problemas. (Gadea 1) 
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 [I want to note that the theme of LAND is fundamental to agrarian politics 
in my country (Paraguay).  We cannot forget that there exists a literal 
legion of landless poor who wander the countryside in the hope that the 
STATE will make good on its constitutional promise to attend the primary 
needs of these agro-citizens who are such a dynamic element in 
agricultural production.  Meanwhile, without solutions to these problems, 
there is no peace and will be no new investments or higher levels of 
production as many crops continue losing their values as a result of these 
problems]. 
 
 In Gadea’s description, the land problem is not a question of fair distribution, but 
rather is a question of efficiency of use.  The Neo-liberal position subtly shifts the 
exigence for land reform from a humanist perspective grounded in the real misery 
of the peasantry to an economic perspective grounded in a view of land as just 
one element in a system of economic production.  Note here how the peasantry is 
defined en masse.  Furthermore, peasants are objectified as “dynamic elements” 
whose integration into the economic system is necessary to optimize the 
modernization, efficiency and competitiveness of Paraguay’s economic project.  
Nowhere in Gadea’s argument is there a notion that peasants might have a hand in 
the project of defining themselves or the Paraguayan economy: it is a fait 
accompli. 
 Still, as Chapter Three demonstrated, there are many different sources of 
arguments in the Paraguayan land reform struggle.  All sources of argument in the 
struggle, including positions offered by the intelligentsia and local peasant 
organizations, have been co-opted with the adoption of neo-liberal economic 
policy.  The subversion of peasant demands is not just a matter of the 
ventriloquizing of peasants by intellectuals and government officials.  The 
peasants themselves are interpolated in a hegemonic system whose economic, 
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 social and political premises are counter-productive to the peasant cause.  Peasant 
demands call for the re-imposition of the very socio-economic system that has 
been responsible for their impoverishment and virtual slavery, primarily through 
their dependence upon mono-cultivation and the cultivation of cotton.  
 The position of the FNC demonstrates just how deeply the rhetoric of neo-
liberal modernization has penetrated national-popular argument sources.  While 
the FNC criticizes the monopolistic and exploitative practices of La Camara 
Algodonera del Paraguay (CADELPA), at the same time, the organization places 
demands upon the government that its peasant members commit more deeply to 
the cotton crop. 
 In a press release at the beginning of the (2001-2002) Zafra Algodonera, 
or cotton harvest, the FNC clearly points out the monopolistic practices of 
CADELPA and the collusion of the state in supporting the exploitation of the 
peasantry, “El Estado se convertió en un instrumento de los empresarios 
agroexportadores” [The State has become a tool of agricultural capitalists] 
(“Campesinos Repudian” 12).  According to the release, the policies of the 
Paraguayan state, including the Ministry of Agriculture have maintained a system 
of inequality that ‘‘solo trajo enormes beneficios y grandes fortunas a los 
capitalistas nucleados en la Cámara Algodonera del Paraguay (CADELPA)’’ 
[only brings enormous benefits and great fortunes to the capitalists who form the 
Paraguayan Cotton Board. (“Campesinos Repudian” 12). 
 On the other hand, the FNC President, Eladio Flecha, stated only four days 
later that the government’s unresponsiveness to the FNC demand for free cotton 
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 seed for its members would result in conflict: ‘‘Si no hay algodón, el campo se 
empobrecerá y no habrá otra alternativa que llegar a la capital para realizar 
manifestaciones por tiempo indefinido’’ [If there is no cotton, the rural 
countryside will be impoverished and there will be no other alternative but to 
travel to the capital to protest for as long as it takes] (“Habra Ocupaciones” 8)  In 
response to the demands, on December 15, 2001, Luis Gonzalez-Macchi absolved 
the agriculture sector, including peasants, of 90 million dollars of agricultural debt 
according to el Ministerio de Hacienda, Francisco Oviedo Brítez (“Ultimatum al 
gobierno” 1+).   
This apparent victory is marred by the simple fact that forgiving this huge 
amount of accrued debt amounted to a state subsidy for cotton production.  
Eliminating the debt (much of which was owed by wealthy farmers and even 
wealthy cotton processors) allowed CADELPA to maintain a system that 
exploited more than 300,000 peasant families who, once again, turned to cotton as 
a way of life, thus beginning the debt-cycle once again. 
 In fact, many of the apparent victories of the peasantry, in the form of 
concessions wrung from the Paraguayan government, including land, free cotton 
seed, free pesticides, technical assistance, and debt forbearance, amount to 
important infusions of capital into a dysfunctional economic system.  Because the 
average peasant actually loses money each year that he or she produces cotton, 
debt is a serious problem with the system.  When peasant debt grows to levels that 
prevent the peasants from borrowing more capital, the system is endangered.  The 
real exploitative mechanism in the Paraguayan system of cotton slavery is the 
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 ability of the cotton processors to shift the burden of investment risk to peasants.  
This is, essentially, why land ownership does not benefit the peasant in the end.  
The ownership of land provides an incentive for the peasant to assume debt and 
the high risk of crop failure in a world market buffeted by swings in cotton prices. 
 The problem with this system is that the peasant who assumes debt is only 
one failed cotton crop away from bankruptcy.   Unable to pay off one year’s 
worth of debt, in addition to the accumulation of debt from previous years, the 
peasant suddenly can no longer assume the entirety of the risk in the system of 
cotton production.  In an economic system where such bankruptcies are 
commonplace, the entire edifice would collapse without the constant infusion of 
government funds.   Governmental concessions to peasant demands for land, 
credit or free agricultural products amount to subsidies for the cotton processors.  
They do not solve the problem of the debt cycle for peasants but only serve to 
dampen the fluxuations in the cycle, making them bearable for the peasant.  They 
also re-inscribe the peasant in an inferior role within the paternalistic relationship 
between state and citizen.  Most peasant demands are, thus, not true demands that 
challenge the system of cotton slavery and peasant exploitation by seeking 
alternatives to the system; rather, they are merely calls for infusions of capital into 
a system that continues to ruthlessly exploit the peasantry. 
 Important questions arise from the conclusion that the land reform struggle 
fails to redress inequities of the poverty, powerless, exploitation and land scarcity 
that peasants experience everyday.  How has the peasant’s self-perception of his 
or her situation functioned as a cultural constraint on the success of the struggle?  
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 What are the prospects for the struggle to transcend such constraints by 
transforming the terrain of struggle?  Finally, one must ask, What happened?  
How can a social struggle that originated in the real experience of peasant 
exploitation become handmaiden to the very system of exploitation and inequity 
the struggle was designed to challenge?   
The answer to these questions rests heavily upon the nature of peasant 
self-awareness.  Indeed, for a social struggle to articulate the identity and needs of 
its membership, the individual members of the struggle must first understand 
themselves and their needs.  Peasant self-awareness of needs and identity bears 
importantly upon the ability of a social struggle to obtain concessions that matter 
to its membership and to represent its membership in the course of public 
argument.  The misidentification or misunderstanding of peasant identity and 
needs on the part of the peasants themselves would seriously handicap the 
emergence of such a social movement as theorists like Alain Touraine, Alberto 
Melucci, and Arturo Escobar have identified.   
 
5.3  Obstacles to Peasant Self-representation 
 
The Paraguayan peasants view of the world and of their place in it is 
shaped by an array of ideologies.  Neo-colonialist economic practices, neo-liberal 
politics, globalism, traditional Stronismo, as well as rural culture, native linguistic 
and social practices, all present themselves as vocabularies for representation of 
the peasant.  Alain Touraine has noted the unique degree of influence that the 
 285
 state exercised over the Paraguayan population under Alfredo Stroessner de 
Matiauda: 
Estuve en 1983 o 1984, no recuerdo. Vine poco tiempo después del 
cierre de la Facultad de Sociología de la Universidad Católica. 
Me llamaba mucho la atención el alto grado de control que ejercía 
el Gobierno sobre la población…. Este era especial. Este 
contraste yo no encontraba por ejemplo ni en Chile de Pinochet ni 
en Argentina de Videla ni en Brasil de los militares. En esos 
lugares había represión, pero no control absoluto como aquí. El 
Paraguay de Stroessner es el único caso -y yo lo menciono  a 
menudo- de un régimen de tendencia totalitaria y no so lo 
autoritaria, de naturaleza fascista. (Olazar 2) 
 
[I was in (Paraguay) in 1983 or 1984, I don’t remember.  I had 
come a little after the closure of the School of Sociology of the 
Catholic University.  The high degree of control that the 
government exercised over the population caught my attention….  
This was special. This contrasted (with other cases) for example in 
the Chile of Pinochet nor in Videla’s Argentina nor in Brazil under 
the military.  In those places there was repression but not absolute 
control like here.  The Paraguay of Stroessner is the only case—
and I mention it often—of a regimen with a totalitarian tendency 
and not only authoritarian, but of a fascist character].      
 
The influence of the Stroessner regime cannot be easily dismissed.  When 
accused of being a Stronista, the late vice-president, Luis Argana said, “Todos 
somos hijos de Stroessner.” [We are all children of Stroessner].  Argana’s insight 
was that, even after the fall of the Stroessner regime, the average Paraguayan was 
conditioned to accept rulership from above and was not yet capable of 
participating in a democracy.  
In fact, the trajectory of the Paraguayan land reform struggle illustrates 
just this point.  The peasants have been bombarded on all sides by propaganda is 
support of Paraguay’s entry into global markets.  Not only have peasants fully 
accepted the necessity for modernization and transformation of their lives, 
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 economies, and futures, but they have also adopted a language for self-
representation provided to them by neo-liberal and globalist ideologies.  Peasant 
demands to be trained in modern agricultural methods, to be provided the most 
potent pesticides in order to increase yields, and to be permitted access to 
markets, all guarantee the peasant dependence upon cotton and other primary 
crops as well as the system of virtual slavery that such practices reinforce.  
However, and more importantly, peasants have conceded the right to define 
themselves within the emerging economic order as self-representing agents.  They 
have traded away a negotiating position capable of shaping the economic future of 
the country for short-term goals such as land and technical assistance.  
Unfortunately, the Paraguayan land reform struggle has been completely 
co-opted by the neo-liberal rhetoric of modernization.  However, the mechanism 
by which this is carried out is not simply a de facto shift from one economic 
system to another.  It is highly dependent upon the promulgation of a state 
ideology and statist influence over public opinion as the mechanism for defining 
peasant identity.  Already primed to receive ideology and language from their 
leaders as a result of the 35 year long Stroneato, peasants even more so than the 
average Paraguayan are ready to accept leadership and ideas from above.  The 
importation of globalist and neo-colonial ideologies and vocabularies utilize the 
control mechanisms of the dictatorship (which have endured to this day in the 
conservative Paraguayan society) to re-inscribe the peasant as an economic 
subject.   
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 As Joeseph Stiglitz, the Nobel laureate and one-time Senior Vice-
President and Chief Economist for the World Bank, unintentionally argues, 
moving into a new system of economic relations is more about redefining 
individual and state identities than it is about actually transforming practices: 
Development represents a transformation of society, a movement 
from traditional relations, traditional ways of thinking, traditional 
ways of dealing with health and education, traditional methods of 
production, to more “modern” ways.  For instance, a characteristic 
of traditional societies is the acceptance of the world as it is; the 
modern perspective recognizes change, it recognizes that we, as 
individuals and societies, can take actions which, for instance, 
reduce infant mortality, increase life-spans, and increase 
productivity.  Key to these changes is the movement to “scientific” 
ways of thinking, identifying critical variables which affect 
outcomes, attempting to make inferences based on available data, 
recognizing what we know and what we do not know. (Stiglitz 2) 
 
While Stiglitz and other proponents of the market transformation of 
developing societies argue that economic innovation offers opportunities to 
redress the unresolved inequities of older economic systems, Arturo Escobar 
argues that the problem lies not in the inequities themselves, since these are 
merely symptoms of the real problem: the inability to construct an inclusive 
society.  Escobar identifies the problem directly: “The Hegemonic discourse [has] 
transformed the system thorough which identities were defined” (Escobar, 
“Culture” 65).  Marginal social groups in Latin America have never had the 
ability to define themselves.  Groups identify themselves using the language 
provided by the state: “the ‘illiterate,’ the ‘landless peasants,’ ‘women bypassed 
by development,’ the ‘hungry and malnourished, ‘those belonging to the informal 
sector,’ ‘urban marginals,’ and so forth” out of which the category of landless 
peasant is only one of a host of “identity groups” (Escobar, “Culture” 65).   
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 Importing economic discourses that define the Paraguayan peasant as a 
“small farmer” using “traction technologies,” or “capital averse” strategies 
becomes detrimental to the peasant who becomes disenfranchised within such a 
discourse. Economies, Escobar argues, possess a “cultural content” (Escobar, 
“Culture” 65).   “Every new technology inaugurates a ritual—a way of doing 
things, of seeing the world, and of organizing the social field” (Escobar, “Culture” 
69).  Adopting a global economic system, as Stiglitz suggests, doesn’t just 
exchange on set of economic exigencies for another, but it restructures the entire 
culture.  The radical economic shift that Paraguay has experienced from an 
internally directed agricultural economy in 1989 to an outwardly directed 
economy predicated upon the export of primary products and the import of 
technology has systematically excluded specific economic groups from society.  
In the case of the Paraguayan peasant, the re-definition of peasant identity in 
purely economic terms was coupled with the derogatory view of the peasant as 
the lazy, uneducated, uncooperative drunkard.  These traditional peasant myths 
functioned to exclude peasants from the economic discussions that emerged after 
the coup d’etat of 1989.  The Paraguayan peasant with his or her sombrero piri 
[traditional straw hat] and py nandi [bare feet] is, by definition, unable to compete 
in a world market predicated upon mass production and mechanized farming.173
Neo-liberal rhetorics have openly benefited the Paraguayan elites and have 
re-inscribed the disenfranchisement of the peasantry following earlier systems of 
control imposed by dictators and administrations in turn for nearly 500 years.  
                                                 
173 Sombrero piri is also the name of a conservative faction within the Partido Liberal that claims 
to represent the peasantry. 
 289
 There is little doubt in the minds of most Paraguayans that the government and its 
rhetorics by no means serve the interests of the peasant majority.  The term 
“mondacraticos” is a jopara term meaning, “thieving rulers” that would be 
recognizable to every Paraguayan citizen.   Lino Oviedo, the ex chief of the armed 
forces and self-proclaimed defender of peasant interests has called the political 
arrangements following the coup d’etat of 1989 a “pacto de mondabilidad” 
[thieves’ agreement] (Oviedo 263).  He points out that the culture of iron-fisted 
rule is revealed by the alliances formed within the Paraguayan government in 
which, even under supposed democratic rule, the most important positions in 
government are filled lackeys of the ex-dictator, an arrangement he questions.  
“¿A usted le parece razonable esa unio n de ‘luchadores’ con ‘dictatores’, con los 
hijos mimados de Stroessner?” [Does this union of the opposition with dictators, 
with those raised by Stroessner, seem reasonable to you?] (Oviedo 263) 
 Why don’t peasants present a modern image of themselves to the public?  
The problem is, as Escobar has pointed out, marginalized social groups are 
labeled by the society in ways that systemically exclude them from public life.  
Touraine’s concept of “historicity” can be usefully applied to the ability of the 
mondacraticos [thieving rulers] to control “the set of cultural models that rule 
social practices” defining both the public conversation about the Paraguayan 
economy and, at the same time, the identity of the Paraguayan peasant as a subject 
of that economy (Touraine, Les Socie tes 8).   
 The ability of the peasant to participate in the historicity of the Paraguayan 
society has been seriously diminished by the profound penetration of the market 
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 system into all sectors of society.  The entry of a developing nation such as 
Paraguay into the world economy is a strategy that only furthers a relationship of 
dependence that defers and disguises social problems by reframing them.   
La ruine du populisme, liee a la pene tration des marches interieurs 
par le capitalisme etranger ou a des crises internationales graves 
fait passer au premier plan le problem de l’accumulations 
capitaliste, donc de la repression des demandes populaires.  On 
voit donc apparaître, en liaison avec le capitalisme etranger, 
parfois contre lui, un Etat qui referme le systeme politique mais 
que augmente considerablement son propre rôle e conomique.  
C’est alors qu’on peut sortir de la situation de dependance pour 
entrer dans celle de capitalisme peripherique or tardif. (Touraine, 
Les Societes 53) 
 
[The failure of populism, tied to the penetration of internal 
corridors by foreign capitalism or by severe international crises has 
permitted in the first case, the problem of over-accumulation and, 
thereby, the repression of popular demands.  One sees appear then, 
in relation with foreign capitalism, sometimes against it, a state 
that closes-up the political system in a manner that considerably 
augments its own economic role.  This then is what one can make 
of the situation of dependence resulting from entry into peripheral 
or late capitalism]. 
 
Touraine’s argument that real social movements seize historicity is 
seriously problematized by the adoption of neo-liberal and globalist ideologies by 
the peasants themselves.  Rather than looking to recover old practices, peasants 
and the organizations that represent them have chosen to seize upon “improved” 
social and economic practices as means of empowerment.  In such a position, the 
peasant is trapped between an old system of political domination by the oligarchic 
elites and a new regime, a powerful central government that restricts political 
participation in the name of the economy.   One master, who was very visible 
under the Stroneato, gives way to a new one that is diffuse, exercising power 
through exploitative market mechanisms.   
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 Entry into the world economy by means of arrangements such as 
MERCOSUR (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay) de-centers power, while 
in no way diminishing the domination of the peasantry.  During the Stroneato, it 
was clear who was a member of the ruling elite and who was not.  Decisions as 
well as blame originated from and returned to this group.  Resistance and change 
could be directed towards the oligarchs.  In the past, under this economic system, 
invading and appropriating land was a direct blow to the power of the oligarchs, 
whose real economic power lay in the control of land as the primary means of 
agricultural production in the country.  Today, the peasant occupation and seizure 
of land results, not in a blow to the oligarchy; rather, it results in yoking the 
peasant to a system of production that ends up pitting the poor from many nations 
against one another in a losing contest to produce cheap cotton as well as other 
agricultural products.   
The neo-liberal economic reforms in Paraguay, as well as in other 
developing nations around the world, have disenfranchised citizens and alienated 
them from the historicity of the process, the ability to participate in economic, 
social and cultural self-definition.  The bulk of the protest demands offered by the 
Paraguayan land reform struggle seek only to accommodate peasants to the 
emerging economic hegemony of MERCOSUR and global capitalism.  It should 
be obvious that this economic reorganization can only result in the re-
incorporation of peasants into a system of inequality.  Even when apparently 
substantial concessions of land are made the lack of social services and the 
“natural” pressures of the market conspire to re-inscribe the land-owning peasant 
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 back into a historically grounded system of cotton slavery.  Furthermore, the 
failures of land reform as a method of wealth redistribution are attributed to the 
failure of the peasants themselves to compete in the market as economic subjects; 
this scapegoats the peasant as the weak link in an economic system that serves its 
own peculiar logic to the detriment of human beings. 
Thus far, the Paraguayan land reform struggle has failed to recognize the 
real needs of the small-scale, rural Paraguayan farmer.  Compromises and short-
term gains have made no impact upon the larger issue of the self-identification 
and self-governance.   Poor peasants have not benefited from and have, in fact, 
become dependent upon the movement’s politics of opposition.  The failure of the 
land reform struggle to address the historicity of the struggle has 1) hidden the 
real site of contestation, historicity, the power to define the national economic 
system and individual identity, 2) rationalized the spread of a market capitalism 
that has permitted the Paraguayan elite class to maintain its monopoly over 
cultural and economic development.  In effect, the rhetoric of the new economic 
system has denied the responsibility of the state to shelter its individual citizens; 
rather, it has appropriated the ideology of the dictatorial regime it followed by 
asserting that individuals are defined by their ability to contribute to the state and 
to the “national economy.”   
 
5.4  Is the Paraguayan Land Reform Struggle an NSM? 
 
The preceding discussion would seem to suggest that the Paraguayan land 
reform struggle has failed, but before it may be informative to examine, in more 
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 depth, its character as a new social movement before passing final judgment.  An 
examination of the Paraguayan land reform struggle as a new social movement 
may suggest how the Paraguayan struggle can productively evolve into an 
effective challenge to the status quo as well as suggest possibilities for struggles 
in other regions of the world that face similar problems.  Scholarly work on the 
rhetoric of social movements may be helpful in this task.   
Leland Griffin implied in his groundbreaking work “The Rhetoric of 
Historical Movements” what Robert S. Cathcart so tersely summarizes: “A social 
movement does not appear on the scene fully developed” (Cathcart 269).  Griffin 
merely pointed out that an effective study of social movement phenomena would 
require “description, analysis, and criticism of the inception, development and 
consummation phase of the rhetorical movement” (Griffin 188).  Cathcart refined 
the idea that social movements develop over time, asserting that there lies a great 
difference between mere “non-institutionalized collectives” and “the emergence 
of a “group that can successfully challenge” the status quo (Cathcart 269).   
 It is clear that the Paraguayan land reform struggle constituted a mere 
“non-institutionalized collective” for many years.  Peasant land squatters who 
organized after-the-fact of their land grabs constituted nothing more than discrete 
pockets of resistance that shared a common socio-economic motive for protest.  
The protests did little to foment “group” consciousness or organization.  
Furthermore, those discrete, local struggles did not conceive of representing 
themselves as a “challenge” to the status quo.  Such early land grabs were 
motivated more by seizing the momentary opportunity presented by the power 
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 vacuum that formed between 1989 and 1992.  Those years constituted a window 
of opportunity between the end of the Stroneato, and the stabilization of 
government under General Andres Rodriguez, after the adoption of a constitution 
and the establishment of a line of succession.174    
 Not until 1994, when the first truly national peasant protests were 
organized, could Cathcart’s definition of a social movement apply to the 
Paraguayan land reform struggle.  Since that time, the struggle has been clearly 
defined in organizational terms.  The cooperation of the MCNOC and the FNC 
has facilitated the bulk of organized peasant protest activity.  While it is still the 
case that illegal land occupations and invasions spontaneously occur in a random 
and disorganized manner throughout the country, the MCNOC and the FNC have 
taken initiative to channel these spontaneous rural protests into organized marches 
consisting of tens of thousands of peasants.  The efforts of these two organizations 
working in concert with one another have far outweighed non-institutional forms 
of protest in numbers, visibility and effect, and have come to symbolize the 
Paraguayan land reform struggle as an institutional alliance between these two 
groups.   
Another important question regarding the constitution of a “group 
consciousness” involves the question of intentionality.  Michael Calvin McGee 
has pointed out that the overzealous study of social movements has the potential 
to report otherwise unconscious mass behavior in response to social pressures as 
meaningful social protest behavior.  He points out the following dilemma: 
                                                 
174 Rodriguez announced in 1992 that he would give way to democratic elections in 1993, thereby 
stabilizing the government. 
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 There is no doubt that “social movement(s)” exist in human experience, 
but there is serious disagreement about how they exist.  The critical 
problem for theorists is determining whether ‘social movement’ is directly 
or inferentially in human experience.  If a thing is directly in experience, it 
is a “phenomenon;” if it is inferentially in experience, it is an 
interpretation, a “set of meanings.” (McGee 233) 
 
Scholars of social movements must take care not to impose their own 
meanings upon the subject of inquiry or to go so far as to ascribe social intention 
to mere mass response.  One cannot simply assume that the subject of a social 
movement study is actually a movement.  Even Malcolm Sillars, who conceives 
of movement in very general terms, cautions that critics must put forth some 
rationale for adopting a particular definition of social movements.  It is within the 
critic’s purview to define or even “create” the movement as a contribution to 
scholarly knowledge from his or her perspective (Sillars 30).  Yet, we must take 
seriously McGee’s caution against “imputing motives to human actors by fiat of 
definition only” (McGee 236).  
Arturo Escobar has developed an approach to the study of social 
movements that might resolve this dilemma.  Rather than relying upon the 
perceptions of the critic as McGee and Sillars suggest, Escobar advocates that the 
study of the social movement be examined as an instrument for the construction 
of meaning and social identity as perceived by the participants themselves.   
Theory thus must start with the people’s self-understanding, with giving 
an account of people as agents whose practices are shaped by their self-
understanding.  It is only be getting as clear a picture as possible of this 
self-understanding that we can hope to identify what should be relevant 
for theory in the first place. (Escobar “Culture” 63) 
 
Placing the emphasis of ethnographic reportage upon the self-perception of the 
social actor eludes the problem of unempirical, interpreted data.  McGee’s 
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 concern for confusing intended meaning for unintentional phenomena is directly 
addressed by surrendering the study of social movements as phenomena.  
Ethnographers have addressed this same problem for some time now and have 
developed various methods for trading the role of objective observer of 
phenomenon for the role of participatory meaning-maker (See Rabinow; Behar; 
and Geertz).  
In the area of social movement studies, Escobar is not alone in placing an 
emphasis upon the self-awareness of the social actor.  Alberto Melucci argues that 
the critical method for understanding social movements lies in understanding the 
conflict between the “networks” of everyday life experienced by the social actor 
and the “dominant codes” that the social actor seeks to challenge by participating 
in social struggles. 
Within these networks there is an experimentation with and direct practice 
of alternative frameworks of meaning, as a result of a personal 
commitment which is submerged and almost invisible…. What nourishes 
[collective action] is the daily production of alternative frameworks of 
meaning, on which the networks themselves are founded and live from 
day to day…This is because conflict take place principally on symbolic 
grounds, by challenging and upsetting the dominant codes upon which 
social relationships are founded in high density informational systems.  
The mere existence of a symbolic challenge is in itself a method of 
unmasking the dominant codes, a different way of perceiving and naming 
the world. (Melucci, “Social Movements” 248) 
 
The epistemological question the scholar of social movements must ask is 
thus not, “how can I know whether this is a movement or not?”  Rather, the 
scholar ought to ask, “What does this social struggle mean to the social actor 
involved, what are the dominant and marginalized social codes of the society and 
are there different kinds of social struggles based upon the nature of the relation 
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 between the social actor and the social struggle?”  With this line of inquiry, social 
movements can be understood as eruptions of the “submerged” social and cultural 
background of the society from which these struggles emerge (Escobar, “Culture” 
73). 
This trajectory of analysis feeds back into McGee’s original question 
about whether social movements are phenomena or meanings.  My theoretical 
reflections point to the answer that movements function to produce meanings.  
The remaining questions ought to be, “How do they create meanings?” and “What 
defines a social phenomenon as opposed to a true social movement capable of 
changing social meaning?”   
Alain Touraine’s argument that mere “conflict” can be distinguished from 
a true social movement by the character of the social actor’s awareness of 
historicity is useful here.  The critical distinction between a mere social conflict or 
struggle and a true social movement lies within the consciousness of the social 
actors.  Whereas Sillars, Cathcart, and other rhetorical social movement theorists 
are concerned with the nature of movements as phenomena of social organization, 
Escobar, Melucci and Touraine have located the defining features of the social 
movement in protestors’ perceptions of their roles as social actors in the contest to 
define prevailing cultural models. 
When social actors become aware of the “stakes” of a social struggle as 
“historicity itself,” a social movement becomes a mechanism for participating in 
the discussions that define society’s “cultural models” and “societal type” 
(Touraine, Return 66-70).  The foundation of Touraine’s theory is that human 
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 society has developed to the point that material factors are far outweighed by the 
social and cultural factors that define postindustrial societies.  Given that few or 
no material constraints exist to define the “societal type,” political organizations, 
social movements and individuals are at liberty to challenge and even change the 
very underlying cultural models that reproduce social norms.  The fact that social 
and cultural factors constitute the “engine” for cultural production is important, 
since the character of social and individual identities are always, potentially “in 
play.” 
For Touraine a true social movement and the social actors that comprise it 
recognize this fact and direct their efforts to the “highest level of meaning” that 
the struggle can attain.  Social struggles, on the other hand, tend to focus upon 
“defensive,” short term, or local goals without developing a sense of the higher 
level of struggle that might be achieved by means of collective protest.   
Yet, true social movements, returning for a moment to Cathcart, do “not 
appear on the scene fully developed” (Cathcart 269).  Touraine’s analysis of the 
French anti-nuclear movement demonstrates that social movements evolve over 
time.  This is an evolution that can potentially move from a social struggle to a 
fully developed social movement.  However, it is not guaranteed that full-blown 
social movements will evolve out of mere social struggles.  Touraine himself 
argues that most social conflicts in Latin America are merely struggles that seek 
to increase political participation rather than control of historicity, or the 
processes of cultural production. 
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 At present, there is no doubt that the Paraguayan land reform struggle is 
no more than that, a struggle and not a full-blown movement.  Touraine’s 
designation has explanatory power in this case and usefully connects the concepts 
of ideology, representation, protest strategy and success in analysis of the 
Paraguayan land reform struggle.  Peasant protest demands for land, credit, free 
cotton seed and even for the rejection of international market agreements such as 
MERCOSUR demonstrate that 1) peasant demands don’t address the “highest 
level of the meaning” of the struggle (which would be full, participatory 
citizenship and respect for peasants and their culture); and 2) that protest demands 
are shared largely by ideologies alien to the peasant experience.  Most peasants do 
not fully understand what MERCOSUR is let alone understand how a national 
economy might or ought to function.  The Paraguayan land reform struggle fails 
to fulfill the first criterion of the new social movement, to create a self-awareness 
in the peasantry of their own condition as social actors.  Individual peasant 
protestors continue to displace themselves as actors in the struggle by selecting a 
language of representation as well as actual representatives who speak in place 
of the peasants, thereby removing the actual peasant protestor as an actor from 
the actual sites of the struggle. 
In addition, the Paraguayan land reform struggle fails the second criterion 
for qualifying as a new social movement as well.  Protest organizations have 
failed to either 1) represent the peasants as participants in the national dialogue 
about the future of the nation or; 2) to posit social demands that redress the actual 
social inequities experienced by the peasantry.  These failures demonstrate the 
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 Paraguayan land reform struggle’s inability to intercede at the level of historicity.  
Peasant demands have always been addressed to politicians and oligarchs who 
are inscribed within the structures of historicity as requests for cooperation 
rather than as demands for participation. 
 Given the failure of the Paraguayan land reform struggle to transform 
itself from pockets of localized resistance into an organization that cultivates its 
members’ self-awareness as social actors, two questions remain: “What are the 
chances that the Paraguayan land reform struggle can become an effective social 
movement?”; and “What constrains the Paraguayan land reform struggle from 
becoming an effective social movement?”    
 
5.5  The Peasant as Social Actor 
 
It has long been accepted that the economic relationship of Latin 
American and other developing nation to the industrialized world has been 
characterized by dependencia.175  However, the internalization of this neo-
colonialist practice to the function of the Latin American state has yet to be fully 
explored.  Just as relations of exploitation and domination have defined a 
hierarchical relationship between developed and developing economies so too is 
the relationship of the peasant producer and the state as regulator of the agro-
industrial market hierarchically and exploitatively structured.   
                                                 
175 Prebisch, Raul. Change and Development: Latin America's Great Task. Washington, DC: The Inter 
American Development Bank, 1970. 
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 The dependent, obedient peasant who works the land without political 
representation and without complaint is a product of a specific socio-economic 
system promoted and founded by the state.  The breakdown of the economic 
component of this system, predicated as it was on the availability of “free” or 
surplus land, has led to the breakdown of the entire socio-economic system, 
including the individual peasant subjects interpellated within it.176  Defining the 
individual peasant as subject of the state is not to import a simplistic and reductive 
concept of false consciousness or ideology, to define the individual subject of the 
state as a mere “dupe.”  In fact, the complexity of the interpellated subject is 
essential to the means by which the interpellation takes place. Anthony Giddens 
points out that identity is based on complex personal narratives.  
A person's identity is not to be found in behavior, nor—important 
though this is—in the reactions of others, but in the capacity to 
keep a particular narrative going. The individual's biography, if 
she is to maintain regular interaction with others in the day-to-day 
world, cannot be wholly fictive. It must continually integrate 
events which occur in the external world, and sort them into the 
ongoing “story” about the self. (Giddens 54) 
 
 The peasant is a subject who is called into being with a system of social 
and economic production.  Indebted to his or her patron, indebted to his or her 
state for land, credit, protection, and the freedoms the peasantry do enjoy, the 
Paraguayan peasant works with a blind, dependent faith in the state to protect and 
support him or her.  The identity of the peasant is succinctly expressed in a rural 
aphorism, “Hay que trabajar para vivir!” [One has to work in order to live!] 
The socially interpellated peasant subject is a Guarani speaking man or 
woman who is dependent upon his or her patron and his or her state to create 
                                                 
176 See footnote 37 for a discussion of Louis Althusser’s use of the term “interpellation.” 
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 markets, buy and ship the agricultural products produced by the peasant.  The 
patron, a member of the socio-political elite and usually the local representative 
for the dominant Colorado party, mediates between the Guarani  speaking rural 
subject and the Spanish (and more commonly English) speaking purchasers, 
manufacturers and commodities brokers.  The peasant must ask which crops to 
grow, must ask for seed, and must ask for information about planting, harvesting 
and processing the crop.  The peasant must also ask the favor of the patron, who 
mediates between the peasantry and the politicians, carrying their requests to the 
state for the construction of roads, schools, the provision of electricity, and other 
public services.   
In short, the peasant does little for him or herself.  Despite living far from 
the physical presence of the state, at the end of unpaved byways that are 
impassible for portions of the year, the peasant’s experience of his or her life is 
mediated by the state.  Even the work ethic by which the peasant lives, “Hay que 
trabajar para vivir” is in a foreign language.  The best evidence of this mediation 
lies in the alienation of the peasant from his or her material, economic condition.   
The work the peasant performs is rarely for him or herself.  Rather, work 
is performed to pay off a debt owed either to a local patron (who collects 5% 
interest per month on store accounts and loans) or to the state which provides 
agricultural loans to cotton farmers who are locked into a system of low prices 
and high risk of crop failure.  In many cases, peasants work to pay portions of 
loans that they can never hope to pay off in full.  The peasant depends upon state 
forecasts of commodity prices and the availability of state seed and state credit are 
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 the determining factors in crop selection.  Every aspect of the peasant’s economic 
life interpellates him or her into the local or national state apparatus.  Even more 
important to the peasant alienation from his or her own material conditions is the 
fact that no other system has ever existed in Paraguay. 
This system has been functioning, more or less, in its present form since 
the native population was deprived of its property and livestock and was forcibly 
integrated into the Paraguayan economic system as labor on the large 
encomiendas of the 19th century.  Mechanized production and a scarcity of cheap, 
arable land has created a labor glut and pressure on the peasant population to 
support itself in the pursuit of small-scale agriculture.  For the first time in the 
history of the nation, peasants are not locked into an economic contract that trades 
their cheap labor for guarantees of employment and protection from harm.   
One would think that such freedom from direct exploitation would be 
viewed as an accomplishment.  To the peasant who has suddenly been denied the 
security of a system that, although exploitative, does provide a place and a means 
of subsistence, the transition out of this exploitative but relatively secure 
relationship has been alarming.  Recent peasant protest activity can almost 
completely be characterized by its insistence on the re-institution of the economic 
apparatus that has virtually enslaved the Paraguayan population for the last forty 
years: the supply of free land in exchange for supporting the cotton monopoly run 
by the socio-political elite of the country.  
The means by which the peasantry has found itself demanding its own 
exploitation are actually quite sensible.  Since the end of the era of the 
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 employment of peasants in massive resource extraction and agricultural projects 
on the encomiendas and later estancias, peasant labor was concentrated on small 
private farms that peasants owned, squatted or were given by the state.  The IBR 
was founded in 1963 to supply peasant farmers with unexploited state land.  This 
program functioned very well bringing unequalled economic prosperity to the 
nation until the late 1980s.  Excess peasant labor was displaced to the forested 
frontier of the nation, occupying the labor of a growing population and 
contributing to the economy of the state as a whole.   
This strategy preserved the social contract by preventing large numbers of 
peasants displaced by the increasing mechanization employed on large farms and 
ranches, from becoming idle.  But eventually, the closing of the forested frontier 
as state land reserves were exhausted, the sudden scarcity of land for farming and 
the high level of unemployment in the rural countryside produced a rupture in the 
social contract and problematized the subject position of the Paraguayan peasant. 
A peasant who does not work, simply put, is not a peasant or any sort of 
social person within the Paraguayan socio-economic system.  A peasant who does 
not work obviously lives outside of the economic social network, but more 
importantly such a peasant also lives outside of the complex social network of 
loyalty obligation and therefore, is not only not a peasant (defined as a rural 
worker) but also is no longer a subject of the state (defined as a link in the system 
of loyalty obligation).   
As a consequence, the scarcity of land and the sub-employment of the 
peasantry have resulted in crises of identity for individual peasants.  The state 
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 discourse that has reinforced the subject position of the loyal, dependent, and 
hardworking peasant fails to interpellate the unemployed peasant as a subject of 
the state.  The ability of the state to interpellate the peasant subject is first 
dependent upon a material and economic regime that reinforces the peasant’s 
subject position.  Without the material effects of labor with its concomitant 
inscription of the peasant into social and linguistic hierarchies, the linguistic 
apparatus defining the peasant as a subordinate subject of the state becomes 
unstable.  Thus, politicians and state bureaucrats invoking time honored tropes 
such as “Hay que ser responsible!” and “Vamos a trabajar” which hail the 
peasant as a subordinate subject by re-inscribing the clientelist relations between 
the working peasant and the politician who benefits from and protects the 
individual laborer collapses.  As a result of the failure, a new subject position has 
emerged outside of the hegemonic domination of the clientelist system.  This new 
discourse employs tropes of resistance and represents a potentially new peasant 
identity, a new kind of peasant, a resistant peasant. 
 
5.6  The Interpellated Subject 
 
The origins of today’s peasant protest activity lie in the breakdown of the 
traditional peasant identity.  The fairly rigid clientelist system is an ideological, 
economic and political system.  Not only does it promise occupation of a peasant 
and protection from the local party boss or a patro n if the peasant works hard, but 
the local party boss incurs a debt or obligation of loyalty to the peasant also.  The 
patron incurs the responsibility of passing peasant needs to politicians up the 
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 chain of political authority.  This chain of obligation ascends, theoretically, to the 
highest levels of government connecting the most remote of peasants to the 
highest realms of political power in the nation.   
The system is predicated upon peasants trading their labor for economic 
support and political favors.  When a peasant suddenly finds him or herself 
without land and without the means to labor in support or his or her family, the 
system suddenly breaks down.  There is nothing to tie the peasant to the state 
when the peasant is not engaged in the system of labor bondage.  This is far more 
important to the function of the state than the mere unemployment of a tax-
generating laborer; the unemployment of a peasant is a rupture in the economic as 
well as the political and ideological ties of the peasant to the state.  To the 
peasant, there no longer exists a social contract; without land, the peasant is no 
longer a citizen of the state! 
The unoccupied peasant has no social, economic or political identity and is 
forced to find an alternative means of describing his or her life and relationship to 
the society.  Ordinarily, the peasant’s daily response to his or her life-conditions is 
mediated by the state ideology as a system of socially legitimated language and 
ideas transmitted over time in the form of arguments and key terms that the 
peasant has at his or her disposal for interpreting his or her experience.  
Ordinarily, a peasant faced with a material hardship describes that need in terms 
provided by the state hegemonic system and addresses the need by actions 
legitimated by that same system.  Describing or addressing material concerns 
outside of legitimate vocabularies or normative actions will be defined by the 
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 peasants themselves as deviant behavior, and individuals engaging in such 
behavior will be socially and/or ideologically constrained by  “legitimate” social 
authorities empowered in the name of social norms. 
 There are many constraints militating against the construction of a subject 
position outside of the clientelist system and its product, the dependent peasant, 
with a substantial portion of such constraints operating on a linguistic level.  
Much of the peasant’s ability to articulate his or her own subjectivity is defined by 
a finite number of cultural tropes that re-inscribe the peasant’s dependence.  
Terms such as aca hata [stupid], opa rei [It’s over.  There is nothing to be done 
about it], xe nembotavy [I’m stupid.  I screwed it up], and ate’y [lazy] are by far 
the most common terms of self-description employed by peasants.  Each of these 
terms is invoked as a method of self-description for chastising a peasant who 
transgresses the identity of the hard working but simple peasant who follows the 
state.  A peasant who cannot provide for his or her family no matter whether they 
work hard or not will be seen and will describe themselves as aca hata [stupid] or 
ate’y [lazy].   The identity of the dependent peasant is completely inscribed within 
the state established clientelist system.  It is difficult for the peasant to imagine 
any failure on the part of the state when seeking to cast blame.  The blame always 
falls squarely on the peasant who is too lazy, too ignorant, and too powerless to be 
an agent in the economic process.  Ironically, it is the peasant who invokes the 
incompetent, illiterate peasant as a self-description, “xe nembotavy,” [I’m stupid. I 
screwed it up].  
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 Each of these terms re-inscribes the clientelist system with a reasoning 
predicated on the lack of agency of the peasant and the capability and leadership 
of the state. As opposed to “Hay que trabajar para vivir,” [One has to work in 
order to live] many of these tropes have penetrated so deeply into the peasant 
consciousness that they are articulated in Guarani  rather than Spanish.  Their 
articulation in Guarani  reveals and reserves the special significance of these terms 
within the self-constructed identity of the Guarani speaking peasant.  These are 
not merely terms translated from another culture or another language but these are 
terms generated and sustained from within the peasant’s own language, own 
culture and own self-conception    
These dynamics become clearer when considering Rigoberta Menchu’s 
famous description of how Native Americans have been forced to hide their 
identities in order to resist colonial regimes: 
Asi  es como se considera que los indi genas son tontos.  No saben 
pensar, no saben andar, dicen.  Pero, sin embargo, nosotros 
hemos ocultado nuesta (sic) identidad porque hemos sabido 
resistir, hemos sabido ocultar lo que el regimen ha querido 
quitarnos. (Burgos 196) 
  
[This is why Natives are considered stupid.  They don’t know how 
to think, they don’t know how to walk, they say.   Nevertheless, we 
have hidden our identities because we have resisted, we know how 
to hide what authority has wanted to take from us].   
 
According to Menchu, the Native American maintains his or her own 
identity by means of preserving an indigenous space, defined by language and 
culture.  She goes on to say that she resists the efforts of the authorities to 
colonize indigenous culture: 
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 Sigo ocultando lo que yo considero que nadie sabe, ni siquiera un 
antropologo, ni un intelectual, por ma s que tenga muchos libros, 
no saben distinguir todos nuestros secretos. (Burgos 271) 
 
 [I continue to hide what I think nobody else should know, not 
even an anthropologist, nor an intellectual, no matter how many 
books (he) has, they don’t know how to find our secrets].   
 
There exists, for Menchu, an ontological distinction between the sphere of 
indigenous cultural formation and the sphere of colonial domination.  However, in 
the Paraguayan case, the Guarani  speaking, mestizo peasant has no alterity, no 
native culture in which refuge can be sought from the dominant culture of the 
state.  Arturo Escobar has argued that marginal social groups in Latin America 
have never had the ability to define themselves.  Noting that post-colonial Latin 
American culture has functioned as “the Hegemonic discourse [that has] 
transformed the system thorough which identities were defined” (Escobar, 
“Culture” 65).  What we now have is a vast landscape of identities—“the 
‘illiterate,’ the ‘landless peasants,’ ‘women bypassed by development,’ the 
‘hungry and malnourished, ‘those belonging to the informal sector,’ ‘urban 
marginals,’ and so forth” out of which the category of landless peasant is only one 
of a host of “identity groups” (Escobar, “Culture” 65).  The peasant, his or her 
culture and the very language with which he or she describes him or herself has 
been interpolated into the clientelist system, through which the power of the state 
manifests itself to even the remotest parts of the country.  
Thus, the very Guarani language with which the peasant constructs his or 
her identity becomes a constraint upon challenging the notion that the peasant is 
little more than an ignorant laborer who must accept his or her lot in life.  The 
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 Guarani  term ate’y is only one of many such terms.   Ate’y translates into the 
English as “lazy.”  However, its cultural significance in the process of identity 
formation of the peasant suggests that much of the meaning of the term is lost in 
translation.   Ate’y describes any peasant who fails to marshal a sufficient amount 
of energy to successfully carve his or her living out of the Paraguayan soil.  Most 
peasants work with only hoes and machetes to cultivate 2-5 hectares of land 
throughout the year.  Working in conditions that would be inhumane in the United 
States, peasants work fifteen-hour days cutting sugar cane, harvesting cotton or 
plowing the soil with oxen and a wooden plow.  In a very literal sense, the 500-
year-long economic history of Paraguay has been predicated upon the ability to 
the peasantry to carve a living out of a hostile tropical environment without the 
benefit of roads, transportation, sanitation or any national resources.  Each peasant 
family is economically independent.  The work ethic of the Paraguayan peasant 
has been so outrageously exaggerated by the expectations placed upon him or her 
that anything less than a superhuman effort is considered “laziness.”  The term 
ate’y reinforces the image of a hardworking, independent peasant who does not 
depend upon the state to supply the least amount of aid in the form of 
infrastructure (electricity, water, transportation), economic or technical assistance.  
 
5.7  A New Subject Position 
 
The leading edge of the Paraguayan peasant struggle lies in the disruption 
of the traditional system of peasant identity construction.  It would be naive to 
assume that, at any historical point, the Paraguayan peasant had access to an 
 311
 original, pre-conquest, anti-colonialist culture (what would have been termed the 
tekoha by the Guarani  Indians).177  However, a fundamental shift in the 
constitution of the peasant identity does not necessarily involve an oversimplified 
conflict between “native” and “modern” cultures.  A more sensible approach can 
be taken by asking the question, “What happens when the peasant realizes that his 
or her failure to successfully farm is not his or her own fault?”  What happens 
when a trope like ate’y is applied to the peasant, and rather than satisfying the 
peasant’s need for an explanation, it demystifies the peasant’s use of the term, 
encouraging the peasant to find another explanation for the phenomenon, an 
explanation that questions the social contract and the role of the peasant in the 
society? 
One must recognize that state control of society is not a given fact but a 
constant process.  Peasant identity does not exist a priori to lived experience; 
rather, identity is a mechanism for mediating between lived, material existence 
and the state.  Material challenges fail to reveal contradictions in the social system 
because they are mediated by language and culture before the subject can reflect 
upon them.  Minor disruptions have and always will exist in every category of 
social description that a state imposes upon a society.  The clientelist system and 
its concomitant disempowering language (in both Spanish and Guarani ) not only 
re-inscribe the peasant identity within a hegemonic system, but they divert, re-
describe and normalize challenges that erupt within the system of signification 
that represent peasant identity. 
                                                 
177 Escobar discusses the concept of cultural hybridity in Latin American societies (Encountering 
Development ).  
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  Social struggles such as that of the Paraguayan land reform struggle may 
originate in the failure of hegemonic systems to fully interpellate individuals 
through their normalizing apparatuses.  Such failures lead to the constitution of 
social struggles as crises of individual identity played out upon a larger stage.  
Originating as ruptures in the integrity of a social contract violated by extreme 
exploitation or rampant state corruption these social struggles become not 
necessarily attempts to constitute a new identity but attempts to re-constitute an 
old one.  In this case, the peasant rebellion is an attempt to compel the controllers 
of the mechanisms of social formation in the Paraguayan society to re-construct 
the clientelist system and reconstitute the peasant as an obedient worker with a 
guaranteed place within that society. 
The peasant farmers protesting for land in Paraguay are not seeking to 
change the society in some progressive manner in order to create a society that 
recognizes a broader conception of rights or privileges in order to include more 
and different interest groups in the society.  Quite the opposite is actually the case.  
These protestors want to return to a previous condition, far from ideal or 
revolutionary, a status quo that satisfied them.  The mechanisms for constituting 
the clientelist system with its “set of cultural, cognitive, economic and ethical 
models” is constantly invoked by peasants who yearn for a return to, as Touraine 
identifies it, “a ‘state of nature’” (Touraine, Return 42). 
 While usefully describing the circumstances of the struggle, Touraine’s 
notion of historicity offers too broad a category to be useful.  I would like to 
sharpen the term “historicity” to demonstrate the specifics of cultural formation 
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 and its contestation in this case.  “Hay que trabajar,” “ate’y” and a host of other 
linguistic artifacts offer some concrete examples of the “cultural, cognitive, 
economic and ethical models” that Touraine suggests exist for the formation of 
culture in this specific case.  Exploring the specific means by which the clientelist 
culture is constituted and how it addresses the challenge offered by the peasantry 
will be illustrative of an area not examined by Touraine: how the social system 
called “historicity” is used by the state to resist usurpation by protestors. 
Here it is important to note that counter-hegemonic identities are not 
merely permitted to erupt out of normal, shall we call them “historical” social 
relations in which historicity is firmly in the control of the state.  It should be 
obvious that revolutions of thought and action have taken place across the world 
and that, even in the Paraguayan case, physical force has been a recourse used as 
recently as 1975 to destroy the Ligas Agrarias, a group of agricultural colonies 
established and supported by the Catholic Church outside of and in conflict with 
the state ideology under the Stroessner regime.  Yet, most revolutions are 
prevented not after they have broken out but before they are permitted to develop 
and mature.  The state’s resources for addressing challenges to its ideological 
hegemony can also be investigated as a technique for diverting and destroying 
challenges to its control of historicity.  Any social movement must address not 
only the need to control the historicity of a society but also to counter the natural, 
reflexive tendency of a society to reject usurpation of historicity.  Thus, an 
essential component of any social struggle is to be found in an understanding of 
the strategy employed by the society to dominate and thwart social protest.  This 
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 project explores that state strategy in the case of Paraguayan peasant protest in 
order to elucidate characteristics of the peasant struggle itself. 
 
  5.8  Hegemonic Pressure and the Rhetoripolitical Strategy  
 
 Rather than merely crushing the peasantry with overwhelming force, the 
Paraguayan state has resorted to other, less coercive means of addressing the 
threat to the social order posed by peasant protest.  In fact, the response of the 
state shows an intuitive sensitivity to Touraine’s notion that historicity is at stake 
and is what ultimately determines the success or failure of social struggles.  If a 
protest challenges the state rather than the “cultural, cognitive, economic and 
ethical models” that make the state possible, then a protest will fail.  If, however, 
a social protest does not directly challenge the state but, rather, challenges the 
conditions that make the state possible, then a protest has an opportunity to call 
the legitimacy of the state and its very existence into question.  Only the latter 
movement actually threatens the state and requires a response. 
 The state’s primary concern is with the models that make the state possible 
and not with protests and protestors themselves.  Nevertheless, the state’s control 
of these models is not a fait accompli but a process.  The state maintains control 
of these cultural models through a process of “offensive” attacks upon protest 
activity that challenge the protestor’s legitimacy, language and identity.  All of 
this is done by re-invoking or re-establishing accepted social tropes as a method 
for interpreting the meaning of the protest activity. 
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  The Paraguayan state has utilized a two-pronged approach to de-legitimize 
peasant protest in this way.  First, the legitimacy of the protestors is attacked by 
re-asserting the fact that peasants are, by nature, a backward people.  They are 
illiterate, lazy, and unable to organize themselves to offer a serious challenge to 
the state.  The “meaning” of any protest activity is simply that these are unruly 
people who are resisting the natural authority of the state to direct them, a task 
they cannot possibly complete themselves.  The ineptitude of the protestors is 
established using long accepted social tropes that invoke a particular cultural logic 
of identity.  Terms such as vuro, sinvergüenza, ate’y are used to re-inscribe and 
reconfirm the peasant identity as the lazy, incompetent, and sheltered by the 
tolerant state within the Paraguayan society.  Secondly, the state has always 
insisted that “some other group” has organized and motivated the peasants to 
protest.  These “other groups,” those truly responsible for the protest, have 
included NGOs, an exiled general, and the opposition party just to name a few. 
 In once instance, a group of approximately twenty peasant women 
protested outside of Mburivicha Roga for three days until the president agreed to 
meet with them.  This small group of women traveled to the capital in order to 
explain to the president that they needed land for their husbands and families to 
farm.  A recent amandau guazu  or hailstorm had destroyed the tiny crops they 
could manage on the little land they did own.  The president responded, “Que 
sinvergüenza!  Pende pe ambiapo pe mena, pe chacra pe!  E-ho pe cocue pe!  
Pende pete’y aite!” [You are so shameless!  You should be working with your 
husbands in the fields!  Get back to the farm!  How lazy all of you are]! (Maria 
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 Martinez, Personal Interview).  After being so scolded by then president Luis 
Go nzalez-Macchi, the women returned home to work with their husbands (Maria 
Martinez, Personal Interview).  The women’s attempt to present themselves as 
sintierras failed singularly as a result of Gonzalez-Macchi’s ability to invoke 
tropes that re-inscribed them as powerless subjects who were violating their social 
roles.  Gonzalez-Macchi’s language cast them as little more than ignorant, lazy 
housewives whose primary business is to work hard in the fields beside their men.  
What business did they have addressing the President of the republic?  
In fact, time after time, in the Paraguayan peasant’s struggle for land, 
equality, and governmental assistance, the state has employed rhetorical 
techniques that have stalled the impetus for protest and permitted a return to the 
rural countryside and the quotidian poverty that is the life of the Paraguayan 
peasant.  The results of peasant protest activity have amounted to little as a result 
of scale, technique, method or spectacle; in the end, nearly every peasant protest 
has failed.   
A typical example of such protest activity occurred on February 14, 2001, 
when approximately 80,000 peasants protested in the capital.  Senate leaders met 
with the leaders of the protest and the state agreed with each demand presented to 
the congressional delegation: funding land purchases for peasants, providing state 
subsidies for cotton seed and other promises that never have and never will be 
fulfilled.  This was the seventh large, organized peasant protest in the capital city 
since 1994.  The government decried the protests as the work of the exiled Armed 
Forces Chief General Lino Oviedo.  Furthermore, the peasants were accused of 
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 damaging the national economy by not working.  Common phrases describing the 
peasant motivation for protest included the terms ate’y and sinvergüenza.  None 
of these protests succeeded in anything more than soliciting empty promises from 
the government (members of Congress agreed to work on the problems in future 
legislation) and a return of the peasantry to the drudgery of the labor. 
 The function of these promises as well as the belittlement of the peasants 
before the meetings (remember, the congressional delegation met with peasant 
leaders who were accused of not being competent enough to organize their own 
protests) was to gain control of historicity or the models of cultural production.  
Why would the state agree to every demand made by peasants they accuse of 
incompetence, laziness, and stupidity?  Wouldn’t it appear a humiliating act to 
cave in to the demands to such people? 
Rather than producing a loss of face, this tactic has proven a successful 
rhetorical approach on the part of the state.  Re-invoking cultural tropes that re-
inscribe the peasant as lazy, stupid, and ignorant while promising that the benign 
state will fulfill the social contract (as it is understood under terms of the 
clientelist relationship between the peasant and the state) have, in almost every 
case, proven successful.   
The strategy of pressuring protestors and protest groups to abandon 
counter-hegemonic self-descriptions and to accept the terms and language offered 
by the “greater society” is what I call “rhetoripolitics.”  Rhetoripolitics permits 
societies to respond to social challenges in such a way as to re-inscribe the 
protesting social actors into a dominant and pervasive economic system by means 
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 of defining the terms of the argument in terms that pre-exist and co-opt resistance.  
This can be done either by describing and defining protest activity in prejudicial 
language or by co-opting a group or individuals by granting economic or financial 
concessions that appear as short term gains but which function in the long-term to 
further integrate a social protest group within an economic regime with the effect 
of conflating that group’s apparent material interests with that of the larger 
society, without actually resolving the initial social complaint. 
Rhetoripolitics is a useful concept for addressing the often-invisible 
process of “agenda setting” or “terminological representation” stages of argument 
formation.  In his examination of the tendency of institutions to prevent public 
deliberation, Erik Doxtader notes that, “The demise of public deliberation through 
colonization may be a function of institutional tendencies to short circuit learning 
processes necessary for collective will formation. This is evidenced by the way in 
which institution define and enact the terms of representation” (Doxtader 201).  
This study points out the fact that institutions intervene in the process of public 
deliberation by substituting institutional codes of communication for alternative 
and collective methods of public deliberation.   
While Doxtader’s study is one of many that have demonstrated the social 
constraints upon a truly democratic process of public deliberation of the public 
good, he gestures beyond a mere critique by suggesting a future area of study.  He 
says, “By studying how institutions use definitional arguments in order to group 
justificatory norms of action, it may be possible to render colonization processes 
transparent in a manner that recreates time and space for learning oriented toward 
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 the creation and expression of public opinion” (Doxater 201).  In other words, 
accepting the fact that public argumentation has been co-opted, practical and 
academic efforts to reverse this state of affairs should rely upon an examination of 
“definitional arguments” and “justificatory norms.”  Furthermore, an 
understanding of the colonization tools, frees individuals for the possibility of a 
genuine “expression of public opinion.”   
 Public opinion, public expression and public action are predicated upon 
understanding rhetoripolitics as the rhetorical technique for utilizing “definitional 
arguments” and “justificatory norms” to constrain public opinion, public 
expression and public action.  In the case of the Paraguayan peasantry, there is an 
important connection between protest activity and self-representation.  Protest 
arguments are essentially arguments exploiting ruptures in the hegemony of the 
Paraguayan state.  While still nascent, the protest strategies employed in the 
Paraguayan land reform struggle have the potential to call for the recognition of a 
new kind of peasant, a peasant who demands rights and a peasant who is not 
content to adhere to a clientelistic chain of command.  Government counter-
arguments in response to peasant protests, rallies, land occupations, and marches 
have successfully addressed this demand for recognition by systematically 
rearticulating it and re-interpreting it in terms of legitimate, authorized discourse, 
as well as and perhaps most importantly, non-discursive expression.   
When the Paraguayan government has argued that peasants are lazy, 
incompetent, stupid and organized by others, this is rhetoripolitics at work.  The 
net result of a rhetoripolitical strategy is the following: 1) a shift of the burden of 
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 proof to the abnormal arguments/descriptions offered by individuals and groups 
who challenge social and linguistic norms; 2) the privileging of normalizing 
accounts that either marginalize the resistant individuals and/or groups or 
redescribes the issue in familiar terms that either 3) rob the issue of its exigence 
and/or 4) displace the burden of critical engagement to a less visible and/or less 
contested domain of the socio-political system. 
The key feature of rhetoripolitical practice is that it invokes pre-extant 
language/argument to 1) define protest activity as deviant, uncivilized or 
inappropriate and 2) to circumscribe the meaning of protest activity and the 
protester’s arguments within the dominant cultural model in order to craft a 
“solution” that resolves the protester’s sense of exigence while reinforcing the 
dictates of the economic and social system.  Thus, defining protestors, as sintierra 
or landless peasants rather than as social actors of equal worth and distinction 
within a social system smuggles in and re-inscribes the historical hierarchies of 
value that constrain the peasantry’s social agency to fully participate in the 
equitable distribution of resources in the Paraguayan society.  The very term 
sintierra signals that individuals and groups in questions who are stupid, lazy, and 
manipulated by outside agitators. 
 
5.8  Rhetoripolitics and Identity 
 
The concept of rhetoripolitical practices can be used to sharpen Touraine’s 
broad notion of historicity as the primary means of cultural production.  
Rhetoripolitics identifies this means of cultural production as a specific system of 
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 symbolic management that re-describes potentially counter-hegemonic 
representations of identity within a “normalizing” discourse.  It is important to 
note the distinction between normal and normalizing here.  The reproduction of 
“normal” discourse would simply be restricted to the re-presentation of identity to 
an individual or a group of individuals with little persuasive force.  However, a 
“normalizing” discourse recasts an individual or a group identity within a whole 
complex of meaning that evokes a sense within the individual or group of 
individuals of a return to a safer, known, compelling status quo.  This 
“normalizing” function is akin to Louis Althusser’s interpellative “hail” 
(Althusser 127-48; 177-86).    Makela Finn offers a concrete example of the 
“hail”: 
A mundane, but pertinent, example of the Althusserian mechanism 
can be found in the relation between name and identity. A newborn 
is no more 'naturally' a John than a François or an Ishmael. Later in 
life, however, when called the child will recognize himself as John 
and this is not just an illusion; he really is John. Shifting to a 
political context, we are not citizens in virtue of any 'real' state of 
affairs that predates the State's interpellative hail. Yet when we 
vote, participate in debate and so forth, we are not delusional; we 
really are citizens. In each case the authority bearing institution 
(Family, State, etc…) 'calls out' to the individual who 
(mis)recognizes that the hail is directed to her. In answering, she 
reveals that she really is that which she was called to be. (Finn 1) 
 
In the case of the peasant who has worked so hard to redefine him or 
herself, rhetoripolitical discourses offer an enticing return to an originary and 
primary subject position for the peasant.  Thus, as Finn puts it, the “call” of the 
state is (mis)recognized by the radical peasant as a solution to the problems of the 
interpellated peasant.  The radical identity of the peasant can be quickly subverted 
by invoking linguistic and social practices to which the radical peasant responds 
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 without even knowing that he has ceded control of him or herself.  The 
mesmerizing influence of the return to a pre-radical identity in the state and the 
status quo is a metaphysical constant whose function is not mitigated by the 
development of another subject position.  Rhetoripolitics is an argumentative 
strategy utilized by the state to invoke a specifically dis-empowering subjectivity 
within the protesting, rebellious subject. 
Revealing rhetoripolitics in this way leads us to conclude two things: 1) 
identity politics are at the heart of any organized resistance to status quo politics 
(as they are the primary means by which radicalism is co-opted); and 2) the 
success of social struggles might just depend to a far greater degree upon the 
process of subject formation of the individual protestor than on the “quality” of 
the argument or the issue at hand. 
 
5.9.2 Non-verbal responses to rhetoripolitical pressures 
 
 Touraine argues that effective social protest struggles for control of 
historicity; however, a refined notion of historicity in the form of rhetoripolitics 
necessitates that effective social protest identify and address rhetoripolitical 
pressures.  While most struggles are presumed to involve protestors pitching 
arguments to a public, the peasant struggle in Paraguay demonstrates the 
important role rhetoripolitics plays in the sustenance of the critical consciousness 
or self-expressed identity of the individual protestor to him or herself. 
Here it is important to note that social protest is not merely an ideological 
conflict between state hegemonic regimes and individuals who reject a statist 
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 narrative, but effective social protest must address the need to construct and 
reaffirm a counter-hegemonic self-description and identity for individuals whose 
life experience contrasts with the state’s accounts of their lives.  Social protest, 
while challenging the need to change a protestor’s lived experience, must also 
perform the work of representing the protestor's life conditions and identity to the 
protestor him or herself as well.  Protestors, as social actors, must construct and 
re-construct that new identity by means that lie outside of the limits of expression 
defined within the ideological norms of the society.   
Sit-ins, marches, rallies and many other forms of protest activity have 
proven almost wholly ineffective in the process of constructing and maintaining a 
new peasant identity in the Paraguayan peasant struggle.  These practices do offer 
concrete, physical disruptions of the flow of social, economic, and informational 
commerce but, en toto, fail to challenge the state and its right to define the social 
stakes of the struggle in any serious way.  To the contrary, by presenting a 
symbolic threat to the status quo and allowing the state to resolve the tensions 
generated by such protest, peasant protest activity has enabled the state to dictate 
the means by which these standoffs end: physical threat, violence, murder, 
negotiations, or concessions.  The sum of peasant protest activity has only 
reaffirmed the state’s primary role in social production and its control of 
historicity.  It can be argued that such protest activity only empowers the state by 
calling the state into being, allowing the state to assert itself as the principle actor 
in the social struggle while protestors and protest organizations are relegated to 
the role of recipient and observer.   
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 The state is empowered through the principle of action: the discourse of 
protestors and protest organizations does not call the state into being as a subject, 
but the discourse of the state calls into being those normalizing subject positions, 
those obedient subjects.  However, failed attempts by the state to quell peasant 
protests have always occurred when the opposite conditions have obtained: the 
actions of the peasants called the state into being as a dominating subject.  As 
Saul Alinsky has suggested, reaction by the opposition may be more important 
than action taken by protestors (Alinsky 150).    
Resistant peasants who have forced the state to use dogs, soldiers, bullets 
and batons have actually won the identity conflict by managing to occupy the 
position of the subject of discourse, successfully hailing the state and setting the 
terms for identity construction.  Three notable occasions include the Dia de 
Perros in Asuncion on June 23, 1989, the repeated desalojos at Capi’ibary, in 
1992 and, more recently, the death of Calixto Cabral outside of Colonel Oviedo in 
June 4, 2002. 
These three cases of successful peasant protest reveal something important 
about the function of rhetoripolitics in public argument.  It is not the whim of a 
disenfranchised and fickle public, nor is it the careful deliberation of a well-
formed public sphere that determines the fate of peasant protestors in Paraguay; 
rather, it is an implicit understanding on the part of all parties, the public, the 
protestors and the state, that control of the rhetoripolitical ground has shifted.  In 
every case in which the Paraguayan state has lost control of the site of struggle by 
reacting to squelch peasant protest rather than acting to resolve the conflict, a 
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 fundamental sense of discomfort on the part of all parties compels the state to 
immediately reassert itself as the primary social actor by quickly conceding to the 
demands of the protestors.  This quick, kairotic response enables the state to 
reassert its subjecthood, relegating the protestors once again to the position of a 
subject-acted-upon rather than an active subject.  
Physical protest is not, in itself, superior to discursive forms of protest.  
The only conclusion that can be drawn from the success of the cases of the Di a de 
Perros, the desalojos of Capi’ibary and the case of Calixto Cabral is that 
rhetoripolitical strategies are primarily discursive in nature.  The rhetoripolitical 
interpellation of the peasant subject functions primarily as a result of language 
and verbal argumentation.  When peasants offer verbal arguments in support of 
their cause, they are easily countered by the state with verbal tropes that re-
inscribe the peasant as too stupid, lazy and dependent to protest.  This defuses the 
protest and returns the society to its status quo.  On the other hand, physical 
protest does not evoke a response that features these tropes.  Physical protest 
requires the state to act outside of the rhetoripolitical system of representation 
with physical force of its own. 
 
5.10 Consequences 
 
The Paraguayan peasant struggles over the past fourteen years have 
amounted to few material gains and little sustained protest activity.  The protest 
cycle that has emerged belies the few successes of the overall struggle for equal 
representation of peasants in the society.  Rhetoripolitical definitions of peasant 
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 identity and peasant protest activity have successfully defused the impetus of 
peasant protests.  Perhaps the only real result of this protest activity has been to 
sharpen and improve the rhetoripolitical strategies of the Paraguayan government.  
Government authorities have developed an armamentarium of tropes for defusing 
and diverting protest pressure in public contexts. 
While the identification of rhetoripolitics as a counter-protest strategy is 
useful for developing an understanding of the failure of the Paraguayan peasant 
struggles, it also raises some important questions about the evolution of new 
social movements as well as strategies for collective protest in the developing 
world.  If rhetoripolitics is a dominant strategy in the state response to peasant 
struggles in Paraguay, can this practice be generalized to other developing 
nations?  Can it be generalized to industrialized nations such as the U.S. as well?  
While physical methods of protest seem, in the Paraguayan case, to successfully 
thwart rhetoripolitical response in this case, is that true in all such cases?  Is there 
a physical component to rhetoripolitics that addresses physical methods of 
protest?  Furthermore, what strategies exist within the category of discursive 
protest methods that might successfully thwart rhetoripolitical responses by the 
state? 
Rhetoripolitics as a statist strategy for interpellating the protesting subject 
makes the case for re-examining the specific means by which the state constrains 
protestors and protest activity.  A further examination of this concept might 
explore the questions above as well as the function of protest rhetoric in the 
process of constructing a “protesting subject.”  Protest rhetorics must implicitly or 
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 explicitly create, reference or contest the arguments that pre-date the protesting 
subject.  In this vein, more work could be done to seek out sources for the 
generation and preservation of extra-hegemonic forms of expression.   
Furthermore, given the historical contexts of developing nations like 
Paraguay, an important question arises about the power of historically embedded 
argument themes stemming from colonialism, neo-colonialism and powerful 
economic influences such as globalism and internal national development and 
industrialization strategies.  The very existence of rhetoripolitical strategies as 
mechanisms for constraining collective protest calls into question the idea of a 
universal method of protest as well as universal rhetorical protest strategies.  The 
state’s capacity for mobilizing historically embedded argument themes in order to 
co-opt social struggles may require culture specific analyses of argument 
strategies to be developed with great sensitivity to the power of developing states 
to deprive potential social actors of models for self-representation. 
Touraine’s observation that society is not a “dominant ideology” is 
important here because I am not saying that rhetoripolitics is a mere linguistic and 
ideological hegemony (Touraine, Return 8).  Touraine’s argument that what we 
often view society as a dominant ideology when the social interactions of human 
beings at this point in history would be better described as a “stake, a set of 
resources and models that social actors seek to manage, to control, and which they 
appropriate or whose transformation into social organization they negotiate 
among themselves” (Touraine, Return 8).  Arguments, too, are resources and 
collective protest is an attempt to mobilize arguments while rhetoripolitics is a 
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 hegemonic strategy for preventing the successful development of new arguments 
and of occupying old ones.   
In this sense, systems of domination, colonization, exploitation and 
conquest, long viewed solely in terms of their ability to mobilize physical and 
economic resources, might, today, be viewed as systems for the mobilization and 
occupation of argument strategies.  Social systems promoting colonialism, 
globalism and racism cannot be productively resisted by collective protest of the 
poor and disenfranchised by mobilizing material and economic resources; they 
have no such resources to mobilize.  However, contesting such systems with an 
awareness of rhetoripolitical strategies might offer a new resource to those 
members of society who are economically poor but idea rich. 
This study has demonstrated that a deeper exploration of the employment 
of non-discursive means of argumentation and its particular practice in the 
developing world ought to be pursued.  One possible extension of this notion is 
that concrete but often overlooked protest strategies such as graffiti and political 
humor could constitute important sources of contestation that lie outside of 
legitimate political discourse.  In addition, a number of important questions can be 
identified in the future study of social movements in the developing world.  Do 
developing nations provide a sufficiently distinct context for the manifestation of 
unique social movement structures?  Does a theory of post-colonial public 
argument need to be constructed to account for the differences between 
industrialized and non-industrialized societies?  Would the study of collective 
protest in such different contexts continue to challenge definitions of collective 
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 protest and the category of the new social movement?  Factors such as high levels 
of illiteracy and weak public spheres in the developing world obviously present 
real obstacles to transposing models of collective protest from the developed 
world to the developing world.  Yet, the question remains: could rhetoripolitical 
practices function as a universal means for co-opting social movements in the 
developing world as well as industrialized world?  
Regardless of the answers to these questions, there must be a benefit to re-
conceiving social struggles as ideological and historical struggles (in Alain 
Touraine’s sense of the term) and examining collective protest strategies in a 
different light.  Analysis of this sort could be put into practice in the development 
of protest movements that displace the site of struggle from the arenas of 
economic wealth and political influence to the common “will to affirm and to 
choose oneself as well as to recognize others as persons, in their differences and 
their own will to be” available to all men and women (Touraine, Return 8). 
 
5.11  The Future of the Paraguayan Land Reform Struggle 
 
 The Paraguayan land reform struggle is an example of a complex, 
polyvocal protest struggle in the developing world.  Study of the struggle has been 
complicated by Paraguay’s unique historical, linguistic and cultural 
circumstances, requiring a profound level of analysis.  As a result of analyzing the 
many factors influencing the struggle and its outcomes, it has become apparent 
that the deep co-option of the national peasant organizations and the collectivist 
tendencies of individual peasants severely impair the prospects for either 
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 movement success or movement transformation.  Given the Paraguayan 
government’s capacity to subvert linguistic attempts to express the real, lived 
conditions of peasant farmers, there appears to be no alternative but to continue to 
utilize non-discursive means of expression in order to structure anticipated 
responses from the state including brutal repression and peasant deaths.   
 The success of individual non-verbal strategies is limited by the inability 
of the national peasant organizations to represent their membership.  The demands 
that have been met by the Paraguayan government have been small in scope and 
irrelevant to resolving the economic and social crises motivating peasants to 
organize in the first place.  However, there is hope that local peasant 
organizations can “spin off” from the national organizations in order to bring the 
level of protest activity closer to the physical and ideological proximity of the 
peasant while preserving a sense of historicity from the training of local activists 
within the national organizations and the NGOs that offer their services through 
those organizations. 
A recent and surprising example of the reversal of the flow of talent and 
information that usually channels resources into the national peasant 
organizations, was revealed in the land struggle in Yvyturuzu.  In several of the 
communities involved in that conflict, peasants have adopted nuanced non-verbal 
protest rhetorics that originate at the local level and arise directly from the 
consciousness of the peasant farmers themselves.  Farmers of the comites de 
agricultures in the communities of Nino Ykua, Maria Auxilladora, and several 
others have constructed viveros, or plant nurseries, and have begun to plant native 
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 species of trees throughout their communities.  The presence of thousands of trees 
lining the roads, surrounding farms and fields and beautifying the communities 
functions as a powerful non-verbal argument for peasant resource management.  
In several cases, the peasants have planted more trees in their communities than 
national and international reforestation projects in the region.  In fact, some 
peasants have supplied state and international agencies with seedlings for their 
own reforestation projects.  Such strategies seriously damage the state’s ability to 
cast the peasants as deforesters and squanderers of natural resources within the 
boundaries of a national park. 
 I hope that future studies of social movements find opportunities to 
respond to emerging struggles and nuanced socio-economic and political contexts 
such as globalism that may present challenges to our suppositions about the nature 
of collective protest.  I have had the opportunity to develop a sensitivity for and a 
desire to examine the possibility of a different model for public deliberation as 
represented by social movements and the different contexts they offer for re-
examining social possibilities.  Finally, I hope that the readers and scholars of 
social movement theory do not lose sight of the human element of social 
movements.  In the case of the Paraguayan land reform struggle, more than 
300,000 families constituting some 2.5 million people live each day precariously.  
It is essential that we do not objectify the subject of our study, such as the 
Paraguayan land reform struggle, by overlooking the basic fact that social 
movements grow from the anguish of real people who are struggling to survive 
and to ensure a better future for their children.  My heart goes out to the thousands 
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 of Paraguayan families who are harvesting cotton in the hopes that this year the 
price will be high enough that they can improve their lives and escape grinding 
poverty by finding a way to more fully participate in their own societies.   
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In dedication to all of those kind proud Paraguayans who taught me their 
languages and their ways: E-ko pora xe ra’a kuera!  Ja ha, ja u la terrere 
enterove! 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
 
Index of Abbreviations 
 
 
 
(ACADEI) La Asociacion Campesina de Desarrollo Integrado or the Association of 
Peasants for Integrated Development. 
(ACAP) La Asociacion Campesina de La Colonia Agroforestal de Capi’ibary or the 
Association of Peasants of the Agroforestry Settlement of Capi’ibary. 
(ALALC) La Asociacion Latinoamerican de Libre Comercio of 1961. 
(ANR) La Asociacion Nacional Repu blicana or the National Association of Republicans. 
(ANTELCO) Adminstracion Nacional de Telecomunicaciones or the National 
Telecommunication Administration. 
(APRO) La Asociacion de Productores Organicos . 
(ASAGRAPA) La Asociacion de Agricultores de Alto Parana . 
(BCP) Banco Central del Paraguay or the Central Bank of Paraguay. 
(BDR) Banco de Desarollo Rural. 
(CADELPA) la Camera Algodonera del Paraguay. 
(CAH) Cre dito Agricola de Habilitacion or Agricultural Credit for Habilitation. 
(CEB) Las Comunidades Eclesiales de Base or Foundational Ecclesiastical Communities. 
(CCH) La Comision Central de Horticultores. 
(CIDSEP) El Centro Interdisciplinario de Derecho Social y Economia Poli tica. 
(CIPAE) El Comite  de Iglesias para Ayudas de Emergencias or the Committee of 
Churches for Emergency Assistance. 
(CNT) Coordinacion Nacional de Trabajadores or the National Workers’ Coordinating 
Committee. 
(CONAPA) La Coordinacion Nacional de Productores Agricolas. 
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 (CPA-SPN) Coordinadora de Productores Agrícolas de San Pedro Norte or the 
Coordinating Committee of the Farm Producers of Northern San Pedro. 
(CPCC) El Centro Paraguayo de Coopertivistas de Cordillera or the Paraguayan Center 
for Cooperatives of the Department of Cordillera. 
(CPKP) El Comite de Productores Kokue Poty or The Farmers’ Committee of the 
Flowered Farm. 
(CORPOSANA) Paraguay's state waterworks company now known as la Empresa de 
Servicios Sanitarios del Paraguay (ESSAP). 
(CST) Campesao Sem Terra or the Peasants Without Land. 
(CUT) Central Union de Trabajadores. 
(FNC) Federacion Nacional Campesina or the National Peasant Federation.  
(IBR) Instituto del Bienestar Rural or the Institute for Social Welfare. 
(JAC) Las Juventudes Agrarias Cristianas or Christian Agrarian Youth. 
(JICA) Japan International Cooperation Agency. 
(LAC)  Ligas Agrarias Cristianas or the Christian Agrarian Leagues. 
(MAG) El Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganaderia or the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Livestock. 
(MCAAC) la Mesa Coordinadora del Asentamiento Agroforestal de Capi’ibary or the 
Coordinating Committee of the Agroforestry Settlement of Capi’ibary. 
(MCNOC) La Mesa Coordinadora Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas or the 
National Coordinating Committee of Peasant Organizations.  
(MCP) El Movimiento Campesino Paraguayo. 
(MERCOSUR) is an acronym for Mercado Comu n de Sur or Southern Common Market.  
MERCOSUR is a free trade pact amongst Brazil, Paraguay, Argentina and 
Uruguay with limited tariff agreements.   
(OLT) La Organización de Lucha por la Tierra or the Organization for the Fight for Land. 
(ONAC) La Organizacion Nacional Campesina. 
(ONC) Organizacion Campesina del Norte. 
(PLRA) El Partido Liberal Radical Autentico. 
(PEN) El Partido Encuentro Nacional. 
(PRF) Partido Revolucionario Febrerista or the Febrerista Revolutionary Party 
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 (PSC) El Pastoral Social Cordillera or the Social Pastoral of the Department of 
Cordillera. 
(SEAG) Servicio de Extension de Agricultura y Ganaderi a. 
(SEARCO) Servicio Arquidiocesano de Comercializacion. 
(SNC) El Servicio Nacional Forestal or the National Forestry Service. 
(STICA) El Servicio Tecnico Interamericano de Cooperacion Agri cola or the Inter-
American Technical Service for Agricultural Cooperation. 
UNA-BID Universidad Nacional de Asuncio n y el Banco Interamericano de 
Desarrollo. 
(UNC-ONONDIVEPA) Union Nacional Campesina. 
(UTEP) La Unidad Técnica de Ejecución de Proyectos or Technical Entity for the 
Execution of Social Projects. 
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 APPENDIX B 
 
 
 
Index of Spanish and Guarani Terminology 
 
 Abono—money that is contributed by members of a group to defer the costs of travel by 
members of a peasant organization or community. 
Aca hata—Guarani  word meaning “stupid” or “slow witted.”  Literally translated, it 
means hard headed. 
Acopiadores—generally refers to anyone who buys cotton, more specifically, it refers to 
the oligopoly of cotton cooperatives known as CADELPA, la Camera 
Algodonera del Paraguay. 
Almacén de consumo—small in-home store were retail goods are sold within the 
community. 
Anarcosindicalistas— Paraguayan anarchist labor and trade unions of the late 19th and 
early 20th Century. 
Ane’embegue de lo mburuvicha kuera—learned discussion among leaders. 
Aplicacion de venenos—pesticide application. 
El Aporque—the necessary practice of manually hilling earth up around the base of 
cultivated plants like cotton or corn in order to create better support to resist wind 
damage to the crop as well as to encourage rooting. 
El Arado—plowing or soil preparation. 
El Arranque y Quema—the agricultural practice of manual removal of the last year’s 
crop, which is burned in order to destroy the eggs and larvae of parasitic insects 
that over-winter in the husks of last year’s crop to plague the next year’s crop. 
Asentamiento—an agricultural colony usually located in a remote area of the country. 
Asuncenos—also known in Guarani  as la mita paragua’y pe, is a rural term for city 
dwellers. 
Ate’y—translates from the Guarani  as laziness. 
Avati—Guarani word for maiz or corn. 
Barrio—a district within a town. 
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 Los blancos—a term referring to light skinned foreigners or Asuncenos, both of whom 
are viewed as different from the campesinos by race or culture. 
Bloqueo de la ruta—roadblock. 
Bracero—peasant labrorer on an encomienda or hacienda. 
Brasiguayos—neologistic reference to illegal Brazilian immigrants living along the 
Paraguay-Brazil border.  
Camara de Diputados— The lower house of the Paraguayan parliament. 
Camara de Senadores— The upper house of the Paraguayan parliament. 
Campesino—Guarani -speaking rural peasant of mestizo racial heritage. 
Campesinos sin tierra—a term sometimes applied to protesting peasants by members of 
the press who compare the Paraguayan land reform movement to the Brazilian 
Campesao Sem Terra movement of the 1980s. 
Campo—term referring to the rural countryside. 
Capi’ibary—translates from the Guarani as capybara, but refers to the site of a land 
struggle delimited on one side by a river of the same name. 
Capullo—the husk or boll protecting the fiber and seeds of the cotton plant. 
Cara dura—literally translates as the “hard face” but describes the act of committing a 
social crime and presenting a face with an unchanging expression to those 
wronged.  The cara dura is a strategy employed by the socio-political elite to 
evade peasant challenges to their political, economic and social crimes.  Given the 
cara dura, the peasant realizes that there is nothing to be done, opa rei el asunto, 
and walks away. 
Carbon—charcoal made by felling trees and incinerating in anaerobic environments.  
Peasants use an horno or a tatakua or sometimes bury the lumber in the soil in 
order to impede full combustion.  The production of carbon is an essential source 
of income to peasants in asentamientos. 
La Carpida—hoeing. 
Carretas—oxcart. 
Carretera—rough path made through the countryside by the passage of oxcarts. 
Catequistas—lay clergy, peasants trained by the Catholic Church to teach church 
doctrine in their own communities. 
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 Catequizacion—the training received in order to become a catequista. 
Caudillo—a Latin American dictator who rules repression and a cult of personality.  
Caudillismo—a political ideology and system of rule defined by the cult of personality 
and dictatorial rule common throughout all of Latin America in the 19th Century 
but persisting in Paraguay until 1989. 
La Chacarita—the famous urban slum of Asuncion, a shantytown directly behind and 
surrounding the congressional building. 
Chagas— a fatal virus transmitted by the vinchuza, a variety of the assassin bug that 
prefers to live in the wattle and daub walls of the peasants’ shacks.  50% of all 
peasants are suspected of being infected with the virus. 
Changa—day labor or work in exchange for money.  Peasant farmers supplement their 
income by working on the farms of terratenientes at rates of about two dollars a 
day. 
Clientelismo—a system of reciprocal exchange of goods and services between 
individuals of unequal status and structured by dependence and obligation. 
Club de amas de casa—mothers club. 
Club de jovenes—youth group. 
Cocue cue—literally translates from the Guarani as “old farm” and usually refers to land 
that has been overexploited agriculturally and is no longer fit for crops. 
Coima—a bribe. 
Colono system—a system in which peasants are given heavily forested land to farm for 
three to five years and then evicted in order to use the land for ranching.  This 
system exploits peasant labor. 
Colono—another name for an agricultural colony but usually reserved for an older, 
established colony. 
Colorado—refers to the party in power since 1936, the (ANR) La Asociacion Nacional 
Republicana. 
Comite de agricultores—local farmers’ committee. 
Comisiones vecinales—neighborhood association. 
Compani a—small agricultural district associated with a pueblo. 
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 Concientizacion del campesino—phrase meaning “raising the socio-political 
consciousness of the peasantry.” 
Conquistador—Spanish term denoting the original Hispanic conquerors of Paraguay. 
Creole—term describing the urban Paraguayan’s descended from a foreign (non-indian)  
heritage.  Culturally, the term “criollo” or “creole” connotes a preference for 
Europeanized practices such as drinking soda as opposed to drinking terrere.   
Croqueta—a bribe offered a public servant in order to perform a public service that such 
a public servant is already obligated to perform. 
Dependencia—a theory that the developing world is structurally dependent upon the 
economies of developed nations and, therefore, cannot become developed nations 
in their own right.  
Desalojo—the term used to indicate the forcible removal of peasants from a property 
they are squatting upon. 
Desde arriba—“from above,” referring to orders from leadership. 
Di a de Perros—“day of the dogs,” referring to the attack of the peasants of Cleto Romero 
and Juan de Mena by Paraguayan police with dogs on June 23, 1989. 
Diario ABC Color—the most widely circulated newspaper in Paraguay, once known as 
the official opposition newspaper. 
Encomienda—large land grants offered to Spanish nobles by the King of Spain during 
the period of colonization. 
Esclavitud blanca—a system of virtual slavery in which peasants who are encouraged or 
compelled to plant cotton accumulate more debt each year losing money as a 
result of exploitation, a cotton monopoly and ignorance. 
Granizo—a hailstorm, a serious threat that often destroys crops. 
Gremiales—labor unions. 
Hacienda—term denoting an extensive ranch in imitation of the hacendados of the past. 
Hacendado— an extensive cattle ranch during the early colonial period of Paraguay. 
Indio—literally, the term means Native American but it is popularly used as a derogatory 
term to denote a lazy, uncivilized, or untrustworthy person. 
Informalidad—the practice of effecting land ownership and transactions under 
circumstances not specifically addressed by law. 
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 Invasion—the act of trespassing and occupying or squatting private or state lands by a 
group of peasants. 
Ipohyite—Guarani translating as “very heavy” but often means “extremely hard work!” 
Irresponsible—is a term denoting that one has failed to hold up one’s end of the social 
contract: either a peasant’s failure to work hard or a administrator’s failure to 
reward and support peasant who work hard. 
Ka’aguygua—Guarani  term for pueblos of the forest, established by Native Americans in 
an attempt to construct communities beyond the reach of the colonial powers. 
Ka’a he’e—sugarcane. Translated from the Guarani , it means “good tasting plant.” 
Kumanda—beans. 
Latifundia— a vast tract of land 1,000+ hectares with the implication that the owner is an 
absentee landlord. 
Latifundias improductivas—large, unproductive land holdings of 1,000+ hectares 
Latifundista— the owner of a vast tract of land 1,000+ hectares. 
La ley de lo mbarete—the law of the jungle, meaning that the rich and powerful are 
above the law.  
Liberales—the opposition political party, (PLRA) El Partido Liberal Radical Autentico. 
Ligas Agrarias—Short for Ligas Agrarias Christianas, which was an association of rural 
church dioceses for the purpose of rural and agricultural development.  The Ligas 
encouraged and sponsored development workshops, experimental agricultural and 
cooperative living in rural Paraguay from the late 1960’s to the Pascua Dolorosa 
of 1976 when Stroessner crushed the movement with military force. 
Lo mbarete—Guarani  for the social elite who economically and politically dominate the 
country. 
Lo ate’y—Guarani for the “lazy ones.” 
Lo jataivy guasu—Guarani that translates as “the big ticks,” is a term of description for 
Spanish speaking Paraguayans who exploit the peasant’s cheap labor and grow 
wealthy without doing any physical labor of their own. 
Loteamiento—the legal titling of land that was occupied by peasants but owned by 
another 
Maestro—teacher. 
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 Mandi’o—the yucca root that serves as a major sustenance crop for the peasantry. 
Marzo Paraguayo—popular name for the coup d’etat of 1999 that removed president 
Cubas Grau from office. 
Mbarete—translates from the Guarani  as “strength” or “power.” 
Mburuvicha roga—Guarani name for the presidential mansion.  It translates as Home of 
the Tribal Chief.  
Medida de fuerza—this is a protest tactic employing sheer numbers and a show of 
strength running the risk of a physical confrontation with the police or armed 
forces.  An example of a medida de fuerza would be a roadblock employing 
several hundred peasants who refuse to permit traffic to pass. 
Mestizo—a person of mixed Native American and Hispanic ancestry. 
Mestizaje—the process by which race and/or culture is mixed. 
Minga—cooperative work performed in a community free of charge.  Minga usually 
involves the whole community donating labor to a different member every other 
week in rotation.  Probably a pre-colonial practice contrasted with changa, work 
in exchange for money. 
Minifundia—the subdivision of land through the passage of land from one generation to 
the next that results in plots that are too small to for sustainable agriculture.  This 
is a serious, endemic problem in Paraguay. 
Minifundista—a peasant who owns less that the minimum of five hectares of land. 
Minifundizacion—the process of subdivision of peasant land holdings. 
La mita o-ke se hape ari—this translates from the Guarani  as “the people want to sleep in 
the road,” meaning that the peasants are too uncivilized and lazy to do anything 
for themselves. 
La mita paragua’y pe—also called Asunceno in Spanish, La mita paragua’y pe is a 
Guarani  expression referring to a city dweller, also connotes that such a person is 
not racially a peasant (mestizo) but is blanco or white. 
Mondacraticos—a reference to the time honored practice of political regimes sacking the 
state coffers.  The term is derived from the combination of the words 
“democractico” and “mondaha,” to mean “rule by those who steal. 
Mondaha—Guarani  for “thief.”  
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 Movimiento de los Campesinos Sin Tierra— a term sometimes applied to protesting 
peasants by members of the press who compare the Paraguayan land reform 
movement to the Brazilian Campesao Sem Terra movement of the 1980s. 
Nembotavy— “stupidity” in Guarani . 
Noticias—Diario Noticias is the second most popular newspaper in Paraguay. 
Nuestra Senora de la Asuncion —full name of the capital city. 
Occupaciones—temporary invasions of private or state property in which peasants build 
ranchos and plant some crops, usually in full expectation of being evicted.  
Opa rei—Guarani expression meaning, “It’s over.  There is nothing to be done about it.”  
It is commonly used to indicate that politics, greed or stupidity has ended the 
possibility of something. 
Parapiti—sugarcane liquor. 
Pasaje—the cost of travel by bus from a rural area to a town or to the capital. 
Pascua Dolorosa— literally translates as the Sad Easter, in reference to the forceful 
dissolution of the Ligas Agrarias between April and May of 1976 when hundreds 
of peasants were injured and dozens murdered. 
Patrimonio—national heritage. 
Patron—a local person of wealth and influence who loans money to peasants at 
exorbitant rates.  The peasant is indebted to a patro n who exploits the peasant by 
overcharging for services and undervaluing the peasant’s labor. 
Picudo—the cotton boll weevil. 
Pobreza—poverty. 
Poroto—the Spanish term for kumanda or beans.  
Pueblo—a small town. 
Py nandi—literally means barefoot in Guarani  but refers either to the traditional irregular 
peasant troops known for their ruthlessness or to the fact of a peasant’s poverty. 
Py rague—Guarani  term meaning peasant spy planted by the Stroessner government to 
monitor peasant organization activity, including communism. 
Que Paraguayo!—Expression meaning “stupid” or “inept.” 
Raices—Spanish term for “roots,” as in “the roots of the plant.” 
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 El Raleo—the practice of thinning seedlings after they have emerged from the soil.  
Choosing to allow only the healthiest plants to remain and grow after a few weeks 
increases crop yields and diminishes the potential for disease to infect weakened 
plants. 
Rancho—a temporary housing structure constructed by farmers in their fields as a place 
to rest and to take a meal since a farmer’s land can be miles from the farmer’s 
home.  Ranchos also refer to the shacks constructed by peasants as their homes in 
new settlements, either legal or illegal.  
Rollotrafico— is the practice of illegally harvesting, processing and transporting valuable 
lumber from state or private land in violation of private property or conservation 
efforts.   
Rosado—virgin land that has a dark, red color and is highly productive for agriculture. 
Rubros—a compensation paid to teachers for room and board.  It is common for rural 
teachers to accept compensation for rubros in order to obtain a teaching position 
in the rural countryside, after which the community takes responsibility for 
petitioning the government to supply the teacher with a salary. 
Seccionalero—the local party boss in charge of a seccional.  Often the seccionalero also 
served as the local mayor as well as patron of peasants in the area. 
Seccional—the local and smallest component in the chain of command within the 
Colorado party’s political structure. 
Semilla—seed for planting. 
Ser responsible—translates literally as, “Be responsible!”  It is a phrase defining the 
implicit social contract in Paraguay and prescribing the rule of behavior for the 
peasant: be responsible and the society will provide for you. 
Sexto curso—sixth grade, equivalent to the fifth grade of an American primary school. 
La siembra—planting. 
Sintierra—a peasant without his or her own land. 
Sinvergüenza —one who is without dignity and possesses no shame. 
Sombrero piri— jopara meaning “straw hat.”  The sombrero piri is a symbol that 
represents pure rural peasant culture.  Traditional peasants wear straw hats, 
indicating their adherence to traditional rural and peasant values. 
 345
 Stroneato—term for the 35 year long rule of the dictator Alfredo Stroessner de Matiauda, 
which ran from 1954 to 1989. 
Stronismo—dictatorial political tactics and thinking in the mold of the Stroneato. 
Tallo—stem, particularly in reference to the hard woody stem of the cotton plant. 
Terrateniente—the owner of a vast tract of land 1,000+ hectares. 
Terrere—yerba mate drunk cold, often with ice.  This practice is unique to Paraguay and 
a particular addition of the peasantry. 
Tierra—land. 
Tractorazo—protest or roadblock by farmers with tractors.   
El Trueque—bartering and or the extension of informal lines of credit. 
Ultima Hora—Paraguayan newspaper. 
Venenos—pesticides. 
Viveros—plant nurseries. 
Vuro—Guarani  for “stupid.”  Derived from the Spanish word “burro.” 
Yerba mate—a tree cultivated to produce leaves that are consumed in the national drinks 
of Paraguay, terrere and mate.  It is a valuable source of income for peasants. 
Xe nembotavy—translates from the Guarani  as “my mistake,” but, by implication, refers 
to a supposed profound inability of the Paraguayan peasant to do anything right. 
Yvy—Guarani  term for “land.” 
Yvy-i— Guarani term for “minifundia,” the subdivision of land through the passage of 
land from one generation to the next that results in plots that are too small to for 
sustainable agriculture. 
Yvy pora—Guarani  for “good land,” meaning arable or agriculturally fertile land. 
Yvytyruzu—name of the Parque Nacional Yvyturuzu, a 24,000-hectare tract of land 
named for the small mountain range that divides the property.  The Parque 
Nacional was established in 1995, as a result of management and tenure 
disagreements land struggles have erupted in the region since 2002.   
Zafra Algodonera—cotton harvest as opposed the la zafra, which refers to the 
sugarcane harvest. 
Zapatu—Guarani word for “sandals” or “shoes.” 
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